New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law §240

  • Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972): Defining ‘Directing’ Under New York Labor Law §240

    Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972)

    For a general contractor to be liable under New York Labor Law §240 for injuries to a subcontractor’s employee, the contractor must have ‘directed’ the employee’s work, meaning there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work, not merely granting permission to use equipment.

    Summary

    Alberti, an employee of a painting subcontractor, was injured when he fell from scaffolding while working at a St. Lawrence University auditorium. He sued the general contractor, Bouse, claiming violations of Labor Law §240. Bouse had allowed the subcontractor to use scaffolding parts from its own supply. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Bouse did not ‘direct’ Alberti’s work. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that merely granting permission to use equipment does not constitute ‘directing’ within the meaning of Labor Law §240, which requires supervision of the manner and method of the work.

    Facts

    Alberti was employed by Svendsen Decorators, Inc., a subcontractor for John W. Bouse Construction Corp., the general contractor.
    Alberti was injured in a fall from a scaffold while painting the ceiling of an auditorium.
    Svendsen’s own scaffolding was not high enough to reach the ceiling.
    Svendsen asked Bouse’s superintendent for permission to use some of Bouse’s tubular scaffolding parts.
    Bouse’s superintendent granted permission, stating Svendsen could use the scaffolding.
    There was no agreement for Bouse to supply the scaffolding nor any direction from Bouse on how to use it. It was simply permission.

    Procedural History

    Alberti sued Bouse, alleging common-law negligence and absolute liability under Labor Law §240.
    Alberti elected to proceed solely on the theory of absolute liability under Labor Law §240, dismissing the common-law negligence claim.
    The trial court dismissed the complaint, relying on Galbraith v. Pike & Son, finding no supervision, control, or contractual obligation by Bouse to provide scaffolding.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Labor Law §240, a general contractor ‘directs’ the labor of a subcontractor’s employee when it grants permission to use its scaffolding, such that the general contractor can be held liable for injuries sustained by the employee due to defective scaffolding.

    Holding

    No, because ‘directing,’ as used in Labor Law §240, means supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed, and the mere granting of permission to use scaffolding does not constitute such direction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, emphasizing the strict and literal construction of the word ‘directing’ in Labor Law §240.
    The court distinguished between ‘permission’ and ‘direction,’ stating that a mere grant of permission or a favor done for the plaintiff’s convenience does not satisfy the affirmative ‘directing’ required by the statute. The Court stated, “‘Directing’…means just that; for one person to be “directed” by another, there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed. The words are to be construed strictly and literally.”
    The court cited Glass v. Gens-Jarboe, Inc. (306 N. Y. 786) as an analogous case where a painter, employed by a subcontractor, was injured by a defective plank he was permitted to use from the general contractor’s supply. The Court in Glass held that the case did not fall under §240 because there was only permission, not direction.
    The court also referenced Mendes v. Caristo Constr. Corp. (6 Y 2d 729) where a subcontractor was allowed to use the general contractor’s rope sling. The court held that such permissive language did not amount to direction under the Labor Law.
    The court also noted that even if Bouse had ‘directed’ Alberti, Alberti still needed to prove that the defect in the scaffolding was the proximate cause of his injuries. “Violation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff was obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall and there was no proof of that essential element here.”

  • Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290 (1978): Scope of New York Labor Law §240

    Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290 (1978)

    New York Labor Law § 240, which requires safe scaffolding and equipment for construction workers, applies to painting work on a private dwelling, even if the work is not part of building construction, demolition, or repair, provided the worker is “employed” to perform the work.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of a claim under Labor Law § 240, holding that the statute’s protection extends to a painter injured while working on a private residence. The court found that the statute’s specific language regarding painting overrides the general heading of the article in which it is found (“Building construction, demolition and repair work”). The dissent argued that the statute should be read in its entirety and that painting, like cleaning (as previously held), when performed on a private dwelling is not covered by the statute.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Allen, was injured while painting the exterior of a private residence. He fell from a ladder. He brought a claim under New York Labor Law § 240, which requires employers to provide safe scaffolding and equipment for workers engaged in certain types of labor. The defendant argued that § 240 did not apply because the painting was not part of building construction, demolition, or repair work.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim, relying on a previous case, Connors v. Boorstein, which held that Labor Law § 240 did not apply to window cleaning in a private dwelling. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York Labor Law § 240 applies to painting work performed on a private dwelling, even if the work is not part of building construction, demolition, or repair work.

    Holding

    Yes, because the specific language of § 240 includes painting and overrides the general heading of the article in which it is found; the statute applies broadly to a “person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the…painting…of a building or structure.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the specific language of Labor Law § 240 explicitly includes “painting.” Despite the article’s heading (“Building construction, demolition and repair work”), the court held that the specific terms of the statute control over the general heading. The court distinguished this case from Connors v. Boorstein, where the court held that window cleaning in a private dwelling was not covered by § 240. The court stated that Connors involved a “truly domestic” situation, implying a narrower scope than the present case. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language covers “a person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the…painting…of a building or structure.”

    Notably, the dissenting opinion argued that the majority was improperly distinguishing between “cleaning” and “painting” without considering the overall spirit of the statute, as emphasized in Connors. The dissent contended that the statute should not be applied literally without regard to its context within the Labor Law, which primarily addresses building construction, demolition, and repair work. The dissent argued that the majority was elevating the specific mention of “painting” over the broader intent of the law, contrary to the principles established in Connors. The dissent stated, “It is my view that the majority’s distinction between ‘cleaning’ and ‘painting’ is unjustified. Moreover, this distinction has been drawn by employing a method of statutory construction expressly rejected in Connors itself.”