New York Law Review

Tag: Long Island Rail Road

  • Long Island Rail Road v. Long Island Lighting Co., 64 N.Y.2d 1088 (1985): Eminent Domain and Prior Public Use

    Long Island Rail Road v. Long Island Lighting Co., 64 N.Y.2d 1088 (1985)

    When property is already devoted to a public use, it can be condemned for another public use if the new use will not substantially interfere with the existing public use.

    Summary

    This case concerns the Long Island Lighting Company’s (LILCO) attempt to acquire easements on Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) property through eminent domain. LIRR argued that LILCO lacked the statutory power to condemn the property because it was already devoted to a public use and that the taking would materially interfere with LIRR’s operations. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that LILCO could condemn the property because the presence of LILCO’s facilities would not substantially interfere with LIRR’s operations. The court also rejected LIRR’s arguments regarding the taking of skill and labor and the nature of the covenants in the easements.

    Facts

    LILCO sought to acquire limited easements and rights of way on property owned by LIRR to construct and maintain utility facilities. LIRR challenged LILCO’s right to condemn the property, arguing that the property was already dedicated to a public use (rail transportation). LIRR contended that LILCO’s proposed use would materially interfere with its railway operations.

    Procedural History

    LILCO initiated a proceeding under EDPL 207 to condemn easements on LIRR’s property. The Appellate Division held that LILCO had the statutory power to condemn the property. LIRR appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether LILCO had the statutory power to condemn LIRR’s property, which was already devoted to a prior public use.
    2. Whether the proposed easements effected a taking of LIRR’s skill and labor.
    3. Whether the various covenants contained in the proposed easements were mere “promissory stipulations.”

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the presence of LILCO’s facilities on the rights of way would not cause substantial interference with LIRR’s operation.
    2. No, because LIRR had no obligation to furnish the skill and labor.
    3. No, because the scope of the condemned easements is determined by the covenants contained in the recorded document itself, which limit and define LILCO’s interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning that LILCO’s facilities would not substantially interfere with LIRR’s operations, thus permitting the condemnation. The court addressed LIRR’s argument that the easements constituted a taking of LIRR’s skill and labor, stating that LIRR was not obligated to furnish them. Instead, LIRR had the right to approve modifications, review plans, and provide flagmen (at LILCO’s expense). Regarding just compensation, the court noted that since LIRR’s personnel services were not being “taken,” the fact that LIRR may be reimbursed in the future did not violate the requirement that the condemnee receive just compensation at the time of the taking. The court dismissed the argument that the covenants in the easements were merely “promissory stipulations,” clarifying that “the scope of the condemned easements is determined not by extrinsic promises but by the covenants contained in the recorded document itself, which limit and define LILCO’s interest.”