Kerr v. Dinkins, 84 N.Y.2d 219, 627 N.E.2d 524, 616 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1993)

The New York State Constitution does not authorize the bicameral “recall” practice used by the Legislature to reacquire a passed bill from the Governor’s desk; such practice unconstitutionally modifies the balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches.

Summary

This case concerns the constitutionality of the New York State Legislature’s practice of recalling bills from the Governor after they have been passed by both houses. The Court of Appeals held that this practice, which allowed the Legislature to retrieve a bill from the Governor’s desk, is not authorized by the New York State Constitution, as it alters the prescribed balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches regarding the law-making process. However, the Court applied its holding prospectively, due to the long-standing use of the practice, to avoid potential disruption and uncertainty.

Facts

Assembly Bill No. 9592-A was passed by the New York State Assembly and Senate in June 1990 and formally sent to the Governor on July 19, 1990. The next day, the Assembly adopted a resolution, with Senate concurrence, requesting the Governor return the bill to the Legislature. The Governor complied with this request. Appellants then initiated legal action, challenging the constitutionality of this recall procedure and arguing that the bill should be considered law because the Governor did not act upon it within ten days of its initial delivery.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court initially dismissed the appellants’ action. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s decision to declare the legislative recall practice constitutional. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals via an appeal as of right based on a substantial constitutional question.

Issue(s)

Whether the New York State Legislature’s practice of recalling a bill from the Governor after it has been passed by both houses is constitutional under Article IV, § 7 of the New York State Constitution.

Holding

No, because Article IV, § 7 of the New York State Constitution explicitly lays out the process for a bill to become law, involving approval, rejection by veto, or approval by inaction by the Governor, and the recall practice undermines this process by allowing the Legislature to circumvent the Executive’s role.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Constitution clearly defines the law-making process and the distribution of authority between the legislative and executive branches. Article IV, § 7 explicitly outlines three routes by which a passed bill may become law: (1) gubernatorial approval, (2) rejection by veto, or (3) approval by inaction. The legislative recall practice is not mentioned in the Constitution and effectively allows the Legislature to suspend or interrupt the Executive’s mandated role in the process. The Court emphasized that the Legislature’s rule-making authority applies to its own proceedings and cannot extend to proceedings pending entirely before the Executive. The Court stated that “[w]hen both houses have * * * finally passed a bill, and sent it to the governor, they have exhausted their powers upon it.” The Court also noted the potential for abuse, as the recall practice could allow interest groups another opportunity to amend or kill bills away from public scrutiny. Though the Court found the practice unconstitutional, it applied the ruling prospectively, recognizing the long-standing nature of the practice and the potential for disruption if applied retroactively. The Court stated, “[T]he courts should not act ‘so as to cause disorder and confusion in public affairs even though there may be a strict legal right.”‘