84 N.Y.2d 709 (1995)

A trial court retains discretion to permit cross-examination of a testifying defendant regarding a prior criminal conviction from another state, even if the underlying conduct would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York.

Summary

Ernest Gray was convicted of murder and robbery. Prior to trial, Gray sought to prevent the prosecution from using a prior Maryland felony conviction (cocaine trafficking at age 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. Under New York law, this act would have been adjudicated in juvenile court. The trial court denied Gray’s motion, and he was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s Sandoval discretion extends to out-of-state convictions, even if the underlying act would have been treated differently in New York. The Court declined to create a per se rule excluding such convictions, emphasizing the trial court’s ability to consider the differing juvenile justice policies.

Facts

Harry Rhodes was found murdered in his truck. The truck’s rear door was open, the driver’s window was broken, and papers were strewn inside. Rhodes’ wallet and documents were found nearby.

Ernest Gray and five others were arrested. Gray admitted in written and videotaped statements that he participated in the robbery of Rhodes.

Procedural History

Gray made a pretrial Sandoval motion to preclude the prosecution from using a 1990 New York misdemeanor conviction for criminal trespass and a 1989 Maryland felony conviction for cocaine trafficking (when Gray was 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. The trial court denied the motion. Gray did not testify and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant’s prior felony conviction in another state, for conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, is automatically inadmissible as cross-examination material under People v. Sandoval.

Holding

No, because the trial court’s broad discretion in Sandoval determinations extends to out-of-state convictions, and a per se rule automatically excluding such convictions is not required.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the well-established principle that a testifying defendant may be cross-examined about prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts that bear on their credibility. The Court emphasized that Sandoval determinations are largely discretionary, and there are no per se rules requiring preclusion based on the age, nature, or number of prior crimes. The Court distinguished between juvenile delinquency adjudications in New York, which cannot be used for impeachment, and criminal convictions in foreign jurisdictions, which can be used if the underlying act constituted a crime in that jurisdiction.

The Court acknowledged New York’s policy of protecting young persons from acquiring the stigma of criminal convictions but reasoned that New York’s interest in adjudicating criminal acts outside the state is less compelling and does not require automatically overriding another jurisdiction’s treatment of youth crime. The court also referenced People v. Kuey, where it held that New York courts may defer to other jurisdictions’ policies in sentencing matters.

While the court declined to adopt a per se rule, it stated that the trial court should be sensitive to the differences between the juvenile justice policies of New York and the foreign state. The court found no abuse of discretion in this case.

Judge Levine’s concurring opinion argued for a per se rule barring cross-examination on out-of-state convictions based on conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, to maintain consistency with New York’s policy of protecting youths from criminal status for nonviolent crimes. However, Judge Levine agreed that the Sandoval error was harmless here.