New York Law Review

Tag: Lesser Included Offenses

  • People v. Colville, 17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011): Allocating Decision-Making Authority on Lesser Included Offenses

    17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011)

    The decision of whether to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a matter of strategy and tactics that ultimately rests with defense counsel, not the defendant.

    Summary

    Delroy Colville was convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, his attorney requested that the judge submit lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury, believing it was a sound trial strategy. However, Colville objected, and the judge deferred to Colville’s wishes and did not include the lesser-included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic one that falls within the purview of defense counsel, not the defendant. This decision emphasizes the attorney’s role as the guiding hand in trial strategy, ensuring defendants receive the benefit of counsel’s expertise.

    Facts

    On October 28, 2004, Colville stabbed and killed Gregory Gardner, and injured Carl Jones in a shared residence. Colville claimed self-defense, alleging Gardner attacked him first. Witnesses presented conflicting accounts, some suggesting Colville was the aggressor. After the incident, Colville hid the knife and was later arrested.

    Procedural History

    Colville was indicted for second-degree murder and second-degree assault. At trial, the defense requested a justification charge and submission of lesser-included offenses of manslaughter. The trial judge initially hesitated but agreed, then ultimately deferred to Colville’s objection to including the lesser offenses. The jury convicted Colville of murder and acquitted him of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic decision entrusted to the attorney, or a fundamental decision reserved to the accused?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the decision is one of trial strategy, best left to the expertise of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed conflicting authorities and commentary on the allocation of decision-making authority between attorney and client. It noted that while the American Bar Association (ABA) initially suggested the defendant should decide on lesser-included offenses, it later revised its stance. The court observed that most jurisdictions now consider this a strategic decision for the attorney. The court emphasized that CPL 300.50 allows either party to request a lesser-included offense instruction when a reasonable view of the evidence supports it. The court reasoned that this decision is unlike pleading guilty or asserting an extreme emotional distress defense, which are exclusively the defendant’s prerogative. The Court stated, “[I]t makes little sense to hold that the defendant personally has the last say about an issue when the defense as a whole does not.” The court found the trial judge erred by deferring solely to Colville’s wishes, denying him the benefit of his counsel’s judgment. “By deferring to defendant, the judge denied him the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him.” The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the jury might have convicted Colville of manslaughter instead of murder had the lesser-included offenses been submitted. The conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered.

  • People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975): Jury Instructions and Lesser Included Offenses in Felony Murder

    People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975)

    In a felony murder case, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses (such as the underlying felony) unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would permit the jury to find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the lesser included offense.

    Summary

    Charles Shuman was convicted of two counts of felony murder. The indictment alleged robbery and burglary as the predicate felonies. Shuman argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense (felony murder) while convicting on the lesser offense. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the victim’s death resulted directly from the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felonies, precluding a finding of guilt on the underlying felonies without also finding guilt on felony murder.

    Facts

    Patrolman Levy found Alex Chafetz bound and gagged in his apartment. Chafetz died from asphyxiation due to the gag. Shuman confessed to entering Chafetz’s apartment with accomplices to commit robbery and burglary. During the crime, Shuman admitted to gagging Chafetz. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was homicide by asphyxiation due to gagging. The defendant did not present any evidence to contradict this conclusion.

    Procedural History

    Shuman was indicted on two counts of felony murder, predicated on robbery and burglary. At trial, Shuman requested the judge to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery, attempted robbery, burglary, or attempted burglary) as lesser included offenses. The trial court refused. The jury convicted Shuman of both counts of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Shuman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a felony murder trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery and burglary) as lesser included offenses when there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the underlying felonies but did not cause the victim’s death.

    Holding

    No, because under no view of the evidence could a jury find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the underlying felonies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the “some basis in the evidence” test (derived from People v. Mussenden) to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction was warranted. This test, now codified in CPL 300.50 as a “reasonable view of the evidence” test, requires the instruction of a lesser included offense only when there is a basis for the jury to find the defendant not guilty of the greater crime but guilty of the lesser crime. The court emphasized that “every possible hypothesis” except the higher crime must be excluded to warrant a refusal to submit lower degrees or included crimes. The court noted that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Here, Shuman’s confession and the medical examiner’s testimony established a direct causal link between Shuman’s act of gagging the victim and the victim’s death by asphyxiation. Because there was no contradictory evidence presented, the court concluded that “under no view of the evidence could a jury find defendant not guilty of the crime charged and yet find him guilty of any crime necessarily included in that charged in the indictment.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The court implicitly suggests that the key is whether the act leading to the felony is separate in time or effect from the act causing the death. Here, the two were inextricably intertwined.

  • People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526 (1968): Duty to Charge Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526 (1968)

    A trial court must submit lesser included offenses to the jury if any reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that trial courts erred in failing to submit lesser included offenses to the jury in two separate cases. In People v. Asan, the defendant, charged with first-degree murder, argued self-defense. The court found the trial court should have submitted second-degree manslaughter to the jury. In People v. Freeman, the defendant, charged with first-degree robbery, claimed the alleged victim gave him money for a sexual act. The court found that the trial court should have submitted lesser robbery and assault charges to the jury. The court reiterated that a jury may selectively credit portions of both the prosecution and defense evidence, requiring submission of lesser offenses when supported by any view of the evidence.

    Facts

    In People v. Asan, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for fatally stabbing Neziri Osmani. The prosecution argued that Asan deliberately stabbed Osmani six times due to Osmani’s involvement with Asan’s wife and daughter. Asan claimed self-defense, testifying that Osmani attacked him with a hunting knife during an argument, and the stabbing occurred during the ensuing struggle.

    In People v. Freeman, the defendant was charged with first-degree robbery for allegedly robbing a pastry deliveryman at knifepoint of two dollars. The prosecution’s evidence indicated Freeman slashed at the deliveryman with a knife before stealing the money. Freeman testified that the deliveryman gave him the money as partial payment for oral sodomy and denied using a knife.

    Procedural History

    In People v. Asan, the defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    In People v. Freeman, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Asan, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offense of second-degree manslaughter to the jury.

    2. In People v. Freeman, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offenses of second and third-degree robbery and third-degree assault to the jury.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Asan, yes, because the jury could have concluded that Asan was culpably negligent in his use of the knife, thus supporting a conviction for second-degree manslaughter.

    2. In People v. Freeman, yes, because the jury might have believed that Freeman robbed the complainant without a dangerous weapon (second or third-degree robbery) or assaulted the complainant without a weapon and with no intention to rob him (third-degree assault).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a trial court must submit a lesser-included offense to the jury if “upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime.” The court emphasized that there must be a basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime and guilty of the lower one. The jury is free to accept portions of the defense and prosecution evidence. In Asan, the court found that a jury could have concluded that Asan was culpably negligent in his use of the knife, thus warranting a charge on second-degree manslaughter. The court also noted that the jury instructions regarding self-defense were inadequate. In Freeman, the court reasoned the jury could have believed Freeman robbed the complainant but without a dangerous weapon, or that Freeman assaulted the complainant without a weapon. The court stated, “The court, in effect, held that the defense evidence must be either accepted or rejected in its entirety. This was error since a jury may properly find a lesser included offense from any portion of the defense and prosecution evidence, or from any part of the total proof.”

  • People v. Malave, 21 N.Y.2d 26 (1967): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Malave, 21 N.Y.2d 26 (1967)

    When a defendant is charged with a crime, and there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed a lesser included offense, the trial court must instruct the jury on that lesser included offense.

    Summary

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of selling narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to sell. At trial, the judge only submitted the charges for sale to the jury, reasoning that the testimony presented only supported a conviction for sale or no crime at all. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by not submitting the lesser included offenses of possession with intent to sell and unlawful possession to the jury. The court reasoned that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant possessed the drugs but that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually sold them. This case reinforces the principle that juries should be allowed latitude, and lesser included offenses must be submitted if any view of the evidence supports it.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted on nine counts related to narcotics offenses:

    • Sale of narcotics (felony).
    • Possession of narcotics with intent to sell (felony).
    • Unlawful possession of narcotics (misdemeanor).

    These charges stemmed from three separate incidents in 1964. The primary witness was Officer Wilson, who testified he purchased narcotics from the defendant on three occasions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court only submitted the sale charges to the jury, removing the charges of possession with intent to sell and unlawful possession. The trial court reasoned that the case presented a binary choice: either the defendant sold the narcotics, or he did not. The jury convicted the defendant on the sale charges. The defendant appealed arguing the trial court erred in not submitting the lesser included offenses to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses (possession with intent to sell and unlawful possession) when the defendant was charged with sale of narcotics, and there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction on the lesser charges.

    Holding

    Yes, because a jury could have reasonably believed that the defendant possessed the narcotics but that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sold them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Section 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states a defendant “may be found guilty of any crime, the commission of which is necessarily included” in the crime charged. The court emphasized that when a defendant is charged with sale of contraband, the normal procedure is to submit charges for possession, possession with intent to sell, and sale to the jury, especially when the Grand Jury has made separate charges based on possession.

    The court cited People v. Bodie, which held that a jury could find a defendant not guilty of selling narcotics but guilty of possession, even if possession was not separately charged in the indictment. The court also cited People v. Schleiman, noting the general rule that refusal to instruct the jury as to their power to convict of a lower degree is warranted only in “exceptional” conditions, where there is “no possible view of the facts” by which the jury could find the lesser degree.

    Quoting Judge Fuld in People v. Mussenden, the court stated, “It has been repeatedly written that if, upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime, the trial judge must submit such lower offense.” The court emphasized the jury’s latitude, quoting People v. Clemente that juries “may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted.”

    The court noted weaknesses in the prosecution’s case: a significant time lapse between the purported sales and the defendant’s arrest, and the officer’s reliance on notes when testifying. The court also noted the defendant’s testimony, where he denied selling narcotics but admitted to being a user. The court reasoned the jury could have interpreted this as a denial of sale but an implicit admission of possession. The classic test to warrant a refusal to submit lower degrees or included crimes is that “every possible hypothesis” but the higher crime be excluded (citing People v. Moran). Because a jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant possessed the drugs but was not proven to have sold them, the trial court erred in not submitting the lesser included offenses.