People v. Harris, 20 N.Y.3d 679 (2013)

A prospective juror who expresses doubt about their impartiality must be excused unless they provide an unequivocal assurance of their ability to be fair; furthermore, when hearsay statements are admitted for a limited purpose, the trial court must provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

Summary

Cal Harris was convicted of second-degree murder in the disappearance of his estranged wife, Michele. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, as Michele’s body was never found. Prior to the retrial, there was extensive media coverage. During jury selection, a prospective juror admitted to having a pre-existing opinion about Harris’s guilt. The trial court denied a challenge for cause, and Harris used a peremptory challenge. Additionally, the trial court admitted hearsay statements but failed to give a limiting instruction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge without obtaining an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from the juror and in failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the hearsay evidence.

Facts

Michele Harris disappeared on September 11, 2001. Her unoccupied minivan was found at the bottom of the driveway the next morning. Michele was in the process of divorcing her husband, Cal Harris, but they were still living in the same residence. Blood was found in the kitchen and garage of the Harris residence. During a visit to his brother’s house, Harris was confronted by his sisters-in-law about threatening statements he allegedly made to Michele, including that he would kill her and police would never find the body.

Procedural History

Harris was indicted for second-degree murder in 2005 and convicted in 2007. That verdict was set aside based on new evidence. Harris was retried and again convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted Harris leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who admitted to having a pre-existing opinion about the defendant’s guilt without obtaining an unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements for a limited purpose but failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of those statements.

Holding

1. Yes, because the prospective juror’s statements raised a serious doubt regarding her ability to be impartial, and the trial court failed to elicit an unequivocal assurance of her ability to be fair.

2. Yes, because the trial court’s failure to issue a limiting instruction created a real danger that the jury accepted the hearsay statements for their truth, especially given the circumstantial nature of the evidence.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 270.20 (1) (b), which allows a party to challenge a potential juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” The court emphasized that “a prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” (People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]). Because the juror stated her opinion would be a “slight part” of her consideration, the court found the trial court should have followed up with its own inquiry to try to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

Regarding the hearsay statements, the court found that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s request for a limiting instruction, explaining that the jury was required to consider the statements only in relation to Harris’s reaction upon being confronted with them, and not for their truth. The court stated that “[t]he trial court’s failure to issue the appropriate limiting instruction was not harmless,” particularly in a case lacking a body or weapon, where the evidence was purely circumstantial. The prosecutor’s summation compounded the error by relying on those statements as direct evidence.

The court acknowledged the extensive pretrial publicity and urged the trial court to exercise “special vigilance” in ensuring the fairness of any subsequent trial and to consider changing venue if for-cause disqualifications became excessively burdensome. The court recognized that “it is unrealistic to expect and require jurors to be totally ignorant prior to trial of the facts and issues in certain cases” (People v Culhane, 33 NY2d 90, 110 [1973]) but that the trial court has a responsibility to mitigate the effects of adverse publicity.