New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 240(1)

  • Brown v. Two Exchange Plaza Partners, 76 N.Y.2d 172 (1990): Enforceability of Indemnification Agreements Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    Brown v. Two Exchange Plaza Partners, 76 N.Y.2d 172 (1990)

    An indemnification agreement in a construction contract is enforceable even when the general contractor is held liable under Labor Law § 240(1), provided there is no finding of negligence on the part of the general contractor.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when a scaffold collapsed at a construction site. The general contractor, Fuller, was held liable under Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability for failing to provide adequate safety measures. Fuller sought indemnification from A & M, another subcontractor, based on an indemnification clause in their contract. The New York Court of Appeals held that the indemnification agreement was enforceable because there was no finding of negligence on Fuller’s part, and General Obligations Law § 5-322.1, which voids agreements indemnifying parties for their own negligence, did not apply. This decision clarifies the relationship between Labor Law § 240(1) liability and contractual indemnification rights in construction settings.

    Facts

    Brown, an employee of Central Furring & Dry Wall Company, a subcontractor, was injured at a construction site when the scaffold he was on collapsed. George A. Fuller Company was the general contractor. Fuller subcontracted with Heydt Contracting Corporation for the erection of the scaffold and with A & M Wallboard Company to erect the walls and ceilings. A & M then hired Central Furring. The cause of the scaffold collapse was not determined. The contract between Fuller and A & M contained an indemnification clause.

    Procedural History

    Brown sued Fuller and Two Exchange Plaza Partners. Fuller impleaded Heydt, A & M, and Central Furring. The trial court directed a verdict against Fuller based on Labor Law § 240(1). Fuller sought a directed verdict on its third-party claims for indemnification from Heydt and A & M. The trial court denied Fuller’s motion, stating indemnity was unavailable without subcontractor negligence and the clause was unenforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1. The Appellate Division reversed, awarding Fuller judgment against A & M. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 bars enforcement of an indemnification agreement in a construction contract when the general contractor is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) but is not negligent.

    Holding

    No, because General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 prohibits indemnifying a contractor for its own negligence, but liability under Labor Law § 240(1) is imposed irrespective of negligence; therefore, the indemnification agreement is enforceable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide adequate safety devices, regardless of negligence. General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 voids agreements that indemnify contractors for their own negligence. Since Fuller’s liability was based solely on Labor Law § 240(1) and there was no finding of negligence, § 5-322.1 did not apply, and the indemnification agreement was enforceable. The court emphasized that the indemnification clause in the contract between Fuller and A & M applied because the claim arose out of A & M’s work. The court stated, “Without a finding of negligence on the part of Fuller, General Obligations Law § 5-322.1’s prohibition against indemnifying a contractor for its own negligence is inapplicable.” The court also noted the legislative history of § 5-322.1, which aimed to prevent contractors from coercively shifting liability for their own negligence to subcontractors. The court distinguished this case, where the liability was statutory and not based on fault. The court found that the indemnification clause between Central Furring and A&M did require negligence to be found, and since no negligence was proven, that indemnification clause was not applicable. In conclusion, the court emphasized that a contractor found guilty of negligence would still be barred from recovering contractual indemnity.

  • Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985): Enforceability of Indemnification Agreements in Labor Law Cases

    Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985)

    A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification when the intention to indemnify is clear from the agreement’s language, purpose, and surrounding circumstances, even without explicit reference to the indemnitee’s negligence, unless prohibited by statute.

    Summary

    This case concerns an injured painter’s claim under Labor Law § 240(1) and the subsequent contractual indemnity claims among the contractors, architect, and owner involved in a renovation project. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff but modified the order regarding contractual indemnity. The court held that the owner (Bowery Savings Bank) and its agent (Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners) were entitled to full contractual indemnification from the scaffolding contractor (Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co.) and the painter’s employer (Rambusch Decorating Co.) because the indemnity agreements demonstrated a clear intent to indemnify, and such indemnification was not prohibited by the relevant statute at the time of the accident.

    Facts

    A painter, employed by Rambusch Decorating Co., was injured when he fell from scaffolding at the Bowery Savings Bank headquarters, which was undergoing a major renovation. Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. was contracted to provide, erect, and maintain the scaffolding. The contracts between the bank, Atlantic, and Rambusch contained indemnity agreements requiring each contractor to indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from their work.

    Procedural History

    The injured painter sued, and a jury found Atlantic, Rambusch, Bowery Savings Bank, and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners liable. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in favor of the injured employee. However, the Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners judgment over against Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co. on the basis of full contractual indemnity.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners are entitled to full contractual indemnification from Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co., or whether their recovery should be limited to contribution due to the absence of express language referring to the negligence of the indemnitee in the indemnity clause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances, and full contractual indemnification was not prohibited by the statute in effect at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Labor Law § 240(1), which places a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide safe scaffolding for workers. The court found that Atlantic, as the scaffolding contractor, was properly held liable to the plaintiff for his injuries under this statute. The court also upheld the finding that Swanke, due to its activities at the jobsite, was Bowery’s agent and thus liable under Labor Law § 240(1). Regarding the indemnity claims, the court stated that a party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the “intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” (Margolin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153). The court further noted that, at the time of the accident, General Obligations Law former § 5-322.1 (as amended by L 1981, ch 964) did not prohibit such full contractual indemnification. The court distinguished the case from situations where the indemnity clause explicitly excludes indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence. The court emphasized that the indemnity clauses in the contracts at issue demonstrated a clear intent for the contractors to bear the ultimate responsibility for claims arising from their work, even if the owner or architect were also found liable under Labor Law § 240(1). This case underscores the importance of carefully drafting and interpreting indemnity agreements in construction contracts, especially in the context of Labor Law claims. “Each Contractor [to] indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from his work, to the fullest extent permitted by law”.

  • Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985): Establishes Absolute Liability for Failure to Provide Any Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), an owner or contractor is absolutely liable for injuries sustained by a worker when they fail to provide any safety devices at a building worksite, and this failure is the proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases concern the liability of owners and contractors under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices at construction sites. In Zimmer, an ironworker was injured when he fell while erecting a steel skeleton. In Hunt, an ironworker fell from a roof while welding. In both cases, no safety devices were provided. The Court of Appeals held that an owner or contractor is absolutely liable under § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices, and that failure proximately causes a worker’s injuries. Evidence of industry custom or the feasibility of safety devices is irrelevant when no devices are provided at all.

    Facts

    Zimmer:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, was injured while erecting a steel skeleton for a building addition.

    He scaled a 31-foot column to direct a crane operator.

    He lost his grip and fell, striking a beam and landing in an excavation.

    No safety devices were provided, though ladders were present but not used for his specific task.

    Hunt:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, fell 25 feet from a flat roof while welding corrugated decking.

    No safety devices were provided.

    Defendants presented evidence of industry custom and usage, arguing safety devices were not typically used on this type of building.

    Procedural History

    Zimmer:

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Hunt:

    The trial court reserved decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found no cause of action. The trial court then granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the Appellate Division in Zimmer and affirmed in Hunt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an owner or contractor is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices at a construction site, and that failure is the proximate cause of a worker’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors who fail to provide any safety devices to workers at a construction site when such failure proximately causes injury, irrespective of industry custom or the feasibility of such devices. The statute’s purpose is to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Labor Law demonstrates an intent to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is to be construed liberally to accomplish this purpose. The Court distinguished between violations of specific statutory provisions like § 240(1) and violations of administrative rules promulgated under § 241(6). A violation of § 240(1), which contains specific safety measures, creates absolute liability, while a violation of § 241(6) does not. In cases where no safety devices are provided, industry custom and usage are immaterial. Evidence of custom and usage is admissible under sections 200 and 241(6) to determine the standard of care in a negligence context, but not for a section 240(1) violation because this section establishes its own unvarying standard. The court quoted Quigley v Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, stating that the statute “is one for the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed.” The dissent argued that the statute should not impose liability when no safety devices were available or adaptable to the situation, and that proximate cause is a necessary element that is a jury question.

  • Glielmi v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 664 (1984): Establishes Indemnification Obligations in Labor Law Cases

    Glielmi v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 664 (1984)

    A contractor whose negligence contributes to a worker’s injury is obligated to indemnify the owner and tenant under a contractual indemnification provision, even if the owner’s liability is vicarious under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Summary

    This case addresses indemnification obligations in the context of New York Labor Law § 240(1). Angelo, a worker, was injured in a fall from a ladder. He sued the owner-trustees, the tenant (Toys “R” Us), and the contractor. The jury found all three liable. The contractor appealed, arguing it should not be obligated to indemnify the owner and tenant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that the contractor was obligated to indemnify the tenant and owner-trustees because the jury found the contractor negligent and the owner’s liability was vicarious. The contractual indemnification provision covered the tenant, and common-law indemnity principles extended the obligation to the owner-trustees.

    Facts

    Angelo fell from a ladder while working at a construction site. The ladder was not secured at the upper end, and no scaffolds were provided. Angelo sustained injuries as a result of the fall. He sued the owner-trustees of the property, the tenant, Toys “R” Us, and the contractor responsible for the work.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury to consider the owner-trustees and tenant as a single unit for liability purposes. The jury found the owner-trustees, the tenant, and the contractor liable for Angelo’s injuries. The contractor appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The contractor then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the contractor is obligated to indemnify the tenant and owner-trustees for Angelo’s injuries, given the jury’s finding of the contractor’s negligence and the owner’s vicarious liability under Labor Law § 240(1), and a contractual indemnification agreement between the contractor and the tenant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury found that Angelo’s injuries were caused in part by the negligence of the contractor, the contractor was obligated under the indemnification provision of the contract to indemnify the tenant, and this obligation also extended to the owner-trustees, whose liability under Labor Law § 240(1) was vicarious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision based on several key points. First, the court noted that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the owner-trustees and tenant absolutely liable under Labor Law § 240(1) due to violations of state safety regulations regarding ladder securement and scaffold provision. Furthermore, the jury instructions, to which no pertinent objection was made, allowed the jury to consider these violations as evidence of the contractor’s negligence. Because the jury found that Angelo’s injuries were partly caused by the contractor’s negligence, the indemnification provision in the construction contract obligated the contractor to indemnify the tenant. The court treated the owner-trustees and tenant as a single unit, extending the indemnification obligation to the owner-trustees as well. Even if they were treated as separate entities, the court reasoned that the owner-trustees would be entitled to common-law indemnity from the tenant and contractor because their liability under Labor Law § 240(1) was vicarious. As the court stated, “inasmuch as their liability under subdivision 1 of section 240 was in this instance vicarious only.” The court cited Kemp v Lakelands Precast, 55 NY2d 1032 and Kelly v Diesel Constr. Div., 35 NY2d 1 in support of this principle. This vicarious liability, coupled with the contractor’s negligence, triggered the indemnification obligation. The decision underscores the importance of contractual indemnification clauses in construction contracts and clarifies their interaction with Labor Law § 240(1) in cases of vicarious liability.