New York Law Review

Tag: malicious prosecution

  • Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13 (1977): Establishing Malice in Malicious Prosecution Claims

    Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13 (1977)

    A jury may infer actual malice, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim, from the absence of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings, especially when the parties were strangers at the time the proceedings began.

    Summary

    Elizabeth Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for malicious prosecution after being arrested and acquitted of obstructing justice. The jury awarded her damages, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no showing of malice. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that a jury could infer malice from the lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, because the Appellate Division also found the verdict against the weight of the evidence, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, respecting the constitutional right to a jury trial.

    Facts

    Elizabeth Martin, while driving home with her husband, stopped to assist an acquaintance pulled over by police. Officer Deso arrived and, without allowing Mrs. Martin to explain, allegedly pushed her, twisted her arm, and arrested her. Her husband intervened and was also arrested. Both Martins were charged with obstructing justice, based on Officer Deso’s account that Mrs. Martin refused to move to the sidewalk and Mr. Martin blocked the arrest. The Martins were acquitted after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    Mrs. Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for unlawful arrest, assault, and malicious prosecution. A jury found no cause of action on the husband’s claims or the wife’s assault claim, but awarded Mrs. Martin damages for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment against the husband, reduced the damages for unlawful arrest, and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. Mrs. Martin appealed the dismissal of her malicious prosecution claim to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in her favor for malicious prosecution.
    2. If the evidence was sufficient, whether the Appellate Division properly dismissed the complaint on the facts.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a lack of probable cause, from which they could infer malice.
    2. No, because when reversing a judgment for the plaintiff based on the facts, the Appellate Division is constitutionally precluded from dismissing the complaint and must order a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    To establish malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) no probable cause existed for the proceeding; and (4) the proceeding was instituted with actual malice. The court focused on the element of malice, noting it’s rarely proven directly, especially when the parties are strangers. It cited the Restatement of Torts § 669, stating that “[l]ack of probable cause for the initiation of criminal proceedings, in so far as it tends to show that the accuser did not believe in the guilt of the accused, is evidence that he did not initiate the proceedings for a proper purpose.” The court emphasized that a jury may infer malice from the lack of probable cause.

    The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude there was no probable cause to arrest Mrs. Martin, thus permitting an inference of malice. While the Appellate Division can overturn a verdict against the weight of evidence, it cannot dismiss the complaint in a case triable by jury as of right; it must order a new trial. To reinstate the jury verdict would require the Court of Appeals to improperly review the Appellate Division’s factual determination. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial on the malicious prosecution claim.

  • Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451 (1975): False Imprisonment and the Prima Facie Rule

    Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451 (1975)

    In actions for false imprisonment based on a warrantless arrest, the burden is on the defendant to prove legal justification for the arrest, and the ‘prima facie’ rule applicable in malicious prosecution cases (presuming probable cause after arraignment or indictment) does not apply.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the ‘prima facie’ rule, which presumes probable cause in malicious prosecution actions after arraignment or indictment, applies to false imprisonment claims. The Court of Appeals held that the rule is inapplicable to false imprisonment actions stemming from warrantless arrests. In such cases, the burden rests on the defendant to prove legal justification for the arrest. Damages for false imprisonment are limited to the period up to arraignment or indictment, excluding legal fees for subsequent defense unless malicious prosecution is proven. The court affirmed the order in Schanbarger and modified and remitted the Broughton case for recalculation of damages.

    Facts

    In Broughton, Susan Broughton was arrested during a search of a mobile home where police found marijuana. The search warrant was later deemed invalid, and the indictment against Broughton was dismissed due to lack of evidence.
    In Schanbarger, Donald Schanbarger was arrested for loitering after refusing to identify himself to a state trooper. He was initially convicted, but the conviction was overturned on appeal because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion.

    Procedural History

    Broughton: The Court of Claims awarded damages to Broughton for false imprisonment, including lost wages, mental anguish, and legal fees. The Appellate Division affirmed.
    Schanbarger: The Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, granted judgment to Schanbarger for false arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed.
    Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prima facie rule, which presumes probable cause in malicious prosecution actions after arraignment or indictment, applies to actions for false imprisonment based on warrantless arrests.
    Whether damages for false imprisonment can include legal fees incurred after the arraignment or indictment.

    Holding

    No, because the prima facie rule applies only to malicious prosecution actions, not false imprisonment actions based on warrantless arrests.
    No, because damages for false imprisonment are limited to the period up to arraignment or indictment, and do not include legal fees for subsequent defense unless malicious prosecution is proven.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. False imprisonment protects freedom from unlawful restraint of movement, while malicious prosecution protects freedom from unjustifiable litigation.

    To establish false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show intentional confinement, awareness of confinement, non-consent, and that the confinement was not privileged. Malice and lack of probable cause are not essential elements.

    Malicious prosecution requires a prior judicial proceeding, termination in favor of the accused, absence of probable cause, and actual malice. The prima facie rule, which recognizes the validity of actions where there has been a judicial evaluation, applies only to malicious prosecution actions.

    “Whenever there has been an arrest and imprisonment without a warrant, the officer has acted extrajudicially and the presumption arises that such an arrest and imprisonment are unlawful.” The burden is on the defendant to prove legal justification.

    Damages for false imprisonment are measured only to the time of arraignment or indictment. “Those damages will not include attorney’s fees expended in the subsequent defense of the criminal prosecution…Such damages are properly attributable to the tort of malicious prosecution.”

    In Broughton, the case was remitted to determine damages limited to the time of false imprisonment, not extending beyond arraignment. In Schanbarger, the award for mental anguish and humiliation was upheld because it related to the tort and did not extend beyond arraignment.

  • Williams v. Barbera, 26 N.Y.2d 158 (1970): Malicious Prosecution Requires Termination on the Merits

    Williams v. Barbera, 26 N.Y.2d 158 (1970)

    A malicious prosecution action requires that the underlying criminal proceeding terminate in a manner indicative of the accused’s innocence, typically a decision on the merits, and a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is insufficient.

    Summary

    Williams sued Barbera for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights, arising from a trespass charge in Canada. The Canadian court dismissed the trespass charge for lack of jurisdiction because title to the land was in question. The New York Court of Appeals held that the malicious prosecution claim must fail because the Canadian court’s dismissal was not a determination on the merits indicative of Williams’s innocence. The court emphasized that a malicious prosecution action requires a termination that fairly implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution.

    Facts

    Williams encamped on a beach in front of Barbera’s house in Ontario, Canada. Barbera, claiming ownership of the beach, had Williams arrested and charged with trespass under the Petty Trespass Act of Ontario. The Ontario Magistrate’s Court declined jurisdiction because the case involved a question of title to land, as barred by the Petty Trespass Act.

    Procedural History

    Williams filed suit in New York against Barbera, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights. The defendant moved to dismiss based on documentary evidence, including the Canadian judgment. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the order by striking the malicious prosecution cause of action, holding that it could not be maintained without a determination on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dismissal of a criminal charge for lack of jurisdiction constitutes a favorable termination on the merits, sufficient to support a claim for malicious prosecution.

    Holding

    No, because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not imply a lack of probable cause for the prosecution and does not reflect on the merits of the underlying claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a malicious prosecution claim requires a termination of the underlying prosecution that fairly implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution. Quoting Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5, the court stated, “A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.” A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, unlike a decision on the merits, does not suggest that the prosecution lacked probable cause. The court noted that neither of the rules for ascertaining the sufficiency of the termination (as stated in Levy’s Store v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 272 N.Y. 155, 162; Halberstadt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 N.Y. 1, 10-11) directly address a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, but the underlying reasoning dictates that such a dismissal cannot support a malicious prosecution claim. The court also emphasized the public policy of ensuring that people feel secure in resorting to the courts for the apprehension and punishment of crimes. Permitting a malicious prosecution claim based on a jurisdictional dismissal would undermine this policy. Finally, the court cited the Restatement, Torts, § 663, comment d, which states that a prior discharge for want of jurisdiction has no tendency to prove lack of probable cause. The court further reasoned that applying the law of Ontario, where the trespass occurred, also dictated the same outcome, as Ontario law requires a determination on the merits to sustain a malicious prosecution claim.

  • Munoz v. City of New York, 21 A.D.2d 96 (1964): Establishing Prima Facie Case for Malicious Prosecution

    Munoz v. City of New York, 21 A.D.2d 96 (1964)

    In a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that the prior criminal proceeding was commenced with malice, without probable cause, and terminated favorably to the plaintiff; where facts are disputed regarding the prosecutor’s good faith and the truthfulness of their complaint, a factual resolution at trial is required.

    Summary

    Anna Munoz and her husband sued a police officer and the City of New York for malicious prosecution after Mrs. Munoz was acquitted of assault. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case. The court emphasized that to dismiss the case as a matter of law, there must be no factual dispute about whether the officer acted with malice and without probable cause. Because Mrs. Munoz denied assaulting the officer, and the evidence must be viewed favorably to her, the question of probable cause and malice was a factual issue for the jury.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Anna Munoz was arrested by defendant Police Officer Daniel Linton for second-degree assault. At the preliminary hearing, the charge was reduced to third-degree assault. Mrs. Munoz was acquitted after a trial. Mrs. Munoz and her husband then filed a suit against Officer Linton and the City of New York for malicious prosecution, claiming she did not assault the officer.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term dismissed the complaint at the end of the plaintiffs’ proof, granting judgment for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution, warranting a trial on the merits.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence presented a factual dispute regarding whether the police officer acted with probable cause and without malice in prosecuting Mrs. Munoz, which requires resolution by a jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that a malicious prosecution requires malice, lack of probable cause, and termination of the prosecution favorably to the plaintiff. “A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.” The court emphasized that the critical element is malice, which often means conscious falsity. The court noted that probable cause in an assault case, where the prosecutor claims to have directly observed the assault, depends on whether the prosecutor told the truth when making the charge. The court acknowledged the need to carefully guard the malicious prosecution cause of action, due to policy concerns about encouraging prosecutions against the apparently guilty and avoiding challenges to finished litigation.

    The court distinguished between cases where probable cause can be determined as a matter of law (e.g., where the prosecutor truthfully presented facts to a public prosecutor who then sought an indictment) and cases where factual disputes exist about the underlying facts or reasonable inferences. In cases with factual disputes, a trial is necessary. Because Mrs. Munoz denied assaulting the officer, there was a dispute about the true state of facts, requiring a factual resolution at trial. The court concluded that it could not hold as a matter of law that Officer Linton prosecuted Mrs. Munoz with probable cause and without malice, thus a new trial was warranted.