New York Law Review

Tag: Landfill Expansion

  • Jones v. Town of Carroll, 15 N.Y.3d 141 (2010): Establishing Vested Rights for Landfill Expansion

    Jones v. Town of Carroll, 15 N.Y.3d 141 (2010)

    A landowner with a pre-existing, permitted landfill operation has a vested right to expand that operation on the entire parcel, even if only a portion was actively used before a restrictive zoning ordinance was enacted, provided they demonstrate an intent to use the entire parcel for that purpose.

    Summary

    Donald and Carol Jones were granted a special use variance in 1989 to operate a construction and demolition (C&D) landfill on their 50-acre property. They obtained a DEC permit for a small portion of the land. In 2005, the Town of Carroll enacted a zoning law restricting landfill expansion. The Joneses sued, arguing their prior variance established a right to use the entire parcel. The New York Court of Appeals held that because landfill operations are akin to mining, where the land itself is a resource, the Joneses had a vested right to use the entire property as a landfill, contingent upon continued DEC approval, as their actions demonstrated an intent to use the whole parcel for that purpose before the restrictive zoning law was enacted. The 2005 local law could not extinguish their legal right.

    Facts

    In 1984, Donald and Carol Jones purchased 50 acres in the Town of Carroll. In 1989, the Town granted them a special use variance for a C&D landfill on the entire property, subject to DEC regulation. Subsequently, the Joneses obtained a DEC permit to operate the landfill on a portion of the land (initially two acres, later expanded to three). The landfill operated as an active business. The Joneses dedicated areas around the landfill for related purposes, purchased heavy equipment, employed a dozen people, developed expansion plans, and discussed future operations with investors.

    Procedural History

    In 2005, the Town enacted a zoning law restricting landfill expansion. The Joneses sued, seeking a declaration that the new law did not apply to their property. Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the Joneses. The Appellate Division modified, denying summary judgment and vacating the declaration, finding the law applicable since the DEC permit covered only three acres and the remaining acreage was merely a contemplated future expansion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner with a special use variance for a landfill on their entire property, but with a DEC permit covering only a portion, has a vested right to utilize the entire property for landfill operations, thereby precluding the application of a subsequently enacted zoning law restricting landfill expansion.

    Holding

    Yes, because the operation of a landfill is similar to mining, where the land itself is a resource, and the landowners demonstrated an intent to use the entire parcel for that purpose before the restrictive zoning law was enacted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its precedents in Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga, and Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, which addressed vested rights in mining operations. The Court extended the rationale of those cases to landfills, noting that landfills, like mines, involve the consumption of the land itself. The Court reasoned that landowners can reasonably be expected to hold land in reserve for future landfill expansion. The court stated, “As opposed to other nonconforming uses in which the land is merely incidental to the activities conducted upon it…the use of property as a landfill, like a mine, is unique because it necessarily envisions that the land itself is a resource that will be consumed over time.”

    The Court emphasized that the Town had previously acknowledged the suitability of the entire parcel for landfill use by granting the variance. The Joneses’ actions, such as purchasing equipment and developing expansion plans, further demonstrated their intent to use the entire property for landfill operations. The court concluded that limiting the vested right to the area covered by the DEC permit would be unreasonable. “The fact that the DEC permit covered only a limited area is not determinative of plaintiffs’ rights over the remaining 47 acres of the parcel… Instead, the factors to examine are whether the operation of a C & D landfill was a lawful use on the property prior to the enactment of the 2005 zoning law and whether plaintiffs’ activities before that time manifested an intent to utilize all of their property in a manner consistent with that purpose.”

  • New York Public Interest Research Group v. Town of Islip, 71 N.Y.2d 292 (1988): Defining Landfill Expansion Under Environmental Law

    71 N.Y.2d 292 (1988)

    The term “expansion” in the Long Island Landfill Closure Law (ECL 27-0704) refers to lateral, not vertical, increases in landfill size, and an order on consent entered in an enforcement proceeding is exempt from SEQRA review.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether modifying a consent order to allow a steeper slope and increased height at an existing landfill constitutes an “expansion” under the Long Island Landfill Closure Law and whether such modification requires compliance with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The Court of Appeals held that “expansion” refers to lateral, not vertical, increases in landfill size and that the consent order was exempt from SEQRA as it was part of an enforcement proceeding. This decision clarifies the scope of environmental regulations concerning landfill modifications and the applicability of SEQRA exemptions.

    Facts

    The Town of Islip operated the Blydenburgh Landfill since 1927. In 1980, the DEC issued a consent order requiring the Town to cease accepting refuse except for contouring and capping the landfill with a slope of 1 foot vertically to 6 feet horizontally. A 1987 consent order modified this, allowing a steeper slope (1 foot to 3 feet) and raising the maximum height to 300 feet. The order also permitted the burial of ash in area F. NYPIRG and the Board of Education challenged the 1987 order, arguing it violated the Long Island Landfill Closure Law (ECL 27-0704) and SEQRA.

    Procedural History

    NYPIRG commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the May 12, 1987 consent order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the dismissal, holding that ECL 27-0704(3) does not encompass vertical expansions and that the order was exempt from SEQRA. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the modifications to the consent order, allowing a steeper slope and increased height, constitute an “expansion” of an existing landfill under ECL 27-0704(3), thus requiring a public hearing and a finding that no other feasible means of solid waste management is available.

    2. Whether the consent order is subject to SEQRA requirements, or whether it falls under the exemption for “enforcement proceedings or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion” as defined in ECL 8-0105(5)(i).

    Holding

    1. No, because the term “expansion” in ECL 27-0704(3) refers to lateral, not vertical, increases in landfill size. The court reasoned that the statute’s language regarding “site preparation” indicates a focus on horizontal expansion.

    2. No, because the consent order was entered in an enforcement proceeding and thus falls within the SEQRA exemption under ECL 8-0105(5)(i).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that “expansion” in ECL 27-0704(3) should be interpreted in its statutory context and in accordance with the statute’s purpose. The court found that the statute’s reference to “site preparation” indicated a focus on lateral expansions, as vertical expansions would not require new site preparation. The court deferred to the DEC’s interpretation of “expansion” as referring only to lateral extensions, citing the agency’s technical expertise. The court noted that the DEC consistently applied this interpretation. The court also considered the underlying purpose of the Long Island Landfill Closure Law, which is to protect Long Island’s aquifer and transition to resource recovery. The court concluded that the DEC’s interpretation was consistent with this purpose, as the DEC believed vertical expansions posed a lesser threat of leachate formation than lateral expansions.

    Regarding SEQRA, the court deferred to the DEC’s determination that the consent order was part of an enforcement proceeding, noting the history of enforcement efforts related to the landfill. The court cited the DEC’s regulation defining “exempt action” as including “civil or criminal enforcement proceedings” (6 NYCRR 617.2[q][1]). The court emphasized the Commissioner’s authority to take “such remedial measures as may be necessary or appropriate” (ECL 71-2727[1]).

    The dissenting opinion argued that the term “expansion” should be given its ordinary meaning, which includes both lateral and vertical growth. The dissent argued that the consent order materially altered the landfill’s capacity and should have been subject to a public hearing and a finding that no other feasible means of waste management was available. The dissent also questioned the DEC’s assertion that vertical expansions pose a lesser threat to groundwater, citing the Town’s own environmental impact statement that raised concerns about erosion and increased nuisances from vertical expansions.