New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 240(1)

  • O'Brien v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 28 N.Y.3d 212 (2017): Adequacy of Safety Devices under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    28 N.Y.3d 212 (2017)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a worker who falls on a construction site is not automatically entitled to summary judgment; there must be questions of fact regarding whether the safety device provided was adequate, or if the hazard was an ordinary tripping hazard unrelated to the work being done.

    Summary

    O'Brien, an employee at a construction site, slipped and fell on a temporary metal staircase while descending to get his rain jacket. He sued the Port Authority (owner) and Tishman Construction (general contractor) under New York Labor Law § 240(1). The trial court and Appellate Division differed on whether O'Brien was entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, finding that the conflicting expert opinions raised questions of fact regarding the staircase’s adequacy as a safety device, particularly since it was designed for both indoor and outdoor use and the worker was exposed to rain and wet conditions. The Court clarified that a fall alone does not establish a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

    Facts

    O'Brien worked at a construction site. He was maintaining welding machines and heading to his shanty to get a rain jacket. He used a temporary metal staircase, which was wet due to rain. O'Brien stated that he slipped on a stair tread and fell. Expert witnesses for both sides offered conflicting opinions on the staircase's compliance with safety standards and its suitability for the conditions, including the impact of rain. O'Brien’s expert opined the stairs were not up to standards; the defendants’ expert disagreed. The staircase was wet, with metal nubs for traction.

    Procedural History

    O'Brien sued the Port Authority and Tishman under Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim, finding factual issues existed, but granted summary judgment for O’Brien on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to O'Brien on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, with one justice dissenting. The Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal by certified question.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division properly determined that O'Brien was entitled to summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    1. No, because the Court of Appeals found that the existence of conflicting expert opinions regarding the staircase’s adequacy as a safety device presented questions of fact, precluding summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, emphasizing that Labor Law § 240(1) requires a hazard connected to a physically significant elevation differential and a failure to provide adequate protection. The Court stated, “To the extent the Appellate Division opinion below can be read to say that a statutory violation occurred merely because plaintiff fell down the stairs, it does not provide an accurate statement of the law.” The court noted the case was distinguishable from cases involving defective ladders or scaffolding. Conflicting expert testimony created questions of fact regarding the staircase’s adequacy. Industry standards were a factor to be considered, but not determinative, as there were questions whether the device provided adequate protection. The dissent argued that the industry standards were immaterial to the liability.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that, under Labor Law § 240(1), a simple fall does not automatically equate to a violation. In cases involving falls, it is crucial to determine if there are factual disputes concerning the adequacy of the safety device provided, and if the injury was the result of a hazard related to the work. Courts will examine if the device provided “proper protection” as the statute requires. The key is whether the device provided was adequate for the work conditions at the time of the injury. If conflicting expert opinions exist regarding the safety and adequacy of the device, this can create a question of fact that precludes summary judgment. This case signals that courts will look to the specific safety device in place, the conditions, and whether that device offered adequate protection from a height-related risk.

  • Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016): Clarifying the Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) and ‘Falling Objects’

    Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016)

    Labor Law § 240(1) applies to falling object injuries only when the object is being hoisted or secured, or requires securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and the injury is proximately caused by the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute.

    Summary

    An electrician, Runner, was injured when a conduit pipe fell on his hand while relocating a pencil box. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), claiming the compression coupling securing the conduit was inadequate. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s denial of summary judgment for the defendants (building owner and general contractor), holding that the compression coupling was not a safety device within the meaning of the statute. The Court clarified that § 240(1) liability for falling objects requires proof that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the task at hand, and that the injury resulted from the lack of, or inadequate, safety device listed in the statute. Here, the coupling’s purpose was support, not worker protection.

    Facts

    Runner, an electrician, was tasked with relocating a “pencil box” (access point for telecommunication wires) that was connected to conduit piping. The pencil box was affixed between two vertical sections of conduit. Runner cut the conduit above and below the pencil box, removed the box, and began drilling new holes to relocate the support. Approximately 15 minutes later, the top conduit section, which was connected to a horizontal conduit near the ceiling by a compression coupling, fell and injured Runner’s hand.

    Procedural History

    Runner sued the building owner (1095 Avenue of the Americas), the general contractor (J.T. Magen Construction), and the tenant (Dechert, LLP), among others, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted Runner’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified, denying Runner’s motion but otherwise affirming. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order regarding the building owner and general contractor, granting their motion for summary judgment, and answered the certified question in the negative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the compression coupling connecting the conduit pipe constituted a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), such that its alleged inadequacy could give rise to liability for a falling object injury.

    Holding

    No, because the compression coupling was not a safety device intended to protect against falling objects, but rather a standard component used to support the conduit/pencil box assembly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability only where the failure to provide proper protection is a proximate cause of the worker’s injury. To prevail in a falling object case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and that the injury was due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute. The Court distinguished between devices meant to provide general support and those intended for worker protection from falling objects. Quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., the court reiterated that a plaintiff must show that the object fell “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute”. Here, the compression coupling’s function was to keep the conduit together, not to prevent it from falling and injuring workers. The court noted that the plaintiff’s argument would inappropriately extend the statute’s reach to any component that lends support to a structure. The Court also noted that the fact that plaintiff suggested a different type of coupling (set screw coupling) would have been better was of no moment, because both couplings serve the same purpose of support and neither is a safety device within the meaning of the statute.

  • Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013): Defines Cleaning Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes liability on building owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices to workers exposed to elevation-related risks, does not extend to routine maintenance tasks such as dusting a shelf in a retail store.

    Summary

    Jose Soto, a commercial cleaner, was injured when he fell from a ladder while dusting a shelf in a J. Crew store. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that dusting a shelf was routine maintenance, not “cleaning” under the statute. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as cleaning under § 240(1), focusing on the routine nature of the task, the need for specialized equipment, the elevation risks involved, and the connection to construction-related activities. Because Soto’s activity did not meet these criteria, his claim was dismissed.

    Facts

    Jose Soto, an employee of Whelan Cleaning Services, was assigned to clean a J. Crew retail store. His duties included daily maintenance such as vacuuming, mopping, and dusting. On the day of the incident, a J. Crew employee asked Soto to dust a six-foot-high display shelf. Soto, using a four-foot ladder, fell while dusting the shelf, sustaining injuries. The ladder was in proper working order.

    Procedural History

    Soto sued J. Crew and the building owner under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the dusting constituted routine maintenance and wasn’t protected by the statute. Soto appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dusting of a display shelf in a retail store constitutes “cleaning” within the meaning of New York Labor Law § 240(1), thereby entitling the injured worker to the protections of the statute.

    Holding

    No, because the dusting of a display shelf is considered routine maintenance and does not involve the type of heightened elevation-related risks that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect against.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that not all cleaning activities fall under the protection of Labor Law § 240(1). While commercial window washing is covered, routine maintenance is not. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as “cleaning” under the statute. These factors are: (1) whether the task is routine and recurring; (2) whether it requires specialized equipment or expertise; (3) whether it involves insignificant elevation risks; and (4) whether it is related to any ongoing construction or renovation project. The Court stated, “Outside the sphere of commercial window washing (which we have already determined to be covered), an activity cannot be characterized as “cleaning” under the statute, if the task: (1) is routine… (2) requires neither specialized equipment or expertise… (3) generally involves insignificant elevation risks… and (4)…is unrelated to any ongoing construction…project.” Applying these factors, the Court found that Soto’s dusting activity was routine, required no special skills or equipment, involved minimal elevation risks, and was unrelated to any construction project. Therefore, Soto was not engaged in “cleaning” as defined by Labor Law § 240(1). The court referenced the example in Dahar v Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., stating this case presented a scenario analogous to the bookstore employee who climbs a ladder to dust off a bookshelf, which the legislature never intended to cover.

  • Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) for Cleaning Activities

    Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co. ,15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related hazards, does not extend to injuries sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a manufactured product as part of the manufacturing process.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, an employee of West Metal Works, was injured when he fell from a ladder while cleaning a steel “wall module” manufactured by West for defendant Bechtel. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), arguing that cleaning the module constituted “cleaning” a “structure.” The Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product, emphasizing that the statute’s central concern is construction-related hazards and that extending it to cover manufacturing processes would broaden its scope beyond the legislature’s intent. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.

    Facts

    West Metal Works, Inc. manufactured a steel “wall module” for Bechtel National, Inc., intended for installation in a nuclear waste treatment plant. Before shipping, the module required cleaning. Plaintiff, a West employee, was cleaning the module while standing on a ladder when the ladder allegedly broke, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including Bechtel and West’s landlords (the Martins), under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a product (a steel wall module) during the manufacturing process.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily intended to protect workers from construction-related hazards, and extending it to cover the cleaning of manufactured products within a factory setting would unduly broaden the statute’s scope beyond what the legislature intended.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily concerned with dangers in the construction industry, tracing its origins to addressing deaths and injuries in the construction trades. While the Court had previously rejected limiting the law solely to construction sites, it had not extended it to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product. The Court noted that the majority of “cleaning” cases under Labor Law § 240(1) involved window cleaning, and even those cases had limitations, such as excluding routine household window washing. The court reasoned that applying the statute to the cleaning of manufactured products would expand its coverage far beyond its intended purpose, potentially including activities like dusting bookshelves or cleaning light fixtures, thus creating a flood of new potential plaintiffs. The Court stated, “It is apparent from the text of Labor Law § 240 (1), and its history confirms, that its central concern is the dangers that beset workers in the construction industry.” The Court found no precedent for allowing recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries suffered while cleaning a product in a manufacturing process and concluded that the statute does not apply to such situations. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “cleaning” any “structure” should automatically trigger the statute’s protections, highlighting the need for a more nuanced interpretation consistent with the law’s original intent.

  • Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011): Establishing Elevation-Related Risk Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011)

    To establish liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the task performed created an elevation-related risk requiring safety devices and that the absence or inadequacy of such devices was a proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Luis Ortiz, a demolition worker, was injured while rearranging debris in a dumpster. He claimed violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Court of Appeals addressed whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court held that while a simple descent from a low height might not trigger § 240(1), Ortiz’s specific task—standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot-high dumpster to rearrange debris—presented a factual question as to whether safety devices were necessary. The Court denied both the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s cross-motion, finding triable issues of fact.

    Facts

    Luis Ortiz was demolishing an apartment building owned by Varsity Holdings and managed by Mag Realty Corp. Ortiz and his coworkers filled a six-foot-high dumpster with debris. To maximize space, they climbed onto the dumpster and rearranged the debris. While standing on the dumpster’s narrow ledge, Ortiz, holding a wooden beam, lost his balance on the slippery, rain-soaked surface and fell, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, simultaneously granting Ortiz leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certifying the question of whether its order was properly made. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the task of rearranging debris in a dumpster, requiring a worker to stand on a narrow ledge six feet above the ground, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment in his favor?

    Holding

    1. No, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgement because, on the record, the court cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.

    2. No, because Ortiz failed to adduce evidence establishing that he was required to stand on or near the ledge to perform his assigned task and because there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the task Ortiz was expected to perform created an elevation-related risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from Toefer v. Long Is. R.R., where a simple descent from a flatbed trailer was deemed not to present an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court reasoned that Ortiz’s task of standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot dumpster to rearrange debris presented a more precarious situation. The Court emphasized that the defendants failed to prove that safety devices would not have prevented the fall. “On this record, therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240 (1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.”

    However, the Court affirmed the denial of Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that he had not sufficiently proven that standing on the ledge was necessary to perform his task. The Court noted that while his affidavit asserting this necessity was enough to ward off summary judgment for the defendants, it was insufficient for him to win summary judgment himself. The Court also pointed out that Ortiz needed to establish that a specific safety device could have prevented his fall, and this remained a triable issue of fact.

    The Court emphasized that when considering the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, and a question of fact remained regarding whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk that § 240(1) aims to protect against.

  • Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011): Clarifying ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not categorically barred simply because the injured worker and the base of the falling object were at the same level; the key inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Summary

    Antoni Wilinski, a demolition worker, was injured when unsecured metal pipes toppled onto him after being struck by debris from a nearby wall demolition. The pipes and Wilinski were on the same floor level. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the accident was not elevation-related because the pipes and Wilinski were at the same level. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the “same level” is not a categorical bar to recovery. The Court emphasized that the central question is whether the injury stemmed from inadequate protection against risks involving a significant elevation differential, remanding for a determination of whether a safety device was required here.

    Facts

    Antoni Wilinski was demolishing brick walls at a warehouse owned by 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp. Two unsecured, 10-foot metal plumbing pipes stood vertically on the same floor where Wilinski worked. Earlier that day, Wilinski expressed concern about the pipes being unsecured during the demolition. No safety measures were taken. Debris from the wall demolition struck the pipes, causing them to fall four feet and hit Wilinski, causing injuries.

    Procedural History

    Wilinski sued, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim and denied the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division modified, denying Wilinski’s § 240(1) summary judgment motion and dismissing the § 240(1) claim, relying on Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s modification was proper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) categorically bars recovery for injuries caused by a falling object when the injured worker and the base of the object are at the same level.

    Holding

    No, because Misseritti does not establish a categorical “same level” exclusion; the critical inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holdings regarding Labor Law § 240(1), stating that its jurisprudence centers on providing adequate protection from reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents. The court distinguished Misseritti, emphasizing that the lack of a causal nexus between the injury and the failure of a device prescribed by § 240(1), not the “same level,” was the basis for the Misseritti decision. The Court stated that the “same level” rule ignores the nuances of a § 240(1) analysis. The Court also distinguished the case from other cases, noting that the pipes were not themselves the target of demolition and should have been secured. Citing Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court reiterated that “the single decisive question is whether plaintiffs injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” Here, the height differential between the pipes and Wilinski was not de minimis. The Court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a required safety device. Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s interpretation of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3), stating that the plaintiff need not show that the pipes fell due to wind pressure or vibration. The court also found the defendants failed to show they complied with 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c) regarding continuing inspections.

  • McCarthy v. Turner Constr., Inc., 26 N.Y.3d 369 (2015): Scope of Common-Law Indemnification in Construction Site Accidents

    McCarthy v. Turner Constr., Inc., 26 N.Y.3d 369 (2015)

    A party seeking common-law indemnification must demonstrate that it was held vicariously liable without any negligence on its own part, and that the proposed indemnitor exercised actual supervision or control over the injury-producing work.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of common-law indemnification in New York construction site accidents. Plaintiff, an electrician, was injured at a construction site and sued the property owners and general contractor. The property owners, vicariously liable under Labor Law § 240(1), sought common-law indemnification from the general contractor, arguing the contractor had overall project responsibility. The Court of Appeals held that mere contractual authority to supervise work is insufficient for indemnification; actual supervision over the specific work causing the injury is required. This decision limits the reach of common-law indemnification to parties actively at fault.

    Facts

    Ann Taylor, Inc. leased retail space and hired John Gallin & Son, Inc. (Gallin) as the construction manager. Gallin subcontracted cable installation to Linear Technologies, Inc. (Linear), who then subcontracted the actual installation to Samuels Datacom, LLC (Samuels). Plaintiff, an electrician employed by Samuels, was injured in a fall at the site. The contract between Ann Taylor and Gallin gave Gallin responsibility for supervising the work and ensuring safety precautions. However, Gallin did not directly supervise Samuels’ employees.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the property owners and Gallin under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The property owners asserted cross-claims against Gallin for contribution and indemnification. The Supreme Court granted plaintiff summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, holding the property owners and Gallin vicariously liable. The court denied the property owners’ claim for contractual indemnification because there was no contract between them and Gallin. After settlement, the property owners’ motion for common-law indemnification against Gallin was denied by the Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner, held vicariously liable under Labor Law § 240(1), is entitled to common-law indemnification from a general contractor who had overall contractual responsibility for the construction project, but did not exercise actual supervision or control over the specific work that led to the plaintiff’s injury.

    Holding

    No, because common-law indemnification requires a showing that the proposed indemnitor exercised actual supervision or control over the injury-producing work, and the property owners failed to demonstrate that Gallin did so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that common-law indemnification is rooted in equity, aiming to prevent unjust enrichment. While Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and general contractors, it does not preclude a vicariously liable party from seeking indemnification from the party wholly responsible for the accident. However, the Court rejected the property owners’ argument that mere contractual authority to supervise is sufficient for indemnification. The Court reviewed Appellate Division decisions, noting inconsistencies in the application of the standard. The Court clarified that “a party cannot obtain common-law indemnification unless it has been held to be vicariously liable without proof of any negligence or actual supervision on its own part,” and that “[l]iability for indemnification may only be imposed against those parties… who exercise actual supervision.” The Court noted Gallin’s agreement with Ann Taylor required it to supervise the work, but it contracted the work out to a subcontractor, Linear. Linear then hired Samuel’s, the plaintiff’s employer. The Court explicitly cited the Supreme Court’s finding that Gallin “had no supervisory authority over Samuels’s (plaintiff’s employer’s) work, (2) would not have directed plaintiff as to how to perform his work, and (3) did not provide any tools or ladders to the subcontractors who worked at the site.” Since Gallin did not actually supervise the plaintiff’s work, the property owners were not entitled to indemnification. The Court concluded that shifting the loss to Gallin would be inconsistent with principles of fairness, as Gallin was also only vicariously liable and did not contract with the property owner.

  • Gallagher v. New York Post, 13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009): Duty to Provide Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a property owner is liable for a worker’s injuries if adequate safety devices were not provided, unless the worker knew the devices were readily available, was expected to use them, and chose not to for no good reason, making their own negligence the sole proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was injured when he fell through an opening while removing metal decking. He sued NYP Holdings, Inc. (New York Post), alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) for failure to provide adequate safety devices. Gallagher and another worker stated no safety devices were provided. NYP argued safety devices were available and Gallagher’s prior injury was the sole cause. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting Gallagher summary judgment, holding that NYP failed to show Gallagher knew safety devices were available and chose not to use them, and that his prior injury could not be the sole cause of the fall.

    Facts

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was assigned to remove metal decking from a building owned by NYP. While using a powered saw, the blade jammed, propelling him through an uncovered opening, resulting in injuries. Gallagher contended no safety devices were provided at the work site. The assistant project manager testified safety harnesses were available and there was a standing order to use them, but could not confirm the order was communicated to the workers. Gallagher had a prior hand injury and the project manager testified that Gallagher told him that he had fallen as he reached to grab the jammed saw with his other hand.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment, finding a factual question about the availability of safety devices. Upon reargument, the court acknowledged an affidavit stating no safety devices were provided but still denied the motion, suggesting Gallagher’s premature return to work and grip weakness might be the sole proximate cause. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding factual issues about the availability of safety devices and instruction to use them. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting Gallagher summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether NYP violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to provide adequate safety devices to Gallagher, and if so, whether Gallagher’s actions or prior injury were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because NYP failed to demonstrate that Gallagher knew safety devices were available and unreasonably chose not to use them. Further, Gallagher’s prior injury could not be the sole proximate cause of his fall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Gallagher presented a prima facie case of a Labor Law § 240(1) violation through affidavits stating no safety devices were provided. The burden shifted to NYP to raise a factual question. Citing Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., the court distinguished the case, noting there was no evidence Gallagher knew where to find safety devices or that he was expected to use them. The court emphasized that the assistant project manager’s testimony about a “standing order” was insufficient, as he couldn’t confirm it was communicated to workers. The foreman’s affidavit corroborated the lack of safety devices. The court stated that even if Gallagher’s grip was weakened due to a prior injury, it would only contribute to his loss of balance, not be the sole proximate cause of the fall. The court found that NYP failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Gallagher knew of the availability of safety devices and unreasonably chose not to use them, thus reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to Gallagher.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of “Falling Object” Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Under Labor Law § 240(1), “falling object” liability extends beyond objects being hoisted or secured, applying to inadequately secured objects used as makeshift supports, but the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Summary

    Narducci sued Manhasset Bay Associates under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured by falling planks used as a makeshift shelf. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court clarified that “falling object” liability isn’t limited to objects being hoisted or secured and can apply to inadequately secured objects. However, summary judgment was inappropriate here because there were triable issues of fact concerning whether the planks were adequately secured for their purpose and whether the plaintiff’s actions contributed to the accident.

    Facts

    Narducci, a construction worker, was injured when planks placed over open doorways, acting as a makeshift shelf, fell and struck him. The planks were intended to facilitate the installation of an air conditioner above the doorway. Narducci claimed the planks were inadequately secured. The defendants contended that Narducci was warned not to enter the doorway area and that his own actions in jostling the doors caused the planks to fall.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, denying partial summary judgment to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is limited to situations where the object is being hoisted or secured, or whether it extends to inadequately secured objects serving as makeshift supports.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not limited to objects being hoisted or secured; it can extend to other inadequately secured objects, although the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, referencing its holding in Outar v. City of New York, reiterated that falling object liability under Labor Law § 240(1) isn’t confined to instances where the object is actively being hoisted or secured. The court emphasized the remedial nature of the statute, designed to protect workers from elevation-related risks. The court found that the planks, used as a makeshift shelf, fell within the statute’s purview if they were inadequately secured. However, the court also highlighted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s own actions in disregarding a warning and jostling the doors contributed to the accident. Because of the factual dispute regarding the adequacy of the securing and the plaintiff’s potential culpable conduct, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate. The court stated, “triable questions of fact preclude summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, including whether the planks were adequately secured in light of the purposes of the plank assembly and whether plaintiff caused the accident by jostling the doors after disregarding a warning not to enter the doorway area.” This case underscores that while the statute is broadly construed to protect workers, the plaintiff’s own negligence can be a factor in determining liability. The concurrence is implicit as all judges concurred in the memorandum opinion.

  • Sotire v. Immigrant Food & Rest. Servs., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008): Applying Labor Law § 240(1) to Commercial Window Cleaning

    10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008)

    Commercial window cleaning, comparable to the activity at issue, falls under Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves elevation-related risks that the statute aims to address and the worker is not provided with adequate safety devices.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a commercial cleaner, was injured while cleaning high interior windows in a dormitory, having been instructed to climb on furniture instead of being provided a ladder. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The court reasoned that the activity created an elevation-related risk contemplated by the statute, as the plaintiff was required to climb on furniture to reach the high windows and was not provided with proper safety equipment such as a ladder or scaffold.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s employer, under a commercial cleaning contract, instructed her to clean 10-foot-high interior windows in a dormitory. She was given only a rag and window washing solution. When she requested a ladder, she was told to use furniture instead. While standing on a bed to clean a window, the plaintiff fell and sustained multiple fractures and other injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against the defendants. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiff’s activity constituted routine maintenance not covered by the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, and denied the defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s activity of cleaning high windows by climbing on furniture, without proper safety devices, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered under Labor Law § 240(1), thus entitling her to summary judgment on the issue of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff was injured while cleaning 10-foot-high windows, and was required to climb upon furniture in order to complete her work—creating an elevation-related risk— and she was not provided a ladder, scaffold or other safety device of the kind contemplated under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., which held that commercial window cleaning is covered by Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves an elevation-related risk. The court reasoned that in this case, the plaintiff established that she was injured while cleaning high windows in a college dormitory with a rag, and was required to climb upon furniture to complete her work. This created precisely the type of elevation-related risk that the statute was intended to address. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff was not provided with a ladder, scaffold, or other safety device as required by the statute. The court concluded that the lower courts erred in characterizing the plaintiff’s activity as routine maintenance, as the circumstances clearly indicated a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The absence of appropriate safety equipment to mitigate the elevation-related risk was the decisive factor in the court’s determination.