People v. Wilkins, 28 N.Y.2d 53 (1971)

The dual representation of a defendant and a complaining witness by different attorneys within a large public defender organization, without a showing of actual conflict or prejudice, does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Summary

Wilkins sought to vacate his robbery conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because the Legal Aid Society, which represented him, also represented the complaining witness in an unrelated matter. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mere dual representation by the Legal Aid Society, without evidence that the defendant’s specific attorney knew of the conflict or that it impacted the defense, does not automatically establish a denial of effective counsel. The court reasoned that, unlike a private law firm, a large public defender organization cannot be presumed to have a free flow of client information.

Facts

Wilkins was convicted of robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon.

The Legal Aid Society represented Wilkins at trial.

After the trial, while preparing the appeal, Legal Aid discovered it also represented the complaining witness in an unrelated criminal proceeding.

Legal Aid withdrew from Wilkins’ case, and new counsel was appointed for the appeal.

Wilkins filed a pro se motion for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

Procedural History

The trial court convicted Wilkins of robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

Wilkins filed a pro se motion for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the coram nobis motion.

Issue(s)

Whether the assignment of the Legal Aid Society to represent both a defendant and the complaining witness in unrelated criminal proceedings constitutes a per se conflict of interest, thereby denying the defendant their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

Holding

No, because the mere dual representation by the same attorney of record, designated on behalf of a large public defender organization, does not raise a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing that the specific attorney knew of the potential conflict and was inhibited or restrained during trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court distinguished the Legal Aid Society from a private law firm, where knowledge is imputed among partners due to the free flow of information. The court stated, “While it is true that for the purpose of disqualification of counsel, knowledge of one member of a law firm will be imputed by inference to all members of that law firm…we do not believe the same rationale should apply to a large public-defense organization such as the Legal Aid Society.”

Given the size and structure of the New York City Legal Aid Society, with its various branches and numerous attorneys, the court declined to presume a complete flow of client information between staff attorneys.

The Court emphasized that Wilkins failed to demonstrate any specific way in which his counsel’s representation was deficient or that the attorney was aware of the potential conflict. The court asserted that “defendant does not allege a single factor which might have deterred his counsel from presenting an effective defense, nor does he claim that his defense was not conducted in a capable and diligent manner.”

Absent a showing that the defendant’s specific attorney knew of a potential conflict and was inhibited or restrained thereby during trial, defendant’s prejudice cannot be inferred.