New York Law Review

Tag: jury selection

  • People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993): Defendant’s Right to be Present During Jury Questioning on Case-Specific Issues

    People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993)

    A defendant has a right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors when the questioning concerns issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as the jurors’ knowledge of pretrial publicity and their attitude toward key witnesses.

    Summary

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan were convicted of robbery and weapons possession. Prior to the formal voir dire, the trial judge conducted a side-bar voir dire of prospective jurors regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity and their familiarity with John Roland, a television newscaster involved in the robbery. The questioning occurred outside the presence of the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had a fundamental right to be present during questioning that delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case.

    Facts

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan allegedly robbed the Racing Club restaurant. Newscaster John Roland attempted to disarm Sloan during the robbery, leading to a struggle. Roland was hit on the head with a pistol by McMahon. Defendants were apprehended near the scene after a waiter alerted the police. Roland and other witnesses identified the defendants. Prior to the formal voir dire, the judge questioned prospective jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity regarding the case and Roland’s involvement. Jurors were questioned on their ability to weigh Roland’s testimony fairly and whether their knowledge of him as a newscaster would affect their impartiality. Defendants were not present during this questioning.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted of robbery and weapons possession after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a right to be present during conference questioning of prospective jurors concerning issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as their knowledge of and reaction to pretrial publicity and their attitude toward a key witness.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning some of the events and witnesses involved in the case, which could have substantially affected the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that defendants have a fundamental right to be present with counsel at all material stages of a trial. The court distinguished this case from People v. Velasco, which held that a defendant’s presence was not required when the court posed questions relating only to the general qualifications of jurors (physical impairments, family obligations, etc.). Here, the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case. “The effect on the jurors of the pretrial publicity, their attitudes toward and possible predisposition to believe Roland, a key prosecution witness, and their ability to weigh the evidence objectively were subjects properly addressed in a formal voir dire.” The court reasoned that the defendants’ presence could have been critical in making proper determinations relating to challenges for cause and peremptories, as assessing jurors’ facial expressions, demeanor, and subliminal responses could reveal bias or hostility. The court noted that, “[a]part from our statutory provision, due process requires the presence of a defendant at his trial ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108). Because their exclusion from the questioning was error, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination in Jury Selection

    79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992)

    A defendant can establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection based on a pattern of strikes against a cognizable racial group, even if jury selection is not yet complete, and the prosecution must then provide racially neutral explanations for those strikes.

    Summary

    These cases address whether a prima facie showing of discrimination in jury selection can be established before the process is complete and whether the defense established such a case based on the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges. In People v. Bolling, the court held that the defense did establish a prima facie case because the prosecution disproportionately struck African-Americans, some with pro-prosecution backgrounds. Since the prosecutor failed to provide racially neutral reasons, the judgment was modified for a hearing. In People v. Steele, the court held no prima facie case was established, affirming the lower court’s order.

    Facts

    In Bolling, after questioning the first 12 prospective jurors, five of whom were African-American, the prosecution struck four African-Americans and one person of Asian ancestry. The defense objected, claiming discrimination. The defense noted that two of the excluded African-Americans had ties to law enforcement. In Steele, after the first 21 jurors were examined, the prosecution had used three of its four peremptory challenges to strike three of the six African-Americans. The defense objected, arguing discrimination based on the defendant and the excluded jurors being African-American females.

    Procedural History

    In Bolling, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. In Steele, the Appellate Division affirmed, emphasizing that the prosecution did not challenge three other African-American jurors.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant may assert a claim that peremptory challenges are being used for discriminatory purposes before jury selection has been completed.

    2. Whether, in People v. Bolling, the defense established a prima facie case that the prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clauses by exercising peremptory challenges for discriminatory purposes.

    3. Whether, in People v. Steele, the defense established a prima facie case that the prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clauses by exercising peremptory challenges for discriminatory purposes.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the purpose of the Batson rule is to eliminate discrimination, not minimize it, and the wrong may occur after only one strike.

    2. Yes, because the prosecution disproportionately struck African-Americans, some of whom had pro-prosecution backgrounds.

    3. No, because the fact that the prosecution struck three of six African-Americans, without additional supporting facts, is insufficient to establish a pattern of exclusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that a Batson challenge is appropriate when peremptory challenges are used for discriminatory purposes, regardless of the stage of jury selection, because the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause, harming the excluded jurors and the community at large. The court emphasized that “[T]he exclusion of any blacks solely because of their race” is constitutionally forbidden. The court stated, “There are no fixed rules for determining what evidence will give rise to an inference sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Factors include a pattern of strikes or discriminatory questions. The court found that in Bolling, the disproportionate number of challenges to African-American prospective jurors, coupled with the uncontested assertion that two had pro-prosecution backgrounds, raised an inference of discrimination. The court stated that in Steele, while the prosecutor used three of her four challenges against African-Americans, that alone is not enough to establish a pattern without other supporting facts.

  • Hynes v. George, 76 N.Y.2d 502 (1990): Upholding Trial Court’s Authority to Proceed Despite Prosecutor’s Unreadiness

    Hynes v. George, 76 N.Y.2d 502 (1990)

    A trial court has the power to deny a prosecutor’s request for an adjournment and to proceed with jury selection, even when the prosecutor claims they are not ready due to the unavailability of a witness, as long as the court does not enter an order of dismissal that would improperly terminate the criminal proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of a trial court’s authority when a prosecutor declares unreadiness on the day of trial. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court, after denying the People’s request for an adjournment due to the complaining witness’s failure to appear, could proceed with jury selection. The Court emphasized that this action did not constitute an unauthorized dismissal of the case, distinguishing it from situations where a court prematurely terminates proceedings. The decision underscores the trial court’s discretion in managing its calendar and preventing undue delays, provided the defendant’s speedy trial rights are not violated.

    Facts

    Daniel Ruso was indicted for robbery and harassment for allegedly stealing $5 from his grandmother, Maria Ruso. On the day of the trial, the prosecutor requested an adjournment because Maria Ruso failed to appear for a pre-trial meeting and could not be reached. The prosecutor knew the complainant was the defendant’s grandmother and reluctant to testify but did not subpoena her. The trial court denied the request, noting the People’s awareness of the complainant’s reluctance and their failure to secure her presence through a subpoena.

    Procedural History

    The case reached trial after multiple announcements of readiness by the prosecution and adjournments for various reasons. The trial court denied the People’s request for an adjournment and ordered jury selection to proceed. The People sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division, which was granted, staying the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court acted within its authority.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court, after denying the People’s request for an adjournment due to the unavailability of a complaining witness, has the power to proceed with jury selection.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court has the inherent power to control its calendar and prevent unnecessary delays, and ordering jury selection does not equate to an improper dismissal of the case, as long as the People are not prevented from presenting their case within statutory speedy trial limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. The court acknowledged the trial court’s undisputed power to deny the People’s adjournment request. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, where a trial court improperly terminated a criminal proceeding by issuing a trial order of dismissal before any evidence was presented. The Court clarified that the trial court’s order to proceed with jury selection did not constitute a dismissal, nor did it prevent the People from attempting to locate the witness during the jury selection process or from making a subsequent adjournment request. The Court also rejected the People’s argument that their time to prepare under CPL 30.30 had not yet lapsed, stating that People v. Anderson does not grant the People immunity from a post-readiness order requiring them to go to trial before the expiration of the CPL 30.30 readiness period. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to halt the trial proceedings through a collateral proceeding would effectively nullify the trial court’s power to deny adjournment requests, stating that “To hold that prohibition lies in this situation would nullify the trial court’s power to deny prosecutors’ requests for adjournments and enable prosecutors, displeased with the denial of their adjournment requests, to override the trial court’s ruling by simply commencing a collateral proceeding.”

  • People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

    People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992)

    A defendant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection by showing membership in a cognizable racial group, the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race, and circumstances raising an inference that the challenges were used to exclude jurors based on race.

    Summary

    Bolling, a black defendant, was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, the prosecutor used 7 of 10 peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. Bolling argued this was discriminatory. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The Court of Appeals agreed a prima facie case was made but modified the order, remitting for a hearing to allow the prosecution to offer race-neutral explanations for the strikes. The Court held excluding even some jurors based on race violates equal protection, regardless of the racial makeup of the final jury, but the prosecution should have an opportunity to explain the challenges.

    Facts

    Bolling, a black man, was indicted for robbery and attempted murder. During jury selection, the prosecution used 7 of its 10 peremptory challenges to remove black prospective jurors. The defense attorney argued this constituted a pattern of discrimination, as the Bronx population was majority black. The prosecutor volunteered to explain the qualifications of each juror, but the trial court denied the mistrial motion and declined the offer.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Bolling of second-degree robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a discriminatory pattern of strikes against black jurors. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that ordering a new trial deprived them of the opportunity to offer non-pretextual, race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in ordering a new trial without first providing the prosecution an opportunity to offer race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor’s disproportionate use of peremptory challenges to strike black venirepersons, who were a heterogeneous group, raised an inference of discrimination.

    2. Yes, because the People were effectively deprived of their opportunity to present their case when the trial court summarily rejected their offer to explain the challenges, and fairness dictates they be given that opportunity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that racially motivated peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must show membership in a cognizable racial group, the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race, and circumstances raising an inference that the challenges were used to exclude jurors based on race. The Court found the high number of strikes against black jurors (7 out of 10) established a pattern. The court emphasized that even if some black jurors remain, excluding others based on race is a Batson violation because it harms both the defendant and the excluded jurors, undermining public confidence in the justice system. The court stated, “The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community…Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is ‘a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.’” (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 87-88). The Court remanded the case to allow the prosecution to offer race-neutral explanations because the trial court originally prevented them from doing so.

  • People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744 (1989): Limits on Voir Dire are Discretionary Absent Prejudice

    People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744 (1989)

    A trial court has broad discretion to restrict the scope of voir dire by counsel, so long as the restrictions afford defense counsel a fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to impose time limits on attorney voir dire, finding no abuse of discretion or prejudice to the defendant. The court emphasized that while restrictions on voir dire are permissible, they must allow a fair opportunity for questioning on relevant matters. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the time limits prevented him from asking necessary questions or that the jury ultimately selected was biased.

    Facts

    During jury selection, prospective jurors completed detailed biographical questionnaires, with clarifications provided when necessary. The trial court, over the defendant’s objection, imposed time limits on each attorney’s voir dire: 15 minutes for the first two rounds and 10 minutes for the third round. Defense counsel did not individually question every prospective juror due to these time limits but could direct questions to the panels as a group. The court offered defense counsel the opportunity to record questions he could not pose individually, but counsel did not do so.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed, arguing that the time limits on voir dire deprived him of a fair trial and an impartial jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing time limits on the voir dire process.

    2. Whether the time limits imposed on voir dire deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record does not support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion or that the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s exercise of its discretion.

    2. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s contention lacks merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that trial courts have broad discretion in managing the scope of voir dire, including setting time limits, citing People v. Pepper, 59 NY2d 353, 358 and People v. Boulware, 29 NY2d 135, 140. The Court also noted the mandate in CPL 270.15 [1] [c] to preclude repetitive or irrelevant questioning. However, this discretion is not unlimited. The Court emphasized that “Any restrictions imposed on voir dire, however, must nevertheless afford defense counsel a fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters.” The Court found no evidence that the time limits prevented defense counsel from adequately questioning prospective jurors or that the jury ultimately selected was biased against the defendant. The defendant’s failure to make a record of specific questions he was unable to ask was also considered. The Court referenced Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 US 182, 189-190, in rejecting the defendant’s constitutional argument.

  • People v. Cargill, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987): Standard for Discharging a Sworn Juror as Grossly Unqualified

    People v. Cargill, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987)

    A trial court may only discharge a sworn juror as “grossly unqualified” if, after a probing inquiry, it is convinced that the juror’s knowledge or state of mind prevents them from rendering an impartial verdict; speculation about partiality based on equivocal responses is insufficient.

    Summary

    During a criminal trial, a juror expressed concerns about the jury’s racial composition, suggesting it might color his judgment. Without further probing, the trial court discharged the juror, deeming him potentially biased. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the discharge was improper. The court emphasized that discharging a sworn juror requires a concrete showing of gross disqualification based on a thorough inquiry, not mere speculation. The Court also noted that harmless error analysis was not applicable when a defendant is denied their constitutional right to a jury of their choosing. Finally, the court noted that the trial court erred in failing to make a record of its Sandoval ruling.

    Facts

    During the People’s presentation of evidence, Juror Number 7 advised the court of concerns regarding the racial makeup of the jury and stated his judgment might be “colored, distorted.” The juror stated he might “bend over backwards one way or another in order to be fair… [and] give this individual…the benefit of the doubt.” The trial court, after a brief exchange, discharged the juror without further inquiry.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding the trial court improperly discharged a sworn juror.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in discharging a sworn juror based on concerns about potential bias without conducting a sufficiently probing inquiry to determine if the juror was, in fact, grossly unqualified to serve.

    2. Whether harmless error analysis applies when a defendant has been denied their constitutional right to a jury of their choosing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a trial court must be convinced, based on a tactful and probing inquiry, that the juror’s knowledge will prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict before discharging a sworn juror as grossly unqualified.

    2. No, because a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law and harmless error analysis is unavailable when that right is denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that discharging a sworn juror is a serious matter that requires more than just a suspicion of bias. The standard, as articulated in People v. Buford, requires the trial court to be “convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent that person from rendering an impartial verdict.” The court found that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient and the juror’s responses were not unequivocal, making the discharge improper. The Court reasoned that the trial court impermissibly speculated as to the possible partiality of the juror based on equivocal responses.

    The Court stated, “[a] defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a ‘particular jury chosen according to law, in whose selection [the defendant] has had a voice’.” Because the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his choosing, the Court held that harmless error analysis was unavailable.

    The Court also briefly noted that the trial court erred in failing to make a record of its Sandoval ruling to allow for appellate review.

  • People v. Shedrick, 66 N.Y.2d 1015 (1985): Upholding Jury Selection from Jury Districts Within a County

    People v. Shedrick, 66 N.Y.2d 1015 (1985)

    The division of a county into jury districts for jury selection is permissible, absent a showing that the selection process results in a jury pool unrepresentative of a fair cross-section of the community, or that a particular segment of the community was deliberately excluded.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that selecting grand and petit jurors from jury districts within Steuben County, rather than the county-at-large, did not violate Judiciary Law article 16 or the defendants’ constitutional rights. The Court found that the jury district system, established in 1904, remained valid after the repeal of the enabling legislation in 1942, as the repealing legislation did not explicitly abolish existing districts. Furthermore, the Court stated that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the selected jurors were unrepresentative of the community or that any segment of the community was deliberately excluded. The Court also addressed evidentiary issues, finding no reversible error in the exclusion of polygraph results or evidence of a police scheme to place an informant in a cell.

    Facts

    Defendants in two separate cases, Robert and Wanda Shedrick, appealed their convictions, arguing that the selection of jurors from jury districts within Steuben County violated Judiciary Law article 16. Steuben County had been divided into three jury districts by the Board of Supervisors in 1904. Robert Shedrick also sought to introduce polygraph results, and Wanda Shedrick sought to introduce evidence of a police scheme to place an informant in Robert’s cell.

    Procedural History

    The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the jury selection process was flawed and raising evidentiary issues. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases for review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the selection of grand and petit jurors from jury districts within Steuben County, rather than the county-at-large, violated Judiciary Law article 16.
    2. Whether the jury selection process resulted in a jury unrepresentative of a fair cross-section of the community, violating the defendants’ constitutional rights.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the results of a polygraph examination offered by defendant Robert Shedrick.
    4. Whether the trial court denied due process to defendant Wanda Shedrick by refusing to admit evidence of a police scheme.

    Holding

    1. No, because Judiciary Law article 16 does not unequivocally require juries to be drawn from a pool of residents throughout the entire county and does not mandate the abolition of existing jury district systems.
    2. No, because the defendants failed to demonstrate that the selected jurors were unrepresentative or that any segment of the community was deliberately excluded.
    3. No, because the reliability of polygraph examinations has not been demonstrated with sufficient certainty to be admissible in New York State.
    4. No, because the evidence of the police scheme was purely collateral to the issues at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1942 repeal of the legislation enabling the creation of jury districts did not automatically abolish districts already lawfully created. The Court interpreted Judiciary Law article 16 as not explicitly requiring jury pools to be drawn from the entire county. The Court emphasized that the defendants failed to prove the jury selection process resulted in an unrepresentative jury or deliberate exclusion of any community segment.

    Regarding the evidentiary issues, the Court cited established precedent holding polygraph results inadmissible due to their unproven reliability. Regarding Wanda Shedrick’s due process claim, the Court found that evidence of the police scheme was collateral and properly excluded, especially since no information was obtained or introduced as a result of the scheme.

    The court cited People v Guzman, 60 NY2d 403, 409-410, regarding the constitutional claims and People v Tarsia, 50 NY2d 1, 7 and People v Leone, 25 NY2d 511, 517 regarding the inadmissibility of polygraph results. The Court stated, “There is no unequivocal requirement that juries be drawn from a pool of residents from throughout the entire county wherein the court convenes and, moreover, there is no provision in any section of article 16 clearly expressing or implying a legislative mandate that any existing jury district system, previously established pursuant to prior legislation, be abolished.”

  • People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984): Actual Bias and Juror Impartiality Based on Defendant’s Reputation

    People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984)

    A prospective juror’s unfavorable impression of a defendant, stemming from hearing or reading about the defendant’s reputation apart from the specific crimes charged, can create actual bias and warrant a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    Thomas Torpey was convicted of criminal mischief, coercion, attempted assault, and conspiracy. The central issue on appeal was the trial court’s refusal to grant a challenge for cause against a prospective juror, Mrs. Raleigh, who had prior knowledge of Torpey’s alleged involvement with the Mafia and had formed a negative opinion of him based on media reports and information from her husband, a sheriff’s department investigator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Mrs. Raleigh’s statements indicated a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that a juror’s bias can stem from a defendant’s reputation, not just opinions about the charged crime, and that general assurances of impartiality may not overcome such bias.

    Facts

    Thomas Torpey was indicted for crimes stemming from an incident at a bar, allegedly part of a conspiracy to extort money. During jury selection, Mrs. Raleigh revealed she had heard of Torpey before the incident, both through media reports linking him to organized crime and through her husband’s work as a sheriff’s department investigator. She admitted to forming a negative opinion of Torpey, associating him with the Mafia and hearing that he might be a “hit man.” She also conceded that it would “probably not” be fair to have someone with her frame of mind judging him.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Torpey was convicted of several charges. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause against Mrs. Raleigh. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Torpey appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the denial of his challenge for cause and exhaustion of peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted to having a negative impression of the defendant based on prior media reports and information linking him to organized crime, thus creating a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Raleigh’s statements demonstrated a state of mind likely to prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence. Her declarations aimed at purging her expressed bias revealed uncertainty and did not overcome the bias.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.20(1)(b) allows a challenge for cause when a prospective juror has a state of mind likely to preclude an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that this provision reflects the fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury. While prior cases often involved jurors expressing opinions on the defendant’s guilt for the charged crimes, the court clarified that actual bias isn’t limited to such situations, citing People v. Blyden, where a juror’s prejudice against minorities was grounds for a challenge for cause.

    The court found that Mrs. Raleigh’s association of Torpey with the Mafia and her impression that he was a “hit man” indicated a substantial risk that her predispositions would affect her ability to discharge her responsibilities. Even though the expurgatory oath is not automatically available under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), the court stated that a trial judge should require a prospective juror with a prima facie showing of actual bias to “expressly state that his prior state of mind * * * will not influence his verdict, and * * * that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” (People v Biondo, 41 NY2d 483, 485).

    The court distinguished between jurors holding opinions about the charged crime (which might be addressed by trial evidence) and jurors holding negative impressions of the defendant’s overall reputation (which trial evidence might not alter). In the latter case, the court stated, “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions of the defendant might influence his verdict.” Because Mrs. Raleigh’s declarations revealed uncertainty and did not overcome her expressed bias, the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. The court reiterated the importance of erring on the side of disqualification to ensure impartiality.

  • People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984): When Juror’s Bias Requires Removal for Cause

    People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984)

    A juror’s expression of abstract feelings about a defendant’s circumstances does not automatically require removal for cause if the juror expresses confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a prospective juror’s biases require dismissal for cause. During jury selection for a case involving a Black defendant who had a child with a white girlfriend, two jurors expressed discomfort with interracial relationships but affirmed their ability to render a fair verdict. The defense’s challenge for cause was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that abstract biases, without concrete evidence of an inability to be impartial, do not warrant removal for cause, especially when jurors affirm their capacity to be fair. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in evaluating juror impartiality.

    Facts

    The defendant, a Black man, was on trial. During jury selection, two prospective jurors stated they did not associate with Black people and disapproved of interracial marriages. The defendant had a white girlfriend, and they had a child together, although they were unmarried. The jurors stated that these circumstances would not interfere with their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Defense counsel did not pursue further questioning of the jurors after being given the opportunity.

    Procedural History

    The defense counsel’s application to excuse the two prospective jurors for cause was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s application to excuse two prospective jurors for cause, given their expressed disapproval of interracial relationships and the fact that the defendant had a child with a white girlfriend.

    Holding

    No, because the jurors expressed confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial, and there was no concrete indication that their feelings would affect their ability to serve on the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Blyden, where a juror volunteered a specific, individualized opposition to minorities and expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial. In this case, the jurors only expressed abstract feelings and affirmed their ability to be fair. The court stated, “It is only when it is shown that there is a substantial risk that such predispositions will affect the ability of the particular juror to discharge his responsibilities… that his excuse is warranted.” The court deferred to the trial judge’s judgment, emphasizing the judge’s opportunity to evaluate the jurors’ demeanor and sincerity. The court recognized that jurors bring predispositions to the jury box, but not every predisposition warrants removal for cause. A potential juror who discloses anything but total absence of prejudice with respect to racial differences should not be removed if he demonstrates a readiness to lay his feelings aside in the discharge of his duties as a juror.

  • People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981): Demonstrating Prejudice from Pretrial Publicity

    People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981)

    A defendant seeking a change of venue due to pretrial publicity must demonstrate, through the jury selection process, that a fair and impartial jury could not be selected because of the publicity.

    Summary

    Ventimiglia was convicted of murder, robbery, and burglary. He appealed, arguing that extensive pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial. His initial motion for a change of venue was denied before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to create a record during jury selection demonstrating the inability to select an impartial jury due to the publicity. The court emphasized the necessity of a detailed record of jury selection, including questions, answers, and the use of peremptory challenges, to support a claim of prejudice from pretrial publicity.

    Facts

    Defendant Ventimiglia was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary.

    Prior to trial, there was extensive pretrial publicity concerning the homicide and the defendant’s alleged involvement.

    The defendant moved for a change of venue based on this pretrial publicity, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for a change of venue before trial, which was denied by the Appellate Division.

    Following his conviction, the defendant appealed the judgment, renewing his claim that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant demonstrated that he was unable to select a fair and impartial jury due to widespread pretrial publicity, thus warranting a change of venue.

    Holding

    No, because the record on appeal did not contain a transcript of the jury selection proceedings, making it impossible to determine whether the extensive publicity prevented the selection of a fair and impartial jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of creating a proper record during jury selection to demonstrate prejudice from pretrial publicity. The court stated that after the initial motion for a change of venue is denied, the defendant must attempt to select an impartial jury, and these proceedings must be recorded stenographically.

    The court noted, “At that time counsel could have attempted to establish by his questions and the answers to them that the extensive publicity made it impossible to select an impartial jury, if such was the fact, and upon said record the motion for change of venue could have been renewed and given proper consideration by the court.”

    The court also mentioned the importance of whether the defendant used all of his peremptory challenges during jury selection, as this could indicate the difficulty in finding an impartial jury.

    Because the record lacked a transcript of the jury selection, the court could not determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. The absence of this record was fatal to the defendant’s claim on appeal.