Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556 (1969)

A general release may be set aside on grounds of mutual mistake if it can be shown that the parties did not intend to release liability for unknown injuries, even if the release contains broad, standardized language.

Summary

In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the circumstances under which a general release for personal injuries could be set aside due to the subsequent discovery of previously unknown injuries. Deborah Mangini, a passenger injured in a car accident, executed a general release for all claims after being treated for back and knee pain. Later, she was diagnosed with a hip condition that medical experts agreed was undetectable at the time of the release. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that factual issues existed regarding the parties’ intent to release liability for unknown injuries and whether the hip injury was a distinct, unknown injury rather than an unanticipated consequence of known injuries. The court emphasized that standardized release language is not always determinative, and the releasor bears the burden of proving a mutual mistake.

Facts

Deborah Mangini was injured in a car accident on February 26, 1963. She complained of knee and lower back pain after hitting her face on the dashboard. She was examined by multiple doctors who diagnosed a lumbo-sacral strain. Deborah also mentioned a “hitch” or “catch” in her left hip. On May 20, 1963, an insurance physician noted her complaint of a clicking hip and diagnosed a resolving hematoma. A settlement was negotiated, and a general release was executed on July 1, 1963, releasing the defendants from all claims related to the accident. In December 1963, Deborah was diagnosed with osteochondritis dissecans in her left hip, a condition that doctors agreed could not have been detected earlier.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs (Deborah and her father) filed an action to set aside the general release and recover damages for the hip injury. Special Term denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants and dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether knowledge of some symptoms, mistakenly attributed to a known injury in another part of the body, constitutes knowledge of the injuries such that a later claim of mutual mistake is precluded.
2. Whether the general release should be set aside due to a mutual mistake of fact regarding the extent of the injuries, specifically the unknown hip injury.

Holding

1. No, because the sensation of pain in the hip area cannot be considered constructive notice of the distinct and unknown injury to the femur.
2. Yes, if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the parties did not intend to release claims for unknown injuries and that a true mutual mistake existed.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that while general releases are governed by contract law, their interpretation is subject to special rules acknowledging their standardized language and the circumstances in which they are executed. The court emphasized that a release should not be lightly overturned but that traditional grounds for setting aside written agreements, such as mutual mistake, must be considered. The burden of persuasion lies with the releasor to demonstrate that the general language of the release should be limited due to a mutual mistake. The court distinguished between injuries unknown to the parties and mistakes about the consequences of known injuries. The court cited Farrington v. Harlem Sav. Bank, 280 N.Y. 1, stating, “a release could be made covering both known and unknown injuries, ‘provided the agreement was fairly and knowingly made.’ ” The court found that the Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment because factual issues remained regarding whether the parties intended to release liability for the unknown hip injury, which was a distinct and separate injury from the known back injury. The court also noted that although the plaintiff’s lawyer drafted the release, the plaintiffs were still entitled to prove that there was no intention to release claims for unknown injuries. The court pointed out that the claims representative’s affidavit did not definitively state whether the possibility of an actual hip injury was considered or if the hip symptoms were considered a consequence of the back injury. Judge Breitel concluded that the affidavits and pretrial testimony did not conclusively demonstrate that no issue of fact remained as to the parties’ intent; thus, the order was reversed and remanded for trial.