New York Law Review

Tag: manufacturing process

  • Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) for Cleaning Activities

    Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co. ,15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related hazards, does not extend to injuries sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a manufactured product as part of the manufacturing process.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, an employee of West Metal Works, was injured when he fell from a ladder while cleaning a steel “wall module” manufactured by West for defendant Bechtel. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), arguing that cleaning the module constituted “cleaning” a “structure.” The Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product, emphasizing that the statute’s central concern is construction-related hazards and that extending it to cover manufacturing processes would broaden its scope beyond the legislature’s intent. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.

    Facts

    West Metal Works, Inc. manufactured a steel “wall module” for Bechtel National, Inc., intended for installation in a nuclear waste treatment plant. Before shipping, the module required cleaning. Plaintiff, a West employee, was cleaning the module while standing on a ladder when the ladder allegedly broke, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including Bechtel and West’s landlords (the Martins), under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a product (a steel wall module) during the manufacturing process.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily intended to protect workers from construction-related hazards, and extending it to cover the cleaning of manufactured products within a factory setting would unduly broaden the statute’s scope beyond what the legislature intended.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily concerned with dangers in the construction industry, tracing its origins to addressing deaths and injuries in the construction trades. While the Court had previously rejected limiting the law solely to construction sites, it had not extended it to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product. The Court noted that the majority of “cleaning” cases under Labor Law § 240(1) involved window cleaning, and even those cases had limitations, such as excluding routine household window washing. The court reasoned that applying the statute to the cleaning of manufactured products would expand its coverage far beyond its intended purpose, potentially including activities like dusting bookshelves or cleaning light fixtures, thus creating a flood of new potential plaintiffs. The Court stated, “It is apparent from the text of Labor Law § 240 (1), and its history confirms, that its central concern is the dangers that beset workers in the construction industry.” The Court found no precedent for allowing recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries suffered while cleaning a product in a manufacturing process and concluded that the statute does not apply to such situations. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “cleaning” any “structure” should automatically trigger the statute’s protections, highlighting the need for a more nuanced interpretation consistent with the law’s original intent.

  • Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace Extends to Manufacturing Processes Under Labor Law § 200

    Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992)

    Labor Law § 200, which codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, applies to factories and is not limited to construction work, thus extending to employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Summary

    An employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc., which manufactured septic tanks, fell from a steel mold while preparing it. He sued the building owner and his employer, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, finding the employee was engaged in a normal manufacturing process outside the scope of these Labor Law sections. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action, holding that this section applies to factories and is not limited to construction work.

    Facts

    The injured plaintiff was an employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc. Defendant Fien owned a building leased to Van Petty, which used the building to manufacture septic tanks. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from an upright steel mold he was preparing as part of his customary work in fabricating a concrete septic tank. The accident occurred within the factory building.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff and his spouse sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants. The Appellate Division modified by granting the defendants’ motions and dismissing the complaints. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory.
    2. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.
    3. Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.

    Holding

    1. Yes, Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory because the section is not limited to construction work and covers all places to which the Labor Law applies, including factories.
    2. No, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply because the plaintiff’s work was not related to “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing” of a building or structure.
    3. No, Labor Law § 241(6) does not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action. The court reasoned that Section 200(1) codifies the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work and applies to all places covered by the Labor Law, including factories. The statute requires that these places be “so constructed, equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety” of employees. The court emphasized that Section 200 is not limited to construction work and does not exclude employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Regarding Labor Law § 240(1), the court held that the injured plaintiff was not engaged in any activity protected under this section. The court noted that Section 240(1) applies to work involving “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing.” The plaintiff’s work in fabricating molds did not fall under any of these categories.

    Similarly, the court found that Labor Law § 241(6) did not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work. The court cited 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13) to further define these terms. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s work fabricating the molds during the normal manufacturing process did not constitute “construction” or “excavation” work as defined by the Labor Law.

    The court explicitly declined to address whether Labor Law § 2(9) renders Article 11, specifically section 316, as the exclusive remedy because they resolved the Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action on narrower grounds.