New York Law Review

Tag: manslaughter

  • Steinberg v. Monasch, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000): Collateral Estoppel Requires Identity of Issues

    Steinberg v. Monasch, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000)

    Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) requires that the issue in the present action be identical to one that was necessarily decided in a prior action and that the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.

    Summary

    This case addresses the application of collateral estoppel in a civil suit following a criminal conviction for manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel could not be applied to prior acts of abuse because the jury in the criminal trial was not required to determine whether the victim had been subjected to repeated physical abuse before the acts resulting in her death. The Court modified the lower court’s order, remitting the case for further proceedings and emphasizing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires an identity of issues necessarily decided in the prior action.

    Facts

    Lisa Steinberg died in November 1987. Her adoptive father, Joel Steinberg, was convicted of first-degree manslaughter in March 1989 for her death. In August 1989, the administratrix of Lisa’s estate commenced a civil action against Steinberg, alleging prior acts of abuse in the fifth and sixth causes of action and reckless failure to obtain medical treatment in the seventh. The plaintiff sought damages for Lisa’s pain and suffering before death, pain and suffering from past abuse, and punitive damages.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court awarded partial summary judgment against Steinberg on the three causes of action based on collateral estoppel arising from his manslaughter conviction. The Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff $5 million for Lisa’s pain and suffering during the 8-10 hours before her death, $5 million for pain and suffering due to past abuse, and $5 million in punitive damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issue of prior abuse in the civil case, given Steinberg’s manslaughter conviction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury in Steinberg’s criminal trial was not required to determine whether Lisa had been subjected to repeated physical abuse by Steinberg prior to the acts that resulted in her death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that collateral estoppel requires an identity of issues necessarily decided in the prior action. It cited Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 303-304 (2001), stating that “[t]here must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.” Although evidence of prior abuse was presented at Steinberg’s criminal trial, the criminal jury’s verdict did not require a finding on whether the prior abuse occurred; therefore, the issue was not “necessarily decided.” The Court reasoned that because the criminal conviction did not definitively establish the prior abuse, collateral estoppel was improperly applied. The court also noted that the question of excessiveness of the compensatory and punitive damages awards was beyond its review in the absence of due process concerns, but Supreme Court could revisit the punitive damages question upon disposition of the fifth and sixth causes of action. The Court also directed the Supreme Court to consider Steinberg’s set-off claim.

  • People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 752 (2006): Redefining Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 752 (2006)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires more than recklessness; it requires conduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and a request for a lesser-included charge of manslaughter does not forfeit a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for depraved indifference.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the defendant’s conviction of depraved indifference murder to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court held that the defendant’s actions, while possibly reckless, did not meet the threshold for depraved indifference murder as defined by the statute and clarified in prior cases. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the depraved indifference murder conviction by requesting a charge on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The case was remitted for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The specific facts surrounding the crime are not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the court implies the defendant’s actions, though resulting in death, did not rise to the level of depraved indifference.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and modified the order, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree and remitting the case to the Supreme Court for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s conduct constituted depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

    2. Whether the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the sufficiency of his conviction for depraved indifference murder by requesting that the jury be charged on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s actions, while perhaps reckless, did not demonstrate the depraved indifference to human life required for a conviction under Penal Law § 125.25(2).

    2. No, because “Depraved indifference” is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Payne and People v. Suarez to clarify the definition of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that depraved indifference requires more than just recklessness or risk of harm; it requires a particularly blameworthy state of mind demonstrating a complete disregard for human life. The court found that the evidence presented did not establish this level of depravity. Regarding the forfeiture argument, the Court stated, “‘Depraved indifference’ is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.” The court reasoned that requesting a charge on a lesser-included offense does not preclude a defendant from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the “depraved indifference” element of the murder charge. The court noted, “testimony at trial could have led a rational jury to infer that the victim moved into a shot that was intended only to scare him,” indicating that the evidence pointed more towards recklessness than depraved indifference. Judge Graffeo concurred in the result, constrained by the precedent set in People v Suarez.

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002): Establishing Causation in Homicide Cases Involving Police Pursuits

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)

    A defendant can be held criminally responsible for a homicide if their actions set in motion the events that led to the victim’s death, even if the defendant’s conduct is not the sole cause, provided the ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable.

    Summary

    Hernandez, a fugitive, was chased by police after being spotted in Buffalo. During the pursuit, Hernandez scaled a fence and ran across a highway. An officer attempting to follow fell from the fence and was fatally injured. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Hernandez’s manslaughter conviction, holding that his flight was a sufficiently direct cause of the officer’s death because it was reasonably foreseeable that the officer would attempt to cross the highway in pursuit and risk injury in doing so. The court distinguished corporate liability cases and emphasized the foreseeability of harm in police pursuits.

    Facts

    Hernandez was wanted on an arrest warrant for violating probation related to a felony drug conviction in Maryland. Bail bondsmen located him in Buffalo, NY, and alerted local police. When police attempted to apprehend Hernandez, he fled. During the foot chase, Hernandez ran across a six-lane highway, scaling a chain-link fence in the median. Officer McLellan, in pursuit, fell from the fence into oncoming traffic and died from his injuries. Hernandez was apprehended nearby.

    Procedural History

    Hernandez was indicted for second-degree manslaughter for recklessly causing Officer McLellan’s death. The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence of causation. A jury convicted Hernandez, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Hernandez’s actions were a sufficiently direct cause of Officer McLellan’s death to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because Hernandez’s actions in fleeing from police and running across a highway during rush hour set in motion a chain of events that made it reasonably foreseeable that the pursuing officer would be injured while attempting to follow.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent such as People v. Matos and People v. Kern, which established that a defendant can be held criminally responsible if their actions set in motion a chain of events leading to a victim’s death, provided the ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable. The court reasoned that Hernandez’s flight from the police placed Officer McLellan in a situation where he was compelled to cross a busy highway. “Rather than a tenuous connection between defendant’s conduct and McLellan’s death, it was reasonably foreseeable that leading Officer McLellan onto the Kensington Expressway in the midst of morning rush-hour traffic into downtown Buffalo could result in a collision with a vehicle.” The court distinguished corporate liability cases like People v. Warner-Lambert Co. and People v. Roth, where the causal connection was more attenuated and the harm less foreseeable. The court emphasized that this case fell within the scope of cases involving the foreseeable dangers of police pursuits and actions leading individuals onto major highways. The court also noted that the officer’s actions were a direct consequence of Hernandez’s attempt to evade arrest and hadn’t reached a “place of temporary safety” as described in People v. Gladman when the injury occurred.

  • People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 224 (2005): Double Jeopardy and Dismissal for Insufficient Evidence

    6 N.Y.3d 224 (2005)

    Dismissal of charges due to insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, barring subsequent prosecution for the same offense or a lesser included offense.

    Summary

    Suarez was indicted for murder but the trial court withdrew the intentional murder counts due to insufficient evidence, submitting only depraved indifference murder and manslaughter charges. The jury acquitted Suarez of murder but couldn’t reach a verdict on manslaughter. He was then indicted for first-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals held that withdrawing the intentional murder charges was an acquittal, and since first-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of intentional murder, retrying Suarez for manslaughter violated double jeopardy. This case clarifies that a dismissal for insufficient evidence acts as an acquittal.

    Facts

    In February 1999, Suarez fatally shot two individuals. He was indicted on multiple counts, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder (both intentional and depraved indifference), and weapons possession. The trial court repeatedly stated there was insufficient evidence of intentional murder. The court only submitted depraved indifference murder and second-degree manslaughter (as a lesser included offense) to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Suarez of the murder charges but deadlocked on the manslaughter charges, resulting in a mistrial. Suarez was subsequently indicted for first-degree manslaughter and second-degree manslaughter. The trial court denied Suarez’s motion to dismiss the second indictment, arguing double jeopardy. A second jury convicted Suarez of two counts of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second trial violated double jeopardy principles.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s withdrawal of the intentional murder counts from the jury’s consideration due to insufficient evidence constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes?
    2. Whether first-degree manslaughter is the same offense as intentional second-degree murder for double jeopardy purposes, such that acquittal of the greater offense precludes subsequent prosecution for the lesser offense?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court’s decision not to submit the intentional murder counts to the jury, based on a finding of insufficient evidence, amounted to a dismissal of those charges and thus the equivalent of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.
    2. Yes, because first-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder, requiring no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established double jeopardy principles, stating that double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal. Citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., the court emphasized that the label given to a judge’s action is not controlling; rather, the key is whether the ruling represents a resolution of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Here, the trial judge’s repeated statements regarding the insufficiency of evidence for intentional murder, coupled with the decision to withhold those charges from the jury, constituted a dismissal amounting to an acquittal.

    The court then applied the Blockburger v. United States test to determine whether first-degree manslaughter and second-degree murder are the “same” offense for double jeopardy purposes. The Blockburger test asks whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. Second-degree murder requires intent to cause death, while first-degree manslaughter requires intent to cause serious physical injury. The court reasoned that it is impossible to intend to kill someone without simultaneously intending to cause serious physical injury. Therefore, first-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. As stated in Brown v. Ohio, “the lesser offense…requires no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater.”

    Because Suarez was acquitted of intentional murder, and first-degree manslaughter is the same offense as second-degree murder under Blockburger, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions barred his subsequent indictment and prosecution for first-degree manslaughter. The court clarified that unpreserved statutory double jeopardy claims are not reviewable.

  • People v. Cable, 652 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1995): Establishing Causation in Homicide Cases

    People v. Cable, 652 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1995)

    A defendant is criminally liable for the death of a victim if their conduct was a contributory cause, even if a subsequent event also contributed to the death, provided the initial conduct was a sufficiently direct cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter, holding that his assault on the victim was a contributory cause of her death, despite a physician’s subsequent removal of her breathing tube. The court emphasized that the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue of superseding cause for appeal. The evidence overwhelmingly showed that the defendant’s actions directly contributed to the victim’s death. Because the defendant did not object to the jury instructions or move for dismissal on the grounds of superseding cause before the jury deliberated, his appellate argument was not properly preserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal trespass in the second degree after severely beating the victim. As a result of the beating, the victim was comatose and placed on life support. Subsequently, at the direction of the victim’s family, a physician removed her breathing tube, leading to her death.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury. He then moved to set aside the manslaughter conviction, arguing that the physician’s removal of the breathing tube was a superseding cause that relieved him of liability. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the physician’s removal of the breathing tube from the comatose victim constituted a superseding cause that relieved the defendant of criminal liability for manslaughter, where the defendant’s initial assault contributed to the victim’s condition.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review by objecting to the jury instructions or moving for dismissal on the basis of superseding cause before the case was submitted to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but primarily on procedural grounds. The Court emphasized that the defendant never objected to the trial court’s omission of the superseding cause issue in its jury charge, nor did he move to dismiss on that basis before the case was submitted to the jury. According to the court, “Defendant did not preserve the argument by raising it, for the first time, in his motion to set aside the verdict.” The court cited CPL 470.05 [2] and People v. Robinson, 88 NY2d 1000, 1002, noting that the defendant’s objection was therefore unreviewable. While the Appellate Division addressed the merits, finding overwhelming evidence that the defendant’s conduct was an actual contributory cause of death (citing Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 280), the Court of Appeals avoided ruling on the merits of the superseding cause argument due to the lack of preservation. The court’s decision underscores the importance of raising objections and motions at the appropriate time during trial to preserve issues for appellate review. The court implied that, procedurally, the initial determination of causation rests on establishing that the defendant’s actions were a contributory factor in the victim’s death. Any arguments related to superseding causes must be timely raised to be considered.

  • People v. Gallagher, 83 N.Y.2d 98 (1994): Jury Instruction Error During Deliberations Requires Reversal

    People v. Gallagher, 83 N.Y.2d 98 (1994)

    When a trial court provides an erroneous jury instruction on a material point of law, and the error is corrected only after deliberations have begun, a reversal is required if it is impossible to determine whether the jury was influenced by the initial erroneous instruction.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an erroneous jury instruction regarding inconsistent counts, corrected only after deliberations had begun, warranted a new trial. The initial misinstruction, coupled with the jury’s specific question indicating confusion about the charges, created uncertainty about whether the jury’s verdict was based on a correct understanding of the law. The Court emphasized that correcting an error after deliberations requires explicit withdrawal of the incorrect instruction to ensure the jury isn’t still influenced by it.

    Facts

    Following a shooting at a party, the defendant was charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder under a theory of acting in concert, as well as weapons possession charges. The verdict sheet instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter (a lesser included offense of intentional murder) before considering depraved indifference murder. During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of the charges and whether they could convict on both manslaughter and depraved indifference murder. The court initially incorrectly stated that they could, then later provided a corrected verdict sheet without explicitly retracting the earlier misstatement. After further deliberations and reinstruction, the jury convicted the defendant of depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were flawed and confusing, particularly regarding the inconsistent counts of intentional manslaughter and depraved indifference murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an erroneous jury instruction on inconsistent counts, corrected after deliberations have begun, requires reversal when it is impossible to determine if the jury was influenced by the initial error.

    Holding

    Yes, because there is no way to determine if the jury continued to be influenced by an erroneous instruction on a material point after deliberations had begun. The correction of the charge after deliberation began did not ensure the jury deliberated with a complete and accurate understanding of the applicable law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 300.40(5) requires the court to instruct the jury that if it renders a verdict of guilty on one inconsistent count, it must render a verdict of not guilty on the other. While the trial court eventually provided a corrected verdict sheet, the initial misinstruction, compounded by the jury’s explicit question indicating confusion, created doubt. The Court reasoned that correcting an error after deliberations requires an explicit withdrawal of the incorrect instruction. Citing Smulczeski v City Ctr. of Music & Drama, 3 NY2d 498, the Court stated: ” ‘[t]o obviate an erroneous instruction upon a material point, it must be withdrawn in such explicit terms as to preclude the inference that the jury might have been influenced by it’ ” (quoting Chapman v Erie Ry. Co., 55 NY 579, 587). Because the jury’s question suggested they may have already decided the defendant was guilty of intentional manslaughter under the original verdict sheet, the Court found it impossible to determine the basis for the jury’s verdict, thus necessitating a reversal.

  • People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766 (1995): Acting-in-Concert Theory Allowed Even When Indictment Charges Only Principal Action

    People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766 (1995)

    A defendant indicted as a principal can be convicted based on an acting-in-concert theory, even if the indictment does not explicitly allege accessorial conduct, because there is no legal distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accomplice.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for the shooting death of Daniels. The indictment charged Rivera as the principal actor, making no mention of accomplices. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting Rivera acted in concert with others, and the judge instructed the jury on accessorial liability. Rivera argued this violated his right to be tried only on charges the grand jury deemed appropriate and that he lacked fair notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that introducing proof and instructing the jury on acting-in-concert when the indictment charges only principal action does not impermissibly broaden the defendant’s liability.

    Facts

    Rivera was in his apartment with Daniels and others. An argument ensued between Rivera and Daniels. A shot was fired, and Daniels exclaimed, “You shot me,” while facing Rivera, who was holding a gun. Daniels fell to the floor. Rivera and others removed Daniels from the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Rivera for second-degree murder and weapons possession. The prosecution’s pre-trial motion to amend the indictment to include an acting-in-concert theory was denied. At trial, over Rivera’s objection, the prosecution presented evidence of acting-in-concert, and the court instructed the jury on accessorial liability. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rivera appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to pursue an accessorial liability theory at trial and in charging the jury on that theory when the indictment charged defendant only as the principal actor.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there is no legal distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accomplice, and the status for which the defendant is convicted has no bearing upon the theory of the prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that it has traditionally been permissible to charge and admit evidence convicting a defendant as an accessory where an indictment charges only conduct as a principal. The Court cited People v. Duncan, stating, “There is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory and the status for which the defendant is convicted has no bearing upon the theory of the prosecution.” The court distinguished People v. Roberts, where the prosecution’s theory at trial (strangulation) differed materially from the facts alleged in the indictment (striking with a fist), prejudicing the defendant. Here, the underlying crime and the theory of liability remained consistent: Rivera caused Daniels’ death. The court noted that Penal Law § 20.00 makes a person criminally liable as a principal even if they intentionally aid another to engage in such conduct, emphasizing that “[t]he key to understanding accessorial liability is that whether one is the actual perpetrator of the offense or an accomplice is, with respect to criminal liability for the offense, irrelevant.” The Court also referenced People v. Guidice, which stated, “The People are not required to specify in an indictment whether a defendant is being charged as a principal or as an accomplice. For charging purposes, the distinction between principal and accomplice is academic”.

  • People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995): Duty to Charge Lesser Included Offense

    People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on a lesser included offense if (1) the additional offense is a lesser included offense and (2) there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. The court reasoned that while the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim, a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest he was unaware that the stabbing would result in death, thus supporting a finding of criminal negligence rather than intentional manslaughter. The court also held that the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation was unpreserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant, Montalvo, stabbed the victim, Golofit. He was charged with manslaughter in the second degree. At trial, Montalvo requested that the judge also instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Montalvo’s request for a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. Montalvo was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Whether there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.
    3. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it is undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the record evidence supports a finding that defendant was not aware that stabbing Golofit would result in his death.
    3. No, because the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that Montalvo was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. The court reiterated the two-pronged test for entitlement to a lesser included offense charge: (1) the additional offense must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense. The court found that both prongs were satisfied. First, it was undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree (citing People v. Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467). Second, the court emphasized that the intentional nature of the stabbing did not preclude a finding of criminal negligence. The court stated, “In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]).” The court further clarified that “criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor’s awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional.” Because a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest that Montalvo was unaware that stabbing Golofit would result in death, the instruction should have been given. Finally, the court held that Montalvo’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation was unpreserved because defense counsel did not object further or request a mistrial after the trial judge issued curative instructions. The court cited People v. Williams, 46 NY2d 1070, 1071, stating that under these circumstances, “the curative instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant’s satisfaction”.

  • People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987): Standard for Appellate Review of Sufficiency of Evidence

    People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987)

    When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, an appellate court must determine whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder based on the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree for the death of a seven-week-old infant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction based on insufficient evidence, applying a standard only applicable to a trier of fact. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the Appellate Division applied the incorrect standard for reviewing legal sufficiency. The Court of Appeals found the evidence legally sufficient and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised by the defendant but not considered on the initial appeal.

    Facts

    Wynonna Mallette and the defendant were alone with her seven-week-old infant daughter, Jamila, on the day Jamila sustained fatal injuries. Only the defendant was charged with causing the child’s death. Medical testimony established that the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the abdomen. This injury was deemed not accidental. The evidence indicated the injury occurred during a period when the infant was alone with the defendant. The infant also had prior rib, arm, and leg fractures consistent with battering.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction based on insufficient evidence, applying the “moral certainty” standard. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct standard when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division erroneously reviewed the evidence pursuant to a standard available only to a trier of fact, the “moral certainty” standard. The Court of Appeals held that the correct standard is whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder based on the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between the standard of review for a trier of fact versus an appellate court reviewing legal sufficiency. The “moral certainty” standard, requiring circumstantial evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, is for the fact finder. For appellate review, the standard is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder.” The court found that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant, rather than the mother, recklessly caused the child’s death. The court noted the medical testimony, the timeframe of the injury, the defendant’s contradictory statements, and the evidence of prior injuries. The court quoted People v. Henson, 33 NY2d 63, 73-74, noting the prior injuries to the baby negating an inference that the fatal injuries were accidental and supported a determination that defendant had recklessly caused the infant’s death.

  • People v. Faulkner, 76 N.Y.2d 580 (1990): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses and Risk Perception

    People v. Faulkner, 76 N.Y.2d 580 (1990)

    A jury is entitled to a charge on a lesser-included offense only if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Faulkner was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and weapons charges after fatally shooting a bystander during a fight. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense, which the court denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Faulkner committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree. The court emphasized that the defendant’s actions of pulling out a loaded gun, aiming into a crowd, and disregarding a warning not to shoot demonstrated recklessness, negating any reasonable basis for a finding of mere failure to perceive risk.

    Facts

    Defendant Faulkner was involved in a fight at a block party.
    During the altercation, Faulkner pulled out a loaded handgun.
    He aimed the gun at a fleeing man he had been fighting with in a crowded area.
    A companion warned Faulkner not to shoot because of the presence of a crowd.
    The gun discharged when Faulkner’s arm was bumped, fatally wounding a bystander.

    Procedural History

    Faulkner was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and weapons charges in the trial court.
    Faulkner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Faulkner committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense charge only if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that he committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. While recklessness (required for manslaughter in the second degree) encompasses criminal negligence, the evidence did not support a finding of the latter without the former.

    The court emphasized that Faulkner’s actions demonstrated a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk (recklessness), rather than a mere failure to perceive such a risk (criminal negligence). The court noted that Faulkner pulled out a loaded weapon, aimed it into a crowded area, and ignored a warning not to shoot. “Nothing in the evidence presented could reasonably suggest that defendant failed to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk.”

    Therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide, as no reasonable jury could have found that Faulkner was merely negligent rather than reckless.