New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 27-a

  • Gammons v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014): Labor Law § 27-a as a Predicate for General Municipal Law § 205-e Actions

    24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014)

    Labor Law § 27-a (3)(a)(1), which mandates employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards, can serve as a valid predicate for a cause of action under General Municipal Law § 205-e for police officers injured in the line of duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Labor Law § 27-a, specifically its general duty clause, could serve as a predicate for a police officer’s claim under General Municipal Law (GML) § 205-e. The plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while loading barriers onto a truck. The Court held that Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a safe workplace, could serve as a valid predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind GML § 205-e to provide broad protection for police officers and the expansive interpretation that the courts must apply to the statute. The Court found that Labor Law § 27-a imposed a clear legal duty, satisfying the requirements for a GML § 205-e predicate. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied because the plaintiff’s injury was, at least arguably, caused by the truck being improperly equipped, thus presenting a recognized hazard.

    Facts

    Allison Gammons, a New York City police officer, was injured while working on a "barrier truck detail." She was loading wooden barriers onto a police flatbed truck when another officer pushed a barrier into her, causing her to fall off the truck. Gammons claimed the truck was unsafe because it was too short, lacked a tailgate and adequate side railings. She sued the City of New York and the Police Department, alleging common law negligence and a violation of GML § 205-e, based on the alleged unsafe condition of the truck and violation of Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1). Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general duty clause of Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a statutory predicate for a GML § 205-e cause of action, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a “recognized hazard”.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML § 205-e. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal on a certified question whether the court properly affirmed the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's GML § 205-e claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1), the general duty clause of the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), can serve as a predicate for a claim under GML § 205-e.

    2. Whether the plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) by demonstrating a “recognized hazard” in the workplace.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court held that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) contains a clear legal duty that may serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim.

    2. The court found that defendants failed to meet their burden to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a "recognized hazard."

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the legislative history and purpose of GML § 205-e. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended a broad application of GML § 205-e to protect police officers. The Court reviewed prior cases which discussed legislative amendments meant to broaden police officers’ rights to sue for injuries. The Court noted that these amendments were enacted to counteract judicial decisions limiting the application of GML § 205-e, emphasizing the legislative goal of providing a cause of action for police officers. The Court referred to cases, such as Williams v. City of New York, that directed the courts to apply GML § 205-e "’expansively’ so as to favor recovery by police officers whenever possible."

    The Court addressed the question of whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) could serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court held that it could, reasoning that Labor Law § 27-a contained a clear legal duty. Specifically, it stated that "[e]very employer shall: (1) furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees." The Court found that this imposed a clear legal duty, despite being general in nature.

    The Court distinguished the case from Williams, noting that the plaintiff’s claim involved an improperly equipped vehicle, which the Court said could be an occupational injury covered by PESHA. The Court also rejected the argument that Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a predicate because the Commissioner of Labor had sole authority over enforcement, noting that GML § 205-e allows courts to consider noncompliance with statutes and regulations as evidence of negligence. Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that a plaintiff should cite to a specific regulation violated to meet the threshold under GML § 205-e when using Labor Law § 27-a as a predicate.

  • McCormick v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 355 (2007): Establishing Liability for Police Officer Injuries Under General Municipal Law § 205-e

    McCormick v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 355 (2007)

    To establish liability against an employer or co-employee under General Municipal Law § 205-e for injuries sustained by a police officer, the plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a statute imposing clear duties, and a rebuttable presumption exists that the Penal Law has not been violated if no criminal charges were brought.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals concern wrongful death claims brought under General Municipal Law § 205-e following the deaths of three New York City police officers. In McCormick, an officer was killed during a drug raid by friendly fire. In Williams, two officers were killed by a prisoner who obtained a weapon from an unsecured locker. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the Penal Law can serve as a predicate for § 205-e liability, the plaintiff in McCormick failed to prove a Penal Law violation. The court also held that Labor Law § 27-a did not apply to the uniquely dangerous aspects of police work, and thus the plaintiff in Williams also failed to prove a violation. Thus, in both cases, the claims were dismissed.

    Facts

    McCormick: During a no-knock drug raid, Officer Huvane encountered a pregnant woman, Perez, with a gun. A struggle ensued, and both Huvane and Perez fired their weapons. Sergeant McCormick was fatally struck by a bullet fired during the confrontation. Perez was charged with crimes related to the incident, but was acquitted of all crimes related to McCormick’s death, except for criminal possession of a weapon.

    Williams: Detectives Williams and Guerzon transported a prisoner, Harrison, to the DA’s office. Harrison, while handcuffed, managed to retrieve a revolver from an unsecured locker in the detention area. On the return trip to Rikers Island, Harrison shot and killed Williams and Guerzon. Harrison was convicted of murder.

    Procedural History

    McCormick: The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the City, finding the officers were justified in using deadly force. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an unproven Penal Law violation cannot support a § 205-e claim.

    Williams: The jury found the City liable for violating Labor Law § 27-a and Administrative Code provisions. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no evidence the locker room was maintained unsafely and that Labor Law § 27-a did not apply to the use of the room.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether alleged violations of the Penal Law can serve as a predicate for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e.

    2. Whether Labor Law § 27-a and Administrative Code provisions can serve as a predicate for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e where police officers were killed by a prisoner who obtained a weapon from an unsecured locker.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a claim may be predicated on a violation of those Penal Law sections that prohibit specific acts; however, in the absence of a criminal conviction, a rebuttable presumption exists that the Penal Law has not been violated.

    2. No, because Labor Law § 27-a does not cover the special risks faced by police officers, and the Administrative Code provisions do not apply to the facts presented.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the requirements for a claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e, emphasizing the need to identify a statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply. The court clarified that while the statute’s language is broad, it cannot be applied literally. A police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a clear duty imposed by a well-developed body of law.

    Regarding the Penal Law, the court held that while justification defenses alone cannot form the basis of a § 205-e claim, violations of specific Penal Law sections prohibiting certain acts can. However, the court established a rebuttable presumption that the Penal Law has not been violated if no criminal charges were brought against the defendant. In this case, the plaintiff failed to rebut this presumption with compelling evidence demonstrating a material question of fact as to whether the conduct was criminal and not justified. The officers acted in self-defense when confronted with a suspect wielding a gun.

    Regarding Labor Law § 27-a, the court reasoned that this provision, designed to provide public employees with workplace protections similar to those in the private sector, does not extend to the unique risks inherent in police work. The court stated, “We think it highly unlikely that the Legislature intended the general language of section 27-a to authorize Department of Labor inspectors enforcing PESHA to second-guess the decisions of police supervisors” regarding sensitive matters like weapons storage and prisoner detention. The court distinguished this case from Balsamo v. City of New York, noting that the injury in Williams arose from risks unique to police work, not from a general workplace hazard.