New York Law Review

Tag: jury selection

  • People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500 (2002): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Street-Level Drug Sales

    97 N.Y.2d 500 (2002)

    Expert testimony on the general practices of street-level drug sales is admissible to help jurors understand evidence, especially when the defendant raises a misidentification defense based on the absence of drugs or buy money, but such testimony requires careful limiting instructions.

    Summary

    In a case involving the sale of controlled substances, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony from a police sergeant regarding street-level narcotics transactions. The defendant, accused of selling drugs, argued misidentification because no drugs or marked money were found on her at the time of arrest. The prosecution offered expert testimony to explain why this might occur. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the expert testimony was admissible to assist the jury in understanding the nuances of street-level drug operations, provided that proper limiting instructions are given to prevent prejudice. The court also addressed and rejected the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury.

    Facts

    An undercover officer asked a group of men who was “working the rock.” After initially being rebuffed, another man directed the officer to the defendant, who sold him three bags of crack cocaine for $20 in marked buy money. The transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of two schools. Defendant was arrested shortly after, but a search revealed neither the prerecorded buy money nor any drugs. In her defense, the defendant claimed mistaken identity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds in the Supreme Court, Bronx County. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony from a police sergeant regarding street-level narcotics transactions.

    2. Whether the defendant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, requiring the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges.

    Holding

    1. No, because the expert testimony assisted the jury in understanding the general practices of street-level drug sales and the roles of participants, providing a plausible explanation for the absence of drugs or buy money, and the trial court gave appropriate limiting instructions.

    2. No, because the defendant’s numerical argument regarding the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes was unsupported by factual assertions or comparisons that would establish a pattern of impermissible discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the expert testimony, the Court of Appeals emphasized that admissibility lies within the trial court’s discretion to determine if jurors would benefit from specialized knowledge. The Court reasoned that while jurors might know drugs are sold on streets, they likely are unfamiliar with the terminology and methods used in street-level drug sales, particularly how drugs and money are moved to avoid detection. Expert testimony can help jurors understand the evidence and resolve factual issues. Citing People v. Taylor, the court noted that expert testimony can dispel misconceptions, similar to how rape trauma syndrome evidence clarifies victim behavior. The court cautioned that such testimony requires limiting instructions to prevent the jury from taking it as proof of the defendant’s guilt.

    Regarding the Batson claim, the Court applied the established framework for analyzing claims of discrimination in jury selection. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must show that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges removed members of a cognizable racial group, and that circumstances support a finding that the challenges were used to exclude potential jurors because of their race. The Court noted that while a disproportionate number of strikes against members of a particular racial group can be indicative of a discriminatory pattern, it is rarely conclusive without other supporting facts. Here, the Court found that the defendant’s reliance solely on the number of African-Americans struck by the prosecution, without further evidence comparing accepted jurors to those challenged or demonstrating other indicia of discrimination, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. “There are no fixed rules for determining what evidence will * * * establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”

  • People v. Nicholas, 98 N.Y.2d 749 (2002): Unequivocal Juror Impartiality Standard

    People v. Nicholas, 98 N.Y.2d 749 (2002)

    A prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding their ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that they can be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The appeal centered on whether a prospective juror should have been excused for cause after expressing that they would tend to believe police testimony to some degree. The defense challenged the juror’s impartiality, but the trial court denied the challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the juror ultimately stated unequivocally that they could be fair. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the need for unequivocal assertions of impartiality and suggesting further questioning to clarify any ambiguity.

    Facts

    During voir dire, a prospective juror acknowledged believing that “trained police officers are good observers” and that they “would tend to believe police testimony to some degree.” Defense counsel questioned the juror about whether this belief would affect their ability to be fair and listen fairly to police testimony. The juror responded, “No, I don’t think so.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s motion to excuse the prospective juror for cause. The defense then used a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror and subsequently exhausted all peremptory challenges. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prospective juror’s statement, “No, I don’t think so,” constituted an unequivocal assertion of impartiality sufficient to satisfy the legal standard for jury selection.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s statements, taken in context and as a whole, were unequivocal. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated the established standard that a prospective juror must be excused if their statements raise serious doubts about their impartiality, unless they state unequivocally that they can be fair. The court acknowledged that the juror’s initial statements suggested a predisposition to believe police testimony. However, the court emphasized that the juror ultimately stated, “No, I don’t think so,” in response to the question of whether their belief would affect their ability to be fair. While the word “think” might, in some cases, render a statement equivocal, here the court found that the statement, taken in context, was unequivocal. The court noted that the use of “think” is often challenged and advised trial courts to ask additional questions to clarify a juror’s impartiality when a “yes” or “no” response is qualified. The Court cited People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 79 (1982) in support of the proposition that “the juror’s use of the word ‘think’ might not in every case render his or her statements inadequate.” The Court also observed, “Time and again this Court has been called upon to measure a particular statement by a prospective juror against the clear legal standard requiring an unequivocal assertion of impartiality.” The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to dispel any doubt as to equivocation to assure an impartial jury and avoid appeals.

  • People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Impartiality

    People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001)

    A prospective juror who expresses doubt about their ability to be impartial based on the law must be excused unless they unequivocally state on the record that they can be fair.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict. One juror indicated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence, and another stated that the defendant’s failure to testify would negatively influence their decision. Because the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances of impartiality from these jurors, the defendant was prejudiced, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, defense counsel questioned prospective jurors about their ability to presume the defendant’s innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. One prospective juror stated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence to return a not-guilty verdict. Another prospective juror indicated that the defendant’s failure to testify would make it difficult for them to find the defendant not guilty. The trial court did not take any corrective action after these statements. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied. The defendant then used peremptory challenges to remove both jurors, exhausting all of their peremptory challenges during jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards, and the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances from them that they could reach a verdict based entirely on the court’s instructions on the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20 (1) (b), which allows a party to challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence at the trial.” Citing People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 362, the court reiterated that “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about [his or] her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that [he or] she can be fair.” The court found that the prospective jurors’ statements indicated a predisposition that would prevent them from fairly considering the evidence and following the court’s instructions. The court emphasized that the trial court had a duty to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from the jurors, and the jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgement was insufficient. The court stated, “We conclude that the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards. The trial court therefore was required to elicit some unequivocal assurance from the two prospective jurors that they were able to reach a verdict based entirely upon the court’s instructions on the law. The jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgment that they would follow the court’s instructions was insufficient to constitute such an unequivocal declaration”. Because the defendant was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove these biased jurors, and because he subsequently exhausted all his peremptory challenges, the error was not harmless and a new trial was required.

  • People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000): Valid Waiver of Right to Be Present During Jury Selection

    People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000)

    A defendant may validly waive their right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently, either by the defendant personally or by defense counsel in the defendant’s presence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a defendant’s waiver of his right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant validly waived this right because his attorney, in his presence and on the record, explicitly waived it. The Court distinguished this from cases where the waiver was implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence, emphasizing the importance of ensuring the defendant’s understanding and voluntary relinquishment of their right. The dissent argued that a more explicit, on-the-record waiver directly from the defendant is required to ensure a truly knowing and intelligent waiver.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. During jury selection, numerous prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar, outside the defendant’s presence. On the record, in the defendant’s presence, his attorney waived the defendant’s right to be present at these sidebar conferences. The defendant did not object to his attorney’s waiver at that time. The defendant later appealed, arguing that his waiver was invalid because he did not personally waive his right on the record.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant had validly waived his right to be present. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors is validly waived when defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waives that right.

    Holding

    Yes, because defense counsel’s explicit waiver in the defendant’s presence and on the record constitutes a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant’s right to be present at trial, including during jury selection, can be waived. The Court emphasized that the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court distinguished the present case from People v. Antommarchi, where the Court held that a defendant has the right to be present during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors concerning their biases. However, the Court clarified that this right can be waived.

    The Court found that the waiver was valid in this case because defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waived the defendant’s right. The Court noted that the defendant did not object to this waiver. The Court stated, “Here, defense counsel, in defendant’s presence, expressly waived defendant’s Antommarchi rights on the record. Thus, a valid waiver occurred.” The court distinguished this situation from scenarios where the waiver is implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence. According to the court, defense counsel can waive the defendant’s right.

    The dissenting judge argued that the waiver was insufficient because the defendant himself did not explicitly waive his right on the record. The dissent emphasized the importance of ensuring that the defendant fully understands the right being waived. “This is distinctly different from the situation in People v Keen (252 AD2d 278, 281, affd 94 NY2d 533), in which the Trial Judge asked the defense counsel in defendant’s presence, on the record, if he waived his Antommarchi rights and this Court ruled that there was a valid Antommarchi waiver.”

    The dissenting judge noted that the court reporter’s notes did not indicate anything about an Antommarchi waiver and that the defense attorney specifically stated that this waiver did not occur.

  • People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997): The Effect of Erroneous Denial of Challenges for Cause on Jury Selection

    People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997)

    An erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error when the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge at the end of the selection process.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. He further argued that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial requires reversal. One juror expressed doubt about impartiality due to the nature of the victim’s injuries. The other was a law student interning at the prosecutor’s office. The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges after an erroneous denial for cause, reversal is required, even if an additional challenge is offered, especially where the initial denials were questionable. This decision reinforces the importance of impartial jury selection and protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, a prospective juror stated the victim’s injuries would likely prevent an impartial verdict and that she could not guarantee she would follow instructions regarding the justification defense. The defendant challenged her for cause, but the court denied the challenge. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    Another prospective juror was a law student interning at the Queens District Attorney’s Office, the prosecuting agency in this case. The defendant challenged this juror for cause, arguing her employment created an appearance of impropriety. The court denied the challenge after the juror asserted she could be impartial. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    The defendant exhausted his statutorily allotted peremptory challenges before the end of jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause and that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, reversal was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding the two prospective jurors?

    2. Whether the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge?

    Holding

    1. The dissenting justice argued yes, because one juror demonstrated actual bias, and the other had professional ties to the prosecutor’s office.

    2. Yes, because an erroneous ruling denying a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, and offering an additional challenge at the last second does not cure the error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting Justice Smith argued that the trial court erred by denying the challenges for cause. He reasoned that the first juror did not provide adequate assurance of impartiality, and the second juror’s connection to the prosecutor’s office created an appearance of impropriety.

    The dissent further reasoned that under CPL 270.20(2), an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error if the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges. The dissent emphasized that offering an additional peremptory challenge after the defendant has exhausted their statutory allotment does not negate the error, particularly when challenges for cause should have been granted in the first place.

    The dissent cited People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 97, stating: “It is well settled that an erroneous ruling by the court, denying a challenge for cause, constitutes reversible error when the defendant peremptorily challenges the prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the jury selection process is complete.”

    The dissent argued that it was an abuse of discretion to offer an extra peremptory challenge after eleven jurors had already been selected and the defendant had exhausted his challenges, suggesting this was an attempt to circumvent CPL 270.20(2). The dissent emphasized that reversal is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

  • People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000): Obtaining Unequivocal Assurance of Juror Impartiality

    People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)

    When potential jurors express doubts about their ability to be impartial, trial judges must obtain an unequivocal assurance of their impartiality or excuse them for cause.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning jury selection. The central issue is whether a challenge for cause should be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt about their impartiality, absent an unequivocal indication of their ability to set aside predispositions and fairly evaluate evidence. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances, the challenge for cause must be granted. The Court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury is fundamental, and when a juror expresses doubt, an explicit assurance of impartiality is required. Failure to obtain such assurance constitutes reversible error.

    Facts

    In People v. Johnson and Sharper, the defendants were tried for robbery. A prospective juror stated he had a friend in the DA’s office, dealt with prisoners and police officers, and had a great deal of trust and respect for police officers. He admitted he would favor police testimony more than civilian testimony. In People v. Reyes, the defendant was tried for selling heroin. A prospective juror expressed concern about drug activity near her son’s park, stating her emotional feelings might color her views and that she might have difficulty being open-minded due to the defendant’s prior convictions.

    Procedural History

    In Johnson and Sharper, the trial court denied the challenge for cause, the defendants used a peremptory challenge, exhausted all challenges, and were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. In Reyes, the trial court denied challenges for cause and the defendant again used peremptory challenges, exhausted them, and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a challenge for cause may properly be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt as to their impartiality in the case.
    2. Whether an unequivocal indication of a prospective juror’s ability to set aside any predisposition and fairly appraise the evidence is necessary before denying a challenge for cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.
    2. Yes, because in cases of “actual bias,” an unambiguous assurance of impartiality is required before a challenge for cause may be denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right. When potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that the elimination of the “talismanic expurgatory oath” requirement in the Criminal Procedure Law gave trial judges both “greater flexibility and a greater responsibility” in determining which venirepersons should be excused for cause.

    The Court distinguished People v. Blyden, where a juror’s statement was deemed insufficient, and People v. Williams, where the jurors never expressed doubt that they could serve impartially. The Court quoted People v. Torpey, stating that “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions might influence his verdict.” (People v Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361). The Court held that a bright-line standard exists: “a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one side] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause.”

    In the cases at bar, the Court found that the potential jurors had openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case. The Court also noted that despite the Trial Judge stating that the jurors had expressed that they could be fair, the record did not support this statement. Therefore, the judges erred in failing to obtain unequivocal assurances, or excusing potential jurors for cause, when they openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case.

  • People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 507 (2000): Discharging and Replacing Jurors Based on Unavailability

    People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 507 (2000)

    Under CPL 270.35(2), a trial court may discharge and replace a juror with an alternate if, after a reasonably thorough inquiry, it determines the juror will not appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the application of CPL 270.35(2), which governs the discharge and replacement of jurors. The New York Court of Appeals held that trial courts have the discretion to replace jurors who, after a reasonable inquiry, are not expected to appear within two hours of the trial’s scheduled resumption. The Court emphasized that the statute establishes a bright-line rule designed to prevent trial delays, and that the two-hour timeframe is not an arbitrary limit but a constitutionally acceptable balance. This decision affirmed convictions in three separate cases where jurors were replaced after being deemed unavailable.

    Facts

    In People v. Jeanty, a juror called to report being in a car accident and going to the hospital. After several hours, the juror still could not estimate a return time. In People v. Jones, two jurors called in sick/unavailable; one with the flu, the other dealing with a burglary at their store. The trial court replaced them, citing authority to do so if jurors are at least two hours late. In People v. Artis, a juror felt ill during the final jury charge and was sent home. After the lunch recess, she remained too ill to return, and the court replaced her despite defense counsel’s objection to waiting until Monday.

    Procedural History

    In Jeanty and Jones, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. In Jones, the court also held that the juror discharge issue was unpreserved for review. In Artis, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing consistency with People v. Page. All three cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated them for review. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the lower court rulings in all three cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.35(2) permits a trial court to discharge and replace a juror with an alternate if the juror is not expected to appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial, after a reasonably thorough inquiry into the juror’s availability.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 270.35(2) allows a court to presume a juror is unavailable and to discharge them if they fail to appear or if there is no reasonable likelihood they will appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial, provided the court has conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1996 amendments to CPL 270.35 were intended to create a bright-line rule for juror replacement, addressing perceived ambiguities after People v. Page. The Court stated the statute requires a “reasonably thorough inquiry” into the juror’s unavailability and codifies the holding in People v. Page to ascertain when the absent juror might arrive at the courthouse. Furthermore, the statute explicitly allows the court to presume unavailability if a juror fails to appear or is unlikely to appear within two hours. The Court rejected arguments that the two-hour rule only applied to missing jurors or created a rebuttable presumption, stating that such interpretations would contradict the legislative intent to avoid trial delays and provide clear guidelines. The two-hour rule strikes a constitutionally acceptable balance between the need to avoid uncertainty and delay and the defendant’s right to an orderly jury trial. The Court emphasized that the “reasonably thorough inquiry” requirement ensures against arbitrary decision-making and that the statute does not compel replacement but grants discretion to the trial court. In Artis, the court specifically addressed the constitutional right to trial by jury, stating that the procedures followed were not arbitrary and did not disrupt the defendant’s constitutional right. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial courts’ decisions in all three cases, finding they had complied with CPL 270.35(2) and acted within their discretion.

  • People v. Colon, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996): Attorney Authority Over Jury Selection Tactics

    People v. Colon, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996)

    A defendant’s attorney, not the defendant personally, has the authority to make tactical decisions during a trial, including the selection of jurors.

    Summary

    Colon was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, after 11 jurors were chosen, the trial court noted that a new panel would be needed for one more juror. Defense counsel withdrew a peremptory challenge to seat the final juror, despite Colon’s desire to empanel a different, previously challenged juror. Colon did not request new counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, finding it was error to seat the juror over Colon’s objection. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that jury selection tactics are the attorney’s domain, not the defendant’s, and the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim lacked merit.

    Facts

    At the end of the second round of jury selection, eleven jurors had been selected.
    The trial court indicated that a new panel would be necessary to select the twelfth juror.
    Defense counsel withdrew a peremptory challenge to seat a juror to avoid a new panel.
    The defendant wanted a different, previously challenged juror empaneled.
    The defense counsel informed the court that the selected juror was acceptable.
    The defendant did not request a change of counsel.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery.
    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by seating a previously challenged juror over the defendant’s express objection.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in accepting defense counsel’s decision to seat a previously challenged juror over the defendant’s objection.
    Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney made a tactical decision regarding jury selection against his wishes.

    Holding

    No, because the selection of particular jurors falls within the category of tactical decisions entrusted to counsel, and defendants do not retain a personal veto power over counsel’s exercise of professional judgments.
    No, because defense counsel’s tactical decision did not create an adverse relationship between attorney and client, and the defendant did not show that his attorney’s representation was undermined.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant retains authority over fundamental decisions like pleading guilty, waiving a jury trial, testifying, or appealing, tactical decisions regarding the conduct of the trial are entrusted to the attorney. The Court stated, “With respect to strategic and tactical decisions concerning the conduct of trials, by contrast, defendants are deemed to repose decision-making authority in their lawyers.” Jury selection falls into the latter category.

    The Court cited People v. Sprowal, 84 N.Y.2d 113, 119, for the principle that defendants do not have a personal veto over their counsel’s professional judgment in tactical matters. The Court also noted the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2[b] (3d ed. 1993). Since Colon’s counsel made a tactical decision, the trial court did not err in accepting it. Furthermore, the Court found that the defendant had waived any argument that the procedure violated CPL 270.25(1) because both Colon and his defense counsel consented to withdrawing peremptory challenges.

    Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court found no merit because the attorney’s tactical decision did not create an adverse relationship with the client. The Court cited People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961, 963, stating the defendant failed to show how his attorney’s representation was undermined.

  • People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Be Present During Jury Selection

    People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318 (1996)

    A defendant has a right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors concerning potential biases, prejudices, or exposure to pretrial publicity, unless the juror is excused for cause or by the prosecution’s peremptory challenge, and the record negates the possibility that the defendant could have provided valuable input.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals consolidated appeals from three separate cases where the defendants’ convictions were reversed due to their exclusion from sidebar discussions with prospective jurors. The court held that defendants have a right to be present at sidebar conferences where potential juror biases or exposure to pretrial publicity are discussed. This right is violated when the defendant is excluded from these discussions and the record does not clearly indicate that the juror was excused for cause or through a peremptory challenge by the prosecution. The Court emphasized the importance of the defendant’s potential contribution to jury selection and affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversals.

    Facts

    In People v. Maher, the defendant was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, several prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar conferences regarding potential biases. The defendant was not present at these conferences. In People v. Ricks and People v. Mack, the codefendants were convicted of murder and attempted robbery. During their jury selection, several prospective jurors who indicated exposure to pretrial publicity were questioned at sidebar conferences outside the presence of the defendants.

    Procedural History

    In all three cases, the defendants were convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions in each case, finding that the defendants had been improperly excluded from material stages of their trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exclusion of the defendants from sidebar conferences with prospective jurors regarding potential biases, prejudices, or exposure to pretrial publicity violated their right to be present at a material stage of trial, warranting reversal of their convictions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the sidebar interviews of prospective jurors concerned potential biases and exposure to pretrial publicity, which are material stages of trial. The records failed to negate the possibility that the defendants could have meaningfully contributed to the sidebar conferences from which they were excluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s rulings, holding that a defendant has a right to be present at sidebar conferences concerning a prospective juror’s bias or exposure to pretrial publicity, as these are material stages of the trial. The court stated, “A sidebar interview of a prospective juror which concerns that juror’s bias or hostility is a material stage of trial which defendants are entitled to attend.” The Court reasoned that although the jury selection process is an ancillary proceeding, the right to be present at sidebar conferences is governed by CPL 260.20. The court emphasized that a defendant can waive the right to attend such conferences. However, the Court also stated that even if a defendant is erroneously excluded, reversal is not required if the potential juror was excused for cause or through a peremptory challenge by the prosecution. In such cases, the record must clearly demonstrate that the juror was excused for one of these reasons to negate the possibility that the defendant could have provided valuable input. Because the records in these cases did not definitively show that the jurors in question were excused for cause or by prosecutorial peremptory challenge, and because the prosecutor conceded in Ricks and Mack that the record supported the conclusion the defendants weren’t present, the Court affirmed the reversals, emphasizing the defendant’s potential contribution to jury selection and the importance of an adequate record to determine whether a defendant’s rights were violated.

  • People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992): Right to Presence During Jury Selection and Meaningful Contribution

    People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during all material stages of the trial, including questioning of prospective jurors about their ability to weigh evidence objectively, and reversal is required unless the defendant’s presence could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing he was wrongly excluded from voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. The trial court did not record substantial portions of the voir dire, leading the Appellate Division to order a reconstruction hearing. The reconstruction court found the defendant absent during bench conferences with jurors about their impartiality. Two of these jurors were peremptorily challenged by the defense, and one was excused by consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the defendant’s exclusion violated his right to be present at a material stage of the trial because he could have meaningfully contributed to decisions about excusing these jurors.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of first and second-degree robbery. During jury selection (voir dire), the trial court held unrecorded bench conferences with prospective jurors. The defendant was not present during these conferences, where jurors were questioned about their ability to be fair and impartial. Two of the prospective jurors discussed during these off-the-record conferences were later excused via defense peremptory challenges, and a third was excused by consent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing that his exclusion from the voir dire violated his right to be present at trial. The Appellate Division remanded the case for a reconstruction hearing because the trial court failed to record substantial portions of the voir dire. Following the reconstruction hearing, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s exclusion from bench conferences with prospective jurors during voir dire, where two jurors were later peremptorily challenged by the defense and one was excused by consent, violated the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant might have provided valuable input regarding his attorney’s discretionary decisions to excuse these venire members, the record does not negate the possibility that the defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant has the right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors concerning their ability to weigh the evidence objectively. The Court emphasized that a defendant’s exclusion requires reversal unless their presence “could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.” The court reasoned that because three of the prospective jurors were ultimately excused either through defense peremptory challenges or with defense counsel’s consent, the defendant’s input could have influenced the decisions to excuse those jurors. The court rejected the People’s argument to analyze whether each dismissed juror appeared favorable or unfavorable, deeming it speculative and reiterating that a case-specific prejudice analysis is inapplicable to violations of a defendant’s fundamental right to be present. The court quoted People v. Roman, stating that the record must ” ‘do[es] not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the [proceeding]’ “. This highlights that the *possibility* of meaningful contribution is sufficient to warrant reversal, reinforcing the importance of the defendant’s presence during jury selection. The decision underscores the significance of the defendant’s right to participate in discretionary decisions regarding jury selection, emphasizing that the potential for input, not just proof of actual prejudice, is the determining factor.