New York Law Review

Tag: manifest necessity

  • People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Without Manifest Necessity

    People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987)

    A trial court’s declaration of a mistrial sua sponte, without manifest necessity and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    Batts was convicted of sexual abuse after a retrial, his first trial ending in a mistrial declared sua sponte by the judge due to a perceived jury deadlock. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mistrial was improperly declared because there was no manifest necessity. The court emphasized that the trial judge prematurely determined the jury was deadlocked without sufficient inquiry, violating the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.

    Facts

    Batts and a co-defendant were tried for assault, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse. The jury began deliberations on April 4th, requested readbacks of testimony, and recessed for dinner. Later that evening, the jury requested another readback. The judge, without consulting counsel, stated his intent to declare a mistrial if a verdict wasn’t reached by 11:30 p.m. At 12:25 a.m., the judge, over the defendant’s objection, declared a mistrial after a brief colloquy with the foreperson indicated possible discrepancies in opinions but also “movement” in voting. The judge did not poll the jury.

    Procedural History

    The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the trial court. Batts was retried and convicted. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Batts appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte, over the defendant’s objection, and without manifest necessity, thereby barring a retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record did not demonstrate a manifest necessity for terminating the trial. The trial judge raised the issue of a mistrial prematurely and the colloquy with the foreperson did not sufficiently establish that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while a trial court’s determination of deadlock is entitled to deference, the defendant’s right to obtain a verdict from the first jury should not be foreclosed unless the jury is hopelessly deadlocked and there is no reasonable probability of agreement. Citing United States v. Perez, the court stated that the power to declare a mistrial must be exercised with the “greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes,” limited to situations where “there is a manifest necessity for the act.” Here, the impetus for the mistrial came solely from the judge, who acted prematurely and without adequately determining the jury’s deadlock. The foreperson’s statement indicated “movement” in the voting, suggesting the jury was not hopelessly deadlocked. The court noted that the judge should have sought confirmation from other jurors before declaring a mistrial. The Court found there was no support in the record for the court’s determination that the jury had found the problem insoluble or believed itself hopelessly deadlocked. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion, and the retrial was barred by double jeopardy.

  • People v. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d 547 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Withdrawal of Mistrial Motions

    People v. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d 547 (1987)

    A defendant waives double jeopardy protections by moving for a mistrial, and the trial court has discretion whether to allow withdrawal of that motion after it has been granted, but before the jury is discharged.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether a retrial after a mistrial, declared over defense objection, violates double jeopardy when the defendant initially requested the mistrial. In Catten, the defendant sought to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted. In Murphy, the defendant’s mistrial motion was initially denied, and the court later granted a mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion on the same grounds, purportedly “on consent.” The Court of Appeals held that in Catten, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the withdrawal of the mistrial motion, while in Murphy, the retrial violated double jeopardy because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity.

    Facts

    Catten: During a drug sale trial, an undercover officer testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup while wearing similar clothes to those worn during the sale. A backup officer later testified the defendant was allowed to change into street clothes before the lineup, and the outer clothing was removed at some point before identification. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was granted. He then attempted to withdraw the motion, but the court denied the request.

    Murphy: During a manslaughter trial, a witness for the prosecution testified that Murphy offered her a jacket if she went to the back of his store with him. The defense motioned for a mistrial, which was denied. Later, the prosecutor requested a mistrial based on the same testimony, which the court granted. The defense attempted to withdraw the mistrial motion but was denied.

    Procedural History

    Catten: Following a retrial, Catten was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial over the defendant’s desire to continue the trial.

    Murphy: Murphy was convicted of manslaughter at the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Catten, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted but before the jury was discharged.

    2. In Murphy, whether the retrial violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights when the mistrial was declared after his initial motion was denied, and the court granted the mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion.

    Holding

    1. In Catten, No, because it is within the trial court’s discretion to deny withdrawal of a mistrial motion after it has been granted, and there was no abuse of discretion here.

    2. In Murphy, Yes, because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity, thus violating his double jeopardy rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Catten: The Court reasoned that once a mistrial motion is granted, whether to allow its withdrawal is within the trial court’s discretion, citing Matter of Napoli v. Supreme Ct. The trial court found that defense counsel had adequate time to discuss the motion with his client, undermining the proffered reason for withdrawal. The Court also noted that a defendant need not agree with counsel’s mistrial motion for it to be binding. Thus, the denial of the withdrawal request was not an abuse of discretion.

    Murphy: The Court reasoned that the defendant’s initial mistrial motion was denied. When the prosecutor later moved for a mistrial (after the witness’s cross-examination testimony bolstered a justification defense) and the court granted it, the defendant possessed the right to have his trial completed by the current tribunal. Because the court had denied his original motion, there was nothing to withdraw, and the defendant registered an objection to the mistrial. The court abused its discretion by not considering a curative instruction, which has been held to preclude the mention of uncharged crimes from constituting reversible error (citing People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865, 866). Since the mistrial was declared without consent or manifest necessity, retrial violated double jeopardy.

    The Court distinguished other cases, noting that in those cases, the defendant did not object to the court’s ruling or attempt to withdraw their prior application on any ground. As the court stated, “appellate review in such situations would be facilitated if, immediately after a motion for mistrial is made and all parties are heard, the court clearly and unconditionally states its decision on the record.”

  • Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Due to Deadlocked Juries

    Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984)

    A retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when a trial court declares a mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury, provided the trial court appropriately considered factors such as the length of deliberations, the complexity of the case, and the potential effects of requiring further deliberation before declaring the mistrial.

    Summary

    Plummer was tried for sodomy and assault. After a day-long trial and approximately 4.5 hours of deliberation, the jury indicated they were deadlocked. The trial judge, after questioning the foreperson, declared a mistrial. Plummer sought to prohibit a retrial, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial, as the trial was short, the issue simple, and the judge adequately explored the genuineness of the deadlock. Therefore, retrial was not barred.

    Facts

    The complainant testified that Plummer entered her apartment under false pretenses and forced her to perform oral sex. Her testimony contained inconsistencies with prior statements. The arresting officer confirmed receiving a radio transmission and arresting Plummer. A defense witness testified that lab tests found no sperm in the complainant’s mouth. The trial lasted one afternoon plus a few minutes the following morning.

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced; the jury deliberated. The jury sent a note indicating deadlock; the judge declared a mistrial over defense objection. Plummer moved to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy grounds before a new trial judge (Rothwax). The motion was denied. Plummer then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking a writ of prohibition to bar retrial. The Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the jury’s apparent inability to reach a verdict, thereby barring a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court appropriately considered the relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury was genuinely deadlocked and unlikely to reach a verdict within a reasonable time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, but noted this right is subordinate to the public interest in seeing criminal prosecutions proceed to verdict. A mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury is a classic example where retrial is not barred. The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the trial court’s broad discretion because the trial judge is best situated to assess the circumstances. However, this discretion is not unlimited; the court must find a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial, or that the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Factors to consider include the length and complexity of the trial, length of deliberations, communication between court and jury, and potential effects of requiring further deliberation.

    In this case, the trial was short and the issue simple, turning primarily on the complainant’s credibility. The jury’s 4.5-hour deliberation was not per se insufficient. The trial judge adequately explored the genuineness of the deadlock by questioning the foreperson, who insisted further deliberations would be fruitless, with no dissent from other jurors. While questioning all jurors would have been better practice, no prejudice resulted here. The court emphasized the importance of avoiding coercion or pressure on the jury to reach a verdict. The court noted that “the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict is limited to those situations where ‘in [the trial court’s] opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” Under the circumstances, failing to give an Allen charge was not error.

  • Matter of Enright v. People, 58 N.Y.2d 172 (1983): Defining ‘Manifest Necessity’ for Mistrials

    Matter of Enright v. People, 58 N.Y.2d 172 (1983)

    A mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent only when there is a “manifest necessity” to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial or when the ends of public justice would be defeated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a trial court may declare a mistrial without the defendant’s consent, thereby permitting a retrial without violating double jeopardy protections. The New York Court of Appeals held that a mistrial was justified in two separate cases: In Enright, the prosecution inadvertently introduced a suppressed confession. In Huntzinger, a key defense witness became unavailable and defense counsel made prejudicial remarks during voir dire. The Court emphasized that a trial judge’s determination of manifest necessity warrants deference due to their superior position to assess the situation, but the reasons for mistrial must be “necessitous, actual and substantial.”

    Facts

    Enright: Defendant was indicted for robbery. After a Huntley hearing, his confession was initially deemed admissible. The confession was referenced in opening statements. The prosecutor then discovered a Miranda rights statement indicating Enright requested counsel before confessing. The confession was suppressed.

    Huntzinger: Defendant was indicted for sodomy. He appeared at trial in a wheelchair, accompanied by an attendant. During voir dire, defense counsel made statements appealing to the jury’s sympathy. After the jury was sworn, the trial court declared a mistrial because of: 1) prejudice to the People from the defendant’s appearance; 2) improper remarks during voir dire; and 3) the unavailability of a crucial defense witness (Chief Jackson), who could not testify due to surgery.

    Procedural History

    Enright: After the trial court declared a mistrial, Enright sought to prohibit retrial via an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division held the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.

    Huntzinger: After the trial court declared a mistrial, Huntzinger commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit retrial. The Appellate Division held that the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals of both cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial in Enright after the prosecution inadvertently referenced a suppressed confession in its opening statement.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial in Huntzinger due to the defendant’s sympathetic appearance, defense counsel’s improper voir dire statements, and the unavailability of a key defense witness.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial to ensure a fair trial for the defendant after a confession was presented to the jury and later suppressed.

    2. No, because considering the combination of the defendant’s appearance, the improper voir dire remarks, and the unavailability of a crucial witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that retrial is barred after a mistrial declared without defendant’s consent unless there is “manifest necessity” for the mistrial or the ends of public justice would be defeated. The Court emphasized deference to the trial judge’s discretion, recognizing that the trial judge is in the best position to determine necessity. However, the reasons for the mistrial must be “necessitous, actual and substantial” and not merely for the convenience of the court. The court noted, ” ‘a defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.’ ”

    In Enright, the court found the inadvertent introduction of the suppressed confession created prejudice for both sides, as unsophisticated jurors may struggle to disregard the confession. The court emphasized that Enright’s counsel agreed the jury could not be “sanitized.” Therefore, the mistrial was justified to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    In Huntzinger, the court found the unavailability of Chief Jackson, deemed “absolutely crucial” by the defense, justified the mistrial. The defense could not estimate the length of Jackson’s unavailability, so the trial judge was not obligated to grant an indefinite continuance. The Court found that considering the witness unavailability along with the improper remarks during voir dire supported the mistrial declaration.

    The court concluded by stating that in both cases, the trial judge did not abuse their discretion, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismissing the petitions.

  • People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Manifest Necessity

    People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981)

    A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity without violating double jeopardy protections when a juror’s conduct indicates an inability to fairly and impartially deliberate.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that declaring a mistrial in Tinsley’s first trial due to a juror’s misconduct did not violate double jeopardy principles. After jury deliberations began, a juror disappeared overnight and expressed doubts about his ability to be fair. The trial court, after interviewing the juror and consulting with counsel, declared a mistrial. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court acted within its discretion, as there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. The court also rejected Tinsley’s claims regarding pretrial identification and jury instructions.

    Facts

    During Tinsley’s first trial, after the jury was charged and sequestered, a juror disappeared overnight and returned the following morning. The juror stated that the deliberations had caused him distress and he doubted the jury’s ability to resolve the issues fairly without legal expertise. He expressed that he could not be fair to the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after interviewing the juror and discussing potential remedies with counsel (who declined to move for a mistrial), declared a mistrial. Tinsley was retried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tinsley appealed, arguing that the mistrial declaration violated double jeopardy principles and that there were errors in the pretrial identification procedure and jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial sua sponte, thus unconstitutionally exposing the defendant to double jeopardy?

    2. Whether the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, tainting the in-court identification?

    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the presumption of correctness of the date on a check?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court was warranted in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity given the juror’s misconduct and expressed inability to be fair.

    2. No, because the suppression court made dual findings that the pre-trial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and that there was an independent source for the in-court identification.

    3. No, because in the prosecution of a crime of violence the trial court was within its discretion to reject a jury instruction regarding the presumption of correctness applicable to commercial paper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the “unusual circumstances” presented by the juror’s behavior and statements. The court cited People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1, 9, emphasizing the principle of manifest necessity as the standard for justifying a mistrial without violating double jeopardy. The court found the juror’s overnight absence and subsequent admission of bias created a situation where a fair trial was impossible. The failure of the trial court to consult further with counsel prior to the declaration of mistrial did not vitiate the propriety of such declaration; the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no acceptable alternative to a mistrial. The court deferred to the suppression court’s findings regarding the pretrial identification procedure, noting evidence supported those findings, referencing People v. Dickerson, 50 NY2d 937. Regarding the jury instruction on the check’s date, the court found no error, implicitly stating that rules applicable to commercial paper generally do not apply in a case involving violent crime, especially where the factual issue involves violence not commercial transactions.

  • Hall v. Potoker, 49 N.Y.2d 705 (1980): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Due to Witness Unavailability

    Hall v. Potoker, 49 N.Y.2d 705 (1980)

    A retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unforeseeable unavailability of a crucial prosecution witness, provided the trial court properly considered alternatives and the unavailability was not due to prosecutorial misconduct.

    Summary

    Raymond Hall was indicted for selling controlled substances. During the trial, the key prosecution witness, an undercover officer, was unexpectedly hospitalized due to a severe infection. The prosecutor requested a continuance, but the defense objected, arguing it would prejudice the jury. The trial court, sua sponte, declared a mistrial over the defense’s objection. Hall then sought to prohibit a retrial based on double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the mistrial was a manifest necessity, stemming from an unforeseeable event and not prosecutorial misconduct, and the trial court had adequately considered alternatives.

    Facts

    Raymond Hall was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance to an undercover officer. The prosecutor was informed that the officer would be available to testify on Wednesday, April 25, and they agreed to meet on Tuesday, April 24. On April 24, a jury was selected and opening statements were made. The prosecutor then learned that the officer had suffered a cut finger while effecting an arrest during the weekend, and the hand became severely infected, requiring hospitalization. The treating physician testified that the officer would remain in the hospital for at least a week, and would not be able to testify prior to the week of May 7, and stressed the impossibility of exact prediction.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for a continuance but, over defense objections, declared a mistrial sua sponte. Hall then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to restrain his retrial. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, holding that the mistrial was manifestly necessary and retrial would not violate double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether double jeopardy bars the retrial of a criminal defendant where a mistrial was declared over defense objection due to the unexpected hospitalization of a key prosecution witness.

    Holding

    No, because the declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary due to the unforeseeable unavailability of a crucial prosecution witness, and the trial court properly explored alternatives, and the unavailability was not due to prosecutorial misconduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the petition. The court acknowledged the defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal but weighed this against the public’s interest in fair trials. The court reiterated the classic formulation from United States v. Perez that retrial is not barred where there was “a manifest necessity for the mistrial, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” The decision to abort a criminal trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must explore appropriate alternatives. The court noted that when a mistrial is premised upon the claimed unavailability of crucial prosecution evidence, that claim is subjected to “the strictest scrutiny” because the prosecutor is not entitled to a mistrial merely to gain “‘a more favorable opportunity to convict’”.

    The court emphasized that the witness’s unavailability resulted from an unforeseeable contingency, not prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor had no reason to anticipate the hospitalization. Given the defense counsel’s strenuous objection to a continuance, the trial court reasonably concluded that a continuance was not a viable option. The court stated that the trial court acted upon reliable information in declaring a mistrial, and trial courts, when considering the exigencies of a potential mistrial, “cannot be bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable at formal proceedings”. Because the trial court adequately explored the available alternatives and based its decision upon valid considerations, there was no abuse of discretion.

  • Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971): Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

    Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971)

    A mistrial granted without manifest necessity, and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defendant, Grant, whose trial was terminated by a mistrial declared by the judge due to a potential, albeit remote, appearance of bias. The New York Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, over the defendant’s strenuous objection and without manifest necessity, violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, thus prohibiting a retrial. The court emphasized that the appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient to justify a mistrial; there must be a demonstrable and substantial basis, a “manifest necessity,” to override the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original tribunal.

    Facts

    The trial court judge, during Grant’s trial, recalled that his cousin was acquainted with Grant’s father. Grant’s father had previously contacted the judge’s chambers about a complaint of police harassment unrelated to the current case. The judge had no personal interaction with Grant or his father, and the contact was minimal (a call to the judge’s clerk a year prior). The judge, concerned that this recollection “might in some conceivable way affect his judgment,” “disqualified” himself and declared a mistrial “in the interests of justice.”

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced without a jury, and after a police witness testified, jeopardy attached. Grant’s counsel objected to the mistrial, arguing that no cause existed and noting a tactical advantage gained from the police officer’s testimony. After the mistrial was declared, Grant sought relief under CPLR Article 78, seeking to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy. The Appellate Division prohibited the retrial. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mistrial, declared by a judge due to a remote possibility of bias and over the defendant’s objection, constitutes manifest necessity, thus permitting a retrial without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s subjective appraisal of a remote possibility of bias was not within the ambit of the well-established rule that “manifest necessity” must be shown to justify a mistrial. The remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant, interdicted the mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the mistrial was improperly granted because it lacked “manifest necessity.” The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a tribunal they believe to be favorably disposed to their fate. The court quoted United States v. Jorn, stating that the judge must consider “the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”. Although the appearance of impropriety is a valid concern, it cannot be used as an “escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty.” The court emphasized that “the necessity must be ‘manifest,’” and the remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with the prejudice to the defendant (losing a tactical advantage), made the mistrial improper. The Court distinguished between a genuine, demonstrable need for a mistrial and a mere subjective apprehension of bias. The court noted that a mistrial declared in the public interest and against the defendant’s will must have some basis of demonstrable substance.

  • People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972): Double Jeopardy and Defendant-Induced Mistrials

    People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972)

    A defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy protections when the defendant’s own actions caused the mistrial, creating a ‘manifest necessity’ to halt the initial proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unavailability of witnesses, where the unavailability is attributed to threats made by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the defendant’s actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial. Allowing retrial in such circumstances does not violate double jeopardy principles, as the defendant should not benefit from obstructing the judicial process.

    Facts

    During jury selection in the initial trial, the prosecutor discovered that two witnesses were difficult to locate. Following a holiday adjournment, the prosecutor informed the court that the missing witnesses had been threatened and that their disappearance was attributable to the defendant. At the subsequent trial, one witness testified to leaving the state because his life was threatened, and another testified that the defendant’s uncle and another person threatened her with a knife.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s application for a mistrial on November 28, 1967, after the jury had been sworn but before any witnesses were called. The defendant was then retried. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the retrial violated the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the mistrial granted on the People’s application due to witness unavailability, where the unavailability was allegedly caused by the defendant, precludes a subsequent trial based on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if a defendant’s actions cause a trial to be aborted, they should not be allowed to claim double jeopardy as a constitutional safeguard. This situation falls within the scope of “manifest necessity,” which justifies interrupting a trial. The court distinguished this case from Downum v. United States, where the witness absence was due to the prosecutor’s failure to ensure their presence. Here, the defendant’s alleged intimidation of witnesses directly impeded the prosecution’s ability to present its case.

    The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from frustrating the trial process. Citing United States v. Perez, the court reiterated that “manifest necessity” allows for the interruption of a trial. The court held that the retrial was permissible under the precedent established in Matter of Bland v. Supreme Ct., County of N.Y., indicating that actions taken by the defendant to disrupt the trial can waive double jeopardy protections.

    The court stated, “If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy.”