New York Law Review

Tag: jury selection

  • People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror

    People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008)

    A sworn juror may only be dismissed if the court determines the juror is grossly unqualified to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly dismissed a sworn juror. The juror had informed the court that she might have worked with the complainant and recalled he was fired for a gun-related incident. However, she assured the court she could remain impartial. The trial court dismissed her, reasoning that it was simply substituting one qualified juror for another. The Court of Appeals found this dismissal improper because the juror was not shown to be grossly unqualified.

    Facts

    During the trial, after the complainant testified, a sworn juror informed the court that she and the complainant may have worked at the same nursing center. She had some recollection that the complainant was fired for an incident involving a gun. However, the juror stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial and that the information would not influence her decision because she did not know the complainant well and was not involved in the incident. She also stated that she would not mention this to the other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The People sought the juror’s removal, and the trial court dismissed her over the defendant’s objection, replacing her with an alternate juror. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the dismissal was improper. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court improperly dismissed a sworn juror over the defendant’s objection, when the juror stated that she could remain impartial despite a possible prior association with the complainant and knowledge of a negative incident involving him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court failed to determine that the juror was grossly unqualified to serve, as required by CPL 270.35(1) and the juror stated that she could remain impartial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 270.35(1), which permits dismissal of a sworn juror only if he or she is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The court referenced People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 298 (1987), stating that a juror is grossly unqualified only when it becomes obvious that the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that the trial court must conduct a probing inquiry and consider the juror’s answers and demeanor to ascertain whether their state of mind will affect deliberations. The court quoted Buford, noting that a court may not speculate as to possible partiality based on equivocal responses but must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent an impartial verdict.

    Here, the juror explicitly stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial. The trial court’s reasoning that it was merely substituting one qualified juror for another was insufficient to justify the dismissal. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court failed to determine the juror was grossly unqualified or, indeed, unqualified at all. The Court stated, “[A]t worst ‘what I’m doing is substituting one qualified juror for another qualified juror.’ On this record, the juror’s dismissal was improper, and thus defendant is entitled to a new trial.”

  • Oglesby v. McKinney, 8 N.Y.3d 561 (2007): Jury Selection in City Courts

    Oglesby v. McKinney, 8 N.Y.3d 561 (2007)

    Jurors for a criminal trial in a City Court may be selected from the residents of the county in which the city is located, even if they are not city residents.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether jurors in a New York City Court criminal trial must be selected exclusively from city residents or whether the jury pool can include all county residents. The defendant, Bradwell, challenged the jury panel because it included county residents who were not city residents. The City Court granted his motion, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that Judiciary Law § 500 does not mandate that city court juries be comprised solely of city residents. The court reasoned that county-wide jury selection is permissible unless a specific statute or regulation provides otherwise, and that excluding county residents does not violate the defendant’s right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.

    Facts

    Reginald Bradwell was being prosecuted in Syracuse City Court for theft of services and resisting arrest. Prior to trial, Bradwell moved to strike the jury panel, arguing that many of the potential jurors, while residents of Onondaga County, did not reside within the city of Syracuse. The City Court initially granted Bradwell’s motion, ordering the County Commissioner of Jurors to provide a new panel consisting only of Syracuse residents.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Jurors and the District Attorney sought review of the City Court’s order via a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the judge and Bradwell in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, prohibiting the enforcement of the City Court’s order. The Appellate Division modified this ruling, finding prohibition inappropriate but converting the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action. The Appellate Division ultimately agreed with the Supreme Court on the merits, declaring that Judiciary Law § 500 does not require city court juries to be exclusively composed of city residents. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed this decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Judiciary Law § 500 mandates that a county commissioner of jurors provide a defendant in a criminal action in city court with a panel of prospective jurors comprised solely of residents of the city.

    Holding

    No, because Judiciary Law § 500 does not explicitly require that jurors in City Court criminal trials be exclusively residents of the city where the court is located; county-wide selection is permissible unless otherwise specified by statute or regulation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Judiciary Law § 500 does not explicitly mandate county-wide jury selection, it implies that it is the norm. The court cited related statutes, such as Judiciary Law § 502(a), which establishes the office of Commissioner of Jurors for each county, and Judiciary Law § 506, which requires the Commissioner to select jurors from lists of county residents. These statutes, according to the court, suggest that county-wide selection is generally permissible unless a specific statute or regulation provides otherwise. The Court acknowledged that some regulations, like 22 NYCRR 128.7(a) for Town and Village Courts, allow for more geographically limited jury pools. However, no such provision exists for City Courts. The Court also rejected the argument that county-wide jury selection violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The Court stated, “We know of no authority, and none has been cited to us, suggesting that the ‘community’ from which a jury is selected must be identical to the area over which the court has jurisdiction.” The court further argued that limiting City Court juries to city residents could potentially disadvantage defendants in felony cases by diverting jurors away from County Court felony trials. The court concluded that Commissioner Oglesby’s procedure of drawing jurors from the entire county did not violate any law or regulation or Bradwell’s constitutional rights.

  • People v. Serrano, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006): Scope of Trial Court’s Discretion in Jury Selection

    People v. Serrano, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006)

    A trial court has broad discretion under CPL 270.15 (1)(a) to manage jury selection, including the number of prospective jurors called for simultaneous voir dire questioning, provided the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective voir dire is not demonstrably impaired.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning. The Court emphasized that CPL 270.15(1)(a) allows for “not less than twelve” jurors to be called, indicating a legislative intent to grant trial judges discretion in managing jury selection for efficiency. The Court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice or inability to effectively conduct voir dire under the trial court’s procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for selling heroin in a buy-and-bust operation. During jury selection, the trial court called 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous questioning, seating 12 in the jury box and the rest in the front rows. The defense attorney objected, arguing that the large number of jurors and their seating arrangement would hinder his ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Procedural History

    The trial court overruled the defense’s objection, citing prior approval of this procedure. The defendant was subsequently convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, upholding the trial court’s jury selection procedure. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning, thereby impairing the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15(1)(a) grants trial courts discretion in managing jury selection, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice or impairment of his ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its decision on the language and legislative intent of CPL 270.15(1)(a), which states that “the court shall direct that the names of not less than twelve members of the panel be drawn.” The Court noted that the 1981 amendment, changing the language from a mandatory 12 to “not less than twelve,” was intended to improve the efficiency of jury selection by allowing simultaneous examination of more jurors. The Court emphasized that the Legislature set no upper limit on the number of prospective jurors, thus granting judges discretion to manage their courtrooms efficiently.

    The Court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant could demonstrate actual prejudice or an inability to observe, hear, or assess prospective jurors. Here, the defendant did not express any specific difficulties during voir dire, nor was there any evidence of prejudice on the record. The Court stated, “Defendant has not demonstrated that he could not conduct a voir dire by the trial court’s decision to expand the jury box. During voir dire, counsel expressed no inability to observe, hear or assess the demeanor and qualifications of, or exercise challenges against, any prospective jurors.”

    The Court cited previous Appellate Division cases, such as People v. Camacho, that approved similar jury selection procedures. By affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals signaled its deference to trial courts in managing the practical aspects of jury selection, absent a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant.

  • People v. Wells, 7 N.Y.3d 51 (2006): Duplicity in Attempted Murder Charges

    7 N.Y.3d 51 (2006)

    An attempted murder charge is not duplicitous when the evidence shows the defendant fired a gun toward multiple individuals, even if the intended victim is not definitively identified.

    Summary

    Terence Wells was convicted of attempted murder for firing a gun at two detectives. He argued the indictment was duplicitous because the prosecution didn’t prove which detective he intended to kill. The New York Court of Appeals held that the attempted murder charge was not duplicitous. The Court reasoned that the identity of the intended victim is not an element of attempted murder, as the focus is on the intent to kill and the actions taken to effect that intent. The court also addressed a Batson challenge related to jury selection and the denial of a motion to dismiss the jury panel after a potential juror’s comment.

    Facts

    Wells and an accomplice robbed a bakery, killing two people and injuring two others.
    Undercover detectives Weston and Molina, nearby for a narcotics operation, heard the commotion and saw Wells and his accomplice fleeing.
    Detective Weston identified himself and ordered them to stop.
    Wells fired his gun twice in the direction of the detectives as he ran.
    Wells dropped clothing, including a wig containing a handgun, during the police chase before being apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Wells was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree attempted murder of a police officer.
    At trial, Wells moved to dismiss the attempted murder count, arguing it was duplicitous.
    The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Wells of, among other things, second-degree attempted murder as a lesser included offense.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attempted murder charge is duplicitous when the evidence doesn’t specify which of multiple potential victims the defendant intended to kill.

    Holding

    No, because the identity of the specific intended victim is not an element of attempted murder; the focus is on the intent to kill and actions taken to effectuate that intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Fernandez, stating that because “actual death is not an element” of attempted murder, the “identity of the person whose death” was intended is irrelevant. The court reasoned that the focus is on whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill and took steps toward committing the murder.
    “Under this rationale, the identity of the specific police officer against whom defendant’s murderous intent was directed is not an element of attempted murder in the first or second degree.”
    The court found the jury instructions proper because they allowed conviction if the defendant acted with intent to kill, regardless of which detective was the specific target.
    The court also addressed Wells’ Batson challenge, finding the prosecutor’s reasons for striking a juror (demeanor, fondness for detective stories) were race-neutral. While one comment comparing the juror to a judge was in “poor taste”, it wasn’t facially discriminatory.
    Finally, the court rejected Wells’ argument that the entire jury panel should have been dismissed after a prospective juror’s comment, finding no evidence of substantial prejudice.

  • People v. Kitchen, 2 N.Y.3d 180 (2004): Trial Court Discretion in Jury Selection

    People v. Kitchen, 2 N.Y.3d 180 (2004)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, a trial court possesses discretion regarding the number of prospective jurors called after the initial round of jury selection.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of weapon and drug possession charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred during jury selection by calling prospective jurors one at a time after the initial round, instead of replacing the seven initially selected jurors with at least five new jurors at once, thereby violating CPL 270.15(3). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that CPL 270.15(3) grants the trial court discretion in determining the number of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury box after the first round. While the court acknowledged that the trial court’s method may have extended jury selection, it was not unlawful.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.

    During jury selection, the trial court initially called 18 prospective jurors, from which seven were chosen.

    Over the objections of both the prosecution and the defense, the court then proceeded to call one prospective juror at a time for questioning and challenges until the jury was complete.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court.

    The defendant appealed, arguing the jury selection process violated CPL 270.15(3).

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated CPL 270.15(3) by calling prospective jurors one at a time after the initial round of jury selection, rather than replacing the initial seven jurors with at least five new jurors at once?

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15(3) gives the trial court discretion in determining the number of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury box following completion of the first round of jury selection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the language of CPL 270.15(3), which states that “[t]he court may thereupon direct that the persons excluded be replaced in the jury box by an equal number from the panel or, in its discretion, direct that all sworn jurors be removed from the jury box and that the jury box be occupied by such additional number of persons from the panel as the court shall direct.”

    The Court emphasized that the statute explicitly grants discretion to the trial court in determining how many prospective jurors are called after the initial round. The Court cited People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d 519, 524 (1996), reiterating that the trial court has discretion to “remove sworn jurors and fill the box with any number of jurors that it chooses.”

    The Court acknowledged that the trial court’s procedure may have unnecessarily prolonged jury selection. However, it concluded that the procedure was not unlawful because the statute grants the trial court discretion, even if the exercise of that discretion leads to a less efficient process.

  • People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.3d 530 (2006): Judicial Duty to Control Jury Trial Proceedings

    6 N.Y.3d 530 (2006)

    A defendant is deprived of the right to a fair trial when the presiding judge abdicates control over critical aspects of the jury trial process, particularly jury selection and instructions, requiring the prosecutor to improperly assume those responsibilities.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault and endangering the welfare of an incompetent person. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court order affirming the conviction and ordered a new trial. The Court found the town justice presiding over the trial was unfamiliar with jury trial mechanics and repeatedly ceded control to the prosecutor regarding jury selection, preliminary and final instructions, and managing jury deliberations. This abdication of judicial responsibility deprived the defendant of a fair trial, necessitating a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and endangering the welfare of an incompetent person after a jury trial presided over by a town justice.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The County Court affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was deprived of her right to a fair trial when the presiding judge demonstrated unfamiliarity with jury trial mechanics and relinquished control over critical aspects of the proceedings to the prosecutor.

    Holding

    Yes, because the judge’s lack of control over jury selection, instructions, and management of deliberations, with the prosecutor stepping in to fill the void, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the town justice demonstrated a profound unfamiliarity with the proper procedures for conducting a jury trial. Specifically, the judge:

    1. Attempted to seat a jury before voir dire.
    2. Failed to elicit basic information from prospective jurors.
    3. Issued an oath to the jurors that did not comply with statutory requirements.
    4. Required the prosecutor to correct and guide him during preliminary and final jury instructions.
    5. Allowed the prosecutor to instruct the jury on the correct procedure for requesting evidence during deliberations.

    The Court relied on precedent establishing that a judge must maintain control over jury selection (citing People v. Toliver, 89 NY2d 843, 844 [1996]) and jury deliberations (citing People v. Bayes, 78 NY2d 546, 551 [1991]). By ceding control to the prosecutor in these critical areas, the judge failed to satisfy his obligation to ensure the integrity of the proceedings. The court stated the judge “relinquish[ed] control” over the jury selection process.

    The court also emphasized the impropriety of the prosecutor “assum[ing] the important function of maintaining control of jury deliberations.” The cumulative effect of these errors was so prejudicial that it warranted a new trial.

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Establishing Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived by counsel, and the trial court is not required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defendants’ rights to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors were violated. In People v. Foster, the Court held that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of his absence from a robing room conference. In People v. Velasquez, the Court found that the defendant validly waived his right to be present, even without a direct colloquy with the court. The Court affirmed both convictions, emphasizing that while a direct colloquy wasn’t required for a valid waiver, greater attention should be paid to recording a defendant’s presence or absence to avoid future disputes.

    Facts

    In People v. Foster, during jury selection, the trial court informed prospective jurors that those with concerns would be invited individually into the robing room with the attorneys. The transcript didn’t explicitly record Foster’s presence. In People v. Velasquez, after a bench conference, defense counsel stated, “Waived,” to which the court responded, “Antommarchi waived.” A prospective juror was questioned at a sidebar conference outside Velasquez’s presence.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions, with two justices dissenting in Velasquez. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Foster: Whether the defendant presented substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and establish his absence from a material stage of the trial.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences without a direct colloquy with the court.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Foster: No, because the defendant failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of court proceedings.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Yes, because a trial court is not required to engage the defendant in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    In People v. Foster, the Court relied on the presumption of regularity that attaches to judicial proceedings, which can only be overcome by substantial evidence. The Court stated that the absence of a specific record of the defendant’s presence, by itself, is insufficient to rebut this presumption. The Court declined to speculate based on the lack of explicit notation of presence.

    In People v. Velasquez, the Court held that defense counsel’s waiver, announced in open court, was sufficient. The Court reasoned that requiring a specific colloquy in every case would be overly burdensome. The court stated, “[T]here is no requirement that the Judge conduct a pro forma inquisition in each case on the off-chance that a defendant who is adequately represented by counsel . . . may nevertheless not know what he is doing” (quoting People v. Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 154 [1975]). The Court emphasized that the waiver occurred in the defendant’s presence, and the defendant didn’t object. The court emphasized, “While the better practice would have been to state the substance of the right being waived, nothing in the record calls into question the effectiveness of defendant’s waiver as announced by counsel…”

    The dissenting judge argued that a hearing should be held to determine if the defendants were present or made adequate waivers, as the record did not clearly show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be present during juror questioning. The dissent argued the presumption of regularity should not substitute for reconstructing the record.

  • People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418 (2003): Proper Procedure for Batson Challenges

    People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418 (2003)

    The Batson procedure for challenging peremptory strikes requires a three-step process: the moving party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the non-moving party must provide a race-neutral reason for each strike, and the court must determine whether the reason is pretextual.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper application of the three-step Batson test for determining whether peremptory challenges were used to exclude potential jurors based on race. During jury selection, the defense raised a Batson objection after the prosecutor struck three minority women. While the prosecutor offered reasons for the strikes, the defense argued a pattern of discrimination. The trial court found sufficient reasons for two strikes but was less clear on the third. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that although the trial court’s analysis was flawed, the defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal by not pressing the issue of pretext regarding one of the jurors.

    Facts

    During the first round of jury selection for Smocum’s trial for criminal possession of a stolen vehicle, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove three prospective jurors: one Hispanic woman and two African-American women.

    Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge, suggesting a pattern of racial discrimination.

    The prosecutor explained that two jurors were struck due to family involvement with police officers, and the third because of the recent death of her son.

    Defense counsel contested the reasons given, particularly regarding the level of concern expressed by one juror regarding a negative experience her son had with police.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding sufficient reasons for the strikes and stating the challenge of one additional juror did not establish a pattern.

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by revisiting the prima facie case determination after the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes.

    2. Whether the trial court’s ruling on pretext regarding prospective juror Mapp was supported by the record.

    3. Whether inadequacies in the record were attributable to the trial court’s impatience during the Batson inquiry.

    Holding

    1. The issue became moot when the prosecutor stated their reasons and the court ruled on the ultimate issue.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal by not pressing the issue of pretext regarding one of the jurors.

    3. While the court improperly rushed and compressed the Batson inquiry, defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing an equal protection violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the three-step Batson framework. First, the party challenging the strike must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the striking party must offer a race-neutral explanation. Third, the trial court must determine whether the explanation is pretextual. The court stated that “It makes no sense, for example, to revisit the issue of whether a prima facie case has been made once the prosecutor has come forward with race-neutral reasons.”

    The Court found that the trial court erred by seemingly merging steps two and three, not explicitly allowing defense counsel to argue pretext. However, the Court also noted that the defense failed to adequately preserve the issue regarding juror Mapp, stating, “While defense counsel persisted in her challenge regarding Torres and Gordon despite the court’s impatience, she said nothing further about Mapp at a time when any ambiguity — if indeed she actually perceived any ambiguity — could have been clarified.”

    The court underscored the importance of both trial court attention to each of Batson’s well-articulated, sequential steps, and of trial counsel attention to placing their objections on the record so they may be addressed by the court.

  • People v. James, 99 N.Y.2d 267 (2002): Preserving Batson Challenges in Jury Selection

    People v. James, 99 N.Y.2d 267 (2002)

    To properly preserve a Batson challenge regarding allegedly discriminatory jury selection, a party must clearly articulate and develop all factual and legal grounds supporting the claim during the relevant colloquy, specifying each juror whose exclusion is challenged.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant failed to preserve his Batson challenge because he did not clearly articulate that he was challenging the exclusion of all the jurors he mentioned when raising the Batson challenge. The Court emphasized that it is the moving party’s responsibility to clearly specify each juror they claim was improperly challenged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court rulings, highlighting the need for specific and timely objections to ensure proper preservation of Batson challenges.

    Facts

    In People v. James, the defendant was observed attempting to break into a car. During jury selection, the defense raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of five out of six African-American women was discriminatory. The defense attorney named four African-American women previously struck and then focused on a fifth woman, Bemejam, stating reasons why her removal was questionable. In People v. Jones, the defendant was indicted for robbery. During jury selection, the defendant raised a Batson challenge concerning the People striking an African-American female and two African-American males. The defense attorney mentioned the jurors but only explicitly challenged the removal of two male jurors.

    Procedural History

    In James, the trial court found no Batson violation. The defendant was convicted, and the Appellate Division affirmed. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal. In Jones, the trial court rejected the Batson challenge, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendants adequately preserved their Batson challenges by specifically articulating which jurors’ exclusions were being challenged as discriminatory.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendants failed to clearly and specifically challenge the exclusion of each juror they now claim was discriminatorily removed, thus failing to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a party making a Batson challenge must clearly articulate and develop all factual and legal grounds supporting the claim. This includes specifying each juror whose exclusion is challenged. The Court reasoned that in James, the defense attorney only explicitly challenged the removal of Bemejam, and in Jones, the defense only clearly challenged the removal of certain male jurors. The court emphasized that an unarticulated claim is an unpreserved claim. The Court quoted People v Childress, stating that a party asserting a Batson claim “should articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and discussed.” By not clearly challenging the exclusion of each juror at the time of the Batson challenge, the defendants failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The court also referenced People v. Allen stating, “Although the race neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, it must be legitimate and not merely a pretext for discrimination.” The Court ultimately affirmed the importance of specific and timely objections to any claimed discriminatory exclusion of jurors.

  • People v. Hedrick, 99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Potential Bias

    99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003)

    Prospective jurors who indicate potential bias but do not provide an unequivocal assurance of impartiality must be excused for cause.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred by not excusing prospective jurors for cause who indicated a potential bias in favor of police officer testimony without providing unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied, forcing the defense to use peremptory challenges. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges, the error was reversible.

    Facts

    During voir dire, prospective jurors indicated, through raised hands and affirmative nods, that they might be inclined to believe a police officer’s account simply because of their position. Defense counsel specifically asked if anyone felt they would have a tendency to believe a police officer’s account, and several jurors responded affirmatively. The defense later clarified whether those jurors would be “leaning towards accepting a police officer just because of the title or the uniform,” to which the jurors nodded affirmatively.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in denying the defense’s challenges for cause. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, reversing the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause against prospective jurors who indicated a potential bias in favor of police testimony but did not provide unequivocal assurances of impartiality.

    Holding

    Yes, because potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of ensuring an impartial jury. CPL 270.20 (1) (b) allows a prospective juror to be challenged for cause if they evince “a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” The Court relied on precedent, stating that potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.” The Court noted that although the record could have been more definitive, the jurors’ demonstrative responses sufficiently indicated possible bias. The trial court should have obtained unequivocal assurances of impartiality but failed to do so. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges after the trial court denied the challenges for cause, the error was reversible. The court referenced CPL 270.20 [2] to reinforce the ruling on reversible error.