New York Law Review

Tag: Malice

  • Parkin v. Cornell University, 78 N.Y.2d 523 (1991): Establishing Malice in Qualifiedly Privileged Defamation Claims

    Parkin v. Cornell University, 78 N.Y.2d 523 (1991)

    In a defamation action involving a qualifiedly privileged statement, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant acted with malice.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of evidence required to defeat summary judgment in a defamation claim where the allegedly defamatory statement is protected by a qualified privilege. The plaintiffs sued Cornell University, its employees, and its attorneys for defamation and other causes of action related to the handling of an insurance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the defamation claim, holding that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of malice to overcome the qualified privilege protecting a disclaimer letter written by the university’s attorneys. The Court also dismissed a claim based on an alleged violation of the Insurance Law, finding no evidence of a general business practice of bad faith.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs commenced an action against Cornell University, the Andrews law firm, Royal Globe Insurance, and Patrick DiDomenico (Royal’s manager). The defamation cause of action was based on a disclaimer letter from the Andrews law firm to the plaintiffs, their attorney, and their adjuster. The plaintiffs also asserted a cause of action alleging a violation of Section 40-d of the Insurance Law, claiming Royal Globe engaged in unfair claim settlement practices.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to publication of the defamatory statement by Royal Globe or DiDomenico.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Andrews law firm acted with malice in publishing the disclaimer letter, thus overcoming the qualified privilege.

    3. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a “general business practice” on the part of Royal Globe to support a private cause of action under Section 40-d of the Insurance Law.

    4. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of gross disregard of the insured’s rights to support a bad-faith claim against Royal Globe.

    Holding

    1. No, because nothing in the complaint or affidavits presented a triable issue as to publication by Royal Globe or DiDomenico.

    2. No, because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of malice on the part of the Andrews firm sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege. The court stated that “one opposing a motion for summary judgment must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact on which he rests his claim.”

    3. No, because the plaintiffs failed to present “evidentiary proof in admissible form” of a “general business practice” on the part of Royal Globe, as required by Section 40-d of the Insurance Law.

    4. No, because plaintiffs failed to present evidentiary proof of gross disregard of the insured’s rights, an essential element of a bad-faith claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the defamation claim, the court emphasized that the disclaimer letter was qualifiedly privileged. Therefore, the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that the Andrews firm acted with malice. The court found no evidence to suggest that further examination of a witness (Turnbull) would reasonably lead to evidence of malice. The court cited Zuckerman v City of New York, stating that a party opposing summary judgment must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form to require a trial or demonstrate an acceptable excuse for failing to do so. Mere conclusions or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient.

    Regarding the Insurance Law claim, the court assumed, without deciding, that Section 40-d could create a private cause of action. However, it found no admissible evidence of a “general business practice” of unfair claim settlement by Royal Globe, as required by the statute. Furthermore, even assuming that bad-faith principles applicable to liability insurance cases (failure to defend or settle third-party claims) extended to first-party claims under a fire insurance policy, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the gross disregard of the insured’s rights necessary to establish such a claim. The Court referenced Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., highlighting the distinction between failure to settle a liability claim versus a first-party insurance claim.

  • Munoz v. City of New York, 21 A.D.2d 96 (1964): Establishing Prima Facie Case for Malicious Prosecution

    Munoz v. City of New York, 21 A.D.2d 96 (1964)

    In a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that the prior criminal proceeding was commenced with malice, without probable cause, and terminated favorably to the plaintiff; where facts are disputed regarding the prosecutor’s good faith and the truthfulness of their complaint, a factual resolution at trial is required.

    Summary

    Anna Munoz and her husband sued a police officer and the City of New York for malicious prosecution after Mrs. Munoz was acquitted of assault. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case. The court emphasized that to dismiss the case as a matter of law, there must be no factual dispute about whether the officer acted with malice and without probable cause. Because Mrs. Munoz denied assaulting the officer, and the evidence must be viewed favorably to her, the question of probable cause and malice was a factual issue for the jury.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Anna Munoz was arrested by defendant Police Officer Daniel Linton for second-degree assault. At the preliminary hearing, the charge was reduced to third-degree assault. Mrs. Munoz was acquitted after a trial. Mrs. Munoz and her husband then filed a suit against Officer Linton and the City of New York for malicious prosecution, claiming she did not assault the officer.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term dismissed the complaint at the end of the plaintiffs’ proof, granting judgment for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution, warranting a trial on the merits.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence presented a factual dispute regarding whether the police officer acted with probable cause and without malice in prosecuting Mrs. Munoz, which requires resolution by a jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that a malicious prosecution requires malice, lack of probable cause, and termination of the prosecution favorably to the plaintiff. “A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.” The court emphasized that the critical element is malice, which often means conscious falsity. The court noted that probable cause in an assault case, where the prosecutor claims to have directly observed the assault, depends on whether the prosecutor told the truth when making the charge. The court acknowledged the need to carefully guard the malicious prosecution cause of action, due to policy concerns about encouraging prosecutions against the apparently guilty and avoiding challenges to finished litigation.

    The court distinguished between cases where probable cause can be determined as a matter of law (e.g., where the prosecutor truthfully presented facts to a public prosecutor who then sought an indictment) and cases where factual disputes exist about the underlying facts or reasonable inferences. In cases with factual disputes, a trial is necessary. Because Mrs. Munoz denied assaulting the officer, there was a dispute about the true state of facts, requiring a factual resolution at trial. The court concluded that it could not hold as a matter of law that Officer Linton prosecuted Mrs. Munoz with probable cause and without malice, thus a new trial was warranted.

  • Crane v. Bennett, 177 N.Y. 106 (1904): Punitive Damages and Malice in Libel Cases

    Crane v. Bennett, 177 N.Y. 106 (1904)

    In libel cases, the falsity of the libel is sufficient evidence of malice to allow a jury to consider awarding punitive damages; this decision is not taken away from the jury even if the defendant presents evidence showing a lack of actual malice.

    Summary

    Crane, a New York City magistrate, sued Bennett, the owner of the New York Herald, for libel based on articles published about Crane’s official conduct. After each article, Crane requested a retraction, but Bennett’s manager published more articles instead. Crane then sued, and the jury awarded damages. Bennett appealed, arguing he wasn’t liable for punitive damages because the publications were made by his employees in his absence, and there was no proof of his personal malice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the falsity of the libel was sufficient evidence of malice to warrant the jury’s consideration of punitive damages.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Crane, was a magistrate in New York City.
    The defendant, Bennett, owned the New York Herald newspaper but resided in France, delegating management to employees.
    The newspaper published four articles in August 1899, alleging misconduct by Crane in his official duties.
    Crane informed Bennett’s manager that the articles were untrue and requested a retraction after each publication.
    Instead of retracting, the newspaper published further articles on the same subject.
    Crane sued Bennett for libel in November 1899.
    The articles were proven false, and no retraction was ever made.

    Procedural History

    Crane sued Bennett in a lower court and won a jury verdict.
    Bennett appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s judgment (77 App. Div. 102).
    Bennett appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the proprietor of a newspaper is liable for punitive damages when libelous material is published by their employees in their absence, without proof of the proprietor’s personal ill-will or hatred.
    Whether the falsity of a libel is sufficient evidence of malice to allow a jury to award exemplary damages, even if the defendant presents evidence of no actual malice.

    Holding

    Yes, because a principal who surrenders their entire business to another is held to the same responsibility as if they personally directed it, as to all matters within the scope of the manager’s authority.
    Yes, because the falsity of the libel is sufficient evidence of malice to allow a jury to consider awarding punitive damages and that decision is not taken away from the jury because the defendant presents evidence showing no actual malice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the proprietor of a newspaper is responsible for the content published, even if done by employees in their absence. The liability stems from the proprietor’s responsibility for the acts of the publisher. When a principal delegates their business to a manager, they are responsible for how the business is conducted. The Court distinguished this from negligence cases, stating the rule for punitive damages differs in tort cases involving personal wrong.

    Regarding the issue of malice and punitive damages, the Court addressed a perceived misinterpretation of its prior decision in Krug v. Pitass. The Court clarified that the falsity of a libel is sufficient evidence of malice for the jury to consider punitive damages. It cited the dissenting opinion in Samuels v. Evening Mail Assn., which the Court of Appeals had previously adopted, stating, “the falsity of the libel was sufficient evidence of malice… The plaintiff in an action of libel gives evidence of malice whenever he proves the falsity of the libel.” The Court emphasized the jury’s discretion in awarding punitive damages when malice is established, even if the defendant presents evidence to negate actual malice.

    The Court noted that the jury could have reasonably found the publications were not only false but also recklessly and wantonly made in bad faith and continued even after the defendant was aware of their falsity. Quoting Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, the court stated, “the case rises to one of premeditated wrong, one of determined malignity towards the plaintiff, which should be dealt with accordingly… and the charities of the law give way to such a prostitution of the public press.”