New York Law Review

Tag: Juvenile Offenders

  • Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999): Limits on Family Court Jurisdiction over Juvenile Offenders

    Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999)

    Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to cases transferred from criminal court; it does not have original jurisdiction over such cases.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of Family Court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders in New York. Raymond G., a 15-year-old, was charged with delinquency in Family Court for acts that would constitute first-degree assault if committed by an adult. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court lacks original jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be held criminally responsible unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The decision reinforces the legislative intent to treat serious juvenile offenses within the adult criminal justice system, reserving Family Court jurisdiction for cases where criminal court deems removal appropriate. This ensures a consistent approach to prosecuting serious juvenile crimes.

    Facts

    Raymond G., a 15-year-old, allegedly participated in an attack at a subway station.

    He was charged with multiple counts of assault, including two counts of first-degree assault, in a designated felony act petition filed in Family Court.

    Raymond G. moved to dismiss the first-degree assault counts, arguing that Family Court lacked jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be subject to criminal prosecution.

    Procedural History

    Family Court denied Raymond G.’s motion and asserted jurisdiction.

    Raymond G. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed in a limited secure facility.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Family Court lacked jurisdiction absent an order of removal from a criminal court.

    The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has original jurisdiction over offenses for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible, absent an order of removal from a criminal court pursuant to CPL article 725.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to transferrals from criminal court where prosecution was commenced there and subsequently removed to Family Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing that the 1978 amendments to the Family Court Act and Penal Law divested Family Court of original jurisdiction over certain serious crimes committed by juveniles. These amendments “criminalized” specific acts committed by 13-, 14-, and 15-year-olds. The Court noted that the legislature intended to subject certain juveniles to criminal prosecution to control violent juvenile crime, which was considered a failure of traditional means. The Court reasoned that the definition of “juvenile delinquent” in the Family Court Act excludes those who are criminally responsible for their conduct by reason of infancy unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The Court rejected the presentment agency’s argument for concurrent jurisdiction, clarifying that while Penal Law § 30.00(3) mentions infancy as a defense, § 30.00(2) expressly eliminates this defense for juvenile offenders. Regarding the designated felony act provisions, the Court explained that these provisions remain relevant for cases transferred from criminal court and for offenses that are designated felonies but do not give rise to juvenile offender status (where infancy defense is still available). Allowing the District Attorney to initially charge a juvenile offender in Family Court would circumvent the legislative directive to have juvenile offenses criminally prosecuted except where a court finds removal appropriate. The Court quoted from Matter of Vega v Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 551, stating that youngsters accused of certain criminal activities are now “automatically prosecuted within the adult criminal justice system unless there exist certain special circumstances warranting more lenient treatment and transfer to the Family Court.”

  • People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956): Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Statutes

    People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956)

    When the legislature reduces the punishment for a crime via an ameliorative amendment, the lesser penalty applies to cases decided after the amendment’s effective date, even if the underlying act occurred before the change.

    Summary

    Oliver, a 14-year-old, was charged with first-degree murder. While awaiting trial, a law was enacted that treated those under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals. The Court of Appeals addressed whether this ameliorative amendment applied retroactively to Oliver, entitling him to treatment as a juvenile offender. The court held that the amendment was indeed ameliorative and should be applied retroactively, reasoning that the legislature’s reduction in punishment indicated its belief that a lesser penalty sufficiently serves the demands of criminal law. Imposing a harsher penalty would serve no penological purpose.

    Facts

    Oliver, a 14-year-old boy, was charged with first-degree murder for killing his two-year-old brother. At the time of the crime, this was punishable by death.

    While Oliver was awaiting trial, the New York legislature amended the Penal Law to treat children under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals, subjecting them to a different, less severe system of corrective treatment.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which considered whether the ameliorative amendment should apply to Oliver’s case, which was pending at the time of the amendment’s enactment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an ameliorative amendment to the Penal Law, which reduces the punishment for a particular crime, should be applied retroactively to cases pending but not yet decided at the time of the amendment’s effective date.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the legislature mitigates punishment, it is presumed to have determined that the lesser penalty sufficiently addresses the needs of criminal law, rendering a harsher penalty pointless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the general rule against retroactive application of non-procedural statutes unless explicitly stated. However, it emphasized the exception for ameliorative amendments that reduce punishment. The court stated, “the law is settled that the lesser penalty may be meted out in all cases decided after the effective date of the enactment, even though the underlying act may have been committed before that date.”

    The court reasoned that by lessening the punishment, the legislature implies that the lesser penalty adequately serves the aims of criminal law. Applying a harsher penalty in such cases would not serve any legitimate penological purpose.

    The court differentiated between altering the definition of a crime by decriminalizing conduct altogether and merely reducing the punishment. In the former situation, the state may retain the right to prosecute the previously committed act, but in the latter, the rationale for imposing the stricter penalty vanishes.

    The Court quoted: “[W]hen the legislature changes the punishment…the new statute applies to all cases tried thereafter. ” The court reasoned that to not apply the new, more lenient, statute would “result in a futility.”

    The case emphasizes the importance of considering the legislative intent behind changes in criminal law, especially when it comes to punishment. If the intent is to be more lenient, the courts should apply the new law to all cases where it is possible.