New York Law Review

Tag: knowledge

  • People v. Levy, 16 N.Y.3d 509 (2011): Trademark Counterfeiting and the Scope of “Goods”

    People v. Levy, 16 N.Y.3d 509 (2011)

    New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute applies even when a counterfeit mark is affixed to goods different from those for which the trademark is registered, as long as the mark identifies the product as genuine to the average consumer.

    Summary

    Mordekhay Levy was convicted of trademark counterfeiting for selling automotive parts with counterfeit Ford trademarks. Levy argued that the statute only applied if the counterfeit mark was used on the same type of goods for which the trademark was registered. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the statute applies as long as the counterfeit mark identifies the product as a genuine article to the average consumer, regardless of whether the trademark is registered for that specific type of good. The court also rejected Levy’s argument regarding the lack of a “knowledge charge,” finding that the intent to evade a lawful restriction necessarily implies knowledge that the goods were fake.

    Facts

    Police executed search warrants at Mordekhay Levy’s auto parts business, Black & Yellow Major Auto Parts, seizing allegedly counterfeit Ford parts in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Ford also filed a trademark infringement suit against Levy, resulting in a stipulated preliminary injunction prohibiting him from selling automotive parts bearing Ford trademarks or confusingly similar marks. The seized parts, not manufactured by Ford, bore Ford trademarks or product numbers. Levy purchased and sold parts at below dealer cost. Ford’s trademark counsel testified to the validity and use of Ford’s trademarks.

    Procedural History

    Levy was indicted and tried for second-degree trademark counterfeiting. He moved to dismiss, arguing some parts weren’t covered by the trademark registrations. The trial court denied the motion and refused to instruct the jury that an “intent to evade a lawful restriction” required knowledge the parts were counterfeit. The jury convicted Levy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute requires that a counterfeit mark be used on the same type of goods for which the trademark is registered to constitute trademark counterfeiting.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to provide a “knowledge charge” to the jury, specifically instructing that the defendant must have known the goods were counterfeit to be convicted of intending to evade a lawful restriction on the sale of goods.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute is not limited to instances where the counterfeit mark is used on the same goods for which the mark is registered; it applies if the mark identifies the product as a genuine article to the average consumer.

    2. No, because it is impossible to intend to evade a lawful restriction on the sale or distribution of goods without knowing that those goods were fake.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that statutory interpretation begins with the words of the statute. New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute lacks the explicit “identity-of-goods requirement” present in the federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act. The court reasoned that the legislature’s choice not to include this requirement indicated an understanding that consumers rely on the mark itself, not on knowing the precise products for which the mark is registered. The court provided an example: “assume that Ford makes brake pads for all of its cars, but that it expressly does not place the familiar ‘Ford oval’ on those pads, and therefore does not register the ‘Ford oval’ trademark for that purpose. If a counterfeiter places the ‘Ford oval’ on brake pads, the use of that mark nevertheless ‘identifies’ the good as a genuine Ford product.” Regarding the lack of a “knowledge charge”, the court found it would be impossible to “intend to evade a lawful restriction” on the sale or distribution of goods without knowing that those goods were fake. The court cited People v Samuels, 99 NY2d 20, 25-26 (2002), noting that jurors are presumed to have sufficient intelligence to make elementary logical inferences. The court determined that ample evidence existed for a rational juror to find that Levy intended to evade a lawful restriction, considering the multiple searches, Ford representatives’ visits, and the preliminary injunction.

  • People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007): Knowledge of Order of Protection Inferred from Signature

    People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007)

    A defendant’s signature on an order of protection is sufficient to infer knowledge of the order’s contents for the purposes of a criminal contempt charge.

    Summary

    Inserra was convicted of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. The information alleged that his name appeared on the signature line of the order. The Appellate Term reversed, finding this insufficient to establish knowledge of the order’s contents. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant’s signature on the signature line of an order of protection is sufficient to allege knowledge of its contents, fulfilling an essential element of criminal contempt. The Court reasoned that the signature implies awareness of the order’s terms, which are typically written clearly and concisely.

    Facts

    Inserra was subject to an order of protection directing him to stay away from his ex-girlfriend and her home, school, business, and place of employment and to refrain from assaulting, stalking, or harassing her. The People presented evidence that Inserra banged on the protected person’s apartment door, shouting and demanding to be admitted, violating the order. The sworn deposition of the police officer stated that he “examined a copy of [the] o[r]der of protection and that the defendant’s name appears on the line for the defendant’s signature.”

    Procedural History

    A Queens County Criminal Court jury found Inserra guilty of second-degree criminal contempt. Inserra appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the information failed to allege he had knowledge of the order’s terms. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the information. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s name on the signature line of an order of protection adequately supports an allegation that the defendant knew of the order’s contents for the purposes of a charge of criminal contempt.

    Holding

    Yes, because defendant’s name on the signature line sufficiently alleges that defendant received and read the terms of the order of protection, enabling an inference that he was aware of its contents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the factual allegations must establish, if true, every element of the crime charged and the defendant’s commission of each. The Court distinguished this case from People v. McCowan, where the defendant was merely informed that “an order” had been issued against him. Here, Inserra’s signature on the order’s signature line suggests he received and read the terms of the order. The Court stated, “defendant’s name on the signature line of the order enables us to infer that he was aware of its contents, which are written on a single page in simple language and clear, legible type.”

    The Court emphasized the pleading standard, stating that, based on the officer’s deposition, the allegations, if true, were sufficient to establish that Inserra violated each element of the crime charged, including his knowledge of the order of protection’s contents. The Court also rejected Inserra’s argument that the information failed to allege a violation by omitting a statement that the protected person was at home when Inserra banged on the door, noting the order prohibited Inserra from going near the protected person’s home, whether or not she was present. The dissent is not discussed as there was none.

  • People v. Zorc, 68 N.Y.2d 647 (1986): Establishing Knowledge in Stolen Property Cases Through Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Zorc, 68 N.Y.2d 647 (1986)

    Knowledge that property is stolen may be proven through circumstantial evidence, including recent exclusive possession, the defendant’s conduct, and contradictory statements from which guilt can be inferred.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of stolen property, holding that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant knew the car he possessed had been stolen. The court emphasized that knowledge of the stolen nature of property can be established circumstantially. Key evidence included the defendant’s recent possession of the vehicle after the theft, inconsistent statements regarding how he obtained the car, his inability to identify the person who allegedly left it with him, evidence of tampering with the car’s features, and the use of license plates from another vehicle previously at his shop. These combined factors allowed the jury to reasonably infer the defendant’s knowledge.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree. The owner of the car testified that she possessed the vehicle until August 18, when it was stolen. The defendant admitted to possessing the car within six hours of the theft being reported. The defendant claimed that a person named “John” had left the car with him for repairs around August 12 or 15, 1982. The car’s radio had been removed, and the locks had been tampered with. The vehicle had license plates affixed to it that belonged to a car that had been at the defendant’s shop before being scrapped.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the defendant knew the car he possessed was stolen.

    Holding

    Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s recent exclusive possession of the stolen vehicle, his contradictory statements, his inability to identify the person who allegedly left the car with him, the tampering with the car’s features, and the use of license plates from a scrapped vehicle, was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant knew the car was stolen.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent that knowledge that property is stolen can be shown circumstantially. Citing People v. Reisman, 29 NY2d 278, 285-286, the court reiterated that evidence of recent exclusive possession, a defendant’s conduct, or contradictory statements could allow a jury to infer guilt. The court pointed out several inconsistencies in the defendant’s story. His claim that “John” left the car for repair was contradicted by the owner’s testimony that she possessed the car until the day it was stolen. The defendant also could not identify “John” or provide accurate information about his whereabouts. The tampered locks and removed radio, combined with the use of license plates from a scrapped vehicle that had been at the defendant’s shop, further supported the inference of knowledge. The court held that this combination of factors provided a sufficient basis for the jury’s conclusion. The court stated, “In this prosecution for criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant knew the car he possessed had been stolen.” This case serves as an example of how circumstantial evidence can be used to prove the element of knowledge in stolen property cases, particularly when the defendant’s explanations are inconsistent or implausible. The court emphasized that the jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, and that its verdict should be upheld if it is supported by a rational view of the facts.

  • People v. Moschiano, 66 N.Y.2d 631 (1985): Establishing Knowledge of Forgery Through Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Moschiano, 66 N.Y.2d 631 (1985)

    A defendant’s knowledge that an instrument is forged can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including their conduct and statements surrounding the attempted negotiation of the instrument.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether sufficient evidence existed to prove that the defendant, Moschiano, knew a check was forged when he attempted to cash it. The court found that circumstantial evidence, including Moschiano’s false statements about the check’s origin, his willingness to accept a significantly reduced amount, and his subsequent disposal of the check, supported the inference that he knew the check was forged. The court emphasized that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, it must do so in the light most favorable to the prosecution, with credibility left to the trier of fact.

    Facts

    Defendant Moschiano asked John Scivoletto to cash a $377 check made out to Richard Moschiano, claiming the payee was on vacation and had given him the check. Moschiano offered to accept only $300 for the check. Richard Moschiano testified that he did not endorse the check or authorize anyone else to do so. After Scivoletto refused, Moschiano tried to cash the check at a diner and a bar, offering a larger discount. Unsuccessful, he threw the check in a garbage can, where it was later found with the payee’s endorsement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and dismissed the indictment. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The defendant cross-appealed, challenging his sentencing as a second felony offender.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant knew when he presented the check for cashing that it was forged.
    2. Whether the defendant was properly sentenced as a second felony offender.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s statements, conduct, and the payee’s testimony, supported the inference that the defendant knew the check was forged.
    2. Yes, because the defendant failed to challenge his prior second felony offender adjudication by direct appeal or post-judgment motion, rendering the issue no longer open for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to infer Moschiano’s knowledge of the forgery. The court highlighted that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a guilty verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People, and credibility is for the trier of fact to determine. The court reasoned that Moschiano’s statement that Richard Moschiano gave him the check, coupled with Richard Moschiano’s testimony that he did not endorse or authorize the endorsement, allowed the inference that Moschiano knew the endorsement was forged. The court further noted that Moschiano’s attempts to cash the check at a significant discount and his subsequent disposal of the check bolstered this inference. The court distinguished this case from People v. Green, noting the presence of sufficient evidence of knowledge, similar to People v. Johnson. Regarding the sentencing, the court held that since Moschiano did not challenge his prior second felony offender status through proper channels, he could not challenge it now.

  • People v. Slaughter, 41 N.Y.2d 993 (1977): Establishing Accessory Liability Requires Proof of Intent and Knowledge

    People v. Slaughter, 41 N.Y.2d 993 (1977)

    To convict a defendant as an accomplice to a crime, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared the principal’s intent and had knowledge of the planned crime.

    Summary

    Milton Slaughter’s conviction for second-degree murder and possession of a sawed-off shotgun was overturned because the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence linking him to the crime. While Slaughter was present in the area where the shooting occurred and was associated with the shooter, Samuel Wysinger, the prosecution presented no evidence demonstrating that Slaughter knew of Wysinger’s intent to commit the crime or that Slaughter shared that intent. The court emphasized that mere presence and association are insufficient to establish accomplice liability. The lack of evidence showing Slaughter’s knowledge or complicity warranted vacating the conviction.

    Facts

    Trevor Thompson and Samuel Wysinger had a violent dispute. On the night of the shooting, Thompson and his friends saw Wysinger and Slaughter outside a bar. Wysinger carried a black bag. Thompson and his friends then went to a disco nearby. As Thompson stepped outside the disco’s vestibule, he was shot in the neck with a sawed-off shotgun. Witnesses saw Wysinger and another man fleeing the scene. Slaughter, who had been seen running from the general area with a pistol, joined Wysinger and the other man about a block and a half away. Earlier that evening, a Mercedes-Benz jointly owned by Wysinger and Slaughter had been burned.

    Procedural History

    Slaughter was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The Appellate Division overturned the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Slaughter shared the intent of the shooter, Wysinger, and had knowledge of the planned crime, thereby establishing accomplice liability for second-degree murder and possession of a sawed-off shotgun.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that Slaughter knew of Wysinger’s intent to shoot Thompson or that Slaughter shared that intent. Mere presence in the area and association with the shooter are insufficient to establish accomplice liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Slaughter’s conviction. The court emphasized that the prosecution’s evidence only showed that Slaughter was a friend of the killer, was seen in the area shortly before the shooting, and was seen running from the general area with a pistol immediately after the shooting. Critically, there was no evidence placing Slaughter at the immediate site of the shooting. The court stated, “Nothing indicates that he knew either that Wysinger had the shotgun or intended to kill Thompson, or that he even saw the shooting.” The court found the evidence insufficient to permit all the inferences necessary to sustain the conviction, noting that “Nothing shows intent, or complicity, or knowledge of the pending crime. Nor is there strong proof of motive.”

  • People v. Green, 47 N.Y.2d 230 (1979): Knowledge as an Element of Possessing a Forged Instrument

    People v. Green, 47 N.Y.2d 230 (1979)

    To be convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the instrument was forged at the time of possession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument, finding insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knew the check was forged when he possessed it. The prosecution demonstrated that the check was stolen unendorsed and later possessed by the defendant with a forged endorsement. However, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant stole the check, how he obtained it, or that the endorsement was not already forged when he acquired it. While evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for petit larceny, the element of knowledge that the instrument was forged was not sufficiently proven, precluding a conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument.

    Facts

    A check was stolen from its owner without an endorsement. Six days later, the defendant delivered the check, now bearing a forged endorsement, to an accomplice. The prosecution stipulated that the endorsement was not in the defendant’s handwriting. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting the defendant knew the check was stolen. However, they did not prove the defendant stole the check or how he came into possession of it. The prosecution also failed to prove the endorsement was not already forged when the defendant acquired the check.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of both petit larceny and criminal possession of a forged instrument. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the check was forged when he possessed it, an essential element of the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument under New York Penal Law § 170.25.

    Holding

    No, because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knew the check was forged at the time he possessed it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a key element of criminal possession of a forged instrument is knowing the instrument is forged. While there was evidence that the check was unendorsed when stolen and had a forged endorsement when the defendant possessed it, there was no proof connecting the defendant to the forgery itself or demonstrating his knowledge of the forgery. The court stated, “There was no proof that defendant stole the check from its owner, or of how or where it came into his possession (other than that he must have obtained it prior to his delivery of it to his accomplice). There was no proof as to who had had the check after it was stolen before defendant acquired it or that the indorsement had not already been forged when it came into his hands.” Without this evidence, any finding that the defendant knew the check was forged would be based on speculation, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the petit larceny conviction, but not the conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument, thus modifying the order to vacate that conviction.