New York Law Review

Tag: Mandamus

  • Matter of Weinstein v. Haft, 66 N.Y.2d 625 (1985): Delay in Sentencing & Court Jurisdiction

    Matter of Weinstein v. Haft, 66 N.Y.2d 625 (1985)

    A court does not lose jurisdiction to sentence a defendant, even after a significant delay following a guilty plea, when the delay is primarily at the defendant’s request and the court has a reasonable basis for further postponement.

    Summary

    Weinstein pleaded guilty but sentencing was delayed for over three years at her request. She then moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the court lost jurisdiction due to the delay. The Court of Appeals held that the delay, primarily caused by Weinstein, was not so “extremely long and unreasonable” as to divest the court of its sentencing power. The court also found that denial of mandamus relief was proper because the further delay to obtain medical reports was not an abuse of discretion given the possibility of improved health affecting sentencing.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    1. Weinstein pleaded guilty to an unspecified crime.
    2. Sentencing was delayed for over three years at Weinstein’s request.
    3. Weinstein moved to dismiss the charges, claiming the court lost jurisdiction due to the delay.
    4. The trial court adjourned the motion for a further year, pending receipt of a medical report on Weinstein’s treatment.

    Procedural History

    The procedural history is as follows:

    1. Weinstein sought relief by way of prohibition and mandamus in the lower courts.
    2. The Appellate Division’s judgment was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
    3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether allowing over three years to elapse from a guilty plea without sentencing, when the delay is at the defendant’s behest, divests the court of its jurisdiction to sentence the defendant.
    2. Whether the denial of mandamus relief was proper where sentencing was delayed at the petitioner’s request and the trial judge postponed disposition pending receipt of a further medical report.

    Holding

    1. No, because the first three years of delay were at the petitioner’s request and the additional time does not constitute such an “extremely long and unreasonable” delay as to divest the court of its power to sentence.
    2. Yes, because sentencing was delayed at the petitioner’s request, and in view of medical testimony that further treatment might improve petitioner’s physical condition, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Judge to postpone disposition of the motion pending receipt of a further medical report.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that:

    1. The delay, being primarily at Weinstein’s request, distinguished the case from those where the court’s inaction led to a loss of jurisdiction. The Court cited People ex rel. Harty v Fay, 10 NY2d 374, 379, emphasizing that only an “extremely long and unreasonable” delay could divest the court of its power to sentence.
    2. The denial of mandamus was appropriate because sentencing delays were at Weinstein’s request, and the trial court had a valid reason (medical reports) for further postponement. The court acknowledged mandamus can compel a determination of a motion and proceeding with sentencing, citing Matter of Briggs v Lauman, 21 AD2d 734, Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 73 AD2d 411, 413, and Matter of Hogan v Bohan, 305 NY 110.
    3. The court considered the medical testimony suggesting further treatment could improve Weinstein’s condition. This potential improvement provided a reasonable basis for the trial judge’s decision to postpone disposition pending the receipt of further medical information. This highlights the trial court’s discretion in sentencing matters.

  • Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, Inc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 1 (1981): Mandamus Not Available to Disrupt Pending Criminal Actions

    Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, Inc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 1 (1981)

    Mandamus does not lie to compel a superior court to remove charges pending in a local criminal court to ensure a defendant’s trial before a lawyer-trained judge; such relief would disrupt the normal progress of a pending criminal action.

    Summary

    The Legal Aid Society sought a writ of mandamus to compel a county judge to remove misdemeanor charges against their client from a town justice court, where none of the justices were lawyers, to a court with a lawyer-trained judge. The motion was based on the argument that the client had a right to be tried before a judge who was a lawyer. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action. The Court emphasized that the defendant could raise the constitutional issue on direct appeal if convicted.

    Facts

    John Housman was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest in the Town of Mamakating Justice Court in Sullivan County.

    None of the Justices of the local criminal court in the Town of Mamakating were admitted to practice law.

    Housman’s counsel, the Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, moved to have the charges prosecuted by indictment and presented to the Grand Jury, arguing for removal to a court with a lawyer-trained judge based on a constitutional right.

    The County Judge denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    After the County Judge denied the motion for removal, the Legal Aid Society initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the County Judge to grant the requested relief.

    The Appellate Division dismissed the petition.

    The Legal Aid Society appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether mandamus lies to compel the removal by a superior court of charges pending in a local criminal court to ensure a defendant’s trial before a lawyer-trained Judge.

    Holding

    No, because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action; the defendant can raise the constitutional issue on direct appeal if convicted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that mandamus is only available to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought, which was not the case here. The Court emphasized that mandamus, like prohibition, is an extraordinary remedy and should not be used for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action. Allowing such collateral proceedings would lead to numerous disruptions and make speedy trials impossible. The court cited Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59 (1975), which held that courts should not entertain collateral proceedings to review errors of law in pending criminal actions. The Court noted that Housman could obtain full judicial review of his claim on direct appeal from any judgment of conviction, making the collateral action unnecessary and inappropriate. As the court stated in Matter of State of New York v. King, “No trial can be conducted while appellate courts by their own protracted proceedings review the alleged errors which may arise preliminary to the trial, during the trial, and before verdict and judgment. Such a system is neither civilized nor even rational. And most certainly it would make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”

  • Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978): Challenging Administrative Orders via Article 78 Proceedings

    Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978)

    Article 78 proceedings are generally not the proper mechanism to challenge administrative orders when direct appellate review is available, although a dissenting opinion argued for their use in compelling a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the propriety of using Article 78 proceedings under the CPLR to challenge the refusal of judges in the New York Civil Court to grant requests. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions, holding that Article 78 proceedings were not the appropriate avenue for challenging these refusals, as direct appellate review was available. The dissenting opinion argued that the judges’ actions were based on a peremptory administrative order, making Article 78 review in the nature of mandamus appropriate to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Facts

    Judges of the New York Civil Court refused certain requests. The petitioners initiated Article 78 proceedings to challenge these refusals. The basis for the judges’ denial was allegedly a peremptory administrative order issued by the Administrative Judge.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding the Article 78 proceedings were properly brought. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ orders and dismissed the petitions, determining that Article 78 was not the appropriate remedy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article 78 proceedings are the appropriate mechanism to challenge the refusal of judges in the Civil Court when such refusals are based on an administrative order and direct appellate review is available?

    Holding

    No, because direct appellate review is available, making an Article 78 proceeding inappropriate in this instance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority held that the petitioners should pursue direct appellate review rather than utilizing Article 78 proceedings. The dissenting opinion, however, contended that the judges’ actions were not discretionary but rather the ministerial execution of an administrative order. The dissent argued that this scenario aligns with the classic use of Article 78 in the nature of mandamus, which is used to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. The dissent noted that Article 78 is appropriate when seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. As stated by Judge Wachtler in dissent, “To the extent that the petitioners are seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law, this case presents an article 78 in the nature of mandamus in its most classic sense.” The majority believed appellate review would suffice; the dissent felt an Article 78 proceeding was required to address the administrative mandate directly.

  • People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977): Prohibition and Mandamus in Criminal Cases

    People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977)

    Prohibition and mandamus do not lie to review errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Summary

    In an Attica-related criminal prosecution, the trial court granted the defendants more peremptory jury challenges than allowed by statute. The prosecution sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exceeding its statutory authority. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition (and mandamus) are extraordinary remedies that do not lie to correct mere errors of law in criminal cases, even if those errors are unreviewable on appeal. Allowing such collateral review would create undue delays and undermine the policy of limiting appeals in criminal matters.

    Facts

    Two inmates were charged with murder stemming from the Attica prison riot. Prior to jury selection, the defendants moved for an order allowing them more than the 20 peremptory challenges prescribed by CPL 270.25. The trial court granted the defendants 30 peremptory challenges and denied the People an equal increase. The prosecution argued that the trial court’s action was without statutory authority and violated precedent. The prosecution also argued that the ruling would never be reviewable on appeal due to statutory limitations on appeals in criminal actions.

    Procedural History

    The People commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from granting the defendants more peremptory challenges than statutorily allowed. The Appellate Division granted the People’s petition. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition or mandamus under CPLR article 78 may lie to undo what may be assumed to be an egregious error of law in a criminal action, and which, for the purposes of the present review, may also be assumed to have been prejudicial to the rights of the People.

    Holding

    No, because the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus do not lie to correct errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies available only where there is a clear legal right, and in the case of prohibition, only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. Errors of law, even if verbalized as excesses of jurisdiction, are not a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ. Nonreviewability by appeal alone does not provide a basis for collateral review via prohibition or mandamus. The court emphasized that the right of review by appeal in criminal matters is determined exclusively by statute, reflecting a policy to limit appellate proliferation and ensure speedy trials. Allowing collateral proceedings to review errors of law would lead to undue delays and frustrate the efficient administration of justice. The Court distinguished cases where prohibition or mandamus were appropriate, noting that those cases involved an unlawful use or abuse of the entire criminal action, as opposed to an error within the proceeding related to its proper purpose. The court warned that allowing such proceedings would “make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”

  • Matter of Kleinman v. Impellitteri, 13 N.Y.2d 923 (1963): Enforceability of Mandamus for Judicial Salaries After Budget Adoption

    Matter of Kleinman v. Impellitteri, 13 N.Y.2d 923 (1963)

    Mandamus relief may be denied even where a legal right exists if the petitioner’s entitlement to such relief is not manifestly clear, especially when considering the practical implications for municipal budgetary processes.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether mandamus should compel the Board of Estimate to include certain judicial salaries in the city’s budget after the budget’s adoption but before a constitutional amendment altering salary-setting procedures took effect. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of mandamus, holding that despite the Justices’ legal right to fix salaries initially, the petitioners did not demonstrate a sufficiently manifest right to warrant mandamus relief at that stage, given the intervening adoption of the budget and the pending constitutional amendment. The dissent argued that the Justices’ right was clear under the existing Judiciary Law and should be enforced.

    Facts

    In January 1962, the Board of Justices of Kings County voted on certain judicial salaries and submitted them to the Board of Estimate for inclusion in the city budget. The Board of Estimate adopted the budget in May 1962, without fully incorporating those salaries. A constitutional amendment, effective September 1, 1962, altered the method of fixing salaries for court employees paid by the city. Petitioners sought a mandamus order to compel the Board of Estimate to include the originally voted salaries in the budget.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term granted the petitioners an order in the nature of mandamus. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ orders, denying the mandamus relief.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioners demonstrated a sufficiently manifest right to mandamus relief to compel the Board of Estimate to include specific judicial salaries in the city budget after the budget’s adoption, considering a pending constitutional amendment that would alter salary-setting procedures.

    Holding

    No, because the petitioners did not demonstrate a sufficiently manifest right to insist on that legal right as to entitle petitioners to mandamus, especially given the timing relative to the budget adoption and the impending constitutional amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority reasoned that even though the Justices possessed the legal right to fix salaries initially under Section 315 of the Judiciary Law, the circumstances did not warrant mandamus. The court implied a degree of deference to the Board of Estimate’s budgetary decisions, especially given the imminent constitutional change. The decision suggests a balancing of the Justices’ legal right against practical considerations of municipal governance and budgetary stability. The majority opinion is brief and does not elaborate extensively on the policy considerations influencing its decision. The dissent, authored by Fuld, J., argued that the Justices’ right to fix salaries was mandatory under existing law at the time the budget was being formulated. The dissent emphasized that the constitutional amendment had not yet taken effect when the budget was adopted, and therefore, it could not diminish the Justices’ power. The dissent cited precedent (e.g., Matter of Moskowitz v. La Guardia) establishing the Justices’ authority in salary matters. The dissenting opinion underscores the principle that, absent a clear legal impediment, a validly established legal right should be enforced, particularly when lower courts have already granted the requested relief. The dissent criticized the majority for substituting its discretion for that of the lower courts, which had found the mandamus appropriate. The dissent stated, “There can be no doubt that, when in January, 1962, the salaries here involved were voted by the Board of Justices of Kings County and submitted to the Board of Estimate for inclusion in the city’s budget, the Justices had the mandatory right and power to fix such salaries and to require the Board of Estimate to provide for them in the budget.”

  • Siraguso v. New York, 266 N.Y. 57 (1934): Parole Board Discretion and Consecutive Sentences

    Siraguso v. New York, 266 N.Y. 57 (1934)

    The Parole Board has discretion in determining when to consider a prisoner for parole, especially when multiple consecutive sentences are involved, and is not obligated to act until the combined minimum sentence for all crimes has been served.

    Summary

    Siraguso sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Parole Board to consider him for parole on his first sentence, arguing that its minimum term had been served. He was serving two consecutive sentences. The court held that the Parole Board has discretion in deciding when to consider parole, especially with consecutive sentences. The Board is not legally obligated to act until the combined minimum terms of all sentences have been served. The court emphasized that parole is not a right and the Board’s discretion prevails as long as the prisoner hasn’t served the full term minus good behavior credits.

    Facts

    Louis Siraguso was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced on March 28, 1927, to a term of 20 to 40 years.
    Prior to the robbery conviction, he committed manslaughter in the first degree and was convicted of that crime on June 14, 1927, and sentenced as a first offender to a term of 10 to 20 years, to commence after the expiration of the robbery sentence.
    His minimum term for the robbery sentence expired on May 21, 1934, due to good conduct credits.
    The combined minimum sentence for both crimes would not expire until May 1940.

    Procedural History

    Siraguso applied for a writ of mandamus in Special Term to compel the Parole Board to convene and consider him for parole. The Special Term denied his application.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term and granted the motion for peremptory mandamus.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Parole Board has a legal duty to convene and consider a prisoner for parole on his first sentence when the prisoner is serving multiple consecutive sentences, and the combined minimum term for all sentences has not yet expired.

    Holding

    No, because the Parole Board has discretion in determining when to consider a prisoner for parole, particularly when consecutive sentences are involved. The Board is under no legal duty to act until the combined minimum terms of all sentences have been served. The time of release shall be “discretionary with the board of parole, but no such person shall be released until he has served such minimum sentence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that sections 210 and 212 of the Correction Law and section 115 of the Executive Law relate to eligibility for “release on parole.” The Board must meet “at such times as may be necessary for a full study of the cases of all prisoners eligible for release on parole and to determine when * * * and to whom such parole may be granted.” (Executive Law, § 115.)
    The court highlighted that the Parole Board has discretion in deciding when to consider a prisoner for parole and is not required to take action until the combined minimum sentences have been served.
    The court emphasized that the minimum sentences for both crimes were already fixed by the court’s sentence and legislative acts. Although the minimum sentence for the robbery had expired, the manslaughter sentence was still running.
    The court noted that no prisoner is entitled to release as a matter of right until they have served their maximum term, minus credits for good behavior, which had not yet occurred in Siraguso’s case.
    Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and affirmed the Special Term’s denial of the writ of mandamus.

  • Nuttall v. Simis, 31 App. Div. 503: Officer Liability for Wrongful Civil Service Removal

    31 App. Div. 503

    A public officer who wrongfully removes a civil service employee without a hearing is liable for damages, even after the employee is reinstated via mandamus.

    Summary

    Nuttall, a former volunteer firefighter, was wrongfully discharged from his civil service position by Simis. After being reinstated via mandamus, Nuttall sued Simis for damages resulting from the wrongful removal. The court addressed whether a wrongfully discharged civil service employee, reinstated by mandamus, can sue the officer who removed him for damages, especially when the position was filled in the interim. The court held that Simis was liable for damages, as the removal was a ministerial act of misfeasance that deprived Nuttall of his right to the position and its associated salary. Mandamus provides reinstatement, but not complete remedy.

    Facts

    Nuttall was a former volunteer firefighter holding a position in civil service.
    Simis, a public officer, removed Nuttall from his position without providing a hearing.
    Nuttall’s position was filled by another person after his removal.
    Nuttall successfully obtained a writ of mandamus, leading to his reinstatement.
    Nuttall then sued Simis for damages suffered because of the wrongful removal, specifically the lost salary during his period of unemployment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of Nuttall, holding Simis liable for damages.
    Simis appealed the decision.
    The appellate court reviewed the case to determine the extent of liability for wrongful removal from a civil service position.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public officer who wrongfully removes a civil service employee without a hearing is liable for damages, even after the employee is reinstated via mandamus.

    Holding

    Yes, because the act of removing the employee without a hearing constitutes misfeasance, entitling the employee to damages for the loss of salary and deprivation of rights. Mandamus is not a complete remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the wrongful removal without a hearing was a ministerial act of misfeasance on the part of Simis, making him liable for damages. The court emphasized that while a public position is not property in the traditional sense, wrongful removal still deprives the employee of a right, specifically the right to the position and its associated salary. The court cited the principle established in Ashby v. White, stating that “where there is a right there is a remedy.” The court also noted that while Nuttall could have sought damages in the mandamus proceeding, he was not obligated to do so, and pursuing a separate action for damages was permissible. Even if Simis acted with good motives, he was still liable for violating the law. The court found that the appropriate measure of damages was the salary Nuttall lost due to Simis’s wrongful act. The court stated, “The loss is the amount of salary of which plaintiff has been deprived by defendant’s, wrongful act.”

  • Hammitt v. Gaynor, 144 A.D. 368 (1911): Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Before Legal Action

    Hammitt v. Gaynor, 144 A.D. 368 (1911)

    Before bringing a legal action to recover pension arrears, a retired city employee must first challenge the initial pension determination through a direct proceeding (e.g., mandamus) to compel the responsible official to make a correct determination.

    Summary

    A retired firefighter sued the trustee of the fire department relief fund, claiming he was entitled to a larger pension than he was receiving. The fire commissioner initially fixed the firefighter’s pension. The court held that the firefighter could not sue for arrears without first challenging the fire commissioner’s determination through a direct proceeding like mandamus. The court reasoned that the fire commissioner’s initial determination was a condition precedent to a legal action and that allowing suits without such a challenge would create administrative chaos within the relief fund.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a member of the New York City Fire Department, retired after more than ten years of service. The fire commissioner ordered his retirement and fixed his pension at $533.33 per annum. The plaintiff claimed he was entitled to $800 per annum under the law, representing half of his previous salary. He sued the defendant, the trustee of the fire department relief fund, to recover the difference between the amount received and the amount claimed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the burden of proof was on the defendant to show that the plaintiff’s pension could be fixed at a sum less than half of his previous salary. The Appellate Division affirmed this judgment by a divided court. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a retired member of the fire department can bring a legal action to recover arrears in pension payments without first initiating a direct proceeding (e.g., mandamus) to challenge the fire commissioner’s initial determination of the pension amount.

    Holding

    No, because the fire commissioner’s determination of the pension amount is a condition precedent to maintaining a legal action for arrears; the proper remedy for challenging the determination is a direct proceeding like mandamus to compel the commissioner to make a correct determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the fire commissioner is responsible for determining the pension amount when a member retires. According to the court, “In every case the said fire commissioner is to determine the circumstances thereof, and said pension or allowance so allowed is to be in lieu of any salary received by such officer or member.” The court found that the firefighter should have used a direct proceeding to challenge the fire commissioner’s decision instead of directly suing for arrears. While the commissioner doesn’t have arbitrary power, their initial determination must be challenged directly before suing. Permitting lawsuits for arrears without challenging the initial determination would create administrative chaos, making it difficult to manage the relief fund and determine the legal charges against it. The court noted that “suits might be brought at any time by retiring members of the force on the claim that the retiring pension had been fixed too low.” The court stated that an administrative action, such as mandamus, is the proper route to address disputes regarding pension calculations. The court emphasized the importance of allowing the fire commissioner to consider the condition of the relief fund and outstanding pensions when determining pension amounts. The court concluded that a direct proceeding is necessary to correct any errors in the commissioner’s determination and to protect the rights of all members of the department.

  • People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900): Mandamus and the Comptroller’s Audit Authority

    People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900)

    Mandamus does not lie to compel a state comptroller to audit a claim in a specific manner, as the comptroller’s auditing function involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over payments for canal work. The relators, Grannis and O’Connor, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the state comptroller to pay drafts in full for work performed. The comptroller argued the contract was fraudulent due to an inaccurate estimate of rock excavation by the state engineer, leading to an unbalanced bid. The court held that the comptroller possesses the authority to audit claims against the state and cannot be compelled by mandamus to make a specific determination, as auditing involves discretionary judgment.

    Facts

    Grannis and O’Connor entered into a contract to perform work on the Erie Canal. The State Engineer’s estimate for rock excavation was significantly lower (100 yards) than the actual amount (over 30,000 yards). The contractors bid $3 per yard for rock excavation. The Comptroller refused to fully pay the contractors’ drafts, arguing that the rock excavation was only worth $1 per yard. The Comptroller further contended that the contractors knew the actual amount of rock excavation before signing the contract. A referee found no collusion or fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    The relators sought a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the Comptroller to pay the drafts. The Comptroller opposed, alleging fraud. The case was referred to a referee who found no fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed the referee’s finding. The Comptroller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Comptroller can be compelled by mandamus to audit a claim in a specific manner, given the Comptroller’s authority to audit claims against the state.

    Holding

    No, because the comptroller’s auditing function involves a judicial function requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, and mandamus cannot substitute the court’s judgment for that of the comptroller.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of auditing authority in New York, noting that the Constitution requires an audit before state funds are disbursed. While the legislature appropriates funds, it is the responsibility of an auditing officer to examine and approve claims. The Court traced the evolution of auditing power, eventually settling with the Comptroller. The Court emphasized that the Comptroller’s role involves more than just a ministerial calculation; it requires the Comptroller to “hear, to examine, to pass upon, to settle and adjust.” The court cited People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, stating, “That would substitute the judgment or discretion of the court issuing the writ for that of the person or persons against whom the writ was issued.” The court found no legislative intent to remove the Comptroller’s audit authority and vest it solely in the State Engineer. Therefore, because the Comptroller’s audit function requires the exercise of discretion, mandamus cannot compel a particular outcome.