New York Law Review

Tag: Kidnapping

  • People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527 (1969): Kidnapping and the Levy-Lombardi Rule

    People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527 (1969)

    The Levy-Lombardi rule, which prevents elevating lesser crimes into kidnapping, does not apply when the kidnapping is a distinct crime, even if it facilitates another crime like murder.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of kidnapping Charles Brooks after attempting to murder him in New Jersey and transporting him to New York in a car trunk. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the kidnapping was a separate crime from the attempted murder and not merely incidental to it under the Levy-Lombardi rule. The court also addressed the admissibility of post-indictment statements made by some defendants to law enforcement, finding that while some statements were improperly obtained, the error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Charles “Cherokee” Brooks was lured to a house in New Jersey by defendant Sandra Hall, where he was attacked and injected with a lye solution by the other defendants. Believing him to be dead, the defendants rolled Brooks in a blanket, carried him to a car, and placed him in the trunk. They then drove from New Jersey to New York, intending to dispose of his body. Police officers stopped the car in New York City and discovered Brooks alive in the trunk, bound and injured, along with weapons in the car. Brooks testified that he was kidnapped and transported against his will, while the defendants claimed he voluntarily entered the trunk to hide from pursuers.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with kidnapping and illegal possession of weapons. Following a jury trial, all four defendants were convicted. They appealed, arguing that the kidnapping verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that they believed Brooks was dead, and that the kidnapping was incidental to the attempted murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove kidnapping, given the defendants’ claim that they believed the victim was dead.
    2. Whether the kidnapping was merely incidental to the attempted murder under the Levy-Lombardi rule, thus precluding a separate kidnapping charge.
    3. Whether the admission of post-indictment statements obtained from the defendants in the absence of counsel constituted reversible error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendants either believed Brooks was alive or were not convinced he was dead, and therefore intended to kidnap him.
    2. No, because the kidnapping involved a complicated asportation with changes in purpose and direction, first in New Jersey and then to New York, for purposes connected with but not directly instrumental to the attempted murder.
    3. Yes, as to defendant Howard, because the statements were improperly obtained in the absence of counsel and used to impeach his credibility on cross-examination regarding details not covered in his direct testimony; however, the error was harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence that the defendants did not absolutely believe Brooks was dead, pointing to the act of retying his hands. The court distinguished this case from People v. Levy and People v. Lombardi, explaining that those cases involved brief asportations that were integral to the commission of another crime, such as robbery or rape. Here, the kidnapping was a separate act with its own distinct purpose. The court stated, “[T]he Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal. It was not designed to merge ‘true’ kidnappings into other crimes merely because the kidnappings were used to accomplish ultimate crimes of lesser or equal or greater gravity.” The court found that the admission of Howard’s post-indictment statement was improper under People v. Arthur because it was obtained without a waiver of counsel in the presence of his attorney. However, the court deemed the error harmless because the inconsistencies related only to preliminary events and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The court emphasized the importance of preventing the elevation of minor crimes to kidnapping charges, while also acknowledging that true kidnappings should be recognized as independent offenses even when connected to other crimes like murder or extortion. The Court quoted old Penal Law § 1250, subd. 3, defining kidnapping, but noted the new Penal Law provided entirely new defintion and classification of the crime.

  • People v. Ludders, 26 N.Y.2d 607 (1970): Limiting Kidnapping Statutes to ‘True Kidnapping’ Scenarios

    People v. Ludders, 26 N.Y.2d 607 (1970)

    The kidnapping statute should be limited to ‘true kidnapping’ situations and not applied to crimes that are essentially robbery, rape, or assault, where confinement or asportation is a subsidiary incident.

    Summary

    Defendant, a pharmacist and travel agent, was convicted of kidnapping, attempted rape, and assault. He had drugged three young women under the guise of “nail-hardening pills” (actually barbiturates) and transported them to a motel in Queens where he attempted sexual assault. The Court of Appeals reversed the kidnapping convictions, holding that the asportation was merely incidental to the attempted rape and assault. The court also ordered a new trial on the remaining charges due to prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor during trial and summation.

    Facts

    The defendant, a pharmacist and travel agent, hired three young women under the pretense of working at his travel agency. He induced each woman to take pills he claimed were “nail-hardening pills” before business parties or social affairs. These pills contained barbiturates, causing drowsiness, dizziness, and impaired muscular coordination. The defendant then drove the women to a motel in Queens, where he attempted to rape one and made sexual advances towards the others. Afterwards, he drove them back home. A policewoman investigating the case was also offered the pills; she seized them, leading to the defendant’s arrest. The pills’ contents and their effects matched the reactions of the other women.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted on multiple charges including kidnapping, attempted rape, and assault. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a substantial prison term. The defendant appealed the conviction to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the kidnapping convictions and ordered a new trial on the remaining charges.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted kidnapping under Penal Law § 1250, subd. 1, considering the asportation was incidental to the crimes of attempted rape and assault.

    2. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during the trial and summation were so prejudicial and inflammatory as to warrant a new trial on the attempted rape and assault charges.

    Holding

    1. No, because the asportation of the victims was merely incidental to the primary crimes of attempted rape and assault. The kidnapping statute should be limited to “true kidnapping” scenarios and not applied where confinement or asportation is subsidiary to another crime.

    2. Yes, because the prosecutor’s comments were excessively prejudicial and inflammatory, denying the defendant a fair trial on the attempted rape and assault charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the kidnapping statute should not be applied to situations where the confinement or asportation is merely incidental to other crimes such as robbery, rape, or assault. The court relied on People v. Levy (15 N.Y.2d 159), which held that the detention or asportation of a victim for a relatively short time as an incident to robbery should not normally be prosecuted as kidnapping. The court noted that the Legislature has since addressed this issue by prescribing definite time periods of detention in cases other than classic kidnapping for ransom. The court also found that the prosecutor’s comments during the trial and summation were excessively prejudicial. The prosecutor made personal attacks on defense counsel and used inflammatory language when describing the defendant’s actions, which exceeded the fair limits of advocacy and prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. For example, the prosecutor argued to the jury that they were “not here to determine” if defendant’s acts “were damnable, diabolical, destructive, death dealing” and whether the defense “is born of desperation and despair, filled with deceit, devoid of decency, devoid of truth, foul and vile”. The court determined that these comments, along with others, warranted a new trial on the attempted rape and assault charges. The court instructed that at the new trial, the jury should be instructed to consider each crime separately on its own merits.