19 N.Y.2d 406 (1967)

When a child is employed in violation of child labor laws, the employer may be liable for resulting injuries, and the child’s contributory negligence is not a defense.

Summary

A 13-year-old boy was hired by a building contractor to mow the lawn of a new house and injured himself using his father’s power lawnmower. The New York Court of Appeals held that the child labor statute applied to this situation, even though the boy was arguably an independent contractor. The court further held that the defendant could not argue that the child was contributorily negligent, as the purpose of child labor laws is to protect children from their own lack of judgment. The case was remanded for a new trial.

Facts

Jerry Riggi, president of Riggi & Sons, Inc., asked Howard Vincent, a 13-year-old boy, if he wanted to earn some money. Riggi pointed out the lawn of a newly constructed house and told him to cut it. There was no discussion about the method, timing, or rate of pay. Vincent borrowed his father’s power lawnmower and, while mowing, his foot slipped under the mower, resulting in the amputation of three toes. Riggi learned of the accident later and had been planning to hire someone else because the lawn wasn’t cut. The house was one of over 200 built by Riggi & Sons in the area.

Procedural History

Vincent sued Riggi & Sons for personal injuries. At trial, the court submitted the case to the jury on a common-law negligence theory and refused to charge the jury on the provisions of Section 130 of the Labor Law, which prohibits the employment of children under 14. The jury found for Riggi & Sons, determining they were free from negligence and that Vincent was contributorily negligent and an independent contractor. The Appellate Division affirmed. Vincent appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Section 130 of the Labor Law, prohibiting the employment of children under 14, applies to the hiring of a 13-year-old boy to mow a lawn by a building contractor.

2. Whether a violation of Section 130 imposes liability on the employer regardless of the child’s contributory negligence.

Holding

1. Yes, because the phrase “employed in or in connection with any trade, business, or service” includes the hiring by a building contractor of a boy to mow a lawn of a house for sale.

2. Yes, because child labor statutes are designed to protect children from their own negligence, and allowing contributory negligence as a defense would undermine the purpose of the statute.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the term “employed” includes those “permitted or suffered to work,” which has been construed to cover independent contractors. The phrase “employed in or in connection with any trade, business, or service” is broad enough to include the hiring of a boy to mow a lawn for a house being sold by a building contractor. The court highlighted that the statute’s exceptions, such as for farm work performed for a parent, suggest the breadth of the prohibition. The court cited Warney v. Board of Educ., emphasizing that even casual employment can fall under the statutory prohibition if connected to a commercial enterprise.

The court emphasized the statutory scheme, which classifies child employment based on hazards and limits the commercial exploitation of children. Sections 131 and 132 allow for the employment of minors 14 to 17 in specified occupations, with some requiring work permits, reflecting a graduated approach based on age and risk.

Regarding contributory negligence, the court noted that child labor statutes are generally interpreted to make the employer liable regardless of the child’s negligence, protecting children from their own lack of judgment. Quoting Karpeles v. Heine, the court stated, “In the case of an infant employed in violation of the direct unqualified prohibition of the statute public policy requires that a recovery for injuries received by such a child in the course of his unlawful employment shall not be defeated by the very negligence, lack of care and caution that the statute was designed to prevent and make impossible…”. Although circumstances have changed since the original child labor statutes, the purpose of preventing injury to young children remains unchanged.

The court also addressed the issue of the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s age, citing Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, which states that the employer must exercise proper vigilance to discover the fact. The court concluded that, generally, the issue of whether the employer was justified in believing the employee was of the prescribed age is a question of fact for the jury.