Tag: Jury Readback

  • People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013): Judge’s Participation in Testimony Readback

    People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013)

    While a trial judge should generally avoid participating in readbacks of testimony to the jury, doing so is not a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal absent preservation, unless the judge’s actions demonstrate bias that deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    James Alcide was convicted of murder and weapon possession. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony from two key witnesses. The trial judge, in an effort to expedite the process, participated in the readbacks by reading either the questions or the answers. Alcide argued that this participation constituted a mode of proceedings error, requiring reversal even without an objection. The New York Court of Appeals held that while it’s generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias, and that Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Alcide was convicted of fatally shooting a man in a grocery store. Key evidence included testimony from a bystander who identified Alcide as the shooter and the victim’s friend who saw Alcide fleeing the scene with a gun. The defense attacked the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, citing inconsistencies and potential biases. During deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of the testimony of the bystander and the first police officer on the scene.

    Procedural History

    Alcide was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge committed mode of proceedings errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alcide appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s participation in the readback of testimony to the jury, by reading either the questions or answers, constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal even in the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because while it is generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks of testimony, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama, where the trial judge withheld the contents of a jury note from counsel. Here, the content of the jury’s requests for readbacks was disclosed in open court, and defense counsel had the opportunity to object to the judge’s proposed procedure. Because counsel did not object, the claim was unpreserved. The Court acknowledged the Second Department’s dictum in People v. Brockett that a trial judge should not participate as a reader during a read-back of testimony, as it might convey the impression that the court is aligned with a particular party. However, the Court clarified that such participation, while generally inadvisable, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it creates a situation analogous to People v. De Jesus, where the judge’s conduct demonstrated clear bias against the defense. The court noted, “Not every procedural misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error”; rather, this narrow exception to the preservation rule is “reserved for the most fundamental flaws.” Here, the judge’s stated reasons for participating in the readbacks were to expedite the process and make it easier for the jury to follow, not to demonstrate bias. Because defense counsel failed to object to the judge’s participation in the readbacks at a time when the error could have been cured, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming Alcide’s conviction.

  • People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999): Judge’s Absence During Testimony Readback

    People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999)

    A trial judge’s brief absence during the ministerial reading back of testimony to the jury, where the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal of a conviction.

    Summary

    Hernandez was convicted of murder. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony. The trial judge, with consent from both parties, absented himself from the courtroom during the readback, but remained immediately available in chambers. The Appellate Division initially affirmed the conviction, but later reversed it on a coram nobis petition, citing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of the judge’s absence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the judge’s brief absence during a purely ministerial readback, with the judge remaining available, did not constitute reversible error.

    Facts

    Hernandez was convicted of second-degree murder and related weapons offenses. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of trial testimony. With the consent of both parties, the trial judge absented himself during the reading of the testimony. The judge informed everyone that he would be immediately available in his chambers should any issue arise. The judge himself conducted the requested rereading of the charge to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially affirmed Hernandez’s conviction. Hernandez then petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the judge’s absence during readbacks. The Appellate Division granted the petition, vacated its prior affirmance, and reversed Hernandez’s conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial judge’s absence during the readback of testimony to the jury, when the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, constitutes a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal.

    Holding

    No, because the readbacks required no further rulings or instructions beyond those previously made by the court, and no delegation of judicial authority occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Ahmed (66 N.Y.2d 307), where the trial judge delegated his duties to his law secretary during deliberations. In Ahmed, the law secretary reread portions of the charge and received jury notes without the judge’s consideration. Here, the judge made all substantive rulings and remained available. Citing People v. Monroe (90 N.Y.2d 982), the Court reasoned that the judge’s absence did not rise to the level of a “mode of proceedings” error requiring reversal. The court emphasized that the readbacks were purely ministerial and required no further rulings beyond those already made. The Court noted, “The absence of Trial Judges from readbacks is disfavored,” but found no reversible error here. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the judge delegates judicial authority or is unavailable to address issues that may arise during the readback. The Court implicitly acknowledged that the parties’ consent played a role in their analysis.