New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 240

  • Chapel v. Mitchell, 84 N.Y.2d 345 (1994): Recovery of Legal Fees in Indemnification Claims

    Chapel v. Mitchell, 84 N.Y.2d 345 (1994)

    An indemnitee can recover legal expenses incurred defending against the primary action but cannot recover legal expenses incurred in prosecuting a third-party indemnification claim.

    Summary

    Chapel sued Mitchell for injuries sustained while working on Mitchell’s property. Mitchell, in turn, sued Chapel’s employer, Lee, for indemnification. The court granted summary judgment to Chapel against Mitchell and to Mitchell against Lee. Mitchell then sought to recover attorneys’ fees from Lee, including fees for both defending the main action and prosecuting the indemnification claim. The Court of Appeals held that Mitchell could recover fees for defending against Chapel’s suit, as Mitchell’s liability was purely vicarious, but could not recover fees for pursuing the indemnification claim against Lee. This decision reinforces the American Rule, which generally prohibits the recovery of legal fees absent a specific agreement, statute, or court rule.

    Facts

    David Chapel, an employee of Robert E. Lee, was injured in a fall from the roof of a building owned by Samuel Mitchell and S.J.M. Entertainment Corp. (Mitchell). Chapel sued Mitchell under Labor Law § 240. Mitchell then commenced a third-party action against Lee, seeking common-law indemnification for any liability to Chapel. The main action concerned a statutory violation, where Mitchell’s liability would be vicarious.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Chapel against Mitchell and to Mitchell against Lee, finding Mitchell passively negligent and entitled to full indemnification. The Supreme Court then awarded Mitchell attorneys’ fees, including those incurred in the third-party action. The Appellate Division affirmed this award, finding the third-party action’s legal expenses legitimately incurred in defending the original lawsuit. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an indemnitee can recover legal expenses incurred in defending a primary action when their liability is vicarious.
    2. Whether an indemnitee can recover legal expenses incurred in prosecuting a third-party action for common-law indemnification.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because an owner vicariously liable under the Labor Law has a common-law right to full indemnification, encompassing attorneys’ fees, from the party wholly at fault.
    2. No, because the legal expenses of pursuing a common-law indemnification claim are not recoverable under the American Rule, absent a contractual or statutory provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between legal expenses incurred in defending the primary action and those incurred in prosecuting the third-party indemnification claim. It reaffirmed the principle that a vicariously liable owner may recover legal expenses from the party wholly at fault in the primary action, citing Kelly v Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 NY2d 1, 6. However, the Court found no basis for recovering legal expenses incurred in prosecuting the indemnification claim itself.

    The Court stated, “We find no authority for the proposition that the legal expenses of pursuing a common-law indemnification claim are recoverable when such claim is incidental to another action.” The Court also emphasized the “American Rule,” under which “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser” (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Socy., 421 US 240, 247). Allowing recovery of legal fees in the indemnification action would undermine this rule.

    The Court acknowledged that while the indemnification claim was related to the main action, this did not justify deviating from the American Rule. The court emphasized that deviating from the American Rule would require a specific contractual or statutory provision, which was absent in this case. The Court stated, “[A]ttorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties, statute or court rule” (citing Hooper Assocs. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 491).

  • Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985): Absolute Liability for Improperly Placed Ladders Under Labor Law § 240

    Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors bear absolute liability for failing to provide adequate safety devices, such as properly placed ladders, to protect workers from elevation-related risks, regardless of the worker’s own negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained in construction accidents. Bland, a worker, was injured when a ladder he was using collapsed. The jury found that the ladder was not defective but was improperly placed, causing the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment holding the owner absolutely liable. The court emphasized that the statute imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide adequate safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks, and comparative negligence is not a defense.

    Facts

    Bland was hired to make alterations to an apartment building owned by Manocherian. While standing on a ladder to remove window sashes, the ladder collapsed beneath him, causing him to fall through a fourth-story window. A co-worker had brought the ladder into the apartment, and Bland himself positioned the ladder “sideways” to and several inches from the window. The floor where the ladder was placed was bare, polished, and shiny. There was no safety equipment such as safety belts, hard hats, or scaffolding used to protect Bland from falling or to secure the ladder.

    Procedural History

    At the first trial, the court initially refused to instruct the jury that improper placement of the ladder was a statutory violation, but the jury found for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. At the second trial, the jury found that the ladder was improperly placed and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court directed a verdict for the owners against the employer and reduced damages. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a new trial on damages unless plaintiffs accepted the reduced amount. The Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker is injured due to an improperly placed ladder, regardless of the worker’s potential negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to ensure that safety devices, such as ladders, are placed and operated to provide proper protection to workers, and the worker’s contributory negligence is not a defense to liability under this statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision in Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, which established that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide necessary safety devices. The court emphasized the legislative intent to place ultimate responsibility for safety practices on owners and general contractors. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the ladder was not “placed so as to give proper protection” and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The court noted testimony regarding the job foreman’s description of the work being performed (twisting and forcibly removing window sashes while on the ladder), the condition of the floor (bare and polished), the ladder’s position (sideways and close to the window), and the lack of any safety equipment. The court distinguished this case from Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, which involved § 241(6), a provision with a more general standard of care. The court also stated that comparative causation, as applied in Arbegast v. Board of Educ., is inapplicable because Labor Law § 240 imposes a “flat and unvarying” duty on owners and contractors. The court directly quoted Labor Law § 240 (1): “All contractors and owners…shall furnish or erect…scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders…and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.”

  • Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180 (1968): General Contractor’s Non-Delegable Duty to Provide Safe Scaffolding

    Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180 (1968)

    A general contractor who undertakes to furnish scaffolding for subcontractors’ employees has a non-delegable duty under Labor Law § 240 to ensure the scaffolding is safe, even if the contractor delegates the actual construction to a subcontractor; however, a subcontractor who merely furnishes the scaffolding, without directing the injured worker, is not liable under the statute and is not liable under common-law negligence for patent defects.

    Summary

    Sarnoff, an employee of a painting subcontractor, was injured when he fell from a scaffold lacking a safety rail. He sued the general contractor, Associated Church Arts, and the scaffolding subcontractor, Charles Schad, Inc. The New York Court of Appeals held that Associated, having undertaken to furnish the scaffolding, had a non-delegable duty to comply with Labor Law § 240, which requires safety rails on scaffolds over 20 feet. However, Schad was not liable under the statute because it did not employ or direct Sarnoff. Schad also was not liable under common-law negligence because the lack of a safety rail was a patent defect.

    Facts

    Associated Church Arts (Associated) was the general contractor for repairs at a church. Associated hired Hans Schmidt as a painting subcontractor, who employed Sarnoff. Associated also contracted with Charles Schad, Inc. (Schad) to furnish and erect scaffolding for the project. Sarnoff was injured when a plank tilted on a scaffold, approximately 21 feet high and lacking a safety rail, causing him to fall.

    Procedural History

    Sarnoff sued Associated and Schad based on common-law negligence and violation of Labor Law § 240. The trial court initially found both defendants liable. However, the court later reversed its decision as to Schad’s liability, holding a supplier is not liable for a patently dangerous appliance. The Appellate Division affirmed. Associated appealed, arguing it was denied a jury trial on the Labor Law claim and that it delegated its duty. Sarnoff appealed the dismissal of claims against Schad.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a general contractor who contracts to furnish scaffolding for the use of subcontractors’ employees can be held liable under Labor Law § 240 for injuries resulting from a lack of safety rails, even if the contractor delegates the actual construction to a subcontractor?

    2. Whether a subcontractor who merely furnishes the scaffolding, without employing or directing the injured worker, can be held liable under Labor Law § 240?

    3. Whether a supplier of a chattel owes a duty, extending to all foreseeable users, of reasonable care in furnishing safe chattels where the alleged defect is patent?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when a general contractor undertakes to furnish scaffolding, it cannot avoid its statutory duty under Labor Law § 240 by delegating this obligation to another subcontractor.

    2. No, because Labor Law § 240 imposes a duty on those employing or directing another to perform labor, and Schad did neither.

    3. No, because liability should not rest upon a theory that a supplier of a chattel owes a duty extending to all foreseeable users where the alleged defect is patent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Associated, by contracting to have Schad build scaffolding for the subcontractors, undertook the responsibility of furnishing the scaffolds and implicitly required the workmen to use them. The uncontroverted facts that the scaffolding lacked a safety rail, was over 20 feet high, and the jury’s special verdict on causation mandated a finding of a violation of Labor Law § 240. The court emphasized that the statute was intended to protect workmen and should be liberally construed. The court quoted Labor Law § 240, which states that a “person employing or directing another to perform labor…shall furnish or erect…scaffolding…which shall be so constructed…as to give proper protection”.

    As to Schad’s liability, the court found no evidence that Schad employed or directed the plaintiff. The court distinguished this from situations involving latent faults or hidden dangers. The court stated: “Liability should not rest upon a theory that a supplier of a chattel owes a duty, extending to all foreseeable users, of reasonable care in furnishing safe chattels where the alleged defect is patent.” Referring to *MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.*, the court concluded that the doctrine of liability as enunciated therein would not extend to a situation involving patent defects.