New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 241(6)

  • Morris v. Pavarini Construction, 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014): Scope of Construction Safety Regulations for Unfinished Forms

    Morris v. Pavarini Construction, 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014)

    Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), which require bracing of ‘forms’ at construction sites, apply not only to completed forms used for pouring concrete but also to individual form walls during the assembly process, ensuring worker safety from potential collapse.

    Summary

    Glenford Morris, a carpenter, was injured at a construction site when a large form wall fell on his hand. He sued the construction manager and owner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6), predicated on a violation of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), requiring forms to be braced. The defendants argued the regulation only applied to completed forms. After a framed-issue hearing, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the claim, granting summary judgment to Morris. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the regulation could apply to individual form walls during assembly, based on expert testimony regarding the necessity of bracing for safety during this phase.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Glenford Morris, a carpenter, was working at a construction site in Manhattan when a large, flat form wall fell and injured his hand. He sued Pavarini Construction (the construction manager) and Vornado Realty Trust (the building owner). The object that fell was a component of a concrete form under construction. Morris argued that the unbraced form wall violated Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), which requires forms to be braced to maintain their position and shape.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim. The Court of Appeals initially reversed and remitted for a framed-issue hearing to determine whether the regulation applied only to completed forms (9 N.Y.3d 47 (2007)). Following the hearing, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division then reversed, granting summary judgment to the plaintiff (98 A.D.3d 841 (2012)). The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), requiring that forms be braced, applies to individual form walls during the assembly process, or only to completed forms used for pouring concrete.

    Holding

    Yes, because the expert testimony established that bracing is essential for maintaining the stability and position of form walls during assembly, protecting workers from the risk of collapse, and therefore the regulation can sensibly be applied to a wall component.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 241(6) is intended to ensure worker safety at construction sites, and mandates compliance with the Commissioner of Labor’s rules. 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a) requires that “forms” be “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape.” The court noted that the expert testimony established that bracing is necessary to prevent form walls from collapsing due to wind, vibrations, or accidental contact during assembly. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that subdivision (b) of the regulation, concerning inspections during concrete pouring, limited the bracing requirement to completed forms. The court explained that the inspection requirement during concrete placement acknowledges the particular vulnerability of forms during that stage, but does not negate the need for bracing during assembly. To interpret the regulation otherwise would diminish protections for workers during form assembly, undermining the legislative intent to ensure worker safety. The court emphasized that “the testimony adduced at the framed-issue hearing establishes that the object that fell on plaintiff was a back wall panel, which was a component of a form under assembly at the time of the injury, and that the back wall is the type of component which can be subjected to the requirements of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a).”

  • St. Louis v. Town of North Elba, 16 N.Y.3d 411 (2011): Interpreting Industrial Code for Construction Site Safety

    St. Louis v. Town of North Elba, 16 N.Y.3d 411 (2011)

    The applicability of a specific safety regulation within the Industrial Code depends on the function of the equipment used at a construction site, not solely on the equipment’s designated name.

    Summary

    Ryan St. Louis, a maintenance worker, was injured when a pipe he was welding fell from a front-end loader. He sued the Town of North Elba, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e). The court addressed whether this regulation, specifically mentioning power shovels and backhoes, applied to a front-end loader used for material handling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of summary judgment, holding that the Industrial Code’s safety requirements extend to a front-end loader used for material handling in the same manner as power shovels and backhoes.

    Facts

    Ryan St. Louis, a maintenance worker at the Olympic Jumping Complex, was injured while welding pipes being held by a front-end loader’s clamshell bucket. The bucket unexpectedly opened, causing the pipe to fall and injure St. Louis. No chains or safety devices secured the pipe in the bucket at the time of the incident. The work crew had previously used chains to secure loads.

    Procedural History

    St. Louis sued the Town of North Elba, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6). The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed this denial, holding that the Industrial Code section 23-9.4(e) could apply to front-end loaders under these circumstances. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e), which specifies safety requirements for power shovels and backhoes used for material handling, also applies to a front-end loader used for the same purpose.

    Holding

    No, the Appellate Division did not err; the order is affirmed. Yes, 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e) does apply to a front-end loader, because the regulation focuses on the function of the equipment (material handling) rather than solely on its name (power shovel, backhoe).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that subpart 23-9 of the Industrial Code, covering power-operated heavy equipment in construction, applies to the front-end loader because a front-end loader qualifies as “power-operated heavy equipment”. The court emphasized that “construction work” includes pipe laying, further solidifying the Code’s relevance. While the Code does not list every machine used for suspending materials, 23-9.4(e) aims to prevent materials from falling. The Court stated, “The same danger that exists for a worker using a power shovel or backhoe with an unsecured load exists for a worker using a front-end loader with an unsecured load.” The court cited testimony indicating the common practice of securing loads with chains and the accident report noting that chains could have prevented the injury, reinforcing the industry’s awareness of the risks. The Court explained that the Industrial Code should be “sensibly interpreted and applied to effectuate its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace.” Ultimately, the Court determined that considering equipment function, not just name, is crucial for applying the Industrial Code effectively, acknowledging that different machines can achieve the same risky objective. The court noted that factual issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence remained to be determined by a jury.

  • Nostrom v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 N.Y.3d 502 (2010): Limits on Labor Law § 241(6) Liability Based on Industrial Code Part 12

    Nostrom v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 N.Y.3d 502 (2010)

    Vicarious liability under Labor Law § 241(6) cannot be based solely on a violation of regulations in Part 12 of the Industrial Code unless those regulations are specifically incorporated into Part 23 of the Industrial Code.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a claim of vicarious liability under Labor Law § 241(6) can be sustained solely on the basis of violations of regulations found in Part 12 of the Industrial Code. The Court of Appeals held that it cannot, unless those Part 12 regulations are explicitly incorporated into Part 23. The plaintiff, an asbestos worker, sought to hold the defendant liable for injuries based on violations of Part 12 regulations concerning air contamination. The Court reasoned that the language and history of the regulations indicate that Part 12 does not independently impose liability under Labor Law § 241(6), except when integrated into Part 23, especially section 23-1.7(g) concerning unventilated confined areas.

    Facts

    Donald Nostrom, a boilermaker, worked for subcontractors at energy facilities owned by Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. (O&R) and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. Sequoia Ventures, Inc. was the general contractor for some projects. Nostrom alleged exposure to asbestos during his work at these plants, leading to mesothelioma. He sued O&R, Central Hudson, and Sequoia, among other defendants, asserting a Labor Law § 241(6) claim based on violations of Industrial Code Part 12 regulations concerning air contamination.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against them. Nostrom appealed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a violation of Part 12 regulations could not support a § 241(6) claim and that the regulations cited were not specific enough. The Court of Appeals granted Nostrom leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether vicarious liability under Labor Law § 241(6) can be predicated solely on violations of regulations contained in Part 12 of the Industrial Code.

    Holding

    No, because the language and history of the relevant provisions establish that Part 12 regulations do not provide a basis for liability under Labor Law § 241(6) except to the extent that particular regulations are specifically incorporated into Part 23.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on statutory and regulatory interpretation, emphasizing legislative intent. It noted that Part 23 of the Industrial Code explicitly applies to owners, contractors, and their agents obligated by the Labor Law, indicating it was promulgated under the authority of Labor Law § 241(6). In contrast, the application section of Part 12 does not contain similar language, suggesting a lack of intent to impose vicarious liability under § 241(6) based on Part 12 violations alone.

    The Court highlighted 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(g), which makes unventilated confined areas subject to Part 12, as further evidence. By explicitly incorporating Part 12 into Part 23 for these specific work sites, the intent was to impose a nondelegable duty only in limited circumstances. Allowing § 241(6) claims based on Part 12 violations regardless of location would render section 23-1.7(g) superfluous, a construction that should be avoided. The Court stated, “a construction that ‘renders one part meaningless should be avoided’ (Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 515 [1991]).”

    The Court also examined the regulatory history of Parts 12 and 23. While Part 23’s predecessor regulations were adopted with reference to Labor Law § 241, Part 12’s revisions did not cite § 241 as a basis. This historical context reinforced the Court’s conclusion that Part 12 does not independently create liability under Labor Law § 241(6).

  • Morton v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 50 (2010): Labor Law § 241(6) Liability Requires Nexus Between Owner and Worker

    15 N.Y.3d 50 (2010)

    A property owner who did not contract for the injury-inducing work is not liable under Labor Law § 241(6) unless there is a nexus (connection) between the owner and the injured worker, established by a lease agreement, easement, work permit, or other property interest.

    Summary

    Alan Morton, an employee of a private water company, was injured while repairing a water main break beneath a state highway. He sued the State under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging the State failed to provide a safe excavation site. The Court of Appeals held that the State was not liable because the water company did not obtain a work permit from the State Department of Transportation before commencing the repairs. This absence of a permit meant that there was no nexus (legal connection) between Morton and the State, as required to establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The court emphasized that without a permit, Morton was essentially a trespasser on state property.

    Facts

    Alan Morton, employed by New York Water Service Corporation, was part of a crew dispatched to repair a water main break under Carman Mill Road, a state highway. The crew excavated a trench to access the water main. While Morton was working in the trench, it collapsed, injuring his leg. The water company had not obtained a work permit from the New York State Department of Transportation before starting the repair work.

    Procedural History

    Morton sued the State, alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6). The Court of Claims dismissed the negligence claims. After a trial on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, the Court of Claims found the State 100% liable. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the State summary judgment and dismissing the § 241(6) claim. Morton appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State, as the owner of the highway, can be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6) for injuries sustained by an employee of a private company repairing a water main beneath the highway, when the company failed to obtain a required work permit from the State Department of Transportation?

    Holding

    No, because the water company’s failure to obtain a work permit meant there was no nexus (legal connection) between the injured worker and the State, as required to impose liability on the State as a property owner under Labor Law § 241(6).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that ownership alone is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 241(6). There must be a nexus between the owner and the worker, such as a lease agreement, easement, or other property interest. The court emphasized that in the absence of a work permit, the water company and its employee (Morton) were essentially trespassing on state property. The court distinguished this case from situations where the owner has granted some form of property interest or permission for the work to be performed. The court stated, “Here, there was no lease agreement or grant of an easement or other property interest creating a nexus between claimant and the State. Claimant was performing excavation work on the State’s premises `not by reason of any action of the [State] but by reason’ of the water company’s obligation to repair a break in its water line.” The dissent argued that the work was an emergency repair, but the majority countered that even in an emergency, a work permit was still required (though notification procedures might differ). The court also noted the importance of work permits for ensuring safety inspections, protecting the integrity of the roadway, and verifying that the permittee has sufficient liability insurance to protect the State’s interests. The court quoted Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., stating “Any permission to work on the premises [would have been] granted upon compulsion and no relationship [would have] existed between [the State] and [the water company] or [claimant]” in the event a work permit was not needed for emergency repairs.

  • Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511 (2009): Specificity Required for Labor Law § 241(6) Claims

    Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511 (2009)

    To support a claim under Labor Law § 241(6), a regulation must mandate compliance with concrete specifications, not simply declare general safety standards; specifically, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a) can support a claim if an employer, after receiving notice of a defect in power-operated equipment, fails to correct it.

    Summary

    Igor Misicki sued 430-50 Shore Road Corporation for injuries sustained while using an angle grinder without a safety handle. He claimed violations of Labor Law § 241(6), alleging violations of specific Industrial Code provisions. The trial court initially dismissed the claim, then reversed its decision after reargument. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the cited regulation, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a), established only general safety standards. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the third sentence of the regulation, requiring repair or replacement of unsafe equipment upon discovery of a defect, was sufficiently specific to support a § 241(6) claim when the employer had notice of the defect.

    Facts

    Igor Misicki, a laborer, was injured while working on a construction project. He was using an angle grinder to cut concrete when the tool “kicked back” and injured his face. The grinder was missing its side handle, which Misicki claims he reported to his foreman, who instructed him to continue working without it. Misicki testified he did not feel safe using the grinder without the handle.

    Procedural History

    Misicki sued Shore and the architect, alleging negligence and Labor Law violations. He later withdrew his § 200 and § 240(1) claims and discontinued the action against the architect. Shore then moved for summary judgment to dismiss the remaining § 241(6) claim, which was initially granted, then denied upon reargument. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing Misicki’s § 241(6) claim. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal due to a conflict among the Appellate Divisions and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a) is sufficiently specific to support a claim under Labor Law § 241(6) where an employee alleges injury due to a known, unremedied defect in power-operated equipment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the third sentence of 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a), which imposes an affirmative duty to correct defects in equipment upon discovery, mandates a distinct standard of conduct and is sufficiently specific to support a claim under Labor Law § 241(6) when the employer has notice of the defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the specificity of 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a) in light of Labor Law § 241(6), which requires compliance with concrete safety specifications. The Court distinguished between general safety standards and specific, positive commands. While the first two sentences of § 23-9.2(a) were deemed too general, the third sentence, requiring correction of structural defects or unsafe conditions upon discovery, was considered sufficiently specific. The Court reasoned that this provision mandates a distinct standard of conduct, imposing an affirmative duty on employers to address known defects. The court cited Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 351 (1998), noting that the third sentence of 23-9.2(a) “mandates a distinct standard of conduct, rather than a general reiteration of common-law principles, and is precisely the type of ‘concrete specification’ that Ross requires.” The court emphasized that the employee must demonstrate the employer had actual notice of the defect. The court also rejected an argument raised by the dissent that the regulation was inapplicable to hand tools because that argument was not properly preserved in the lower courts and was raised for the first time on appeal. Judge Smith, dissenting, argued that the inapplicability of the regulation was a point of law that the court should consider despite it not being preserved. Judge Graffeo, in a separate dissent, argued that 23-9.2(a) was a general safety standard similar to the one deemed insufficiently specific in Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9 N.Y.3d 47 (2007), and that the fact that the employer had notice of the defect should not change that analysis.

  • O’Connor v. Spencer-Green, 2 N.Y.3d 475 (2004): Specificity Required for Labor Law 241(6) Violations Based on Regulation

    O’Connor v. Spencer-Green, 2 N.Y.3d 475 (2004)

    To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6) based on a violation of a regulation, the regulation must contain a specific, positive command, not merely incorporate general safety standards.

    Summary

    This case concerns a carpenter injured by a falling form component at a construction site, leading to a claim under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging violation of a Labor Department regulation regarding concrete forms. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s summary judgment dismissal, holding that further factual development was needed to determine if the regulation’s bracing requirements applied to the form component in question. The court emphasized that the regulation must impose specific requirements, and the meaning of specialized terms may require expert testimony.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a carpenter, was injured at a construction site in Manhattan when a part of a concrete form fell on his hand. The object was part of the side of a form used to mold concrete walls. The plaintiff’s description of the object was incomplete, but it consisted of metal plates joined together. The plaintiff sued the construction manager and owner, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) based on a Labor Department regulation governing concrete work safety.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), requiring forms to be “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape,” was violated when a component of a concrete form fell and injured the plaintiff.

    Holding

    Yes, further proceedings are required because the record was insufficient to determine whether the regulation applied to the object that fell on the plaintiff and whether its requirements were violated. The Court reversed the Appellate Division order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court explained that under Labor Law § 241(6), liability can only be imposed on owners and contractors if they violate a specific regulatory requirement. While the statute itself imposes a nondelegable duty to comply with the Commissioner of Labor’s rules, those rules must contain a “specific, positive command.” The court determined that while the words “structurally safe” and “properly” in 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a) were too general, the phrase “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape” could impose more specific obligations. The key question, however, was whether this regulation applied only to completed forms or also to components of forms during assembly. The court found the record insufficient to answer this question, noting that the meaning of specialized terms in the regulation might require expert evidence. The court noted that the plaintiff’s engineer offered a conclusory affidavit but without explaining what should have been done to prevent the accident. Because the nature of the object that caused the injury, and the applicability of the regulation to it, remained unclear, the court held that summary judgment was premature. The court cited Millard v. City of Ogdensburg, 274 A.D.2d 953, 954 (4th Dept. 2000), for the proposition that the meaning of specialized terms within a regulation can require the court to hear evidence before making a determination.

  • Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002): Labor Law § 241(6) Applies Only to Construction, Demolition, or Excavation

    Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002)

    Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate safety to workers only when the work being performed falls within the context of construction, demolition, or excavation, not routine maintenance.

    Summary

    Bruce Nagel, a laborer, was injured while performing a routine two-year safety inspection on an elevator. He sued D & R Realty Corp., the building owner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6). The New York Court of Appeals held that Nagel could not recover under this section because his work constituted routine maintenance, not construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 241(6) is specifically designed to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous activities of construction, demolition, or excavation, as evidenced by the statute’s legislative history and associated regulations.

    Facts

    Bruce Nagel was performing a two-year safety inspection on top of an elevator. The purpose of the inspection was to ensure the elevator’s safety mechanisms, specifically the brakes, were functioning correctly. During the inspection, Nagel slipped on oil and fell, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder. The accident occurred approximately 1.5 hours into the two-hour inspection process. The Nagels then brought an action against D & R Realty Corp., alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6).

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted D & R Realty Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court reasoned that Nagel was performing routine maintenance work, which did not constitute construction, demolition, or excavation under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, clarifying that maintenance work only qualifies as construction if it involves significant structural work, not routine maintenance. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to injuries sustained during routine maintenance work, specifically a two-year elevator safety inspection.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 241(6) is intended to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous work of construction, excavation, or demolition, and routine maintenance does not fall within this scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and the Industrial Code demonstrate a clear intent to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically connected with construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court highlighted that the statute’s title, “Construction, excavation and demolition work,” further supports this interpretation. The Court examined the Industrial Code’s definition of “construction work” (12 NYCRR 23-1.4[b][13]), which includes maintenance, but clarified that this definition must be construed consistently with the overall intent of Labor Law § 241(6). The Court reasoned that the regulation refers to protection in the construction, demolition, and excavation context. The Court distinguished this case from Mosher v. State of New York, where the plaintiff was injured while repaving a highway, an activity the court deemed to fall within the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) because it involved construction at a site. The court stated, “That the Legislature sought to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically in connection with construction, demolition or excavation work is, therefore, patent. In the present case, Nagel’s work of performing a two-year elevator test constituted maintenance work that was not connected to construction, demolition or excavation of a building or structure and is therefore not within the statute’s coverage.”

  • Comes v. New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876 (1993): Owner Liability for Contractor’s Negligence

    Comes v. New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876 (1993)

    An owner or general contractor is liable under Labor Law § 200 for a construction worker’s injuries only if they had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury, or violated concrete specifications imposing a duty on the defendant.

    Summary

    Lynn Comes, a construction worker, was injured when he was directed by his employer to carry a heavy steel beam unassisted. He sued the property owner, New York State Electric and Gas Corp. (NYSEG), alleging violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). The New York Court of Appeals held that NYSEG was not liable under § 200 because it did not control the work that led to the injury, and was not liable under § 241(6) because the regulations cited were general safety standards, not specific requirements. This case clarifies the scope of owner liability for construction site injuries in New York.

    Facts

    Lynn Comes was employed by a general contractor hired by NYSEG to construct a building on NYSEG’s land. Comes was instructed by his employer to lift and carry a 14-foot steel I-beam without assistance. He sustained personal injuries as a result. NYSEG hired a construction inspector whose duties were limited to observing the work and reporting safety violations to the contractor.

    Procedural History

    Comes and his wife sued NYSEG, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). The lower court ruled in favor of NYSEG. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the claims. Comes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSEG is liable under Labor Law § 200 for Comes’ injuries, based on common-law negligence principles of providing a safe workplace?

    2. Whether NYSEG is liable under Labor Law § 241(6) for Comes’ injuries, based on a violation of a specific safety regulation?

    Holding

    1. No, because NYSEG did not exercise supervisory control over the method of Comes’ work and the injury arose from the contractor’s own methods.

    2. No, because the plaintiffs alleged violations of only general safety standards of the Industrial Code, not concrete specifications imposing a duty on NYSEG.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the § 200 claim, the Court of Appeals reiterated that liability under this section requires that the party charged with responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury. The court emphasized that because Comes’ injury was caused by lifting the beam and NYSEG did not control how the beam was moved, no liability attached. The court distinguished this case from those where the owner had notice of an unsafe condition, explicitly stating that it had not adopted the reasoning that mere notice of an unsafe manner of work is sufficient for liability under § 200.

    Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the court emphasized that liability under this section requires a violation of a specific, concrete safety standard. The court cited Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., stating that general safety standards are insufficient to impose liability. Because Comes only alleged violations of general safety standards, his claim under § 241(6) failed. The court stated that the duty imposed by section 241(6) requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers, but that a violation requires a concrete specification.

  • Tamara B. v. Pete F., 80 N.Y.2d 959 (1992): Scope of Labor Law § 241(6) Extends Beyond Building Construction

    Tamara B. v. Pete F., 80 N.Y.2d 959 (1992)

    Labor Law § 241(6), which concerns safety precautions at construction, excavation, and demolition sites, applies not only to building construction but also to other types of projects like highway repaving.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) and whether it applies solely to building construction. The Court of Appeals held that § 241(6) extends beyond building sites to include activities such as highway repaving. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the statute and prior case law support a broader interpretation, ensuring worker safety in various construction-related activities. This decision clarifies the applicability of § 241(6) and ensures that workers engaged in non-building construction activities receive the same safety protections.

    Facts

    The claimant, Tamara B., sustained injuries while working on a State highway repaving project. She brought a cause of action under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging that the State failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety at the worksite.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims denied the State’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the cause of action brought under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Court of Claims’ order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the requirements of Labor Law § 241(6) are limited to building construction sites, or whether they extend to other construction, excavation, or demolition work such as highway repaving projects.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) demonstrates that its scope was not intended to be limited to building construction, and prior holdings by the Court of Appeals support this broader interpretation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and prior case law. The court noted that while the introductory language of § 241 appears to limit the applicability of the subsequent subdivisions to building construction, the history of subdivision (6) shows that its scope was not intended to be so limited. Prior to a 1969 amendment, the statute applied to “[a]ll areas, buildings or structures.” The court referenced Tilkins v. City of Niagara Falls, which examined the legislative history and concluded that the amendment was not meant to narrow the scope of protection. The court also cited its prior decisions in Page v. State of New York and Celestine v. City of New York, which endorsed this reasoning. The Court specifically addressed the contrary interpretation in Matter of Dillon v. State of New York, clarifying that Dillon incorrectly relied on a case arising under an earlier, narrower version of the statute and should not be followed. The Court concluded that the claimant’s allegations fall within the purview of Labor Law § 241(6) because the statute’s protections extend to injuries sustained during a State highway repaving project.

  • De Milio v. Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 220 (1982): Non-Delegable Duty and Common-Law Indemnity in Construction Accidents

    55 N.Y.2d 220 (1982)

    When a party’s liability arises from a non-delegable duty imposed by statute, and that party did not exercise actual control over the work that caused the injury, they are entitled to common-law indemnity from the party directly responsible for the negligent act.

    Summary

    This case concerns a construction worker’s injury and the allocation of liability between the property owner (New York Telephone) and the subcontractor (Lakelands Precast). The Court of Appeals modified the lower court’s order, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. Further, because New York Telephone’s liability arose solely from its non-delegable duty under Labor Law § 241(6) and it did not exercise actual control over the work, it was entitled to indemnification from Lakelands, the party whose employee’s negligence caused the injury. The Court ordered a new trial on New York Telephone’s liability to the plaintiffs and, if found liable, directed a verdict in its favor on its claim over against Lakelands.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured during the offloading of a vault at a construction site. Lakelands Precast, Inc., was the subcontractor responsible for offloading the vault. New York Telephone Company was the owner of the property and held responsible for the project’s compliance with Labor Law.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled against New York Telephone. The Appellate Division affirmed. New York Telephone appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the order, granting a new trial on New York Telephone’s liability and directing a verdict in its favor against Lakelands Precast on the claim over, should it be found liable to the plaintiffs.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge contributory negligence as a bar to recovery by the plaintiffs.

    2. Whether New York Telephone, whose liability arises from a non-delegable duty under Labor Law § 241(6), is entitled to common-law indemnity from Lakelands Precast, the subcontractor whose employee’s negligence caused the injury, given that New York Telephone did not exercise actual control over the work.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court erred in refusing to charge contributory negligence as a bar to recovery by plaintiffs.

    2. Yes, because New York Telephone’s liability stemmed from a non-delegable duty, and there was no evidence it exercised actual control over the offloading operation. Therefore, it is entitled to common-law indemnity from Lakelands Precast.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the trial court erred by not allowing the jury to consider the plaintiffs’ contributory negligence. Regarding indemnity, the Court emphasized that New York Telephone’s liability was based on the non-delegable duty imposed by Labor Law § 241(6). This section of the Labor Law imposes a duty upon owners and general contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers. However, the court noted, “There being no evidence that it [New York Telephone] had authority to exercise or in fact did exercise control over the offloading of the vault by Lakelands’ employee in the course of which the plaintiff’s injury occurred, New York Telephone was entitled under principles of common-law indemnity to a directed verdict on its claim over.” The key factor was the lack of evidence that New York Telephone controlled the specific work that led to the injury. Because Lakelands Precast was directly responsible for the negligent act, New York Telephone was entitled to indemnification for any liability arising from its statutory duty. This case illustrates the principle that a party held liable due to a non-delegable duty can seek indemnification from the party whose direct negligence caused the harm, provided the former did not exercise control over the negligent act. This prevents unfair allocation of liability when a party is only vicariously liable due to statute and did not contribute to the negligence.