New York Law Review

Tag: Legal Representative

  • Albany Law School v. NYS Office of Mental Retardation, 19 N.Y.3d 106 (2012): Access to Clinical Records for Disability Advocates

    Albany Law School v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d 106 (2012)

    Mental Hygiene Law §§ 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4) grant protection and advocacy organizations access to clinical records of developmentally disabled individuals consistent with the federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act), balancing privacy rights with advocacy needs, and actively-involved family members can be considered legal representatives under certain circumstances.

    Summary

    Albany Law School and Disability Advocates, Inc., sought unrestricted access to clinical records of residents at two OPWDD facilities, arguing that Mental Hygiene Law §§ 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4) granted them this right. OPWDD countered that these state laws incorporated the access provisions of the federal DD Act, which balances resident privacy with advocacy needs. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state statutes must be read in accordance with federal law and that actively-involved family members can be considered legal representatives if they have sufficient decision-making authority and their designation is appropriately reviewed. The court remitted the case to determine the adequacy of OPWDD’s process for designating and reviewing family members as legal representatives.

    Facts

    Albany Law School and Disability Advocates, Inc. (petitioners), contracted with the New York State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities to provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with developmental disabilities. After receiving a complaint about discharge practices at an OPWDD facility and noting concerns about timely transfers to less restrictive settings, the petitioners requested access to the clinical records of all residents at two OPWDD facilities. OPWDD denied unrestricted access, citing the DD Act’s requirements for authorization from the individual or their legal representative.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners filed an Article 78 proceeding and a § 1983 action to compel OPWDD to grant access to the records. Supreme Court sided with OPWDD, holding that the Mental Hygiene Law incorporated the DD Act’s access procedures and that legal representatives could include actively-involved family members. The Appellate Division modified, finding that § 45.09(b) authorized access upon receipt of a complaint but disagreed that actively-involved family members could be legal representatives. Both OPWDD and petitioners were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) provide P&A organizations with unqualified access to clinical records or incorporate the federal access provisions of the DD Act?

    2. Whether actively-involved family members can be deemed legal representatives for purposes of the federal and state access provisions?

    Holding

    1. No, because Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) must be read in accord with federal law, which balances privacy with advocacy needs.

    2. Yes, because actively-involved family members can possess sufficient decision-making authority to qualify as legal representatives, pending an assessment of OPWDD’s appointment and review process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the primary consideration in statutory interpretation is legislative intent, as gleaned from the text, context, and legislative history. Although Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(a) grants the Commission on Quality of Care broad access, § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) tie the access rights of P&A organizations to the Commission’s administration of the P&A system “as provided for by federal law.” The court found the legislative history indicated that the amendments were intended to ensure New York’s compliance with the DD Act to maintain federal funding.

    Regarding family members as legal representatives, the court noted that New York law grants actively-involved family members significant powers, such as consenting to major medical procedures and making end-of-life decisions. The court cited 45 CFR 1386.19, which defines a legal representative as “an individual appointed and regularly reviewed by a State court or agency…and having authority to make all decisions on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities.” While actively-involved family members hold significant decision-making authority, the court remitted the case for further proceedings to examine the nature and adequacy of OPWDD’s process for selecting and reviewing these family members.

    The court emphasized the need to balance the privacy rights of developmentally disabled individuals with the crucial advocacy role of P&A organizations, concluding that New York law parallels federal law in this regard.

  • Kese Industries v. Roslyn Torah Foundation, 19 N.Y.3d 484 (2012): Defines ‘Legal Representative’ in Tax Lien Redemption Notices

    Kese Industries, Inc. v. Roslyn Torah Foundation, 19 N.Y.3d 484 (2012)

    The term “legal representative” in Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0, regarding notice of tax lien redemption, refers to executors or administrators of an estate, not to a party’s attorney in a pending action.

    Summary

    Kese Industries, a mortgagee in a foreclosure action, and Roslyn Gate Corporation, a property owner, challenged the validity of a tax deed issued to Gillen Living Trust. The challenge was based on Gillen’s failure to serve notice to redeem the tax lien on Kese’s foreclosure attorney and the court-appointed referee. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that a foreclosure attorney is not a “legal representative” under Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0, and that a referee is not an interested party requiring notice. This decision clarifies the scope of required notice in tax lien foreclosure proceedings, emphasizing the traditional definition of “legal representative.”

    Facts

    Roslyn Torah Foundation (RTF) defaulted on a mortgage held by Kese Industries, leading to a foreclosure action. RTF also defaulted on property taxes, resulting in Nassau County issuing a tax lien to Gillen Living Trust. Gillen served notice to redeem the tax lien on Kese, RTF, and Roslyn Gate Corporation, but did not serve Kese’s foreclosure attorney or the court-appointed referee. Kese and Roslyn Gate then sued, claiming the tax deed issued to Gillen was void due to improper notice.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court ruled in favor of Kese and Roslyn Gate, voiding the tax deed because Gillen failed to serve Kese’s attorney. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on precedent that defined a “legal representative” to include a mortgagee’s foreclosure attorney. Gillen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that a foreclosure attorney does not fall under the definition of “legal representative” in the relevant statute.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the term “legal representative” in Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0 includes a mortgagee’s attorney in a pending foreclosure action.
    2. Whether a court-appointed referee in a foreclosure action is an interested party entitled to notice under Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0.

    Holding

    1. No, because the term “legal representative” ordinarily denotes the executor or administrator of an estate, not a party’s attorney in a pending action.
    2. No, because the referee is an agent of the court performing ministerial duties, not a party with a lien, claim, or interest in the property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “legal representative,” in its ordinary sense, refers to someone who manages the legal affairs of another due to incapacity or death, such as an executor or administrator. The Court cited its prior decisions, noting that “‘legal representatives’ mean ordinarily executors or administrators, and that meaning will be attributed to them in any instance unless there be facts existing which show that the words were not used in their ordinary sense, but to denote some other and different idea.”
    The court emphasized the principle of noscitur a sociis, interpreting the term in relation to the adjacent words in the statute: “heirs” and “assigns,” all of which relate to the transfer of rights and duties of a property owner. The presence of the term “attorney” in other sections of the Nassau County Administrative Code indicated that the legislature would have used that term explicitly if it intended to include attorneys in the notice requirement. The Court further reasoned that a referee acts as an agent of the court without any independent legal interest in the property. The court stated, “the legislative purpose of requiring service upon a ‘legal representative’ is to ensure that personal representatives, namely executors or administrators of an estate, are notified of a risk of divestiture of title to their property.”