New York Law Review

Tag: Labor Law § 200

  • Comes v. New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876 (1993): Owner Liability for Contractor’s Negligence

    Comes v. New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876 (1993)

    An owner or general contractor is liable under Labor Law § 200 for a construction worker’s injuries only if they had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury, or violated concrete specifications imposing a duty on the defendant.

    Summary

    Lynn Comes, a construction worker, was injured when he was directed by his employer to carry a heavy steel beam unassisted. He sued the property owner, New York State Electric and Gas Corp. (NYSEG), alleging violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). The New York Court of Appeals held that NYSEG was not liable under § 200 because it did not control the work that led to the injury, and was not liable under § 241(6) because the regulations cited were general safety standards, not specific requirements. This case clarifies the scope of owner liability for construction site injuries in New York.

    Facts

    Lynn Comes was employed by a general contractor hired by NYSEG to construct a building on NYSEG’s land. Comes was instructed by his employer to lift and carry a 14-foot steel I-beam without assistance. He sustained personal injuries as a result. NYSEG hired a construction inspector whose duties were limited to observing the work and reporting safety violations to the contractor.

    Procedural History

    Comes and his wife sued NYSEG, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). The lower court ruled in favor of NYSEG. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the claims. Comes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSEG is liable under Labor Law § 200 for Comes’ injuries, based on common-law negligence principles of providing a safe workplace?

    2. Whether NYSEG is liable under Labor Law § 241(6) for Comes’ injuries, based on a violation of a specific safety regulation?

    Holding

    1. No, because NYSEG did not exercise supervisory control over the method of Comes’ work and the injury arose from the contractor’s own methods.

    2. No, because the plaintiffs alleged violations of only general safety standards of the Industrial Code, not concrete specifications imposing a duty on NYSEG.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the § 200 claim, the Court of Appeals reiterated that liability under this section requires that the party charged with responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury. The court emphasized that because Comes’ injury was caused by lifting the beam and NYSEG did not control how the beam was moved, no liability attached. The court distinguished this case from those where the owner had notice of an unsafe condition, explicitly stating that it had not adopted the reasoning that mere notice of an unsafe manner of work is sufficient for liability under § 200.

    Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the court emphasized that liability under this section requires a violation of a specific, concrete safety standard. The court cited Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., stating that general safety standards are insufficient to impose liability. Because Comes only alleged violations of general safety standards, his claim under § 241(6) failed. The court stated that the duty imposed by section 241(6) requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers, but that a violation requires a concrete specification.

  • Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace Extends to Manufacturing Processes Under Labor Law § 200

    Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992)

    Labor Law § 200, which codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, applies to factories and is not limited to construction work, thus extending to employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Summary

    An employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc., which manufactured septic tanks, fell from a steel mold while preparing it. He sued the building owner and his employer, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, finding the employee was engaged in a normal manufacturing process outside the scope of these Labor Law sections. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action, holding that this section applies to factories and is not limited to construction work.

    Facts

    The injured plaintiff was an employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc. Defendant Fien owned a building leased to Van Petty, which used the building to manufacture septic tanks. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from an upright steel mold he was preparing as part of his customary work in fabricating a concrete septic tank. The accident occurred within the factory building.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff and his spouse sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants. The Appellate Division modified by granting the defendants’ motions and dismissing the complaints. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory.
    2. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.
    3. Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.

    Holding

    1. Yes, Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory because the section is not limited to construction work and covers all places to which the Labor Law applies, including factories.
    2. No, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply because the plaintiff’s work was not related to “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing” of a building or structure.
    3. No, Labor Law § 241(6) does not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action. The court reasoned that Section 200(1) codifies the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work and applies to all places covered by the Labor Law, including factories. The statute requires that these places be “so constructed, equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety” of employees. The court emphasized that Section 200 is not limited to construction work and does not exclude employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Regarding Labor Law § 240(1), the court held that the injured plaintiff was not engaged in any activity protected under this section. The court noted that Section 240(1) applies to work involving “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing.” The plaintiff’s work in fabricating molds did not fall under any of these categories.

    Similarly, the court found that Labor Law § 241(6) did not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work. The court cited 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13) to further define these terms. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s work fabricating the molds during the normal manufacturing process did not constitute “construction” or “excavation” work as defined by the Labor Law.

    The court explicitly declined to address whether Labor Law § 2(9) renders Article 11, specifically section 316, as the exclusive remedy because they resolved the Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action on narrower grounds.