New York Law Review

Tag: Lineup Identification

  • People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013): Admissibility of Lineup Identification After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013)

    Evidence obtained following an illegal arrest is admissible if the connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a lineup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest. The defendant was initially arrested without probable cause for disorderly conduct, but a subsequent conversation between the arresting officer and a detective, who had independently gathered substantial evidence linking the defendant to a robbery, provided probable cause for the defendant’s detention. The Court held that the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by the intervening discovery of the detective’s independent evidence. The Court considered the temporal proximity of the arrest and identification, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    Facts

    A woman was robbed in her apartment building. The victim and a neighbor described the perpetrator as a tall, dark-skinned man in his early thirties, with a large build. The neighbor added that the perpetrator was known as “Izz.” A detective learned that “Izz” was also known as “Michael Wright,” and that Wright’s physical attributes matched the descriptions given by the witnesses. Several days later, a store employee who had seen the man leaving the building identified the defendant to a sergeant. The sergeant located the defendant, who identified himself as “Michael Wright” but could not produce identification. The sergeant arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct because he was allegedly blocking the sidewalk. The sergeant also suspected the defendant was involved in the robbery. After the arrest, the sergeant contacted the detective, who informed him about the photograph of the suspect in his case folder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary and robbery. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter for a Dunaway hearing to determine the legality of the arrest. The hearing court found that the arrest was illegal but that the detective’s independently gathered evidence attenuated the taint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lineup identification must be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest, or whether the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by intervening events such that the identification was admissible.

    Holding

    No, the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated because the detective possessed sufficient independent evidence to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, which was discovered shortly after the illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the initial arrest was illegal because it was made without probable cause. However, the Court emphasized that evidence discovered subsequent to an illegal arrest is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the People must show that the evidence was obtained independently of the illegal conduct. To determine whether attenuation exists, the Court must consider “’the temporal proximity of the arrest and [the evidence at issue], the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’” (People v. Bradford, 15 N.Y.3d 329, 333 (2010), quoting People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 983 (1986)).

    The Court found that the detective had gathered detailed descriptions of the perpetrator from two witnesses, learned of the perpetrator’s street name, and discovered that the street name was associated with an individual whose physical description matched the witnesses’ descriptions. The detective also had a photograph of the suspect. This evidence was obtained independently of the illegal arrest. The sergeant’s conversation with the detective shortly after the arrest, which revealed the existence of this independent evidence, constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the disorderly conduct charge was a pretext for an illegal investigation, noting that there was record support for the Appellate Division’s finding that the police did not exploit the illegal arrest. The Court further stated that “a police officer is entitled to rely on a name given him by a fellow officer as part of his investigation” (People v. Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d 416, 420 [1999]).

  • People v. Jones, 2 N.Y.3d 235 (2004): Warrantless Home Arrests and Admissibility of Subsequent Lineup Identifications

    2 N.Y.3d 235 (2004)

    Evidence of a lineup identification is admissible even if the defendant’s arrest violated Payton v. New York, provided the police had probable cause for the arrest and the lineup itself was not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that lineup identifications are admissible even if the defendant was arrested in their home without a warrant, violating Payton v. New York, provided the police had probable cause for the arrest and the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule should not be applied automatically, but rather requires balancing the deterrent effect on police misconduct against the detrimental impact on the truth-finding process. Here, there was no causal connection between the Payton violation and the lineup identifications.

    Facts

    Two women were robbed in their apartment buildings in separate incidents. Both robbers claimed to have been involved in a shootout and needed money to escape. The second victim identified the defendant, Jones, from a set of mugshot photographs. The first victim also identified Jones after viewing a photographic array that included his photo. Based on these identifications, police went to Jones’s home without a warrant and arrested him after his mother opened the door and led them to him. Approximately five hours later, both victims separately identified Jones in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Jones was indicted on robbery charges. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications, arguing that the photographic identification was unduly suggestive and that the Payton violation tainted the lineup identifications. The Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial where the victims identified Jones, he was convicted of one count of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Constitution requires suppression of eyewitness lineup identifications when the lineup was conducted after police arrested the defendant at his residence without a warrant or consent, violating Payton v. New York, despite having probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of the identification evidence where the police had probable cause to arrest and the lineup itself was not the “fruit” of the illegal entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the Payton violation but emphasized that the police had probable cause to arrest Jones based on the photographic identifications. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Harris, where statements made after a Payton violation were suppressed due to New York’s expansive right to counsel. The Court reasoned that the right to counsel is less significant in the lineup context than during custodial interrogation. “[T]he underlying purpose of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine’—to ‘preclude[ ] the use of evidence which would not have been obtained had the illegal search or seizure not occurred’—will not always be served when lineup identifications are at issue.”

    The Court explained, “Here, allowing evidence of the lineup identifications to be admitted does not put the People ‘in a better position than [they] would have been in if no illegality had transpired’ since the requisite ‘connection between the violation of a constitutional right and the derivative evidence’ is absent.”

    The court further noted that unlike situations where police lack probable cause, in Payton scenarios, the police have probable cause, so it is the means of effecting the arrest that is unlawful. The court concluded that admitting the lineup identifications did not violate Jones’s rights because the identifications were based on the photographic identifications by the victims, not the illegal entry. There are other deterrents to Payton violations, including the Harris rule, which renders uncounseled statements inadmissible, and civil suits. The court emphasized that properly conducted lineups are generally reliable and the People bear the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the police conduct and the absence of undue suggestiveness.

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error and Lineup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When a key eyewitness’s testimony is internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasizes an erroneously admitted lineup identification, the error cannot be deemed harmless, even if an independent source for the in-court identification exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The defendant was convicted of murder and related crimes based largely on an eyewitness identification. The court agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed. However, the court found that the error was not harmless because the eyewitness testimony was inconsistent, and the prosecutor heavily relied on the inadmissible lineup evidence. The existence of an independent source for the in-court identification did not automatically render the error harmless.

    Facts

    The defendant and a co-defendant were convicted of murder in the second degree and related criminal counts after a jury trial. The primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of an eyewitness who identified him in a lineup and in court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reviewed the case and agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed but did not find the error to be harmful. The dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division level argued the error was not harmless. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the erroneous admission of an eyewitness’s lineup identification testimony was harmless error, given that the eyewitness’s testimony was internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasized the inadmissible lineup evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; therefore, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the eyewitness’s testimony, being the sole evidence directly linking the defendant to the crime, was crucial. Given the witness’s inconsistent statements and the prosecutor’s reliance on the improperly admitted lineup identification during both the opening statement and summation, the court determined the error was prejudicial. The court emphasized that the finding of an independent source for the in-court identification by the suppression court did not, by itself, overcome the prejudice. The court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, stating that it must be determined that there was “no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court could not conclude that this standard was met in the present case. The court distinguished this case from People v. Harris, decided the same day, suggesting that the nature and impact of the erroneously admitted evidence differed significantly. The court found that other arguments raised by the defendant lacked merit.

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error Analysis and In-Court Identification

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When an improperly admitted lineup identification occurs, a conviction can still be upheld if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the independent source for an in-court identification and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim’s lineup identification testimony was improperly admitted due to the suggestive nature of the lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless due to a strong independent source for the victim’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, finding the in-court identification, supported by other evidence, rendered the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring a traditional and thorough harmless error analysis.

    Facts

    The defendant participated in a knife-point robbery of an elderly woman as she approached her home in Brooklyn. At trial, the victim testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup. The lineup was later determined to be suggestive, making the victim’s testimony regarding the lineup inadmissible.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, even with the improperly admitted lineup identification, citing the harmless error doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction, finding the improperly admitted evidence harmless.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of the suggestive lineup identification testimony was harmless error, considering the victim’s in-court identification and other evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the victim’s strong, independently-evolved, non-suggestive in-court identification was supported by her sister’s testimony and other evidentiary inferences, establishing that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; thus, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s ultimate decision affirming the conviction. While acknowledging the error in admitting the lineup identification, the court emphasized that the strength of the independent source for the in-court identification is crucial in determining harmless error. The court found that the victim’s in-court identification was strong and reliable because it was independently evolved and non-suggestive. This in-court identification was further supported by her sister’s testimony and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances presented at trial. The Court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. The court distinguished this case from others, such as People v. Coates, 74 N.Y.2d 244 and People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408, where the errors were deemed not harmless. The court cited People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677 in support of their decision. The Court held that the error in admitting the lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the evidence, specifically the victim’s independent in-court identification and corroborating testimony.

  • People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670 (1990): Right to Counsel at Lineup After Attorney’s Explicit Entry and Judicial Notice

    People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670 (1990)

    When an attorney explicitly informs the court and requests that the police be notified that they represent a defendant on a specific charge, the defendant’s right to counsel attaches, requiring that the attorney be notified of any impending investigatory lineup unless exigent circumstances exist.

    Summary

    LaClere was convicted of attempted murder after being identified in a lineup conducted without his attorney present. His attorney had informed the court that they represented LaClere on the charge for which he was being arrested and asked the judge to inform the arresting officers that no statements should be taken without counsel present. The judge complied, but the police conducted a lineup without notifying the attorney. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the attorney’s explicit entry into the case and the judicial notification to the police triggered LaClere’s right to counsel at the lineup, requiring notification to the attorney absent exigent circumstances.

    Facts

    LaClere was arrested after a court appearance on an unrelated matter. His attorney informed the presiding judge that they also represented LaClere on the matter for which he was then being arrested and requested the judge to advise the arresting officers not to take any statements from him without counsel present. The judge complied. The police then conducted a lineup without notifying LaClere’s attorney, where he was identified.

    Procedural History

    The initial court denied the motion to suppress the lineup identification. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing precedent that the police were not obliged to inform defense counsel of the investigatory lineup. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when an attorney has explicitly entered a case, sought judicial protective relief, and secured a court’s alert to the arresting officers that the defendant is represented on the charge for which an imminent lineup is to be conducted, the police are required to notify the attorney of the lineup.

    Holding

    Yes, because counsel’s announced entry into the case and explicit solicitation of formal judicial admonitory relief attached the defendant’s right to counsel, requiring notification of the lineup absent some legally recognized excuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the formal point of counsel’s entry into the case, their representational activity, and the solicitation of judicial intervention were sufficient to trigger the entitlement to counsel at the investigatory lineup. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Coates, where the defendant had requested counsel’s presence, but the attorney had not formally entered the case. Here, the attorney had explicitly informed the court and requested that the police be notified of their representation. The Court quoted People v. Blake stating, “When an accused, at any stage, before or after arraignment, to the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies, already has counsel, his right or access to counsel may not be denied”. The court found that prompt notification to counsel would have been a feasible and reasonable accommodation of defendant’s right and that there was no indication that notifying counsel would have significantly inconvenienced the witnesses or undermined the advantages of a prompt identification.

  • People v. Smalls, 74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989): Right to Counsel at Lineup and Independent Source for Identification

    74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989)

    A defendant has a right to counsel at a lineup when a removal order has been issued to secure the defendant’s attendance, and in the absence of a hearing to determine independent source, in-court identification testimony from witnesses exposed to an uncounseled lineup is inadmissible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial because the defendant’s right to counsel was violated during pretrial lineups. The lineups occurred without counsel present despite a removal order securing the defendant’s attendance. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the lineup evidence was not harmless error because the key issue at trial was identification, and the in-court identifications of the witnesses who attended the lineup were tainted. The court also addressed errors related to the testimony of an informant witness.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and other charges. The People’s case rested significantly on eyewitness identifications. Two witnesses identified the defendant at lineups conducted without the presence of counsel, despite a removal order in place to ensure the defendant’s attendance. Another witness was a police informant who testified in exchange for a reduced sentence on an unrelated charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lineup testimony of the two witnesses should have been suppressed due to the absence of counsel during the lineups, given that a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance.

    2. Whether the erroneous admission of the lineup evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    3. Whether the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who attended the uncounseled lineups was admissible without a hearing to determine if the testimony had an independent source.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the informant-witness’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a removal order had been issued to secure defendant’s attendance at the pretrial identification procedures, defendant had a right to the presence of counsel during the lineups.

    2. No, because the only significant issue at defendant’s trial was identification, and the People’s strongest evidence came from the two eyewitnesses who had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    3. No, because in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.

    4. Yes, because the court should have instructed the jury to scrutinize the informant’s testimony carefully and determine whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony, and the court’s erroneous instruction created an imbalance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance at the lineups, the defendant had a right to counsel under People v. Coleman, 43 NY2d 222. Since the defendant did not waive that right, the lineups conducted without counsel violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    The court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237, because identification was the only significant issue at trial. Two of the four witnesses connecting the defendant to the crime were subject to serious impeachment, and the other two eyewitnesses had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    The court emphasized that the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who viewed the lineup was inadmissible without a hearing to determine whether the testimony had an independent source, citing United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 240-241; People v. Coates, 74 NY2d 244; and People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408. The court noted, “in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.” This underscored the importance of establishing that the in-court identification was based on the witness’s independent recollection of the crime and not influenced by the tainted lineup.

    Regarding the informant-witness, the court found that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to carefully scrutinize the informant’s testimony for truthfulness, given the benefits he received. The court stated that “the informant’s testimony should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony.” The court also noted the error in instructing the jury that the informant’s criminal past could be considered only insofar as it implicated his general credibility, thereby ruling out consideration of the more specific possibilities of bias and motive to falsify, citing People v. Bell, 38 NY2d 116, 123.

  • People v. Alviti, 64 N.Y.2d 956 (1985): Harmless Error in Right to Counsel at Lineup

    People v. Alviti, 64 N.Y.2d 956 (1985)

    An error in admitting lineup identification evidence, even if it violates the right to counsel, may be deemed harmless if there is overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, such as multiple untainted in-court identifications by eyewitnesses and a confession used for impeachment.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He challenged the introduction of a lineup identification by one of the victims, arguing it violated his right to counsel because his attorney did not attend the lineup. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if the lineup identification was admitted in error, the error was harmless. The court reasoned that there were three in-court identifications by eyewitnesses, and the defendant’s confession, though inadmissible in the prosecution’s direct case, was used to discredit his testimony. This constituted overwhelming evidence of guilt, making any error in admitting the lineup evidence harmless.

    Facts

    On October 21, 1980, a man robbed a gas station attendant, John Taylor, and his cousin, James Alviti. The next day, Taylor and Alviti identified the defendant from photographs at police headquarters. A week later, the same man robbed Taylor and Vincent Rizzuto at the same station. Taylor informed police he recognized the defendant and both he and Rizzuto identified the defendant from a photographic array. The defendant was arrested on November 7, 1980, and confessed to both robberies. On May 19, 1981, the defendant was placed in a lineup after being indicted, and Rizzuto identified him. The other victims did not view the lineup. The defendant’s attorney was notified but did not attend.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress the identifications, finding the photo arrays and lineup were not unduly suggestive and each victim had an independent source for in-court identification. The court also found the defendant was not denied his right to counsel at the lineup because his counsel refused to attend. The defendant was convicted after trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the introduction of Rizzuto’s lineup identification violated the defendant’s right to counsel and, if so, whether that violation requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, because even if the introduction of Rizzuto’s lineup identification was an error, it was harmless given the overwhelming independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including multiple untainted in-court identifications and the defendant’s confession used for impeachment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals did not definitively rule on whether the lineup identification violated the defendant’s right to counsel. Instead, it assumed, arguendo, that there was an error. The court emphasized that the lower courts found that Taylor and Alviti’s identifications were untainted by any improper procedure. As for Rizzuto, his in-court identification was based on his observation of the defendant during the robbery itself, not the lineup. The court highlighted the significance of the three in-court identifications by eyewitnesses. The court reasoned that Rizzuto’s lineup identification added little to the already substantial evidence against the defendant. The court also noted the defendant’s confession, even though inadmissible in the prosecution’s direct case, was properly used to impeach his testimony. Citing People v. Maerling, 64 NY2d 134 and People v. Ricco, 56 NY2d 320, the court underscored the legitimacy of using the confession for impeachment purposes, even if it couldn’t be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Given this evidence, the court concluded that any error in admitting the lineup evidence was harmless, citing People v. Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 252. This case illustrates the harmless error doctrine: an appellate court can affirm a conviction, even when an error occurred at trial, if that error did not affect the outcome. Here, the court found that the weight of evidence against Alviti was so overwhelming, that any error stemming from Rizzuto’s lineup identification, was not prejudicial. This case serves as a practical example of how appellate courts consider the totality of evidence when evaluating claims of reversible error.

  • People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 820 (1980): Right to Counsel at Lineups Can Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal

    People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 820 (1980)

    The denial of the fundamental constitutional right to counsel, including at a pre-trial lineup, may be raised for the first time on appeal, even if a different basis for suppression was argued at trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of armed robbery based on eyewitness identification at trial. The pre-trial lineups violated the defendant’s right to counsel because they were conducted pursuant to a court order, but in the absence of counsel and without a valid waiver. Although the defendant did not specifically argue at trial that the court order triggered his right to counsel, the New York Court of Appeals held that the issue was preserved for appeal because the right to counsel is fundamental. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that the erroneous admission of the lineup identification testimony was not harmless error.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of two supermarket armed robberies. At trial, two prosecution witnesses, each a cashier at one of the supermarkets, testified about her prior lineup identification of the defendant. The lineups were conducted pursuant to a court order but without counsel present for the defendant and without a valid waiver of counsel.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the violation of the right to counsel at the lineup was not harmless error, and that the issue was properly preserved for appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of the right to counsel at a pre-trial lineup can be raised for the first time on appeal, even if a different basis for suppression was argued at the trial level.

    Holding

    Yes, because the constitutional right to counsel is fundamental and its denial may, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel is fundamental, and therefore, its denial can be raised for the first time on appeal, even if the defendant did not specifically argue the right to counsel issue at the trial level. The Court acknowledged prior cases where it had articulated this principle with respect to the suppression of confession evidence, citing People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218, 221. The court reasoned that this principle has no less vitality where the suppression of identification evidence is sought. The court stated: “That the specific right to counsel issue here urged on appeal was not urged at the trial level is immaterial. The constitutional right to counsel is fundamental and its denial may, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal”. The court agreed with the majority below that the receipt of the lineup identification testimony was not harmless error. The court’s holding emphasizes the importance of the right to counsel in protecting the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings.

  • People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256 (1969): Prosecutorial Misconduct and Tainted Identification Procedures

    People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256 (1969)

    A criminal conviction will be reversed when prosecutorial misconduct during summation creates a risk of prejudice, and when pre-trial identification procedures are so suggestive as to taint subsequent in-court identifications.

    Summary

    Richard Damon was convicted on multiple charges, including carnal abuse and burglary. The prosecution’s summation contained inflammatory remarks and improper attacks on the defense counsel. Additionally, the initial lineup procedure was unduly suggestive. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecutorial misconduct risked prejudice and that the tainted lineup procedure potentially influenced the in-court identifications. The Court emphasized the need for a fair trial and the careful handling of identification evidence.

    Facts

    Two incidents occurred in Depew, New York: a man broke into a home and molested a nine-year-old girl on October 13, 1965, and a man attempted to enter a home where a fourteen-year-old girl was alone on October 16, 1965. In both instances, the perpetrator was seen leaving in a white Cadillac convertible. Damon, a 39-year-old bartender who drove a white Cadillac convertible, became a suspect. Three days after the second crime, Lieutenant Maccarone brought Damon to the police station. The two victims identified Damon in an informal lineup and a formal lineup. The younger girl’s father also identified Damon. Damon’s defense was mistaken identity, presenting alibi witnesses who placed him at work around the time of the second crime, and evidence making it impossible for him to have committed the first crime.

    Procedural History

    Damon was convicted of carnal abuse, assault, and burglary based on two indictments. He appealed, arguing prosecutorial misconduct and improper identification procedures. The appellate court considered these arguments and the totality of the circumstances of the trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s summation was so inflammatory and prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.

    2. Whether the lineup procedures used in this case violated the defendant’s due process rights.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in directing the defense to supply the prosecution with prior statements of defense witnesses.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor’s improper comments and attacks on defense counsel during summation created a risk of prejudice to the jury.

    2. Yes, because the informal lineup was unduly suggestive, potentially tainting the subsequent formal lineup and in-court identifications.

    3. No, because the defendant is not being compelled to produce self-incriminating statements. The statements were those of witnesses offered by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the prosecutor’s summation included improper references to the heinous nature of the crimes, possible deviate behavior, and attacks on defense counsel. Even though objections were not made to all statements, sufficient protest was recorded to preserve the issue for review. The Court reasoned that in a case of this nature, which tends to arouse emotions, it could not be certain that the summation did not prejudice the jury. Referencing People v. Adams, 21 N.Y.2d 397, 401-402 and People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 163, the court emphasized the need to avoid any sense of insecurity regarding potential prejudice.

    Regarding the lineup procedures, the Court determined that the initial informal lineup, where the victims viewed Damon through a mirror while he stood at the complaint desk, was “clearly improper, constituting little more than a showup” (citing People v. Brown, 20 N.Y.2d 238). Because of this, the subsequent formal lineup was deemed suspect. The Court directed that a hearing should be held outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the in-court identifications were tainted by the suggestive circumstances surrounding the informal lineup, and the People must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was not the product of suggestive circumstances surrounding the ‘informal’ lineup.

    Regarding discovery, the Court stated, “We have recognized the defendant’s right to obtain and inspect statements of prosecution witnesses for possible use in cross-examining them (see People v. Rosario, 9 Y 2d 286). There is neither reason nor justification for not allowing the Peoplg to procure from the defendant statements taken from his witnesses for the same purpose of cross-examining them.”