Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881)

An easement, which is an interest in land, requires a written conveyance (deed) or a legally sufficient substitute like prescription; a mere parol agreement or license, even with consideration, is generally revocable and does not create a permanent easement.

Summary

Wiseman sued Lucksinger to enforce an easement for a drain running through Lucksinger’s property. Wiseman claimed he purchased the right for $7 and enjoyed it for over 25 years until Lucksinger blocked the drain due to nuisance issues caused by Wiseman’s alterations. The court found no written conveyance existed, only a lost receipt. The Court of Appeals held that the oral agreement, even with consideration, was a mere revocable license, not an enforceable easement. Wiseman’s use was permissive, not adverse, precluding a prescriptive easement claim. Equity will not enforce a parol agreement absent clear terms, acts of part performance unequivocally related to a permanent easement, and circumstances making reliance on the agreement reasonable. Therefore, Lucksinger was within his rights to revoke the license.

Facts

• Wiseman and Lucksinger owned adjoining lots in Syracuse.
• Lucksinger built a drain across his and Stern’s land to the street sewer.
• Wiseman paid Lucksinger $7 for the right to connect his drain to Lucksinger’s drain.
• Wiseman connected his drain and used it for 25 years.
• Wiseman replaced his plank sewer with a larger tile sewer which, combined with changes to his privy vault, caused waste to flow back into Lucksinger’s basement.
• Lucksinger cut off the connection to stop the nuisance.
• No deed or written agreement for the easement existed, only a lost receipt for the $7 payment.

Procedural History

Wiseman sued Lucksinger in equity court seeking to restore his drainage rights and restrain Lucksinger from interference. The trial court ruled in favor of Wiseman, declaring an easement and enjoining Lucksinger. The General Term affirmed. Lucksinger appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a parol agreement supported by consideration can create an enforceable easement allowing Wiseman to drain his property through Lucksinger’s land in perpetuity.
2. Whether Wiseman acquired a prescriptive easement based on 25 years of usage.

Holding

1. No, because an easement requires a written conveyance or a legally sufficient substitute; the parol agreement created a revocable license, not an easement.
2. No, because Wiseman’s use was permissive and not adverse; therefore, no prescriptive right was established.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the right to drain through Lucksinger’s land constituted an easement, which is an interest in land. The statute of frauds requires such interests to be created by a written conveyance. A parol agreement, even with consideration, constitutes a mere license, which is revocable at will. Citing Hewlins v. Shippam, the Court emphasized that an easement cannot be conferred except by deed.

The court acknowledged that equity might enforce parol agreements in certain circumstances, but only where the contract is complete and sufficient, its terms are well-defined, and there are acts of part performance unequivocally related to the agreement. Here, the receipt was equivocal, and the circumstances did not suggest a permanent arrangement. The court noted the lack of specificity regarding the duration of the agreement and the heavy burden a perpetual easement would place on Lucksinger’s property.

The Court distinguished the case from those where significant, permanent improvements were made in reliance on an agreement, creating an equitable estoppel. Wiseman’s temporary plank sewer was not a substantial enough improvement to justify equitable intervention.

The Court also rejected Wiseman’s claim of a prescriptive easement because his use was permissive, not adverse. The initial agreement purchased permission for use. Quoting St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, the court stated, “The occupation of a grantee of the fee is perhaps hostile to his grantor, but not so as to a licensee.” Permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.

The court concluded that Lucksinger had merely exercised his legal rights and had not acted fraudulently. Therefore, the judgments were reversed, and a new trial was ordered.