New York Law Review

Tag: Landlord-Tenant Law

  • Potter v. Furniture Mfrs. Bldg., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 205 (1971): Liability for Dangerous Conditions on Leased Premises

    Potter v. Furniture Mfrs. Bldg., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 205 (1971)

    A landlord is not liable for injuries sustained by a business invitee of a tenant on premises controlled by the tenant when the landlord could reasonably believe the tenant would remedy a temporary condition.

    Summary

    Marion Potter was injured when she tripped over a bed frame inside the furniture suite of Van Stee Corporation, a tenant of Furniture Manufacturers Building, Inc. Potter was a business invitee of Van Stee, brought to the suite by a retail dealer. The bed frame had been moved to the suite by Building employees after a furniture exposition. The Court of Appeals held that while Van Stee could be liable for negligence, the Building was not, because it was reasonable for the Building to assume that Van Stee would not leave the bed frame in a dangerous position for an extended period. The sole liability should rest on the party controlling the premises and responsible for the dangerous condition.

    Facts

    Furniture Manufacturers Building, Inc. (Building) owned a building leased to furniture manufacturers. Van Stee Corporation (Van Stee) leased a suite in the building. Van Stee also temporarily displayed furniture on the ninth floor for a furniture exposition held in September 1962. After the exposition, Building employees moved Van Stee’s displayed material, including a bed frame, from the ninth floor to Van Stee’s regular suite, placing the material just inside the entrance. It was Van Stee’s practice to allow retail dealers to bring retail customers into its suite. On December 29, 1962, Marion Potter, a retail customer, was brought to Van Stee’s suite by a retail dealer. Potter tripped over the bed frame and was injured. The incident occurred under circumstances of location, color, and lighting where a jury could find negligence on Van Stee’s part and a lack of negligence on Potter’s part. The material had been moved sometime between the end of September and November 15.

    Procedural History

    Potter sued both Van Stee and Building for her injuries. The trial court found both defendants liable. The appellate division affirmed. Building appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a building is liable for injuries sustained by a business invitee of a tenant on premises controlled by the tenant, when the injury is caused by a condition the owner could reasonably believe the tenant would remedy.

    Holding

    No, because in these circumstances the sole liability should rest on the party having control of the premises where the danger caused injury to its business invitee.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the responsibility of Van Stee and Building, stating that Mrs. Potter was in the premises as a business invitee of Van Stee. The court reasoned that Building, in returning the bed frame and other material to Van Stee’s suite, “would be justified in believing the material would not be left over a long period of time in position to become a danger to customers in premises which Van Stee controlled and used in its business.” Because the material was moved sometime between the end of September and November 15, and the accident occurred on December 29, the court concluded that “the sole liability should rest on the party having control of the premises where the danger caused injury to its business invitee.” The court emphasized Van Stee’s control over the premises and its responsibility for maintaining a safe environment for its business invitees. The decision highlights the importance of control over the premises in determining liability for injuries sustained due to dangerous conditions. It suggests that landlords are not automatically liable for injuries on leased premises, especially when they have reason to believe the tenant will address potential hazards.

  • Stern v. Equipping Corp. of America, 31 N.Y.2d 857 (1972): Landlord’s Options When Tenant Holds Over

    Stern v. Equipping Corp. of America, 31 N.Y.2d 857 (1972)

    Section 232-c of the Real Property Law alters the common-law rule regarding holdover tenancies by requiring acceptance of rent for tenancies longer than one month to create a holdover tenancy, absent an express or implied agreement otherwise.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the effect of Section 232-c of the Real Property Law on holdover tenancies in New York. The court held that merely remaining in possession after the lease expires for tenancies longer than one month does not automatically create a holdover tenancy unless the landlord accepts rent. The statute’s reference to “an agreement either express or implied” pertains solely to extending the holdover tenancy beyond a month-to-month basis. Without rent acceptance, the landlord’s remedies are limited to eviction and damages for use and occupation, but not an action for unpaid rent based on a unilaterally set amount.

    Facts

    Equipping Corp. of America (tenant) remained in possession of the premises after its lease term expired. The landlord, Stern, did not accept any rent from the tenant for the holdover period, nor was any rent offered by the tenant. Stern attempted to create a holdover tenancy and sue for nonpayment of rent based on a rent amount unilaterally fixed by Stern.

    Procedural History

    The landlord initiated an action for nonpayment of rent. The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s order was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Section 232-c of the Real Property Law, a landlord can create a holdover tenancy for a term longer than one month simply by the tenant remaining in possession after the lease expires, without the landlord accepting rent from the tenant during the holdover period?

    Holding

    No, because Section 232-c requires the landlord to accept rent from the holding-over tenant to create a holdover tenancy for tenancies longer than one month, absent an express or implied agreement to the contrary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that Section 232-c of the Real Property Law changed the common-law rule. The court stated that the statute “provides that the mere holding over by a tenant whose term is longer than one month does not allow the landlord to create a holdover tenancy without his acceptance of rent from the holding over tenant.” The court interpreted the phrase “unless an agreement either express or implied is made providing otherwise” to refer solely to the duration of the holdover tenancy, not to the fundamental requirement of rent acceptance to establish the tenancy itself. Since the landlord did not accept rent, no holdover tenancy was created. The court clarified that the landlord’s recourse is to remove the tenant and seek damages for both incidental losses and for the tenant’s use and occupation of the premises. Because there was no agreement on rent and no rent paid, there was no basis for an action for nonpayment of rent; “there being no tenancy in fact or at law obligating the tenant for such rent.” The court reinforced the necessity of actual agreement (or implied agreement through conduct such as rent acceptance) to bind the tenant to a new rental obligation. The decision reflects a policy favoring clear contractual obligations over implied tenancies, especially when dealing with commercial leases.

  • Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450 (1966): Contractual Indemnification for Active Negligence

    Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450 (1966)

    A contractual indemnification clause can provide indemnity for a party’s own active negligence if the contract language is sufficiently broad and unequivocal, demonstrating a clear intent by the parties to provide such coverage.

    Summary

    Mrs. Kurek, a tenant in a housing project, was injured by a defective washing machine in the building’s laundry room. She sued both the Housing Authority and the laundry service company. The Housing Authority cross-claimed against the laundry service for indemnity. The jury found both defendants liable, and the trial judge granted the Housing Authority’s contractual cross-claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the indemnification clause was broad enough to cover the Housing Authority’s own active negligence because the language of the contract demonstrated a clear intention to provide such coverage.

    Facts

    Mrs. Kurek, a tenant in a housing project operated by the Port Chester Housing Authority, was injured when a washing machine in the building’s laundry room unexpectedly restarted. The washing machines were owned and serviced by John Liammari, doing business as Westchester Metered Laundry Service. The Housing Authority received a monthly sum and a percentage of revenue for allowing the machines to be placed in the basement and for providing water and electricity.

    Procedural History

    Mrs. Kurek and her husband sued the Port Chester Housing Authority and John Liammari for personal injuries and loss of services. The Housing Authority cross-claimed against Liammari for indemnity based on a contractual provision and common-law right. The trial court found for the plaintiffs against both defendants and in favor of the Authority on its contractual cross-claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment upon a stipulation by the plaintiffs agreeing to accept a reduced judgment. The Court of Appeals granted further review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the verdict against both the Housing Authority and Liammari.

    2. Whether the trial judge was correct in allowing recovery on the cross-claim in favor of the Housing Authority, given that the Authority may have been actively negligent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could have reached its determination that the injury to the plaintiffs resulted from the negligence of both defendants.

    2. Yes, because the contractual indemnification clause was broad enough to cover the Authority’s own active negligence, given the unmistakable intent of the parties as expressed in the contract.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. Regarding the cross-claim, the court acknowledged that the Housing Authority’s negligence was considered “active,” precluding common-law indemnification. However, the court focused on the contractual indemnity clause, which stated that the Licensee (Liammari) would “hold the Authority and State of New York harmless against all claims and demands of persons not parties to this agreement, of whatsoever kind or nature, which may arise in connection with the installation, operation, maintenance, servicing, supervision, ownership and control of the Machines…or which may arise in the performance of this Contract.”

    The court emphasized that such clauses are strictly construed and that “contracts will not be construed to indemnify a person against his own negligence unless such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms” (Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 41). However, the court also cautioned against construing these provisions in a way that would render them meaningless, particularly where common-law indemnity would already apply to passive negligence. The Court noted prior cases like Jordan v. City of New York, 3 A.D.2d 507, 509, affd. 5 N.Y.2d 723, where indemnification was permitted even when the language didn’t expressly cover active negligence, because that was the parties’ clear intent.

    The court found the indemnification clause here sufficiently broad, covering “all claims and demands” of third persons “of whatsoever kind or nature” arising out of the machines’ operation and maintenance. The claim against the Authority arose from the operation and maintenance of the machine. Therefore, the agreement applied unless the court were to disregard the clear and unequivocal wording of the agreement. The court stated, “Unless we are to disregard the clear and unequivocal wording of this agreement and engraft an exception to the ‘claims * * * of whatsoever kind or nature’ for which indemnification is provided, the agreement must be held applicable here.”

  • Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc., 239 N.Y. 87 (1924): Liability of an Assignee for Lease Obligations Upon Taking Possession

    Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc., 239 N.Y. 87 (1924)

    An assignee of a lease, by taking possession of the leased property, becomes liable for the lease obligations, especially when the rent is already due and payable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the liability of a party who takes possession of leased property as an assignee but may not have explicitly assumed the obligations of the lease. The court determined that by taking possession of the leased property, especially when aware that the rental balance was already due, the assignee becomes liable for payment of the outstanding rent. This principle applies even without a formal assumption of the lease, based on the benefit derived from possessing the leased asset.

    Facts

    Aristocrat Restaurant leased property from Gillette Bros. At some point, Aristocrat Restaurant defaulted on the lease. Another party, having knowledge of the existing lease agreement and the outstanding rental balance, acquired the property and took possession of the leased assets. The new possessor, referred to as the appellant, retained possession of the leased property.

    Procedural History

    The lessor, Gillette Bros., sued the appellant for the accelerated balance of rent due under the lease. The lower court ruled in favor of Gillette Bros., holding the appellant liable for the rent. The appellate division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the appellate decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an assignee of a lease, who takes possession of the leased property with knowledge that the rental balance is already due, becomes liable for the payment of that rent, even without a formal assumption of the lease.

    Holding

    Yes, because by taking and retaining possession of the leased equipment with knowledge of the already due rental payments, the appellant became, in effect, an assignee of the lease and thereby bound to pay the accrued rent for the balance of the term.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the appellant’s act of taking possession of the leased property, knowing that the rent for the balance of the term was already due, created an implied assignment of the lease. The court relied on precedent, citing cases like Frank v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. and Mann v. Munch Brewery to support the principle that taking possession under these circumstances implies acceptance of the lease’s obligations. The court emphasized that there was no illegality in the acceleration clause that made the rent due before the appellant’s entry into possession. The court stated, “Regardless of whether appellant be deemed to have assumed the lessee’s obligations under this lease of air-conditioning equipment, the cases hold that having taken possession of the leased property under the circumstances disclosed by the record, appellant became at least an assignee, and, therefore, liable for payment of the accelerated balance of rent without assumption of the lease”. By retaining possession of the equipment, the appellant benefited from the lease and thus became obligated to fulfill its financial terms. This is consistent with the general principle that one cannot accept the benefits of a contract without also accepting its burdens.

  • Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 553 (1973): Landlord’s Non-Delegable Duty and Indemnification

    Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 553 (1973)

    A landlord has a non-delegable duty to provide safe ingress and egress for tenants, and this duty precludes indemnification from a contractor when the landlord’s own negligence contributes to the injury.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Rogers was injured while using a scaffold erected by a contractor, El-Mar Painting & Decorating Co., hired by the landlords, Dorchester Associates and Berman. Rogers sued both the contractor and the landlords. The Court of Appeals held that while Rogers was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the landlords were not entitled to indemnification from the contractor because the landlord had a nondelegable duty to use reasonable care in providing for a safe means of ingress to a tenant, and their failure to do so constituted negligence barring indemnity as joint tortfeasors.

    Facts

    Dorchester Associates and Berman (landlords) hired El-Mar Painting & Decorating Co. (contractor) to perform work on their property. Rogers (plaintiff) followed instructions from the painters (presumably employees of El-Mar) while mounting a scaffold. Rogers sustained injuries as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Rogers sued both the landlords and the contractor. The trial court found in favor of Rogers against all defendants. The trial court also granted judgment in favor of the landlords on their cross-claim against the contractor, seeking indemnification for any liability they had to Rogers. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the validity of the judgment against the landlords, specifically concerning the indemnification claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
    2. Whether the landlords were entitled to indemnification from the contractor for damages awarded to the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff followed the instructions of the painters in mounting the scaffold.
    2. No, because a landlord has a nondelegable duty to use reasonable care in providing for a safe means of ingress to a tenant, and failure to comply with that duty bars indemnity because the codefendants are joint tort-feasors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the plaintiff’s negligence, the court summarily cited precedent (Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., Meyer v. West End Equities, and Hamblet v. Buffalo Lib. Garage Co.) to support its conclusion that the plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law because they followed the instructions of the painters.

    Regarding the landlords’ claim for indemnification, the court emphasized the non-delegable duty of a landlord to provide safe access to tenants, citing Harrington v. 615 West Corp. The court further reasoned that the landlord employing the contractor must ensure precautions are taken to protect tenants, citing Sciolaro v. Asch and Dollard v. Roberts. The court stated, “To this duty is added the responsibility that the landlord, who employs the contractor to do work in a place where tenants are in the habit of passing, must see that necessary precautions are taken not to endanger the tenants.” The court reasoned that the landlord’s failure to meet this duty constitutes negligence, barring indemnification because both the landlord and the contractor participated in the wrong that caused the damage, making them joint tortfeasors. Citing Bush Term. Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., the court reiterated that there is no right of indemnity where codefendants participated in the wrong. The dissent argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish any negligence by the landlords.

  • MacDonald v. State Tax Commission, 293 N.Y. 263 (1944): Taxing Landlords for Providing Utilities

    MacDonald v. State Tax Commission, 293 N.Y. 263 (1944)

    A state tax on landlords’ gross operating income from the sale or furnishing of electricity and water to tenants does not violate the U.S. Constitution, even if it arguably singles out a specific group.

    Summary

    The executors of H. Mabel MacDonald’s estate, who owned a building and leased space to tenants while providing them with water and electricity, challenged the New York State Tax Commission’s determination that they were subject to a tax on their gross operating income from the sale of these utilities. The executors argued that the tax was unconstitutional because it was discriminatory and based on erroneous assumptions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the tax did not violate the U.S. Constitution, relying on prior decisions that upheld the statute against similar challenges under the New York Constitution.

    Facts

    The executors of the estate of H. Mabel MacDonald owned a four-story building at 115 Lenox Avenue in New York City. They leased stores, offices, and assembly rooms within the building. As part of the leases, the landlords furnished water and electricity to some of their tenants. The State Tax Commission determined that the landlords were subject to a tax under Section 186-a of the Tax Law on their gross operating income derived from furnishing electricity and water to their tenants.

    Procedural History

    The executors challenged the Tax Commission’s determination through Article 78 proceedings in the Civil Practice Act. The Appellate Division confirmed the Tax Commission’s determination. The executors appealed to the New York Court of Appeals from the order of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of a tax on the gross operating income of landlords derived from furnishing electricity and water to tenants, as per Section 186-a of the Tax Law, violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because it is discriminatory and based on erroneous assumptions.

    Holding

    No, because the principle of the tax’s constitutionality had been previously established in similar cases concerning the New York State Constitution, and those principles extend to challenges under the U.S. Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on its prior decisions in Matter of Lacidem Realty Corp. v. Graves, 288 N.Y. 354 and Matter of 436 W. 34th St. Corp. v. McGoldrick, 288 N.Y. 346. In those cases, the court rejected challenges to the same statute based on violations of the New York Constitution. The court found that the principles established in those cases were equally applicable to the U.S. Constitutional challenges raised in this case. The court did not offer extensive additional reasoning, but rather summarily affirmed the Appellate Division’s order based on the reasoning in the prior cases. The essence of the prior holdings was that the tax classification was reasonable and did not constitute an arbitrary or discriminatory singling out of landlords. The court acknowledged that the contentions regarding violations of the U.S. Constitution were properly raised, but ultimately found that the underlying principle remained the same. The court emphasized deference to the legislature’s power to create tax classifications, provided they bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose.

  • Walton v. Stafford, 162 N.Y. 558 (1900): Rent Due on Holiday Not Postponed

    Walton v. Stafford, 162 N.Y. 558 (1900)

    Rent due on a legal holiday (that is not a Sunday) is payable on that day, and is not automatically postponed to the next business day unless a statute specifically provides otherwise.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether rent due on a legal holiday is payable on that day or postponed to the next business day. The plaintiff, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, occupied a hotel leased by his assignor from the defendants. The lease stipulated rent was due on the first of each month. The defendants sought to counterclaim for January rent against the plaintiff’s claim for personal property sold to them. The court held that because January 1st was a legal holiday, the rent was still due that day. As the plaintiff only took possession on January 2nd, he was not liable for that month’s rent and the counterclaim failed.

    Facts

    Francis T. Walton leased the Grand Hotel from the Staffords, with rent payable monthly in advance on the first of each month.

    Walton made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors to the plaintiff on January 2, 1894.

    The plaintiff took possession of the hotel on January 2, 1894, and continued to occupy it until January 28, 1894.

    During January, the plaintiff collected rent from sub-tenants but did not pay rent to the Staffords.

    On January 27, 1894, the plaintiff sold personal property located on the premises to the defendants for $811.16.

    The Staffords initiated dispossess proceedings, and the plaintiff surrendered possession on January 28, 1894.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the Staffords to recover the $811.16 owed for the personal property sale.

    The Staffords counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff was liable for January rent and, after deducting the $811.16, owed them $3,348.84.

    The trial court heard the case based on stipulated facts.

    The Appellate Division’s judgment, presumably in favor of the plaintiff, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether rent due on January 1st, a legal holiday, was legally due and payable on that day, such that the assignor, and not the assignee, was responsible for its payment?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Court found no controlling authority or statute preventing rent falling due on a legal holiday (that is not a Sunday) from being treated as due and payable on that day.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the stipulation of facts explicitly stated that the January rent was due on January 1st. Even without that stipulation, the court found no legal basis to postpone the rent payment.

    The court reviewed the Statutory Construction Law (Laws 1892, ch. 677, § 27, as amended) and noted that while it addresses computation of time and the transaction of business in public offices regarding holidays, it does not affect the payment of rent.

    The court distinguished the rule for negotiable instruments, where payment is deferred to the next business day if the due date falls on a Sunday or holiday. This rule exists because banks are closed on holidays.

    The court stated, “We thus have holidays distinctly dealt with by the legislature as to computation of time in certain cases, as to the transaction of business in public offices and as to the falling due of commercial paper, but the matter of rent and its payment is unaffected by this legislation.”

    Because the rent was due on January 1st, and the assignee only took possession on January 2nd, no rent became due during the assignee’s occupancy. The rent was a debt owed by the assignor at the time of the assignment.

    The court rejected the argument that the assignee was liable for use and occupation, explaining that the landlord could have removed the assignor and assignee immediately for failure to pay the January rent. Because the assignee was removed before February 1st, no rent ever became due from him.

    The court cited Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. 52, 60, noting the assignee merely succeeded to the rights of his assignor.

  • O’Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N.Y. 156 (1890): Attornment to Tax Title Purchaser is Void

    O’Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N.Y. 156 (1890)

    An attornment by a tenant to a purchaser of a tax title is void because the tax title purchaser is considered a stranger to the original landlord’s title.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a tenant’s attornment to a tax title purchaser without the landlord’s consent. The New York Court of Appeals held that such attornment is void. The court reasoned that a tax title purchaser obtains title from the state, not from the original owner, and therefore, there is no privity between them. Because the tax title purchaser is a stranger to the original owner, the tenant’s attornment is invalid and does not affect the landlord’s possession. This decision clarifies the relationship between tax titles and existing tenancies, protecting landlords from losing possession due to unauthorized agreements.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, O’Donnell, owned property that was leased to a tenant named Bates. The defendant, McIntyre, obtained a tax title to the property and subsequently, Bates, the tenant, attorned to McIntyre. O’Donnell then brought suit, claiming McIntyre had no right to possession because Bates’ attornment was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that O’Donnell, as the original owner, had the right to use reasonable force to retain possession and eject McIntyre and that McIntyre had no right to remain after being told to leave. The defendant appealed, arguing that Bates’ attornment to McIntyre was valid. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the attornment of a tenant to a purchaser at a tax sale, without the consent of the landlord, is valid and affects the landlord’s possession.

    Holding

    No, because a purchaser at a tax sale is considered a stranger to the original owner’s title; therefore, the tenant’s attornment is void.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on a New York statute stating that “the attornment of a tenant to a stranger shall be absolutely void and shall not in any way affect the possession of his landlord” unless the landlord consents, it is pursuant to a judgment, or it is to a mortgagee after foreclosure. The court emphasized the distinction between a “stranger” and someone in “privity” with the original owner. It stated, “By privity is meant the mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property…”. The court reasoned that a tax title purchaser obtains title from the state, not from the original owner, establishing no privity between them. The court quoted Becker v. Howard, 66 N.Y. 5: “The purchaser is not subjected to any of the inconveniences of the old title, nor can he take any advantage from it. Covenants running with the land do not bind him, nor do him any good.” Because the tax title purchaser acquires the land free from prior encumbrances and obtains title from the state’s taxing power, they are considered a stranger to the original owner. Thus, the tenant’s attornment to the tax title purchaser was void, and the landlord’s right to possession remained unaffected. The court distinguished Hubbell v. Weldon, noting that privity and attornment were not issues in that case. The ruling protects the original landlord’s possessory rights against unauthorized actions by tenants who attorn to tax title purchasers.

  • Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863): Enforceability of a Lease Despite Landlord’s Lack of Title

    Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863)

    A tenant’s obligation to pay rent under a lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title to the property, especially where the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the tenant has not been evicted.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant can avoid paying rent by claiming the landlord had no valid title to the property. Smith (landlord) sued Wait (tenant) for unpaid rent under a two-year lease. Wait argued Smith lacked title and that a third party, Williams, had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The court held that Wait was obligated to pay rent because the lease implied a covenant of quiet enjoyment, which served as sufficient consideration, and because Wait had not alleged actual eviction from the premises. The court emphasized that the agreements for quiet enjoyment and rent payment were independent.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    1. Smith leased property to Wait for a two-year term in a written agreement, reserving rent payable quarterly.
    2. The written lease was not an indenture (a deed executed by both parties) but a parol demise (oral or simple written lease).
    3. Wait allegedly promised to pay the rent.
    4. Wait claimed Smith lacked any interest or estate in the property.
    5. A third party, Williams, obtained a judgment against Wait in a separate action to recover possession of the property.
    6. Wait did not allege that he had been evicted or deprived of possession as a result of Williams’ judgment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated from a suit by Smith against Wait for unpaid rent. Wait presented a defense claiming Smith lacked title and that Williams had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The lower court’s ruling on the demurrer is not specified, but the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on appeal from that ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tenant can refuse to pay rent based on the landlord’s alleged lack of title to the property when the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
    2. Whether a judgment obtained by a third party to recover possession constitutes a valid defense against rent payment when the tenant has not alleged actual eviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agreement for quiet enjoyment implied in the lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title and serves as sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent.
    2. No, because the tenant must plead and prove actual eviction from the premises to assert a valid defense against rent payment based on a third party’s claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the agreement to pay rent and the agreement for quiet enjoyment are independent covenants. The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment acts as a sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent, regardless of the landlord’s actual title. The court referenced The Mayor of New-York v. Mabie and Tone v. Brace to support the existence of an implied agreement for quiet enjoyment. Drawing on Whitney v. Lewis, the court highlighted that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is sufficient consideration even if the grantor lacks title.

    Furthermore, the court stated that to properly plead an eviction as a defense, the tenant must allege an actual eviction or expulsion from the premises and being kept out of possession until after the rent became due. Simply stating that a third party obtained a judgment to recover possession is insufficient. As the court noted, “In pleading an eviction, the plea must state an eviction or expulsion of the tenant from the demised premises, and the keeping him out of possession until after the rent became due; otherwise it is bad.”

    The court underscored the principle that without a deed executed by both parties or an actual entry, the strict landlord-tenant relationship might not exist, but the independent agreement for quiet enjoyment remains enforceable.