La Torre v. Genesee Management, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 578 (1997)

A parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless the parent has specific knowledge of the child’s dangerous propensities and the ability to control their conduct.

Summary

This case addresses whether a defendant can maintain a claim for negligent supervision against the mother of an adult plaintiff with developmental disabilities who allegedly caused them damages. The plaintiff, LaTorre, sued the defendant, Genesee Management, after a physical altercation with security personnel at a mall. Genesee then filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint, holding that absent specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and an ability to control the adult child’s conduct, a parent is not liable to third parties for negligent supervision. This decision reinforces the principle that parental duties primarily run to the child, not to the general public, and emphasizes the importance of avoiding undue intrusion into family relationships.

Facts

LaTorre, a 20-year-old developmentally disabled man, accompanied his mother to a mall. While his mother shopped, LaTorre stayed in an arcade area. He became involved in an altercation with another person, prompting the arcade manager to call security. Security personnel subdued and handcuffed LaTorre, who subsequently sued Genesee Management, the security company, for physical and psychological injuries.

Procedural History

LaTorre sued Genesee Management in Supreme Court. Genesee filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The Supreme Court dismissed the third-party complaint, finding no actionable claim of negligent parental supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

Whether a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification can be maintained against the mother of an adult child with developmental disabilities, based on a theory of negligent supervision.

Holding

No, because a parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and the ability to control the child’s conduct are demonstrated.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals based its decision primarily on the principles established in Holodook v. Spencer, which generally prohibits claims against parents for negligent supervision of their children. The court distinguished the case from Nolechek v. Gesuale, which recognized a limited duty of parents to third parties regarding a child’s use of a dangerous instrument. The Court emphasized that the allegations against LaTorre’s mother were too general and did not demonstrate specific knowledge of dangerous propensities. The court stated, “Defendants’ conclusory, generalized assertion is patently insufficient under presently governing principles to satisfy the requisite pertinent knowledge of the kind of dangerous propensities…” The court reasoned that allowing such claims would unreasonably burden parents and intrude into family relationships. The Court also noted the lack of specificity in the allegations against the mother, stating, “In order for a third-party claim of this kind against a parent or guardian to withstand the force of Holodook, negligence must be alleged and pleaded with some reasonable specificity, beyond mere generalities.” Ultimately, the court reaffirmed the importance of limiting litigation intrusions into families, stating that “[t]he mutual obligations of the parent-child relation derive their strength and vitality from such forces as natural instinct, love and morality, and not from the essentially negative compulsions of the law’s directives and sanctions.”