New York Law Review

Tag: Kleinman v. McCoy

  • Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972): Determining Appointing Authority Under Court Unification

    Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972)

    Under New York’s court unification provisions, the power to appoint and control court personnel generally shifted from local boards of justices to the Appellate Divisions, except where specifically reserved by statute, such as for personal assistants to judges.

    Summary

    Kleinman, a clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, challenged the Appellate Division’s authority to withhold pay raises previously granted. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, possessed the authority to withhold these raises. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, emphasizing that the power to appoint personal assistants to judges was specifically reserved, unlike the general administrative powers over court staff that devolved upon the Appellate Divisions.

    Facts

    Kleinman was appointed clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, in 1954. Legislation in 1961 and 1962 provided pay raises for nonjudicial court personnel, but allowed the appointing authority to withhold increases if unwarranted. In 1964, the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division in the First and Second Judicial Departments withheld Kleinman’s pay raises, citing their authority under the court unification provisions effective September 1, 1962.

    Procedural History

    Kleinman initiated a proceeding claiming he was underpaid because the Appellate Division lacked the authority to withhold his pay raises. Special Term denied the application and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the determination, with one Justice dissenting. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, the Appellate Division in the Second Judicial Department was the “appropriate appointing authority” empowered to withhold pay raises from the clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court unification provisions vested administrative powers, including the authority to withhold pay raises, in the Appellate Divisions, except where specific statutes reserved such powers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Justices of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was initially the appropriate appointing authority under Section 168 of the Judiciary Law, the court unification provisions of the State Constitution (Article VI) and the Judiciary Law (Article 7-A), effective September 1, 1962, transferred this power to the Appellate Division. Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution grants broad supervisory power to the Appellate Divisions over the administration of courts within their departments. Section 214 of Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law implements this authority, stating that each Appellate Division is vested with “all administrative powers and duties vested pursuant to any provision of law in any judicial or non-judicial personnel of the courts in its department.”

    The court distinguished Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, where it held that the Presiding Justices were not the appropriate appointing authorities for nonlawyer “law secretaries” to Supreme Court Justices. The court emphasized that in Gilligan, Section 222 of the Judiciary Law specifically reserved the power of individual judges or justices to appoint their personal assistants. As the court stated, “the power of an individual Judge or Justice to appoint his personal assistants was expressly reserved and continued. It did not devolve upon the Appellate Divisions.” In Kleinman’s case, no such specific reservation existed, thus the Appellate Division’s power was valid. The court effectively demonstrated how the general rule of unified administrative control yields to specific statutory exceptions.

  • Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 292 (1967): Upholding Delegation of Collective Bargaining Authority in Court System

    Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 292 (1967)

    The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference can delegate authority for collective bargaining with court personnel to a local government entity when that entity bears the financial responsibility for the employees’ salaries.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference’s authority over collective bargaining with nonjudicial employees of the court system, particularly when those employees’ salaries are paid by a local government. The Court of Appeals held that the Board could delegate collective bargaining authority to the City of New York’s Department of Labor because the city bore the financial burden of any negotiated agreements. This delegation was deemed a reasonable and effective way to manage the shared responsibilities between the Board and the city, ensuring both administrative oversight and fiscal accountability.

    Facts

    Following the unification of the New York court system, the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference conducted a personnel classification survey of nonjudicial employees. Based on this survey, the Board adopted a “Title Structure, Unified Court System” defining job titles, duties, and qualifications. The Board and the City of New York then entered into an agreement establishing procedures for joint collective bargaining with these employees, with the City Labor Department designated to certify unions representing a majority of employees in a given class. The City Labor Department certified the appellant Association as the collective bargaining representative for probation officers and trainees in New York City courts.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner-respondent initiated a proceeding to annul the collective bargaining certificate issued to the appellant Association and to restrain collective bargaining. Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Administrative Board had sole authority to establish appropriate collective bargaining units and could not delegate this authority. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, possessing constitutional authority for administrative supervision of the court system, can delegate the authority to determine appropriate collective bargaining units for court employees to the New York City Department of Labor.

    Holding

    No, because the Constitution does not prevent the Administrative Board from delegating the task to some official or agency. Since the Board has only a partial and shared responsibility for the approval of the result of bargaining, and the local government, which will pay the bill, be authorized by the Board to carry on the detailed bargaining process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Administrative Board has constitutional authority for administrative supervision of the court system, this does not preclude it from delegating certain tasks, particularly in the context of collective bargaining where a local government bears the financial responsibility. The court emphasized that the Constitution grants broad powers for “administrative supervision” to the board, but it does not require the Chief Judge and Presiding Justices to personally conduct all bargaining discussions. The court stated, “Delegation of the task to some official or agency would be expected”. The agreement between the Board and the City of New York was viewed as a reasonable way to carry out shared responsibilities. The court acknowledged that both the Board and the city were jointly concerned in any negotiation where the City of New York would pay the cost of the agreements. The court noted that the “final determination” of the fiscal needs of the courts is expressly left to normal fiscal authorities, either State or local. The Court reasoned that the Board retained the power to consider the budget and make recommendations, while the local governing body made the final fiscal determination. Therefore, delegating the detailed bargaining process to the city, which ultimately pays the bill, did not constitute an invalid delegation of the Board’s constitutional authority.