New York Law Review

Tag: Leave to Replead

  • Goldman v. Zafir, 63 N.Y.2d 851 (1984): Requirements for Requesting Leave to Replead After Motion to Dismiss

    63 N.Y.2d 851 (1984)

    A party opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must specifically request leave to replead in their opposing papers and demonstrate good ground to support the proposed new pleading.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedural requirements for a plaintiff seeking leave to replead their complaint after a motion to dismiss has been granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s denial of leave to replead, emphasizing that the plaintiff failed to include a request for such relief in their original opposing papers and did not adequately demonstrate grounds supporting a successor liability theory. The court clarified that merely raising the issue for the first time on appeal is insufficient when the statutory requirements for requesting leave to replead are not met. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules and demonstrating a valid basis for an amended pleading.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Goldman, brought an action against defendants Zafir and Brooklyn Garbage Bag Co. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 for failure to state a cause of action and on Workers’ Compensation Law grounds. The plaintiff opposed the motion. Special Term denied the motion to dismiss.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the plaintiff, for the first time, requested leave to replead to assert a theory of successor liability if the motion to dismiss were granted. The Appellate Division reversed Special Term’s order and dismissed the complaint, implicitly denying the plaintiff’s request to replead. The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in implicitly denying the plaintiff’s request for leave to replead, given that the request was made for the first time on appeal and the plaintiff did not comply with CPLR 3211(e) by requesting such relief in their opposing papers at Special Term.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CPLR 3211(e) by not requesting leave to replead in their opposing papers at Special Term and did not adequately demonstrate good grounds to support a theory of successor liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division’s decision. The court emphasized that under CPLR 3211(e), a party opposing a motion to dismiss who desires leave to replead must set forth and support that request in their opposing papers. The court found that the plaintiff’s papers were missing allegations supporting a claim of successor liability under Schumacher v Richards Shear Co., which requires showing specific circumstances to support such a claim. The court stated, “In order to reverse the implicit refusal by the Appellate Division of leave to replead to plaintiff we would have to say that plaintiff’s papers, as a matter of law, necessarily satisfied that court that there was good ground to support a theory of successor liability (CPLR 3211, subd [e]) and, further, that the appellate court was required (again as a matter of law) to excuse compliance with the statutory mandate of inclusion of a request to replead in the opposing papers. We can do neither.” The Court distinguished Sanders v. Schiffer, noting that in that case, the plaintiffs had complied with the statutory requirement by requesting permission to replead in their attorney’s affidavit opposing the motion to dismiss.

  • Foley v. D’Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60 (1964): Granting Leave to Replead After Failure to State a Cause of Action

    Foley v. D’Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60 (1964)

    A party may be granted leave to replead even after failing to request it in initial opposition papers, provided they can demonstrate evidentiary facts supporting a valid claim in a proposed amended complaint.

    Summary

    This case concerns the right to replead after a complaint has been dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals held that even though the appellants did not initially request leave to replead, they could still apply to the Special Term for such leave. This opportunity is contingent upon the appellants submitting a proposed amended complaint, accompanied by evidentiary facts, demonstrating a valid claim that would justify the granting of leave to replead. This decision balances the need for judicial efficiency with the principle that parties should have a fair opportunity to present their case if they possess sufficient evidence to support a valid claim.

    Facts

    The specific facts underlying the original complaint are not detailed in this brief memorandum opinion. However, the core issue stemmed from the dismissal of the appellants’ complaint for failure to state a cause of action and the cancellation of a related notice of pendency.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of motions to dismiss the complaint and cancel the notice of pendency. The appellants did not state a desire to plead again in their opposing papers. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, affirming the dismissal but without prejudice to the appellants’ right to apply for leave to serve an amended complaint at Special Term.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party, whose complaint has been dismissed for failing to state a cause of action and who did not initially request leave to replead, can subsequently apply for such leave by demonstrating evidentiary facts supporting a valid claim in a proposed amended complaint?

    Holding

    Yes, because even though the appellants did not initially request leave to replead, they should be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate their right to relief if there are evidentiary facts which would warrant recovery under the applicable principles of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the original complaint failed to state a cause of action. However, the court emphasized that if the appellants possessed evidentiary facts that could warrant recovery under relevant legal principles, they should have the opportunity to present those facts. The court allowed the appellants to apply to the Special Term for leave to serve an amended complaint. This application must include a copy of the proposed amended complaint and a disclosure of the evidentiary facts supporting the claims. The court explicitly referenced CPLR 3211, subd [e], indicating reliance on statutory authority governing motions to dismiss and the potential for amendment. The decision reflects a balance between adherence to procedural rules and ensuring fairness in litigation. Even though the appellants did not initially seek leave to replead, the court recognized the possibility that they could possess a valid claim supported by evidence that was not adequately presented in the original complaint. The court stated, “Nonetheless, if there are evidentiary facts which would warrant recovery under the applicable principles of law, appellants should be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate their right to relief.” This demonstrates the court’s intent to allow a party to pursue a potentially valid claim if they can provide sufficient evidentiary support, even if they initially failed to request leave to replead. The court’s decision underscores the importance of presenting concrete evidentiary facts to support legal claims and highlights the availability of procedural mechanisms to correct pleading deficiencies, provided that a party can demonstrate a reasonable basis for doing so.