New York Law Review

Tag: Larceny

  • People v. Zinke, 89 N.Y.2d 243 (1996): Defining ‘Owner’ in Robbery and Larceny Cases

    People v. Zinke, 89 N.Y.2d 243 (1996)

    In robbery and larceny cases, the term “owner” refers to someone with a possessory right to the property superior to that of the taker, but does not automatically extend to anyone who attempts to prevent a theft without having a pre-existing claim or custodial duty regarding the property.

    Summary

    Zinke was convicted of robbery and petit larceny for forcibly stealing boots from a mall security guard (Davis), who the indictment identified as the “owner.” The boots were stolen from a store unaffiliated with the mall. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the robbery and petit larceny convictions, holding that Davis was not the “owner” of the boots because he did not have a possessory right superior to Zinke’s. The Court emphasized that merely attempting to stop a theft does not automatically create ownership rights in the stolen property.

    Facts

    Zinke and an accomplice stole a carton of Timberland boots from Mr. Lee’s Men’s Shop. They carried the boots into the nearby Gertz Mall. Frank Davis, a mall security guard, saw Zinke and his accomplice with the box of boots and stopped them. Zinke claimed the box was theirs but couldn’t produce a receipt. Zinke and his accomplice started transferring the boots to a bag. Davis radioed for assistance and tried to stop them from leaving. Zinke displayed a box cutter and threatened Davis. Zinke and his accomplice ran from the mall but were later apprehended by police officers.

    Procedural History

    Zinke was charged with first-degree robbery, petit larceny, and menacing. At trial, Zinke moved to dismiss the robbery and larceny charges, arguing that Davis was not the owner of the boots. The trial court denied the motion, and Zinke was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the robbery and petit larceny convictions, finding that the People failed to prove that Davis had a right of possession superior to Zinke’s. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a mall security guard who attempts to stop a suspected theft of property from a store unaffiliated with the mall qualifies as an “owner” of the property for purposes of robbery and larceny statutes, based solely on his attempt to prevent the theft.

    Holding

    1. No, because the security guard did not have a possessory right to the boots superior to that of the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that robbery and larceny require a taking of property “from an owner thereof,” and ownership includes anyone with a right to possession superior to that of the taker. However, the Court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that a thief’s lack of ownership automatically makes anyone who tries to stop them an owner. The Court distinguished the case from prior holdings, noting that here, no special relationship or prior possessory interest existed between the security guard and the stolen boots. The guard’s actions, without more, did not create a superior right of possession. Relying on Foulke v. New York Consol. R. R. Co., the People argued that Davis was a gratuitous bailee, but the Court stated that the passenger/common carrier relationship was crucial to the creation of the bailment. In the present case, there was no relationship between the true owner and the security guard that could have given rise to a duty on the guard’s behalf to become a bailee of the property. The court further reasoned that “[l]abeling the security guard an owner would expand the crime of robbery beyond the definitional limits imposed by the common law and the Legislature.”

  • People v. McDonald, 88 N.Y.2d 281 (1996): Establishing Larceny Through Medicaid Fraud with Unambiguous Billing Codes

    People v. McDonald, 88 N.Y.2d 281 (1996)

    When a professional billing code has a clear, technically defined meaning within a specific profession, using alternative methods not meeting that definition to obtain reimbursement constitutes larceny.

    Summary

    Defendants McDonald and Strogov, podiatrists, were convicted of grand larceny for submitting Medicaid claims under a billing code (90473) for custom-made orthotics. The prosecution argued that the code required a three-dimensional cast of the patient’s feet, while the defendants used less accurate two-dimensional methods. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the term “casting” had a universally recognized meaning within podiatry, requiring a three-dimensional mold. Submitting claims without meeting this standard, therefore, demonstrated larcenous intent, especially given additional evidence of intentional misrepresentation.

    Facts

    McDonald and Strogov, participating podiatrists in the New York Medical Assistance Program, submitted claims under billing code 90473 for “Foot mold, balance inlay support (casting and fabrication).” Instead of creating three-dimensional casts of patients’ feet, as the prosecution contended the code required, they used tracings or pressure imprints. These methods involved sending a two-dimensional outline or footprint to a laboratory that supplied prefabricated stock orthotics, rather than custom-made devices based on a three-dimensional mold. The maximum reimbursement under the code was $46.

    Procedural History

    McDonald was convicted in a jury trial of grand larceny and offering a false instrument for filing. Strogov was convicted of grand larceny in a bench trial. Both defendants appealed their convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding the billing code unambiguous. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Medicaid billing code 90473, using the phrase “casting and fabrication,” unambiguously requires the creation of a three-dimensional cast or mold of the patient’s feet.

    2. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants submitted claims under code 90473 with larcenous intent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the term “casting” has a universally recognized meaning within the podiatric profession to require a three-dimensional cast or mold.

    2. Yes, because the act of submitting claims under code 90473 without creating a cast or mold constitutes circumstantial evidence of larcenous intent, and additional evidence of intentional misrepresentation existed in both cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the term “casting” has a well-established meaning within the podiatric profession, referring to the creation of a three-dimensional cast or mold. Expert testimony confirmed this understanding. The court reasoned that billing codes intended for professional use can rely on technical terms understood within the relevant profession. “As the podiatry fee schedule is intended for use by members of the podiatric profession, the use of technical terms recognized by the profession to describe the scope of permissible work that can be billed under code 90473 provides an explicit and nonarbitrary standard for enforcement of proper Medicaid billing practices and imposing criminal responsibility for flagrant violations thereof.” Because the defendants used methods that did not meet the definition of “casting,” their actions constituted circumstantial evidence of intent to defraud. In McDonald’s case, a former partner testified they knowingly billed for custom-made orthotics when they provided prefabricated devices. In Strogov’s case, an intern was instructed to falsify patient charts to indicate that casts were made. This additional evidence further supported the conclusion of larcenous intent. The court stated, “in each case, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the fact finder’s conclusion that defendants’ improper billing was done with criminal intent.”

  • People v. Jensen, 86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995)

    A grand jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for each element of the charged offense, but the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining the “legal sufficiency” of the evidence, without weighing the proof or examining its adequacy.

    Summary

    Michael Jensen was indicted on charges including petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault after an incident involving the theft of a dorm chair. He was stopped by campus police while carrying a lounge chair, admitted to taking it as a prank, and then resisted arrest, injuring an officer. The County Court dismissed the indictment, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding the Grand Jury evidence was sufficient to indict on all counts. The court reasoned that larcenous intent could be inferred, the arrest was based on probable cause, and the assault occurred while preventing a lawful duty.

    Facts

    At 3:13 A.M. on November 6, 1992, Cornell University Public Safety Officers observed Michael Jensen carrying a dormitory lounge chair on his head. Jensen admitted to taking the chair from a residence hall as a prank. He refused to identify himself or confirm if he was a student. After repeated requests for identification, Jensen eventually reached for his pocket, but an officer attempted to retrieve the ID instead. Jensen slapped the officer’s hand away and fled. During the pursuit, Officer Zoner was injured when Jensen dragged her down a gorge slope as he attempted to escape.

    Procedural History

    Jensen was indicted on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault. The County Court granted Jensen’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating all charges. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient for the Grand Jury to infer larcenous intent, probable cause for arrest, and intent to prevent a lawful duty, causing physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard that a Grand Jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, including all elements of the crime and reasonable cause to believe the accused committed the offense. The court stated, “[L]egally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court emphasized its review is limited to ascertaining legal sufficiency, without weighing the proof. The court found that the Grand Jury could rationally infer larcenous intent from Jensen’s actions of carrying the chair at 3:13 A.M., his admission that the chair did not belong to him, and his evasive behavior. The court reasoned that there was probable cause to arrest Jensen for larceny, thus justifying the charge of resisting arrest. Finally, there was legally sufficient evidence that Jensen intended to prevent Officer Zoner from performing a lawful duty, causing her physical injury, thus supporting the charge of second-degree assault. The dissent argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of larceny or the lawfulness of the arrest, and the officer’s injury stemmed from the officer’s own misconduct. The dissent noted, “[T]here must still be a showing that the underlying police conduct was lawful.”

  • McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989): Double Jeopardy and Federal vs. State Prosecutions

    McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989)

    Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections, a prior federal conspiracy conviction for stealing funds does bar a subsequent state prosecution for larceny based on the same underlying theft, as the federal government is not considered “another state” under CPL 40.20(2)(g).

    Summary

    Thomas McNeil was indicted in New York for grand larceny. He had previously been convicted in federal court for conspiracy to transport stolen property interstate, based on the same underlying theft. McNeil sought to dismiss the state charges, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state prosecution was barred. The Court reasoned that the federal conviction was based on the same criminal transaction as the state charges, and that the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), which allows prosecution for a “result offense” after a conspiracy prosecution in “another state”, did not apply to prior federal prosecutions. Therefore, the writ of prohibition barring Thomas McNeil’s prosecution was granted.

    Facts

    Thomas McNeil and his brother were charged in New York with stealing funds from their respective companies, Triad and Everest. Prior to being apprehended on the state charges, McNeil was indicted federally for interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy to commit that crime, for stealing funds from Triad and Everest and transporting them to Switzerland. McNeil pleaded guilty to the federal charges. He was then arraigned on the State charges.

    Procedural History

    McNeil moved to dismiss the state charges based on statutory double jeopardy grounds (CPL 40.20). The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding an exception applied. McNeil then sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division to prevent the state prosecution, but the Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal transaction, triggering double jeopardy protections under CPL 40.20(2)?
    2. Whether the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), for conspiracy prosecutions in “another state,” applies to prior federal conspiracy convictions, thus permitting the state prosecution?
    3. Whether the exceptions in CPL 40.20(2)(a) or (b) apply, permitting the state prosecution despite the federal conviction?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the federal conspiracy charge encompassed the same underlying theft that formed the basis of the state larceny charges.
    2. No, because the term “another state” in CPL 40.20(2)(g) does not include the federal government.
    3. No, because the offenses did not have substantially different elements, and the statutes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the federal conspiracy charge, which included the theft of funds as an overt act, was part of the same criminal transaction as the state larceny charges. The court emphasized that “the significant inquiry is not what overt acts were actually charged as part of the conspiracy but whether ‘the particular activity for which the State seeks to hold defendants responsible could have been alleged to support the [Federal] conspiracy charge’” (citing People v. Abbamonte). The Court rejected the argument that the federal and state prosecutions were not based on the same criminal transaction, stating that the conspiracy count charged the very conduct that constitutes the crime of larceny.

    Regarding CPL 40.20(2)(g), the Court held that the plain language of the statute limits the exception to prior prosecutions in “another state,” which does not include the federal government. The Court reasoned that when the Legislature intends to broaden the scope of an exception to the double jeopardy bar, it does so explicitly, as seen in other subdivisions of CPL 40.20(2). The court stated, “[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is to be construed ‘according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.’”

    The Court also rejected the People’s argument that CPL 40.20(2)(a) and (b) permitted the state prosecution. It found that the acts establishing the state and federal offenses were not clearly distinguishable. The Court stated, “it is the same theft ‘charged and proved and for which a conviction was had’” that constitutes the state larceny charges. Additionally, the Court held that the federal and state offenses were designed to prevent the same evils (theft and protecting property owners), thus making the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b) inapplicable.

  • People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989): Larceny and Enforcement of Default Judgments

    People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989)

    Taking money pursuant to a default judgment, even if the judgment is later found to be jurisdictionally defective due to improper service, does not constitute larceny unless the defendants misrepresented the facts to the court.

    Summary

    Defendants, attorneys, obtained a default judgment against Prior for unpaid legal fees. Prior’s bank account was levied to satisfy the judgment. Prior had been part of a communal group and had lived at a group-owned apartment. She moved out, allegedly without informing the group of her new address and attempting to conceal it. The defendants served the summons at the group address, although service may have been improper. The People charged the attorneys with larceny, arguing they knew service was defective and the judgment was invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict, holding that enforcing a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally flawed, does not automatically constitute larceny absent misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    Mia Prior was a member of a communal group for 10 years, during which time she received benefits, including legal assistance. Defendant Foster, also a member and an attorney, assisted her with legal issues related to her father. After her father’s death in 1984, Prior inherited a trust and decided to leave the group. A dispute arose over Foster’s legal fees. Prior moved out of the group’s apartment at 415 East 12th Street and allegedly concealed her new address. Foster, represented by codefendant Paolo, sued Prior for unpaid fees and served a summons at the East 12th Street address, claiming it was Prior’s “last known residence”. The service arguably violated CPLR 308(2). A default judgment was entered, and Prior’s bank account was levied for over $7,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. A jury found the defendants guilty, but the trial court set aside the verdict, reasoning that the judgment was valid when executed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the conviction, holding that obtaining a judgment with knowledge of improper service and intent to deprive property constitutes larceny. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether obtaining money pursuant to a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally defective due to improper service and the defendant’s knowledge of the defect, constitutes larceny.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court when applying for the default judgment. The Court reasoned that merely obtaining a judgment known to be defective is not sufficient for a larceny conviction; there must be evidence of fraud or misrepresentation to the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court. While the affidavit of service contained the legal conclusion that service was “duly made,” the affidavits also disclosed that service was made at Prior’s “last known residence” and mailed to the same address, which, on its face, reveals a potential defect under CPLR 308(2). The court distinguished the case from others where defendants obtained court orders through forgery, perjury, or other factual misrepresentations. The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that taking money under a void order constitutes larceny under Penal Law § 155.05(1). However, the Court stated this section is not a “catchall” for acts not specifically prohibited by the Legislature. The Court cited the reluctance to elevate civil wrongs to criminal larceny, especially in business activities where intent is unclear. The Court noted the need for specific legislative action to criminalize such conduct, including safeguards against abuse. “Conduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes”. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has generally identified prohibited conduct quite specifically and provided some additional safeguard, such as the corroboration requirement for perjury. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not larceny as defined by the Legislature and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Garland, 69 N.Y.2d 144 (1987): Tenant’s Right to Occupy Apartment is Property for Larceny Purposes

    People v. Garland, 69 N.Y.2d 144 (1987)

    A tenant’s legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or statute, constitutes “property” within the meaning of New York’s larceny statutes.

    Summary

    Defendant Garland was convicted of conspiracy and attempted grand larceny for attempting to deprive tenants of their rights to occupy their apartments through extortion. Garland argued that a tenant’s right to occupancy is not “property” under Penal Law § 155.00 (1), and thus, his actions were not criminal. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a tenant’s right to possess and occupy an apartment, whether through a lease or statutory protections like rent control, does constitute “property” under the larceny statutes. The Court emphasized that “property” includes any thing of value and that a tenant’s right to occupancy falls within this definition. The Court also noted that the interest need not be transferable to constitute property.

    Facts

    Defendant Garland, acting as an agent for the owner of an apartment building, engaged in a conspiracy to steal tenants’ rights to occupy their apartments. This was done through extortion tactics. The specific rights at issue included rights arising from leases, rent control laws, and rent stabilization laws. The prosecution argued that Garland’s actions constituted attempted grand larceny because he was trying to steal something of value from the tenants.

    Procedural History

    Garland was convicted after a nonjury trial of conspiracy in the fourth degree and two counts of attempted grand larceny in the first degree. He appealed, challenging the fundamental basis of the larceny-related charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Garland then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tenant’s right to occupy and possess an apartment constitutes “property” as defined by Penal Law § 155.00 (1) for the purposes of larceny statutes.

    Holding

    Yes, because a tenant’s legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or under statute, is a thing of value and thus falls within the definition of “property” under Penal Law § 155.00 (1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on the broad definition of “property” in Penal Law § 155.00 (1), which includes “any money, personal property, real property, computer data, computer program, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value”. The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Spatarella, 34 N.Y.2d 157 (1974), which held that a contractual right to service a restaurant was “property” for purposes of larceny by extortion, even if it was an intangible business relationship. The Court reasoned that when a lease is entered into, a landlord transfers the sole and exclusive right to possession to the tenant. Furthermore, rent-controlled and rent-stabilized tenants have a statutory right to continued possession. The court explicitly stated that “Tenants who have a legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or under statute, own ‘property’ as defined by Penal Law § 155.00 (1)”. The Court also dismissed the argument that an interest must be transferable to constitute property, citing Spatarella. The court’s decision underscores a broad interpretation of “property” to protect various rights and interests from theft and extortion.

  • People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32 (1986): Collateral Estoppel and Admissibility of Evidence After Mixed Verdicts

    People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32 (1986)

    When a defendant is acquitted of some charges and convicted of others in a multi-count indictment, collateral estoppel does not automatically bar the introduction of evidence related to the acquitted charges in a retrial of the convicted charge, especially if the jury’s verdicts can be rationally reconciled based on factors other than a factual determination in the defendant’s favor.

    Summary

    Goodman was initially convicted of grand larceny but acquitted of murder and related charges. His larceny conviction was reversed on appeal. On retrial for larceny, the prosecution presented evidence related to the murder, which Goodman argued was barred by collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible. The court reasoned that the initial jury’s mixed verdict (acquittal on some charges, conviction on others) did not necessarily establish any ultimate fact in Goodman’s favor that would preclude the evidence. The court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of proving that the first jury necessarily resolved an issue in his favor, and that the jury’s verdict can be rationally explained.

    Facts

    Elodie Henschel was found murdered in her apartment, and two diamond rings were missing. Goodman, who knew Henschel, had discussed stealing her rings with an acquaintance, Shafran, even stating he would kill her to get them. Shafran testified that Goodman left their company near Henschel’s apartment, returning with blood on his clothes and the rings. Goodman later sold the rings. At the first trial, Shafran testified against Goodman who was convicted of larceny but acquitted of murder and related charges. That conviction was reversed and a second trial on the larceny charge ensued.

    Procedural History

    1. Goodman was initially convicted of grand larceny, but acquitted of other charges including murder, robbery, and burglary.

    2. The initial grand larceny conviction was reversed on appeal.

    3. On retrial for grand larceny, Goodman was again convicted. He appealed, arguing that the admission of evidence related to the murder charges violated double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles.

    4. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Goodman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether collateral estoppel bars the prosecution from introducing evidence related to charges for which the defendant was acquitted in a prior trial, when the defendant is being retried on a separate charge for which he was initially convicted?

    2. Whether evidence of a homicide and related circumstances is relevant and admissible in a trial for grand larceny, when the larceny involves property taken from the homicide victim?

    Holding

    1. No, because Goodman failed to demonstrate that the first jury necessarily resolved any factual issue in his favor that was essential to the larceny charge.

    2. Yes, because the evidence was relevant to establishing the elements of larceny, including the lack of consent from the victim and Goodman’s intent to commit the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that collateral estoppel applies in criminal proceedings, preventing the relitigation of issues already decided in a prior valid judgment. However, the court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of proving that the prior verdict necessarily resolved a specific factual issue in his favor. “The rule is not to be applied with a hypertechnical approach but with realism and rationality by examining all parts of the record of the prior proceeding and concluding from it whether a rational jury could have grounded its decision on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”

    In this case, the court found that the first jury’s acquittal on the murder charge did not necessarily mean they found that Goodman did not kill Henschel or that he was not present at the scene. The jury could have rationally concluded that Goodman committed the larceny but that the evidence linking him to the murder was insufficiently corroborated, as accomplice testimony required. Because the jury could have based its decision on lack of corroboration, rather than a factual finding in Goodman’s favor, collateral estoppel did not bar the evidence at the retrial. The court found that because the initial jury found Henschel had been killed, evidence supporting that theory was admissable in the second trial.

    The court also held that the evidence of the homicide was relevant to the larceny charge because it supported the prosecution’s theory that the rings were taken without Henschel’s consent. The court stated: “Defendant’s statement that he would kill Ms. Henschel in order to obtain the rings was similarly relevant to this prosecution because it revealed his intent to commit larceny and the gravity of that intention.” The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

  • People v. Matthews, 50 N.Y.2d 913 (1980): Necessity of Statutory Definitions in Larceny Jury Instructions

    People v. Matthews, 50 N.Y.2d 913 (1980)

    In a larceny case, failure to include statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, when requested, constitutes reversible error, regardless of whether the larcenous intent issue is unique or difficult.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and remitted the case to the Criminal Court. The court held that the trial judge’s failure to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, despite a request to do so, was reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Term’s reasoning that such definitions are only required when a “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue is present. The Court found that omitting these definitions could mislead the jury into believing any withholding, temporary or permanent, constitutes larceny.

    Facts

    The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was observed striking several women in the back of the head. Following this, he allegedly reached out and pulled an earring from a victim. The earring fell to the ground. By the time the defendant was arrested, both the victim and the earring had disappeared from the scene.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried in the Criminal Court, New York County, for attempted larceny. The trial judge did not include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, despite a request for their inclusion. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the statutory definitions were not required because there was no “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue present. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of the trial judge to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, when requested by the defense, constitutes reversible error in an attempted larceny case.

    Holding

    Yes, because the omission of the statutory definitions could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constitutes larceny.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge’s failure to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” (Penal Law § 155.00, subds 3, 4) was reversible error. The court emphasized that there is no requirement for a “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue to be present before such definitions must be provided to the jury. The court reasoned that without these definitions, the jury could have been misled into believing that any withholding, whether permanent or temporary, would constitute larceny. The court agreed with Justice Sandifer’s dissent in the Appellate Term, quoting that the omission “could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constituted larceny.” This highlights the importance of accurately conveying the legal meaning of key terms to the jury to ensure a fair trial. The court’s decision underscored the necessity of precise jury instructions, especially when dealing with elements of a crime that have specific statutory definitions. This ensures that the jury understands the specific intent required for a larceny conviction, avoiding the potential for convicting a defendant based on conduct that doesn’t meet the statutory requirements. The practical impact of this decision is that trial judges must include statutory definitions of key terms when requested, even if the case does not present particularly complex issues of intent. This provides a clearer framework for the jury to apply the law to the facts.

  • People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984): Consequences of Unreasonable Delay in Sentencing After Conviction

    People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984)

    An unreasonable delay in sentencing a defendant after conviction can result in a loss of jurisdiction by the court, requiring dismissal of the indictment, unless the delay is excusable due to the defendant’s actions or other good cause.

    Summary

    Drake, a state employee, was convicted of grand larceny for falsely claiming jury duty leave. Thirty-nine months passed between the guilty verdict and sentencing. The Court of Appeals held that this delay was presumptively unreasonable and could result in a loss of jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the indictment unless the delay was excusable. The court emphasized that the burden to explain and justify the delay rests with the prosecution and the court, not the defendant, and that unexplained delays are prejudicial to the defendant. The case was remitted to the trial court for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable.

    Facts

    Drake, a supervisor in the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance, was convicted of larceny for submitting a false time card claiming he was on jury duty when he was not. State employees received fully compensable leave for jury duty but were expected to work when court was not in session. Drake claimed for over 10 days of jury duty when he only served 4. As a result, he was unlawfully paid for six days of unauthorized leave time.

    Procedural History

    Drake was indicted by the Grand Jury and convicted of grand larceny in the third degree. Thirty-nine months later, he was sentenced to an unconditional discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Drake then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing insufficient evidence and unreasonable delay in sentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for larceny by false pretenses.
    2. Whether the 39-month delay between the guilty verdict and sentencing was an unreasonable delay that resulted in a loss of jurisdiction by the trial court.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant received money from the State in the form of salary because of the State’s reliance upon his false statements concerning jury service.
    2. Yes, because a 39-month delay is facially unreasonable. The case is remitted for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable; absent excusing facts, the indictment must be dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the larceny conviction, the court found the evidence sufficient. Even though Drake received the money before the false statements were made, the State relied on the false statements to avoid deducting money from a subsequent paycheck. The larceny was complete when Drake wrongfully received funds due to his false statements.

    Regarding the delay in sentencing, the court emphasized that sentence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay (CPL 380.30(1)). Failure to do so results in a loss of jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Weinstein v Haft, where the delay was at the defendant’s behest. Here, the 39-month delay was unexplained, with the court merely alluding to extrajudicial pleas for leniency. The court stated, “It is unexcusable delay that does so. If the delay is caused by legal proceedings or other conduct of the defendant which frustrates the entry of judgment, it is excusable.” In contrast, negligence by judicial or prosecutorial staff is not excusable.

    The court emphasized that the New York rule assumes the defendant has been prejudiced by unreasonable delay and does not require the defendant to demand sentencing. The burden rests solely with the State. Unless the delay is excused, it requires dismissal of the indictment.

    The court noted that “[s]peedy trial requirements focus upon the need for a prompt trial so that witnesses are available, possible exoneration is swift and the public’s interest in deliberate prosecution is fulfilled. After a defendant is convicted, the focus shifts to the defendant’s right to appeal, his eligibility for pardon and commutation of sentence, and, if a retrial becomes necessary, the danger that witnesses may be unavailable. Of equal significance in the need for timely sentencing is the public perception that prompt and certain punishment has been imposed upon a defendant found guilty, uninfluenced by legally irrelevant considerations.”

  • People v. Olivo, 428 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1981): Establishing Larceny in Self-Service Stores Before Exit

    People v. Olivo, 428 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1981)

    In the context of self-service stores, larceny can be established if a customer exercises control over merchandise that is wholly inconsistent with the store’s continued rights, even if the customer is apprehended before leaving the store.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a person could be convicted of larceny for shoplifting if apprehended with goods inside a store, before exiting. The Court held that a larceny conviction could be sustained even if the shoplifter was caught inside the store, provided that the customer’s actions demonstrated control over the merchandise inconsistent with the owner’s rights. The Court emphasized that the evolution of larceny law necessitates a focus on the defendant’s intent and exercise of dominion and control over the property, particularly within the context of self-service stores.

    Facts

    In People v. Olivo, the defendant concealed wrenches in his clothing while in a department store and was apprehended a few feet from the exit. In People v. Gasparik, the defendant removed the price tag and sensormatic device from a leather jacket, put it on, and headed toward the exit of the floor before being stopped. In People v. Spatzier, the defendant placed a book in his attaché case while in a bookstore, and an altercation ensued when he was accused of stealing.

    Procedural History

    In all three cases, the defendants were convicted of petit larceny. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Term. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals due to the common legal issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish the elements of larceny when the shoplifter was apprehended inside the store, before exiting.

    Holding

    Yes, because in the context of self-service stores, a taking can be established by evidence that a customer exercised control over merchandise wholly inconsistent with the store’s continued rights, even without leaving the store.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court traced the evolution of larceny from common law to modern statutes, noting that the emphasis has shifted from a trespassory taking to the intent and exercise of dominion and control over the property. The Court acknowledged that self-service stores invite customers to handle merchandise, thus implying consent to possession for a limited purpose. However, this consent does not preclude a larceny conviction if the customer’s actions are inconsistent with the owner’s rights.

    The Court stated, “If the customer exercises dominion and control wholly inconsistent with the continued rights of the owner, and the other elements of the crime are present, a larceny has occurred. Such conduct on the part of a customer satisfies the ‘taking’ element of the crime.”

    The Court identified several factors that could demonstrate such control, including concealment of goods, furtive behavior, proximity to an exit, and possession of shoplifting devices.

    The court reasoned that it is impossible to delineate all situations establishing a taking, but any attending circumstance bearing on whether the shopper exercised control inconsistent with the owner’s rights is relevant.

    Applying these principles, the Court found sufficient evidence in each case to raise a factual question as to the defendants’ guilt. In Olivo, the defendant concealed goods and was near the exit. In Gasparik, the defendant removed the price tag and sensor and attempted to leave the floor. In Spatzier, the defendant concealed a book in his attaché case after looking furtively around.

    The Court concluded that a customer crossing the line between limited rights to handle merchandise and the store owner’s rights may be prosecuted for larceny. This rule supports the interests and operation of self-service shops.

    There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.