97 N.Y.2d 447 (2002)

An injured window cleaner can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1); however, Labor Law § 202 requires the application of comparative negligence principles, while Labor Law § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

Summary

Keith Bauer, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows at Female Academy of the Sacred Heart. He sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 202, and 240(1), and common-law negligence. The defendant argued that § 202 was the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and § 240(1). It also determined that § 202 incorporates comparative negligence principles because it relies on Industrial Code regulations, while § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

Facts

Bauer, employed by Environmental Service Systems (ESS), was assigned to clean third-floor exterior windows at the Academy using the belt-and-anchor method. The building’s anchors were square, while the hooks on Bauer’s lanyard were round, violating Industrial Code requirements. While detaching a hook, Bauer lost his balance and fell, sustaining severe injuries.

Procedural History

Bauer sued the Academy. The Academy initiated a third-party action against ESS. The Supreme Court denied motions to dismiss all claims except the Labor Law § 202 claim, and also denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend both sections to apply simultaneously. At trial on the § 202 claim, the Supreme Court directed a verdict for Bauer, finding a § 202 violation resulted in strict liability. The jury found in favor of Bauer. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that § 202 was a comparative negligence statute due to a 1970 amendment. At the second trial, the jury found the Academy negligent, but its negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Bauer’s injuries. Bauer appealed.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an injured window cleaner’s claims under Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1) can coexist.

2. Whether a violation of Labor Law § 202 results in strict liability or comparative negligence.

Holding

1. Yes, because the Legislature did not express an intention that these statutes be mutually exclusive; the inclusion of “cleaning” in Labor Law § 240(1) supports this.

2. Comparative Negligence, because a 1970 amendment made it a comparative negligence statute by deferring to the safety standards for window cleaners set forth in regulations of the Industrial Board.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the statutes serve different goals, apply to different defendants, and have been interpreted differently. Labor Law § 202 protects window cleaners and exterior surface cleaners, and applies to owners, lessees, agents, and managers. Labor Law § 240(1) applies to workers engaged in “cleaning” a building, and strict liability flows to owners and contractors only.

The Court stated, “We would be ill-advised to hold that— simply because an injured window cleaner’s claim appears cognizable under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240 (1)— one cause of action must be chosen to the exclusion of the other.”

Regarding Labor Law § 202, the Court found that the 1970 amendment, which replaced specific safety requirements with references to the Board of Standards and Appeals, transformed the statute from a strict liability statute to one based on comparative negligence. A violation of a regulation or ordinance is only some evidence of negligence. The Court cited Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346 (1925) and Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N.Y. 456 (1939). The Court noted, “Violation of a rule of the Industrial Board, however, constitutes merely some evidence which the jury may consider on the question of defendant’s negligence, along with other evidence in the case which bears on that subject”. Because the current version of Labor Law § 202 relies on the Industrial Code for specific safety standards, violations of those standards are evidence of negligence, not strict liability.