New York Law Review

Tag: jury polling

  • People v. Simms, 13 N.Y.3d 867 (2009): Inquiry When a Juror Expresses Doubt During Polling

    13 N.Y.3d 867 (2009)

    When a juror expresses uncertainty or reservations during a jury poll, the trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to ensure the verdict is voluntary and not the result of coercion or duress, without improperly delving into the deliberative process.

    Summary

    In People v. Simms, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the adequacy of a trial court’s inquiry when a juror expressed feeling pressured during a jury poll. After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty. During the polling, one juror stated the verdict was hers, but she felt pressured. The trial judge inquired about the pressure, but limited the scope to external factors. The Court of Appeals held that the judge’s inquiry was insufficient to ensure the verdict’s voluntariness, as it didn’t adequately address potential duress arising within the jury room. The Court emphasized that while the secrecy of jury deliberations must be protected, the court must ensure the verdict isn’t the product of coercion. A new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    The jury found Everton Simms guilty of first-degree robbery. During the polling of the jury, the tenth juror stated, “Well, it is my verdict, although I feel like I was pressured to make that decision.” The juror then volunteered, “It is my verdict.” The trial judge confirmed, “That is your verdict; is that correct?” and the juror replied, “Yes.” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, accepted the guilty verdict, and subsequently denied a motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge’s inquiry was insufficient to establish that the juror agreed with the verdict. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to ensure that a juror’s guilty verdict was voluntary when the juror initially stated she felt pressured to reach that decision during the jury poll.

    Holding

    No, because while the trial judge established that there was no pressure exerted on juror number 10 emanating from outside the jury room, he did not clear up whether there was duress arising out of matters extraneous to the jury’s deliberations or not properly within their scope, although perhaps occurring within the jury room.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals cited CPL 310.80, which requires the court to refuse the verdict and direct the jury to resume deliberations if a juror dissents during polling. It acknowledged the trial judge’s duty to resolve uncertainties arising from a juror’s response, citing People v. Mercado, 91 NY2d 960, 963 (1998). The Court distinguished between permissible inquiry and violating the secrecy of jury deliberations, citing People v. Pickett, 61 NY2d 773, 774 (1984). The court stated, “Trial judges may not violat[e] the secrecy of the jury deliberations, but they must insure that a verdict is not the product of actual or threatened physical harm.” The court noted the trial judge never dispelled the ambiguity by asking whether the juror found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. Judge Smith concurred, stating the juror made it perfectly clear that what she meant by pressure was no more than vigorous argument: “[E]veryone is standing up, yelling at me, why can’t you see it that way, why can’t you see it that way?”

  • People v. Alcide, 89 N.Y.2d 961 (1997): Preserving Objections to Jury Polling

    People v. Alcide, 89 N.Y.2d 961 (1997)

    A defendant must make a specific objection or request for further inquiry during jury polling to preserve a claim that the court failed to adequately inquire into a juror’s verdict.

    Summary

    Alcide was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree assault. During jury polling, one juror initially remained silent when asked if the verdict was hers, but eventually responded affirmatively after the court’s prompting. The defense attorney did not object to the procedure or request further inquiry. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into the juror’s verdict was unpreserved for appellate review because the defense failed to object or request specific procedures during the polling process. The court also found no abuse of discretion in repeating the “acting-in-concert” instruction.

    Facts

    Alcide was tried for murder and assault stemming from an incident in Bronx County. During deliberations, the jury requested further explanation of attempted second-degree murder and second-degree assault. The court, in response, repeated its previous instruction on “acting-in-concert” liability. The jury then informed the court it had reached a verdict, finding Alcide guilty of second-degree murder and second-degree assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Alcide of second-degree murder and second-degree assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting. A dissenting justice granted Alcide leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into a juror’s vote during polling is preserved for appellate review when the defendant failed to object or request further inquiry during the polling process.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by including an instruction on the “acting-in-concert” theory of liability in its response to the jury’s note.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to make a specific objection or request further inquiry when the juror was being polled, and again failed to object after the entire jury was polled.
    2. No, because there is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory, and the prosecution pursued both lines of reasoning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 310.80, a juror’s negative response during polling requires the court to refuse the verdict and direct further deliberations. While a juror’s response may raise doubts requiring resolution, a request for specific procedures to correct irregularities must be preserved for review. Here, Alcide’s counsel failed to object or request further inquiry when the juror hesitated. The court stated, “Defendant’s contention on appeal concerning a claimed failure of the trial court to make certain inquiries is unpreserved for our review.”

    Regarding the “acting-in-concert” instruction, the court stated, “Because there is ‘no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory’ and the prosecution pursued both lines of reasoning in presenting its case, the court’s repetition of its previous instructions to which defendant had not objected was consistent with ‘the substantive scope of the initial written inquiries’.” The court found no abuse of discretion.

  • Sharrow v. Dick Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 54 (1995): Upholding Right to Deliberation by a Full Six-Member Jury

    86 N.Y.2d 54 (1995)

    A valid jury verdict in a civil case requires participation by all six jurors in the deliberations on all issues presented, and a trial court errs when it refuses a request to conduct a limited inquiry into a juror’s possible non-participation.

    Summary

    Lyndon Sharrow, an ironworker, sued Dick Corporation and Southern Steel Corporation for negligence and violations of New York Labor Law § 241(6) after being injured at a construction site. During jury polling after a verdict in favor of Sharrow, one juror gave ambiguous responses, suggesting she may not have participated in all deliberations. The trial court denied a request for limited questioning of the juror. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ambiguous responses raised sufficient doubt about the juror’s participation to warrant a limited inquiry. The Court emphasized the constitutional right to a trial by a six-member jury, which necessitates deliberation by all jurors on all issues.

    Facts

    Lyndon Sharrow, an ironworker for G & H Steel, was injured while moving a metal lockbox at a construction site. He sued the general contractor, Dick Corporation, and subcontractor, Southern Steel Corporation, for negligence and violations of Labor Law § 241(6). At the trial’s conclusion, the jury foreperson announced a verdict finding the defendants’ statutory violation to be the proximate cause of Sharrow’s injuries, awarding him $430,000 in damages. During the jury poll, Juror No. 5 answered “No” to the first question (violation of Labor Law). To subsequent questions on proximate cause, total damages and specific damages, she either offered ‘no response’ or simply said ‘no’.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment for Sharrow after denying a request to question Juror No. 5. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a new trial on pain and suffering damages unless the defendants stipulated to an additur. G & H Steel and Southern appealed. The Court of Appeals granted Sharrow’s motion to dismiss Southern’s appeal due to a stipulation to the additur. G & H Steel’s appeal remained before the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to conduct a limited inquiry to determine if a juror participated in deliberations on all issues when the juror’s responses during polling suggested possible non-participation.

    Holding

    Yes, because a valid jury verdict requires that all six jurors participate in the underlying deliberations, and the trial court’s refusal to inquire compromised the right to a trial by a full six-member jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional right to a six-member jury trial in civil cases, which necessitates all six jurors participating in deliberations on all issues. The Court noted that while a five-sixths verdict is permissible, all six jurors must engage in the deliberative process. Juror No. 5’s ambiguous responses during polling raised a legitimate question about her participation, warranting a limited inquiry by the trial court. The court distinguished a pre-discharge inquiry to clarify a verdict from a post-discharge attempt to impeach it, noting policies against post-trial juror questioning (finality of verdicts, preventing juror harassment, encouraging frank discussion). The court cited People v. Pickett, 61 N.Y.2d 773, indicating that a limited inquiry, without infringing upon the secrecy of deliberations, would be permissible. Because of the trial court’s error in failing to conduct a limited inquiry, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, stating “Even if ‘no response’ is considered the equivalent of ‘no award’ in reply to the questions on damages, juror No. 5 also offered ‘no response’ to the question whether plaintiff had been negligent. Her answers raised a legitimate question whether juror No. 5 had participated in the jury’s discussion of issues other than liability, and defense counsel appropriately requested a limited inquiry to clarify that juror No. 5 had participated in the deliberative process.”

  • People v. Rukaj, 51 N.Y.2d 529 (1980): Inquiry into Juror’s Claim of Duress During Polling

    People v. Rukaj, 51 N.Y.2d 529 (1980)

    When a juror expresses having reached a verdict under duress during polling, the trial court must conduct a specific inquiry to determine the nature and source of the duress without violating the secrecy of jury deliberations, and then determine appropriate remedial action.

    Summary

    During the polling of the jury, one juror stated that her verdict was given “under duress.” Defense counsel requested a hearing to determine the nature of the duress, but the trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry into the juror’s claim of duress. The Court outlined a specific procedure for the judge to follow, balancing the need to investigate potential coercion with the importance of maintaining the secrecy of jury deliberations. The Court stated the trial court should have questioned the juror to ascertain whether the duress arose from extraneous matters and then taken remedial action as needed.

    Facts

    After the jury announced its verdict, the defense requested that the jury be polled. When asked whether the verdicts were hers, one juror responded, “Yes, under duress, I’m saying yes”. Defense counsel then requested the court to hold a hearing to determine the nature of the stated duress. The trial court denied this request and accepted the verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defense appealed the trial court’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the trial court should have inquired into the juror’s claim of duress. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs when it fails to inquire into a juror’s statement during polling that their verdict was given under duress.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court had a duty to investigate the juror’s claim to determine if the duress arose from improper influences without compromising the secrecy of jury deliberations and to take appropriate remedial action if necessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred by not inquiring into the juror’s claim of duress. The Court established a specific procedure for handling such situations. The trial judge should question the juror privately, instructing them not to disclose the content of jury deliberations. The judge should then inquire whether the juror can describe the circumstances of the duress without violating the secrecy of deliberations. If the juror can do so, the judge should listen, being careful to prevent disclosure of the deliberative process. If the duress arises from matters extraneous to the jury’s deliberations, the judge must determine what remedial action is suitable, which could range from directing the jury to continue deliberating to declaring a mistrial. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining jury secrecy while also ensuring that verdicts are not the product of coercion: “communications among the jurors that were a part of their deliberative process in attempting to reach a verdict on the issues they were charged to decide (including their efforts by permissible arguments on the merits to persuade each other) were secret and not to be disclosed to him.” The Court criticized the trial court’s limited inquiry, which gave the juror “only the categorical alternative of ‘yes or no’, with no opportunity even to volunteer any comment or exposition of the predicament in which she found herself.” The appropriate action depends on the specific facts and the effectiveness of any procedure to eradicate the effect of the duress.