New York Law Review

Tag: Klein v. McCoy

  • Matter of Klein v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 512 (1967): Self-Executing Transfer of Non-Judicial Personnel in Court Reorganization

    Matter of Klein v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 512 (1967)

    In the context of court reorganization, legislation providing for the transfer of non-judicial personnel to courts exercising the jurisdiction of their former courts is self-executing, entitling transferred employees to the compensation associated with their new roles from the effective date of the reorganization.

    Summary

    This case concerns a petitioner who was a Secretary to a Bronx County Court Judge before court reorganization. After reorganization, the County Court was abolished, and the judge became a Supreme Court Justice. The petitioner continued working for the same judge, performing the duties of a Clerk to a Supreme Court Justice. The petitioner sought the difference in salary between a County Court Secretary and a Supreme Court Clerk for the period between the reorganization and when he began receiving the higher salary. The Court of Appeals held that the legislation mandating the transfer of non-judicial personnel was self-executing, entitling the petitioner to the higher Supreme Court Clerk salary from the date of reorganization.

    Facts

    Prior to September 1, 1962, the petitioner was the Secretary to a Judge of the Bronx County Court.
    With court reorganization on September 1, 1962, the Bronx County Court was abolished, and the Judge became a Justice of the Supreme Court.
    The petitioner continued in employment, performing the duties of a Clerk to a Justice of the Supreme Court.
    He was not paid the salary of a Supreme Court Clerk until July 1, 1963.
    The petitioner sought the difference in salary for the 10-month period from September 1, 1962, to July 1, 1963.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated a proceeding to recover the salary difference.
    The lower courts’ decisions are not explicitly stated, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order appealed from, implying a prior unfavorable ruling.
    The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether section 223 of the Judiciary Law, concerning the transfer of non-judicial personnel during court reorganization, is self-executing.
    Whether the petitioner was entitled to be compensated at the rate of pay for a Supreme Court Clerk from September 1, 1962, the date of the court reorganization.

    Holding

    Yes, section 223 of the Judiciary Law is self-executing because it mandates the transfer and appointment of non-judicial personnel to positions in the reorganized courts where their skills can be utilized.
    Yes, the petitioner was entitled to be compensated as a Supreme Court Clerk from September 1, 1962, because the transfer provision was self-executing and he was, in effect, “appointed” to the analogous position of Clerk to a Supreme Court Justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the abolition of the Secretary position in the County Court coincided with the court’s abolishment, indicating the Legislature’s intent for a seamless transition during reorganization.
    The court relied on the New York Constitution, Article VI, § 35, subd. 1, which directs that nonjudicial personnel be assigned to like functions in the reorganized courts “to the extent practicable” and “as may be provided by law.”
    The court interpreted section 223 of the Judiciary Law as implementing this constitutional directive by mandating the transfer of personnel to positions where their skills could be fully utilized.
    The court found section 223 to be self-executing, meaning it took effect immediately without requiring further legislative action to define the specific terms of employment.
    The court analogized the petitioner’s situation to its decision in Matter of Rein v. Wagner, 18 N.Y.2d 989 (1967), where former County Court employees were deemed Supreme Court employees for salary increase purposes after reorganization. The court stated, “Manifestly, if the Legislature intended to treat former County Court employees as Supreme Court employees after September 1, 1962, for purposes of giving them a salary increase, it must necessarily have intended that they be similarly treated for purposes of their salary base.”
    The dissenting judges, Burke and Scileppi, voted to affirm the lower court’s decision, but their reasoning is not detailed in the majority opinion.