New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Sequestration

  • People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247 (1992): Attorney Waiver of Jury Sequestration

    People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247 (1992)

    An attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the defendant’s presence, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, without requiring explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney’s stipulation, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, to allow a jury to go home overnight after deliberations had begun, constituted a valid waiver of the jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10. The Court held that such consent by counsel effectively waived the statutory requirement. The court reasoned that the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental trial rights and is purely statutory. Therefore, the attorney’s waiver was sufficient without explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Facts

    After the jury retired to deliberate, the defendant’s attorney stipulated, on the record and in the defendant’s presence, that the jury could go home overnight. CPL 310.10 requires that a deliberating jury “must be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer or court officers.” The defendant later argued that the waiver of this sequestration requirement was invalid because he did not personally consent to it.

    Procedural History

    The lower court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the presence of the defendant, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, absent explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the sequestration provision of CPL 310.10 is statutory and does not implicate fundamental rights, an attorney’s consent to waive the sequestration requirement, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, is sufficient to waive the requirement even without explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, where it established that a defendant could waive the CPL 310.10 jury sequestration requirement. The Court clarified that Webb did not mandate that the defendant personally consent to the waiver or that the record reflect a discussion between counsel and the defendant regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court emphasized that “the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial; rather, the requirement ‘is entirely statutory and reflects no established common-law right of the defendant’ (78 NY2d 335, 339-340, supra; see, id., at 340, n).” The court analogized to other situations where attorney consent is binding on the client, referencing Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237; People v Ferguson, 67 NY2d 383, 390; People v Rosen, 81 NY2d 237, 244-245. Therefore, because the attorney stipulated before the court, on the record, and in the presence of the defendant, that the jury be permitted to go home overnight after it had commenced deliberations, such consent effectively waived the statutory sequestration requirement.

  • People v. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d 26 (1991): Delegation of Ministerial Duty to Court Officer

    People v. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d 26 (1991)

    A court officer’s communication to jurors to cease deliberations before sequestration is a ministerial duty, not an improper delegation of judicial authority, and does not require the defendant’s presence.

    Summary

    Bonaparte was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court improperly delegated a judicial function by directing a court officer to inform the jury they were being sequestered without instructing them against discussing the case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court officer’s instruction to cease deliberations was a ministerial duty. The Court emphasized that not every communication with a jury requires the court or defendant’s presence. The failure to instruct the jury against discussing the case was unpreserved and did not warrant a new trial, though the court acknowledged the better practice would be for the judge to give such instructions.

    Facts

    Bonaparte was charged with the murder of a 61-year-old man. The trial lasted about a week and a half. After jury instructions on a Monday morning, the jury began deliberating. The jury requested and received repeated instructions concerning the charges. Later that afternoon, the jury was sequestered. The court officer told the jurors to “cease all deliberations” before taking them to dinner and a hotel for the night. The jury reached a guilty verdict the following morning.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Bonaparte of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding an improper delegation of judicial function to the court officer. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the original conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether directing a court officer to inform jurors to cease deliberations before sequestration constitutes an improper delegation of judicial authority requiring the defendant’s presence.

    Holding

    No, because the communication from the court officer was a ministerial duty, not an improper delegation of judicial authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has the right to be present during critical stages of trial, including when the jury receives instructions or information from the court. The court may not delegate its authority to instruct the jury on matters affecting deliberations to a nonjudicial staff member. However, not every communication with a deliberating jury requires the court or defendant’s presence. The court distinguished this case from others where the court officer provided legal instructions or influenced deliberations (e.g., delivering an Allen charge). Here, the court officer simply told the jurors to stop deliberating because they were being sequestered for the evening; this fell within the scope of “administerial duties” under CPL 310.10. Defense counsel’s concern was that the jury may have deliberated during sequestration, but the court and court officer’s responses satisfied the court that no improper deliberations occurred. The court also noted that to the extent the defendant was objecting to the lack of sequestration instructions, the claim was unpreserved as it was made too late for the error to be cured. The Court stated, “The better practice, and the one that should be followed in the future, would be for the court, in the presence of the defendant and his counsel, to notify the jurors that they are going to be sequestered for the evening and to instruct them as to their duties and obligations during this period, including their duty to refrain from discussing the case among themselves or with others.”