Matter of Lemma v. Maybrook, 84 N.Y.2d 835 (1994)

Prior to the 1974 amendment to Workers’ Compensation Law § 39, an employee seeking workers’ compensation for a dust-related disease like asbestosis had to demonstrate complete disablement as a result of the dust-related disease itself, and the combination of the disease with a pre-existing condition only entitled the employee to compensation if the causative agents were inseparable or the dust-related disease completely disabled her.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a claimant was entitled to workers’ compensation for asbestosis when her exposure occurred before the 1974 amendment to Workers’ Compensation Law § 39. The claimant had a pre-existing lung disability unrelated to her employment, and the Workers’ Compensation Board found that the combination of asbestosis and the pre-existing condition caused her total disablement. The Court of Appeals held that because the claimant’s exposure to asbestos predated the 1974 amendment, she had to prove complete disablement as a result of asbestosis alone, or demonstrate that the asbestosis and pre-existing condition were inseparable causative agents or that the asbestosis completely disabled her. Since she failed to do so, she was not entitled to benefits.

Facts

The claimant worked as a stenciler and packer of brake linings from August 1956 through September 1970, during which she was exposed to asbestos.

In 1978, she became totally disabled due to asthma and emphysema, conditions unrelated to her employment, and began receiving Social Security disability benefits.

In March 1988, she was diagnosed with asbestosis and filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging injurious exposure to asbestos during her employment.

Procedural History

The Workers’ Compensation Board found that the claimant’s asbestosis was causally related to her employment.

However, the Board also determined that the claimant had a pre-existing lung disability (emphysema and asthma) unrelated to her employment, and that the combination of asbestosis and the pre-existing condition caused her total disablement.

The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the claimant’s pre-existing lung disability and asbestosis were not inseparable causative agents of her total disability.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether a claimant, whose exposure to asbestos occurred before the 1974 amendment to Workers’ Compensation Law § 39, is entitled to workers’ compensation when her total disability results from the combination of asbestosis and a pre-existing, unrelated lung condition.

Holding

No, because the claimant failed to demonstrate that her asbestosis alone caused complete disablement or that the asbestosis and pre-existing condition were inseparable causative agents or that the asbestosis completely disabled her.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that prior to July 1, 1974, Workers’ Compensation Law § 39 only provided benefits for total disability caused by dust diseases. The 1974 amendment extended coverage to partial disabilities resulting from exposure to noxious dust, but only for exposure occurring on or after July 1, 1974.

Because the claimant’s exposure occurred before the amendment, her recovery was contingent on proving complete disablement specifically as a result of asbestosis. The court found that the Workers’ Compensation Board erroneously awarded benefits based on the combination of the asbestosis and the pre-existing lung disability.

The court stated, “Since claimant’s period of exposure to asbestos predated the 1974 amendment to section 39, the recovery of workers’ compensation was contingent on her complete disablement as a result of asbestosis, a fact not evidenced by this record. The fact that claimant’s asbestosis contributed to her preexisting lung disability could not create an entitlement to compensation, prior to the 1974 amendment to section 39, absent proof that the disabling causative agents were inseparable or that the asbestosis completely disabled her.”

The court implicitly distinguished between cases where the dust-related disease is the sole cause of disability and cases where it combines with other factors. In the latter situation, a higher standard of proof is required to establish compensability before the 1974 amendment.