New York Law Review

Tag: loss of consortium

  • Buckley v. National Freight, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 210 (1997): Mandatory Joinder of Loss of Consortium Claims

    90 N.Y.2d 210 (1997)

    A claim for loss of consortium, arising from injury to the marital relationship, must be joined with the impaired spouse’s main action whenever possible; the impaired spouse’s release bars a subsequent loss of consortium claim if joinder was possible before settlement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a settlement in a personal injury claim bars a subsequent loss of consortium claim by the injured party’s spouse. Dorothy Stapleton settled her personal injury claim against National Freight, Inc. Her husband, Buckley, later sued for loss of consortium. The Court of Appeals held that Buckley’s claim was barred because it should have been joined with his wife’s original action. The Court reasoned that requiring joinder minimizes the risk of overlapping damages, conserves judicial resources, and discourages sharp litigation practices, aligning with the majority of jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

    Facts

    Dorothy Stapleton was seriously injured in a vehicle accident caused by a truck operated by Edward Alto and owned by National Freight, Inc. She sued the defendants seeking damages including loss of household services. Stapleton settled her action for a substantial sum. The settlement agreement released all claims by parties represented by or claiming through Stapleton and warranted that no other person had an interest in the claims. Subsequently, Buckley, Stapleton’s husband, commenced a separate action for loss of consortium, seeking $5 million in damages.

    Procedural History

    Buckley sued National Freight, Inc. for loss of consortium after his wife settled her personal injury claim. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Buckley’s complaint based on the release signed by his wife. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, emphasizing judicial efficiency and the avoidance of overlapping damage awards. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the settlement and release of a personal injury claim by one spouse bars a subsequent action for loss of consortium by the other spouse, when the loss of consortium claim could have been joined in the original action.

    Holding

    Yes, because a loss of consortium claim must be joined with the impaired spouse’s claim for illness or bodily harm whenever possible; the release signed by the impaired spouse in settlement of her claim also releases the deprived spouse’s claim for loss of consortium when the deprived spouse had full knowledge of the initial action and opportunity to join it before settlement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the importance of joining loss of consortium claims with the underlying personal injury claims to prevent double recovery and promote judicial efficiency. Citing Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498 (1968), the court reiterated that concerns about overlapping damages are best addressed through joinder. The court noted that “‘[consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception’” (Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797, 798 (1992)). The court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693(2) approach, requiring joinder of the loss of consortium action with the action for illness or bodily harm unless impossible. Since the plaintiff had full knowledge of his wife’s action and opportunity to join it before settlement, his subsequent claim was barred. The Court stated, “[i]t is possible to join the actions * * * in all situations in which the deprived spouse has had full opportunity to join in the impaired spouse’s action and assert a claim and has failed to do so…and the deprived spouse cannot now be permitted to maintain a separate action.” The Court rejected the argument that the defendant had a responsibility to join the plaintiff in his wife’s action, stating it was the plaintiff’s burden to assert his claim before his wife’s claim was settled.

  • Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797 (1991): Pre-Marital Injury Bars Loss of Consortium Claim

    Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797 (1991)

    A cause of action for loss of consortium does not exist if the tortious conduct and resulting injury to the spouse occurred before the marriage.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued several manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES), asserting a derivative claim for loss of consortium based on injuries allegedly suffered by his wife due to her in utero exposure to the drug before their marriage. The defendants were granted summary judgment because the wife’s exposure and resultant injuries occurred before the marriage. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a claim for loss of consortium requires the injury to occur during the marriage, not before. The court rejected arguments that the discovery statute of limitations (CPLR 214-c) or the revival statute altered this fundamental requirement.

    Facts

    Plaintiff’s wife was allegedly injured in utero by exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug manufactured by the defendants. The wife’s exposure to DES and the resultant injuries to her reproductive system occurred before she married the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the DES manufacturers, asserting a derivative cause of action for loss of consortium, claiming that his wife’s injuries negatively impacted their marital relationship.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not recover for loss of consortium because the wife’s injuries predated the marriage. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for loss of consortium exists where the tortious conduct and resulting injury to the spouse occurred prior to the marriage.

    Holding

    No, because consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception, not upon some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting latent injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent, stating that “a cause of action for loss of consortium does not lie if the alleged tortious conduct and resultant injuries occurred prior to the marriage.” The court reasoned that the rationale underlying this rule is not limited to situations where the injuries to the spouse are manifest at the time of the marriage. The court emphasized that consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuation of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception, and not a guarantee that marital partners are free of preexisting latent injuries. The court quoted the Appellate Division: “Consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception (see, Millington v Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 NY2d 498, 504-505), not upon some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting latent injuries” (158 AD2d 91, 94). The court dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments that the enactment of CPLR 214-c (the new discovery Statute of Limitations) dictated a different result, noting that CPLR 214-c was aimed at removing procedural barriers to recovery for DES injuries, not at expanding the basis for liability. Similarly, the court rejected reliance on the revival statute (L 1986, ch 682, §4), stating that the provision merely revived certain time-barred claims without creating any new causes of action. The court highlighted the distinction between expanding access to recovery versus expanding the basis for liability, maintaining the established principle that loss of consortium claims are predicated on injuries sustained during the marital relationship.

  • Valicenti v. Valicenti, 59 N.Y.2d 78 (1983): Scope of Damages Recoverable Under the Dram Shop Act

    Valicenti v. Valicenti, 59 N.Y.2d 78 (1983)

    The Dram Shop Act permits recovery for loss of support due to the death of an intoxicated person, but does not extend to damages for loss of consortium, whether economic or noneconomic.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of damages recoverable under New York’s Dram Shop Act (General Obligations Law § 11-101). Plaintiff sought damages for the death of his wife, who died in an accident after being allegedly served alcohol to intoxication at the defendant’s bar. The Court of Appeals held that while the Dram Shop Act allows recovery for loss of support, it does not permit recovery for loss of consortium. The Court reasoned that loss of consortium is a common-law concept, and the Dram Shop Act does not explicitly provide for such damages.

    Facts

    Judy Valicenti died in a car accident after leaving the defendant’s bar. The plaintiff, her husband, filed suit on behalf of himself and their children, alleging that the bar negligently served Mrs. Valicenti alcohol while she was visibly intoxicated, leading to her death. The complaint sought damages under both a negligence theory and the Dram Shop Act, claiming loss of support, maintenance, care, nurture, love, guidance, training, and education. Evidence presented indicated the couple was separated before her death, with the husband partly supporting her.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified the order, dismissing the negligence cause of action and dismissing the claim for noneconomic loss of consortium under the Dram Shop Act. The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision regarding the economic loss of consortium.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “or otherwise” in the Dram Shop Act includes damages resulting from loss of consortium, either economic or noneconomic.

    Holding

    No, because the Dram Shop Act does not provide a basis for recovery for loss of consortium, as such damages are not permitted under common law and the Legislature has not explicitly included them in the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act, noting its original purpose of suppressing intemperance and the subsequent shift toward compensation for injury caused by the illegal sale of alcohol. The court emphasized that while the statute creates a new cause of action, it does not alter existing rules concerning recovery and damages. The Court referenced Reid v. Terwilliger, 116 N.Y. 530, 533-534, stating that the Legislature left recovery “subject to the existing rules of damages, and to the facts established upon the trial.” The Court found that the husband and children were entitled to have a jury weigh evidence relating to their loss of support, considering both the support provided before the death and the support they could have reasonably expected but for the death. However, the court drew a line at loss of consortium, citing De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Center, 58 NY2d 1053 and Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 NY2d 622, 634 to support the principle that loss of consortium is not allowed under common law and any change to that rule is the province of the Legislature, not the courts. The court stated, “[i]f a change should be made, it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to make.” Therefore, the court concluded that the Appellate Division erred by not dismissing the claim for economic loss of consortium damages under the Dram Shop Act.

  • Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 51 N.Y.2d 303 (1980): No Derivative Action for Loss of Parental Consortium

    Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 51 N.Y.2d 303 (1980)

    Under New York law, a child does not have a cause of action for loss of parental consortium against a tortfeasor who injures the child’s parent, because such a cause of action was not recognized at common law and the court finds no reason to create one now.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether children can sue for loss of parental consortium when a tortfeasor injures their parent. The New York Court of Appeals held that no such cause of action exists. The court reasoned that while they recognized the real loss suffered by children in these situations, creating such a right would extend tort liability too far, a decision best left to the legislature. The court emphasized the policy considerations of balancing remedies for injured parties with the potential for unlimited liability.

    Facts

    In each of the consolidated cases, a child sought to recover damages for loss of parental consortium. The claim stemmed from disabling injuries inflicted upon one of the child’s parents by an alleged tortfeasor. The children argued that they suffered a loss of companionship, guidance, and support due to the parent’s injuries.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts had dismissed the children’s claims for loss of parental consortium. The cases were then consolidated and appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child has a cause of action for loss of parental consortium against a tortfeasor who inflicted disabling injuries on one of the child’s parents.

    Holding

    No, because such actions were not recognized at common law, and the court finds no reason to recognize such a right now, especially in the absence of legislative action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court declined to recognize a new cause of action for loss of parental consortium. It acknowledged the children’s loss but emphasized the importance of setting reasonable limits on tort liability. The court noted that “Duty is essentially a legal term by which we express our conclusion that there can be liability…It tells us whether the risk to which one person exposes another is within the protection of the law.” The court emphasized that fixing the bounds of duty involves policy considerations beyond logic and symmetry.

    The court expressed concern about extending tort liability without limit, stating, “A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort liability almost without limit.” It recognized the temptation to impose new duties and liabilities but stressed that the courts must ultimately define the “orbit” of duty, referencing Palsgraf v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). Absent legislative action, the court believed it was inappropriate to create such a broad new avenue for recovery. The court considered the equal protection arguments raised by the appellants but found them unpersuasive in justifying an extension of the spousal right to recover for loss of consortium to the parent-child relationship.

  • Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622 (1980): No Common-Law Action for Loss of Consortium Due to Wrongful Death

    Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622 (1980)

    Under New York law, a surviving spouse cannot maintain a common-law cause of action for loss of consortium due to the death of their spouse; any remedy for such loss must be based on statutory authority, and loss of consortium is not a recoverable element of damages in a wrongful death action under EPTL 5-4.3.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether a surviving spouse can sue for loss of consortium due to the wrongful death of their spouse, either as a separate common-law action or as part of a statutory wrongful death claim. The New York Court of Appeals held that no common-law action exists for loss of consortium due to death, as this area is preempted by statute. Furthermore, the court held that loss of consortium is not a “pecuniary injury” recoverable under New York’s wrongful death statute (EPTL 5-4.3), reaffirming a longstanding interpretation that excludes damages for grief, loss of society, and affection.

    Facts

    Liff v. Schildkrout: Joseph Liff died due to Dr. Schildkrout’s malpractice. His estate sued for pain and suffering before death and wrongful death. The widow sought to amend the complaint to add a claim for loss of consortium.

    Grant v. Guidotti: Patricia Grant died during a C-section. Her husband, as administrator, sued for wrongful death, loss of parental guidance, and his loss of consortium more than two years after her death.

    Ventura v. Consolidated Edison Co.: Anthony Ventura died in a gas explosion. His estate sued for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering. After a finding of liability against Consolidated Edison, the widow sought to amend the complaint to include a cause of action for loss of consortium.

    Procedural History

    Liff v. Schildkrout: Special Term allowed the amendment for loss of consortium only during the decedent’s conscious pain. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the certified question.

    Grant v. Guidotti: Special Term dismissed the complaint against Macalino due to the statute of limitations and lack of standing for the loss of consortium claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Ventura v. Consolidated Edison Co.: Trial Term denied the motion to amend. The Appellate Division reversed, holding loss of consortium is a pecuniary injury. The Court of Appeals reviewed the certified question.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a surviving spouse can maintain a common-law cause of action for loss of consortium due to the wrongful death of their spouse, independent of the statutory wrongful death action.

    2. Whether loss of consortium can be claimed as an element of damages within a wrongful death action under EPTL 5-4.3.

    Holding

    1. No, because the common law in New York does not recognize suits for wrongful death outside of statutory authority, and the legislature has preempted this area.

    2. No, because the statutory language of EPTL 5-4.3 limits damages to “pecuniary injuries,” which does not include loss of consortium.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the absence of a common-law cause of action for wrongful death in New York, coupled with the existence of a statutory right (EPTL 5-4.1), precludes a separate action for loss of consortium. The court deferred to the legislature’s role in defining the scope of remedies for wrongful death, stating that the right to sue for injury due to another’s death must be founded in statutory authority.

    Regarding damages under EPTL 5-4.3, the court emphasized that the “pecuniary injuries” limitation has been consistently interpreted to exclude recovery for grief, loss of society, affection, and conjugal fellowship, which are all elements of loss of consortium. While acknowledging that loss of consortium can be measured in monetary terms (citing Millington v Southeastern Elevator Co.), the court maintained that the legislature’s intent to limit damages in wrongful death actions to pecuniary losses should be respected. The court stated, “The Legislature, by including the pecuniary injury limitation in its statutory scheme, clearly intended that damages for loss of consortium should not be recoverable in wrongful death actions. The courts, under such circumstances, are not free to consider the relative merits of the arguments in favor of, or in opposition to, this limitation for the Legislature has ‘struck the balance for us.’” The Court reaffirmed that any change to this principle must come from the legislature, not the courts.

  • Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498 (1968): Recognition of Wife’s Right to Consortium

    22 N.Y.2d 498 (1968)

    In contemporary society, a wife has an equal right to her husband’s consortium as he has to hers, and she can recover damages for its loss due to negligent injury, analogous to a business partner’s loss.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a wife can seek damages for loss of consortium due to injuries sustained by her husband. The husband, a harbor worker, was injured on a vessel due to a defective tension jack. The wife sought to join the lawsuit, claiming loss of consortium. The court held that the wife could indeed bring a claim for loss of consortium, recognizing the modern view of marriage as a partnership where both spouses have equal rights to each other’s companionship, support, and affection. This decision reflects the evolving understanding of marital roles and the equal value of each spouse’s contribution to the marital relationship.

    Facts

    The respondent, while working as a ship’s lasher on the appellant’s vessel, sustained injuries when struck by a defective tension jack, resulting in the loss of his right eye. He initiated a lawsuit against the appellant. His spouse sought to amend the complaint to be added as a plaintiff, claiming loss of consortium due to the husband’s injuries.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term denied the respondent’s motion to add his spouse as a plaintiff, reasoning that maritime law does not provide a remedy for loss of consortium. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, granting the respondent’s motion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the wife of an injured harbor worker may seek recovery for loss of consortium caused by her husband’s injury.

    Holding

    Yes, because in today’s society, the wife’s position is analogous to that of a partner, and when her husband’s love, strength, and protection are diminished due to the defendant’s actions, she suffers a compensable loss.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized the evolving understanding of marital roles, emphasizing the wife’s position as a partner in the marriage. It cited Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48-49, stating: “‘The gist of the matter is that in today’s society the wife’s position is analogous to that of a partner, neither kitchen slattern nor upstairs maid. Her duties and responsibilities in respect of the family unit complement those of the husband, extending only to another sphere. In the good times she lights the hearth with her own inimitable glow. But when tragedy strikes it is a part of her unique glory that, forsaking the shelter, the comfort, the warmth of the home, she puts her arm and shoulder to the plow…In such circumstances, when her husband’s love is denied her, his strength sapped, and his protection destroyed, in short, when she has been forced by the defendant to exchange a heart for a husk, we are urged to rule that she has suffered no loss compensable at the law.’”

    The court distinguished its holding from earlier maritime law cases that denied recovery for loss of consortium. The court emphasized that, unlike the situation in the past, the great majority of states now recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium by either husband or wife in a personal injury action. It also acknowledged the importance of uniformity in maritime law, but noted that the trend in both state and federal law favored recognizing the wife’s right to consortium. The court noted that to deny the wife’s claim would be inconsistent with the modern view of marriage as a partnership and would fail to recognize the real losses suffered by the wife when her husband is injured.