New York Law Review

Tag: Lineup

  • People v. Whitaker, 64 N.Y.2d 347 (1985): Use of Detainees as Lineup Fillers

    People v. Whitaker, 64 N.Y.2d 347 (1985)

    The Fourth Amendment is not violated when a person lawfully in custody is placed in a lineup as a filler for an unrelated crime, even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the second crime, as long as the detention is not a pretext and the additional intrusion is minimal.

    Summary

    Whitaker was lawfully in custody on a murder charge when police placed him in a lineup as a filler for an unrelated robbery and murder investigation. He was identified in the lineup and subsequently convicted of the second murder. Whitaker argued that using him as a filler without his consent or probable cause violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the minimal additional intrusion on his lawful confinement did not constitute an unreasonable seizure. The court balanced the intrusion on individual rights against the legitimate needs of law enforcement, finding the lineup a reasonable investigative tool.

    Facts

    On January 4, 1976, a robbery occurred at a Brooklyn bar, during which Charles Hill was murdered. On January 24, Lindsay Webb was arrested in connection with the crime. The police decided to hold a lineup with Webb and five others. However, they lacked enough individuals resembling Webb. John Whitaker, already in custody for an unrelated murder, was used as a “filler” in the lineup without his consent. Two witnesses identified Whitaker, not Webb, as the shooter. Whitaker later waived his rights and confessed to killing Hill.

    Procedural History

    Whitaker moved to suppress the identifications and his confession, arguing the lineup was suggestive, he was denied counsel, and his participation was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, and he was convicted. The Appellate Division initially reversed, finding his confession inadmissible due to a violation of his right to counsel but upheld the admissibility of the lineup identification. At the second trial, Whitaker was again convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Whitaker appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether using a person lawfully in custody on one charge as a filler in a lineup for an unrelated charge, without consent or probable cause to suspect involvement in the second crime, constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the minimal additional intrusion on the defendant’s lawful confinement did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that incarcerated individuals retain some Fourth Amendment rights, citing examples like the prohibition against forced stomach pumping (Rochin v. California) and blood draws without exigent circumstances (Schmerber v. California). However, the court distinguished these from actions like fingerprinting (Davis v. Mississippi) or searching a person lawfully in custody (United States v. Robinson). The court noted established precedent that compelling voice exemplars (United States v. Dionisio), handwriting samples (United States v. Mara), or lineup participation does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the initial detention is lawful (United States v. Crews), because individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in publicly exposed physical characteristics.

    The court rejected Whitaker’s argument that placing him in a lineup for an unrelated charge constituted an “additional intrusion” requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion. It balanced the degree of intrusion on individual rights against the legitimate needs of law enforcement, citing Camara v. Municipal Court. The court emphasized the importance of lineups in the criminal justice system (United States v. Wade) and the practical difficulty of finding suitable fillers. The court stated, “Moving a person already in custody a short distance to a lineup and briefly placing him in it involves at best a minimal, and in our view constitutionally inconsequential, additional restraint.” The court also reasoned that this practice provides a reasonable alternative to potentially less reliable showups. The court found no evidence of harassment or pretextual arrest to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections.

  • People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982): Right to Counsel at Pre-Accusatory Lineups

    People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a suspect does not have the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that suspects do not have a right to counsel at investigatory lineups under the state constitution, provided the lineup occurs before formal adversarial proceedings begin. The court reasoned that the benefits of counsel at this stage are outweighed by the policy considerations favoring prompt identification, such as preserving witness memory and quickly exonerating innocent suspects. This decision clarifies the scope of New York’s right to counsel, distinguishing it from the right during custodial interrogations.

    Facts

    Four separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a defendant who participated in a pre-accusatory lineup without counsel:
    1. Laffosse: Convicted of robbery after being identified in a lineup. He requested an attorney during questioning but proceeded with the lineup after failing to secure one.
    2. Johnson: Convicted of murder; he requested counsel just before the lineup, but it proceeded without an attorney.
    3. Hawkins: Convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary after being identified in a lineup. He consented to the lineup without requesting counsel, despite having a pending drug charge.
    4. Diaz: Convicted of sodomy and assault after being identified in a lineup; police were aware of unrelated charges against him but did not contact his attorney.

    Procedural History

    In all four cases, the defendants moved to suppress the lineup identifications based on a denial of the right to counsel. The trial courts denied the motions, and the defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution provides a suspect with the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because the benefits of requiring counsel at investigatory lineups are outweighed by policy considerations favoring prompt identification procedures, and the New York Constitution does not mandate counsel at this stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. The court then examined whether the New York State Constitution should be interpreted to provide greater protection. While New York has expanded the right to counsel in the context of custodial interrogations, the court found that the role of counsel at a lineup is more limited than during an interrogation. The court emphasized that, unlike interrogations where counsel actively advises the suspect, counsel at a lineup serves primarily as an observer. The court stated, “the need for and right to a lawyer at an identification lineup is insignificant compared to the need in an ensuing interrogation.” People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485.

    The court also emphasized the importance of prompt lineups to preserve witness memory, benefit the suspect by diminishing mistaken identification, and aid police investigations. Requiring counsel at this stage could cause unreasonable delays, undermining these advantages. Although a suspect’s attorney may attend the lineup if they are already represented, police are not required to notify counsel or delay the lineup significantly to accommodate counsel’s arrival. The court found no basis in the State Constitution to mandate counsel at investigatory lineups. The court noted, “The Constitution does not expressly or even impliedly require it.”

  • People v. Tom, 59 N.Y.2d 45 (1983): Waiver of Counsel at Lineup and Judicial Overreach

    People v. Tom, 59 N.Y.2d 45 (1983)

    A defendant’s right to counsel at a post-arraignment lineup can be waived by counsel, even outside the defendant’s presence, provided the waiver is informed and strategic; however, a trial judge’s excessive interference in the examination of witnesses can deprive a defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    Yut Wai Tom was convicted of second-degree murder. Key evidence included lineup identifications. Tom’s attorney initially arranged the lineup but left before it occurred, telling the prosecutor to proceed without him. The New York Court of Appeals held that the attorney’s waiver of presence was valid, but reversed the conviction because the trial judge’s excessive questioning of witnesses unfairly prejudiced the defense. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s rights while ensuring judicial impartiality.

    Facts

    Fong Yue Yee was shot and killed in Manhattan’s Chinatown. Michael Chin saw Tom in a beige Nova near the scene shortly before the shooting. Rosabel and Marivel Ortiz witnessed the shooting; they later identified Tom from a photo album and at a lineup. Tom was arrested and arraigned. His attorney, Joseph Stone, initially arranged the lineup but left due to a scheduling conflict, instructing the prosecutor to proceed without him because he was satisfied the lineup would be fair.

    Procedural History

    Tom was convicted of second-degree murder. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications, arguing denial of right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s right to counsel at a post-arraignment lineup is effectively waived when the defendant’s attorney, having discussed the lineup with the defendant, arranges the lineup details, and then instructs the prosecutor to proceed in his absence.

    2. Whether the trial judge’s persistent and excessive participation in the examination of witnesses denied the defendant a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the attorney had fully consulted with the defendant, arranged for a fair lineup, and strategically chose to absent himself, communicating the waiver to the prosecutor.

    2. Yes, because the trial judge abandoned his role as an impartial arbiter and assumed the role of an advocate, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while a defendant needs counsel in custody to protect against coercion and inappropriate communication, the rule prohibiting waiver of counsel outside counsel’s presence does not apply when counsel, after full consultation with the client, strategically waives their presence. The court emphasized that Stone, Tom’s attorney, had arranged a fair lineup and advised his client. Further, Stone had a strategic reason for leaving, stemming from concerns about witness intimidation. “[O]ur goal is to protect the substantive rights of individual defendants, not ritualistically to impose requirements which add nothing to the protections afforded a defendant.”

    However, the Court found the trial judge’s conduct to be egregious. The judge asked over 1,300 questions, essentially conducting direct examination of key prosecution witnesses and repeatedly interrupting defense counsel’s cross-examination to rehabilitate witnesses. The court noted that, “[t]he role of the Trial Judge is neither that of automaton nor advocate,” but rather to safeguard the rights of the accused and the interests of the public. The court emphasized that a judge should intervene sparingly and should avoid trying the case for the lawyers, which unfortunately did not occur in this case.