New York Law Review

Tag: lay witness testimony

  • In re Enrique D., 23 N.Y.3d 942 (2014): Admissibility of Lay Witness Testimony in Civil Management Proceedings

    In re Enrique D., 23 N.Y.3d 942 (2014)

    In civil management proceedings under Mental Hygiene Law article 10, a respondent has the right to call and examine material and relevant lay witnesses, not just expert witnesses, to rebut evidence presented regarding their alleged mental abnormality and predisposition to commit sex offenses.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a trial court erred in precluding a lay witness from testifying in a civil management proceeding brought against Enrique D., who had a history of sex offenses. The State argued that Enrique D. suffered from a mental abnormality that predisposed him to commit sex offenses. Enrique D. sought to introduce testimony from a former girlfriend to show he did not exhibit a fixation on non-consenting women and could control his sexual behavior. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the witness, as her testimony was relevant to rebut the State’s expert’s diagnosis. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Facts

    Enrique D. had an extensive history of sex offenses and was nearing release from prison after serving a sentence for attempted sexual abuse. Prior to his release, the State of New York commenced a civil management proceeding against him under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The State’s expert diagnosed Enrique D. with paraphilia, specifically sexual arousal by forcing unwilling women to engage in sexual conduct, and testified he was unable to control his sex-offending behavior. Enrique D.’s attorney sought to call a former girlfriend, Naomi N., to testify that Enrique D. never offended or attempted to offend against her and respected her boundaries.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Enrique D.’s request to call Naomi N. as a witness, stating that her testimony could be presented through Enrique D.’s expert. The jury found that Enrique D. suffered from a mental abnormality. The Supreme Court then adjudged him a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals granted Enrique D. leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the respondent from calling a lay witness to testify in his defense during a civil management proceeding under Mental Hygiene Law article 10.

    Holding

    Yes, because Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(g) grants a respondent in an article 10 proceeding the right to call and examine other witnesses and produce other evidence in his or her behalf, and the proposed witness’s testimony was relevant to the issues to be resolved, particularly the State expert’s diagnosis of paraphilia NOS—non-consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(g) explicitly grants a respondent the right to call witnesses in their defense, and this right is not limited to expert witnesses. The key consideration is whether the witness, expert or lay, has material and relevant evidence to offer. The Court found that Naomi N.’s testimony was relevant to the State’s expert’s diagnosis of paraphilia NOS—non-consent. The jury had to determine whether Enrique D. suffered from a condition that predisposed him to commit sex offenses and whether that condition caused him serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending conduct. Naomi N.’s testimony would have called into question whether Enrique D. exhibited a long-standing fixation on non-consenting women and whether he experienced difficulty controlling his sexual behavior. The Court stated, “[T]he pertinent question is whether a witness—expert or lay—has material and relevant evidence to offer on the issues to be resolved.” By precluding Naomi N.’s testimony, the trial court prevented Enrique D. from presenting potentially exculpatory evidence directly relevant to the key issues in the case.

  • People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256 (1896): Admissibility of Lay Witness Testimony on Sanity

    People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256 (1896)

    A lay witness may testify to specific observed facts relating to a person’s sanity and characterize those acts as rational or irrational, but cannot offer a general opinion on whether the person’s mind is sound or unsound.

    Summary

    Barberi was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting Charles McFarlane. His primary defense was insanity. He presented both lay and expert witnesses to support his claim. The prosecution countered with evidence of Barberi’s actions and expert testimony asserting his sanity. A key point of contention on appeal was the trial court’s exclusion of certain questions posed to a lay witness regarding Barberi’s rationality. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, clarifying the permissible scope of lay witness testimony on the issue of sanity. They affirmed the conviction because there was enough evidence and the judge’s instructions to the jury were fair.

    Facts

    Barberi fatally shot Charles McFarlane in the Criminal Court building in New York City. The shooting occurred because McFarlane, an agent of the Anti-Policy Society, had previously prosecuted Barberi for violating policy laws. Barberi was aware McFarlane would be at the courthouse that day. Barberi waited for McFarlane, approached him, and shot him multiple times. After his arrest, Barberi expressed a lack of remorse and stated a preference for the electric chair over jail.

    Procedural History

    Barberi was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial, he pleaded insanity as his defense. The jury found him guilty. Barberi appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain questions to a lay witness and in a question posed by the court to an expert witness, among other things. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in excluding questions posed to a lay witness regarding the defendant’s rationality.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in asking a specific question of the expert witness, Dr. Van Giesen, based on another witness’s testimony, to test his opinion of Barberi’s insanity.

    Holding

    1. No, because lay witnesses can only characterize specific actions as rational or irrational, not offer general opinions on a person’s sanity. Moreover, the court later allowed the witness to be recalled for further questioning, negating any earlier error.
    2. No, because the question was relevant to assessing the expert’s opinion and did not prejudice the defendant, especially since the defense was later given an opportunity to clarify the expert’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the lay witness testimony, the Court emphasized the established rule that a lay witness may only testify about specific facts within their knowledge related to the defendant’s sanity and then characterize those acts as rational or irrational. The Court explicitly stated that, “He may not, however, express an opinion upon the general question whether the mind of the individual was sound or unsound. The opinion of witnesses who are not experts on the general question of the state of a prisoner’s mind and his mental condition, is inadmissible.” The questions posed to the lay witness sought a general opinion on Barberi’s rationality, which is inadmissible from a non-expert. The Court also noted that any potential error was cured because the trial judge allowed the defendant’s counsel to recall the witness and ask the previously excluded questions, an opportunity that was declined.

    Regarding the question posed to Dr. Van Giesen, the Court found no reversible error. Although the question was based on the testimony of another witness and aimed at testing the expert’s opinion, it was within the bounds of permissible examination. Additionally, the defense was given ample opportunity to clarify Dr. Van Giesen’s testimony and address any potential ambiguities or misinterpretations. The court reasoned that the question was not improper and the defense had the chance to clarify the expert’s answer, thus any perceived error was not prejudicial.