New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 240(1)

  • Bauer v. Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 97 N.Y.2d 447 (2002): Coexistence of Labor Law § 202 and § 240(1) Claims

    97 N.Y.2d 447 (2002)

    An injured window cleaner can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1); however, Labor Law § 202 requires the application of comparative negligence principles, while Labor Law § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

    Summary

    Keith Bauer, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows at Female Academy of the Sacred Heart. He sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 202, and 240(1), and common-law negligence. The defendant argued that § 202 was the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and § 240(1). It also determined that § 202 incorporates comparative negligence principles because it relies on Industrial Code regulations, while § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

    Facts

    Bauer, employed by Environmental Service Systems (ESS), was assigned to clean third-floor exterior windows at the Academy using the belt-and-anchor method. The building’s anchors were square, while the hooks on Bauer’s lanyard were round, violating Industrial Code requirements. While detaching a hook, Bauer lost his balance and fell, sustaining severe injuries.

    Procedural History

    Bauer sued the Academy. The Academy initiated a third-party action against ESS. The Supreme Court denied motions to dismiss all claims except the Labor Law § 202 claim, and also denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend both sections to apply simultaneously. At trial on the § 202 claim, the Supreme Court directed a verdict for Bauer, finding a § 202 violation resulted in strict liability. The jury found in favor of Bauer. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that § 202 was a comparative negligence statute due to a 1970 amendment. At the second trial, the jury found the Academy negligent, but its negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Bauer’s injuries. Bauer appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an injured window cleaner’s claims under Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1) can coexist.

    2. Whether a violation of Labor Law § 202 results in strict liability or comparative negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature did not express an intention that these statutes be mutually exclusive; the inclusion of “cleaning” in Labor Law § 240(1) supports this.

    2. Comparative Negligence, because a 1970 amendment made it a comparative negligence statute by deferring to the safety standards for window cleaners set forth in regulations of the Industrial Board.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statutes serve different goals, apply to different defendants, and have been interpreted differently. Labor Law § 202 protects window cleaners and exterior surface cleaners, and applies to owners, lessees, agents, and managers. Labor Law § 240(1) applies to workers engaged in “cleaning” a building, and strict liability flows to owners and contractors only.

    The Court stated, “We would be ill-advised to hold that— simply because an injured window cleaner’s claim appears cognizable under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240 (1)— one cause of action must be chosen to the exclusion of the other.”

    Regarding Labor Law § 202, the Court found that the 1970 amendment, which replaced specific safety requirements with references to the Board of Standards and Appeals, transformed the statute from a strict liability statute to one based on comparative negligence. A violation of a regulation or ordinance is only some evidence of negligence. The Court cited Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346 (1925) and Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N.Y. 456 (1939). The Court noted, “Violation of a rule of the Industrial Board, however, constitutes merely some evidence which the jury may consider on the question of defendant’s negligence, along with other evidence in the case which bears on that subject”. Because the current version of Labor Law § 202 relies on the Industrial Code for specific safety standards, violations of those standards are evidence of negligence, not strict liability.

  • Toefer v. General Electric, 95 N.Y.2d 74 (2000): Illustrating Limits of Labor Law § 240(1) Protection

    95 N.Y.2d 74 (2000)

    Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply when an object falls that is not being hoisted or secured and when a hoisting or securing device would not typically be necessary or expected for the task at hand.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for injuries to workers caused by gravity-related risks at construction sites. The plaintiff, an asbestos removal employee, was injured when a piece of asbestos, deliberately dropped from a chemical tank above, struck him. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that § 240(1) did not apply because the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured, and no hoisting or securing device was necessary or expected in this situation. This decision clarifies that the statute’s protections are not limitless and require a nexus between the injury and the specific risks associated with elevation-related tasks involving hoisting or securing.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was an employee of an asbestos removal company working at premises owned by General Electric Company. During the asbestos removal process, a piece of asbestos was cut and intentionally dropped from a chemical tank approximately 12 feet above the ground. This piece of asbestos then fell and struck the plaintiff, causing him injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff and his wife sued General Electric Company, alleging, among other things, absolute liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the § 240(1) cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. General Electric appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to CPLR 5601(d), challenging the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury caused by a piece of asbestos that was deliberately dropped from a height of 12 feet, where the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured at the time it fell.

    Holding

    No, because the asbestos that fell on the plaintiff was not a material being hoisted or a load that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and a hoisting or securing device would not have been necessary or expected in this situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on its prior holding in Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 (2001) (Note: the Narducci cite in the original opinion is incorrect, but this brief fixes it.). The court emphasized that the determinative factor is whether the falling object was being hoisted or secured at the time of the accident. The Court reasoned that the purpose of Labor Law § 240(1) is to protect workers from elevation-related risks where hoisting or securing devices are necessary to prevent injuries. Here, the asbestos was intentionally dropped, not hoisted or secured, and the task did not inherently require such devices. The court stated: “This was not a situation where a hoisting or securing device of the kind enumerated in the statute would have been necessary or even expected.” Because the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured, and the situation did not require such measures, the Court concluded that Labor Law § 240(1) was inapplicable. This case demonstrates that not every injury sustained at a construction site falls under the purview of Labor Law § 240(1); the injury must be connected to the specific hazards the statute aims to address: falling objects that should have been hoisted or secured. The key takeaway is that the mere presence of a height differential is insufficient; the injury must arise from a failure to use appropriate safety devices for hoisting or securing materials. The court focused on the nature of the task being performed and whether the injury stemmed from the absence of necessary safety equipment for that task.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for injuries caused by falling objects only when the objects are being hoisted or secured and fall due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute; it does not apply to general workplace hazards or pre-existing structural elements.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the scope of liability under Labor Law § 240(1) in the context of falling objects. In Narducci, a window frame fell on a worker. In Capparelli, a light fixture fell on an electrician during installation. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) only applies when the falling object is related to a significant risk inherent in the elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and when the object falls because of inadequate safety devices. The court found that neither case involved such risks, limiting the statute’s application to situations involving the hoisting or securing of materials.

    Facts

    In Narducci, Alex Narducci, an employee of Atlantic Windows, was removing steel window frames from a fire-damaged warehouse. While standing on a ladder, a piece of glass from an adjacent window fell and injured him. The glass was part of the pre-existing building structure. In Capparelli, Louis Capparelli, Jr., an electrician, was installing light fixtures into a dropped ceiling. While on a ladder, a light fixture he was installing began to fall, and he injured his hand trying to stop it. Plaintiff did not fall from the ladder in either case.

    Procedural History

    In Narducci, the Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Capparelli, the Supreme Court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the third-party defendant, holding that the injury was caused by the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, not the extraordinary elevation risks covered by Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to injuries caused by falling objects that are not being hoisted or secured at the time of the accident.

    2. Whether the fact that a worker is at an elevation when injured by a falling object brings the scenario within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1) if the object was not being hoisted or secured.

    Holding

    1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) applies only where the falling of an object is related to a significant risk inherent in the relative elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and the object falls due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute.

    2. No, because working at an elevation does not increase the risk of being hit by an improperly hoisted load; the hazard posed by working at an elevation is that the worker might be injured in a fall. The different risks arise from different construction practices, and the hazard from one type of activity cannot be transferred to create liability for a different type of accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to protect workers from elevation-related risks stemming from the failure to use adequate safety devices such as scaffolds, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, and ropes. The Court emphasized that the statute’s protections extend to falling objects only when the falling object is related to “a significant risk inherent in * * * the relative elevation * * * at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured.” In Narducci, the falling glass was part of the pre-existing building structure and was not being hoisted or secured. The absence of a hoisting or securing device did not cause the glass to fall; thus, it was a general workplace hazard. In Capparelli, there was no height differential between the plaintiff and the falling object, meaning the injury wasn’t due to an elevation-related risk within the statute’s scope. The Court stated, “Even ‘a violation of [Labor Law § 240 (1)] cannot “establish liability if the statute is intended to protect against a particular hazard, and a hazard of a different kind is the occasion of the injury.”’” The Court distinguished between risks inherent in working at an elevation (falling from a height) and risks associated with falling objects (improper hoisting or securing). It clarified that the statute does not cover every gravity-related accident; courts must discern the Legislature’s intended application. The Court found that the scissor jack was designed to protect the worker from falling, an entirely different risk. Here, the plaintiff was adequately secured, and the only risk was the glass. Since the glass was not an object being hoisted or secured, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply.

  • Toefer v. Long Island Railroad, 4 N.Y.3d 882 (2005): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    Toefer v. Long Island Railroad, 4 N.Y.3d 882 (2005)

    Labor Law § 240(1) applies only to elevation-related risks where a worker is exposed to the risk of falling from a height or being struck by a falling object; the mere fact that an injury occurred during a fall does not automatically trigger the statute’s protections.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a demolition worker, was injured when he slipped and fell while exiting a demolition vehicle. He stepped onto the vehicle’s track, which was greasy, causing him to fall three feet to the ground. The Court of Appeals held that the risk of alighting from the vehicle was not an elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1), which requires protective devices for elevation-related hazards. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim, as there was no evidence that the defendant created or had notice of the greasy condition. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the claims.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was employed as a demolition worker. After completing his workday, he began to exit his demolition vehicle. The vehicle had tracks on each side but lacked a step for entry or exit. The plaintiff stepped from the cab onto the vehicle’s track, intending to use it as a step. He claimed his foot slipped due to grease on the track, causing him to fall approximately three feet to the ground, resulting in injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought claims under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 200, and under certain provisions of the Industrial Code. The lower court’s decision is not specified in the Court of Appeals opinion. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling (implicitly a ruling in favor of the plaintiff or denying summary judgment to the defendant). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the risk of alighting from the construction vehicle constituted an elevation-related risk within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the defendant created or had notice of the greasy condition of the track, thereby supporting a claim under Labor Law § 200?

    Holding

    1. No, because the risk of alighting from the construction vehicle was not an elevation-related risk requiring the protective devices listed in Labor Law § 240(1).

    2. No, because plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant created or had prior notice of the greasy condition of the track.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) applies to specific elevation-related risks, referencing Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 514-515. The Court emphasized that the accident must involve a risk stemming from a difference in elevation. Here, the risk of slipping while exiting a vehicle, even one three feet off the ground, did not necessitate the protective devices enumerated in the statute. The Court clarified that a fall alone is insufficient to invoke § 240(1); the fall must be connected to an elevation-related hazard. Regarding the Labor Law § 200 claim, the Court applied the standard established in Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 294-295, requiring evidence that the defendant either created the dangerous condition or had prior notice of it. Since the plaintiff presented no such evidence, the § 200 claim failed. The Court also dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments based on the Industrial Code regulations, deeming them either unpreserved or without merit. The decision underscores the importance of linking an injury to a specific elevation-related hazard to trigger the protections of Labor Law § 240(1). The case is a reminder that not every fall on a construction site is covered by the statute, even if it involves some difference in elevation.

  • Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 913 (1999): Limits of Liability Under New York’s Scaffold Law

    Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 913 (1999)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), the Scaffold Law, protects workers from elevation-related risks and does not apply to injuries resulting from general construction site hazards unrelated to the protective devices provided.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Reding Nieves was injured at a construction site while installing a sprinkler system. He stepped from a ladder onto a drop cloth, tripping over a concealed portable light underneath. He sued under New York Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted summary judgment to the defendant, Five Boro Air Conditioning. The court held that the injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk that the scaffold law was designed to protect against, but rather by a common construction site hazard.

    Facts

    Reding Nieves was installing a sprinkler system at a construction site in Queens. While descending a ladder, he stepped onto a drop cloth covering the floor. Underneath the cloth was a concealed portable light. Nieves tripped over the light, twisting his ankle and falling. He sustained injuries as a result of the fall.

    Procedural History

    Nieves sued Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The trial court’s decision is not noted. The Appellate Division’s decision is not directly stated but is impliedly reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained when a worker trips over a concealed object on the floor after stepping off a ladder, where the ladder itself was not defective or improperly placed.

    Holding

    No, because the injury resulted from a hazard unrelated to the elevation-related risk that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect against. The core objective of the statute is to prevent falls from elevated worksites where protective devices are required, and the ladder in this case served its intended purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) provides extraordinary protections, but only for a narrow class of special hazards related to elevation. The statute does not cover “any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity” (quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer HydroElec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501). The court emphasized that the law’s core objective is to prevent falls by requiring protective devices for workers at heights. The court distinguished the case from situations where the ladder itself was defective or improperly placed. Here, the ladder was effective in preventing a fall during the ceiling sprinkler installation. Nieves’ injury resulted from a separate hazard – the concealed object on the floor – wholly unrelated to the elevation risk. Therefore, the court concluded that Nieves’ injuries resulted from the usual dangers of a construction site, not the type of extraordinary peril that Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to prevent. As the court stated, “Where an injury results from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first instance, no section 240 (1) liability exists”.

  • Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322 (1999): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) and Inspection Work

    Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322 (1999)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide proper safety equipment for elevation-related work, does not extend to preliminary inspection work conducted prior to and separate from any actual construction, repair, or alteration activities enumerated in the statute.

    Summary

    Walfredo Martinez, an environmental inspector, was injured while measuring an insulation-covered pipe during an asbestos inspection at a school. He sought recovery under Labor Law § 240(1), arguing that the lack of proper safety equipment caused his fall. The New York Court of Appeals held that Martinez’s inspection work, which was preliminary to any actual asbestos removal and performed by a separate entity, did not fall within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1). The Court emphasized that the statute applies to specific activities like erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building, none of which were taking place during Martinez’s inspection.

    Facts

    Martinez was hired as an environmental inspector to work for Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates, which contracted with the New York City School Construction Authority for asbestos inspection services. His job involved inspecting school buildings, identifying asbestos problem areas, and cataloging the asbestos for future removal. While inspecting P.S. 85 in Queens, Martinez attempted to measure an insulation-covered pipe by climbing onto a desk placed against a tall closet. While reaching for the pipe, he fell and sustained injuries. The asbestos removal itself was to be done by a different company in a later project phase.

    Procedural History

    Martinez sued the City of New York and others, alleging negligence and violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court denied Martinez’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law claim and granted the defendants’ cross-motions for dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a divided vote. The Court of Appeals granted an appeal based on the two-Judge dissent and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an environmental inspector, performing preliminary inspection work to identify asbestos prior to any actual removal or abatement, is engaged in an activity covered by Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    No, because Martinez’s inspection work was merely investigatory and did not constitute “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” as required by Labor Law § 240(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Labor Law § 240(1) should be liberally construed to protect workers. However, the Court emphasized that the statutory language should not be strained to encompass activities the Legislature did not intend to include. The Court found that Martinez’s work was purely investigatory and preliminary. No actual repair, alteration, or other covered activity was underway at the time of his injury. The Court explicitly rejected the lower court’s “integral and necessary part” test, stating that it improperly expanded the scope of the statute. The Court quoted Gibson v. Worthington Div. of McGraw-Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 1108, 1109 stating that the plaintiff was “not a person ‘employed’ to carry out the repairs as that term is used” in section 240(1). The key factor was that Martinez was not engaged in any of the enumerated activities listed in the statute, meaning that summary judgment was inappropriate. The dissent in the appellate division argued that this type of inspection work was “an integral and necessary part of a project that was within the purview of’ Labor Law § 240 (1).” However, the majority found that this would improperly enlarge the reach of the statute.

  • Narducci v. Con Edison, 88 N.Y.2d 905 (1996): Establishing Limits on “Falling Object” Claims Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Con Edison, 88 N.Y.2d 905 (1996)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), concerning elevation-related risks, is not implicated simply because an object falls due to gravity; the object must be elevated above the worksite for the statute to apply.

    Summary

    Narducci, an employee of a general contractor, was injured when a steel plate being moved by a backhoe fell on his foot and shoulder. He sued Con Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), which concerns risks related to elevation differentials at construction sites. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) did not apply because the steel plate was either resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it, and was not elevated above the worksite, thus not presenting the type of elevation-related risk the statute was designed to protect against. The court emphasized that the mere involvement of gravity is insufficient to trigger § 240(1); the object must be elevated.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Narducci was employed by a general contractor performing excavation work. At the end of each day, workers covered unfilled trenches with heavy steel traffic plates. On the day of the accident, Narducci and a co-employee were directing the placement of a steel plate using a backhoe. The plate was attached to the backhoe’s shovel by a chain with hooks. As the plate was being maneuvered, one of the hooks became unfastened, and the plate toppled over, falling onto Narducci’s foot and striking his shoulder.

    Procedural History

    Narducci sued Con Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted Con Edison’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. Narducci appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury caused by a falling object when that object was not elevated above the worksite but was either resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it.

    Holding

    No, because the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) are not implicated simply because an injury is caused by the effects of gravity upon an object; the object must be elevated above the worksite to present the elevation-related risks the statute aims to address.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to address “exceptionally dangerous conditions posed by elevation differentials at work sites.” The court noted that while gravity may have caused the steel plate to fall, the plate was not elevated above the worksite. The court distinguished the case from situations where the statute applies, namely, cases involving “a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or secured.” Because the steel plate was resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it, the court concluded that the statute did not apply. The court relied on precedent, specifically citing Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 490-491, emphasizing that the statute prescribes safety precautions for workers laboring under unique gravity-related hazards arising from elevation differentials. The court also cited Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 to underscore that not all gravity-related incidents fall under the protection of Labor Law § 240(1). The decision clarifies that a crucial element for a § 240(1) claim involving falling objects is the object’s elevation relative to the worksite.

  • O’Connell v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 573 (1998): Sole Proximate Cause as a Defense to Labor Law § 240(1) Liability

    O’Connell v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 573 (1998)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a defendant can avoid liability if the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of their injuries, even if the work involved altering a building or structure.

    Summary

    O’Connell, an employee of Alpha TeleConnect, was injured when he fell from a ladder while installing computer and telephone cable at Hagedorn & Company. The Court of Appeals held that while O’Connell was engaged in “altering” the building within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on proximate cause. A reasonable jury could have concluded that O’Connell’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, thus precluding liability under the statute. The Court also found error in directing a verdict against Hagedorn’s third-party claim for common-law indemnification against Alpha. The case was remitted for a new trial.

    Facts

    O’Connell, an employee of Alpha TeleConnect, Inc., was injured while working at premises leased by Hagedorn & Company. His task involved running computer and telephone cable from an existing computer room to newly leased space, which would be used as a telecommunications center. This required him to stand on a ladder and access holes in the ceiling to pull wiring through “canals” made in chicken wire.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that O’Connell was “altering” the building within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) and directed a verdict in favor of O’Connell on the issue of proximate cause at the close of his case. The Supreme Court also directed a verdict for third-party defendant Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the judgment for the plaintiffs, reinstated Hagedorn’s third-party complaint, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s work constituted “altering” a building or structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of proximate cause?

    3. Whether the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the third-party defendant Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plaintiff’s work involved “making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure.”

    2. Yes, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

    3. Yes, because there were questions of fact as to whether Alpha properly supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff was engaged in “altering” the building or structure, citing Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465, noting the work involved “making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” not a simple, routine activity. However, the Court found that Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on proximate cause. The Court reasoned that a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, referencing Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524. This is a critical distinction in Labor Law § 240(1) cases: even if the statute applies, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff’s own actions were the only cause of the accident.

    The Court also held that Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification. The Court stated that “on this record, there are questions of fact as to whether Alpha properly supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff,” citing Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219, 226. The Court rejected the Supreme Court’s reasoning that Hagedorn’s disposal of the ladder was relevant to those questions.

  • Nowak v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 821 (1999): Defining ‘Owner’ Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Nowak v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 821 (1999)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), the term “owner” includes owners in fee, even if the property is leased to another entity, and the owner’s ability to control the work or benefit from it is legally irrelevant to liability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the City of New York, as the owner of property leased to the New York City Transit Authority, was liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a Transit Authority employee during repair work. The court reaffirmed that ownership alone is sufficient to establish liability, regardless of the owner’s control over the work or the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship. The decision emphasizes a bright-line rule for determining owner liability under the statute, prioritizing the protection of workers engaged in elevated risk activities.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a structure maintainer for the New York City Transit Authority, was injured when he fell through a canopy attached to an elevated train station owned by the City of New York. The plaintiff was performing repair work at the time of the incident. The City of New York owned the train station but leased it to the New York City Transit Authority.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1). The City initiated a third-party action against the Transit Authority. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, and both the City and the Transit Authority cross-moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied the cross-motions. Following a jury trial on damages, the Supreme Court entered judgment against the City and awarded the City full indemnification from the Transit Authority. The Appellate Division affirmed the jury award against the City. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York, as the owner of the property leased to the New York City Transit Authority, is an “owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), despite lacking direct control over the work or the worker.

    Holding

    Yes, because liability under Labor Law § 240(1) rests upon the fact of ownership. The court emphasized that the City’s lack of control or the lessor-lessee relationship with the Transit Authority does not negate its responsibility as the owner under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, specifically Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, stating that “liability rests upon the fact of ownership and whether Eastern had contracted for the work or benefitted from it are legally irrelevant.” The court further explained, referencing Celestine v City of New York, that the Legislature intended to include owners in fee within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1), “even though the property might be leased to another.” The court rejected the argument that the City’s lack of direct control over the Transit Authority’s operations should exempt it from liability, noting that the Legislature has created specific exceptions for certain owners (e.g., owners of one- and two-family dwellings) but not for the City in this context. The court stated, “We therefore decline to exempt the City — which is in fact the owner — from the plain word and reach of the statute, leaving that for the Legislature if it so chooses.” This establishes a clear and consistent application of the statute based on ownership alone. The court also explicitly stated that “To the extent that Robinson v City of New York (211 AD2d 600) may be inconsistent with our holding today, it should not be followed.”

  • Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995): Establishing Liability Under New York’s Labor Law § 240(1) for Elevated Risks

    Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker’s injuries are proximately caused by the failure to provide adequate safety devices to protect against elevation-related risks at a construction site.

    Summary

    This case concerns a painter who fell from a ladder while attempting to paint an alcove, falling over a wall and through a suspended ceiling. The New York Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the painter from the specific risk of falling over the alcove wall. The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff and held the painting subcontractor liable for common-law indemnification to the general contractor because the subcontractor supervised the work. The ruling emphasizes the non-delegable duty of owners and contractors to provide adequate safety measures against elevation-related hazards.

    Facts

    Corning Incorporated owned a property called Sullivan Park and contracted with Wellco to perform construction work. Wellco subcontracted with Cook to perform painting work. Plaintiff, an employee of Cook, was injured while painting an alcove. He was positioned on a ladder, reaching over an eight-foot alcove wall to paint, when he lost his balance and fell over the wall and through a suspended ceiling to the floor below. No safety devices were provided to prevent a fall over the alcove wall.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Corning and Wellco, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240, 241, and 200. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Corning and Wellco on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1). Corning was granted contractual indemnity against Wellco, and Wellco was granted common-law indemnity against Cook. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted Cook leave to appeal from the Supreme Court judgment awarding damages.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether summary judgment on liability was properly granted to the plaintiffs under Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the general contractor Wellco is entitled to indemnification from Cook in the absence of a showing of negligence by Cook and in view of the contractual indemnification agreement between the parties?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the plaintiff from the specific elevation-related risk of falling over the alcove wall and through the suspended ceiling.

    2. Yes, because Cook supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff and is therefore liable for common-law indemnification, which is not superseded by the contractual agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) places responsibility for worker safety on owners and contractors. The court identified two distinct elevation-related risks: the need to elevate the painter via a ladder, and the risk of falling over the alcove wall. While the ladder itself was not alleged to be defective, the critical failure was the lack of any safety device to protect the painter from falling over the alcove wall. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, stating that an owner or contractor who fails to provide safety devices is absolutely liable when the absence of such devices is the proximate cause of injury. The court also referenced Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, noting that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the precise manner of the accident was foreseeable, only that some risk of injury was foreseeable. The court determined that the absence of protection against a fall through the elevated open area above the alcove was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of law. Regarding indemnification, the court found that Cook supervised the work and was therefore liable for common-law indemnification, consistent with Hawthorne v. South Bronx Community Corp. The court clarified that a contractual agreement to indemnify does not supersede the common-law duty to provide indemnification when the subcontractor directly controlled the work.