New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Poll

  • Duffy v. Vogel, 91 N.Y.2d 167 (2008): Jury Polls are Required Upon Request

    Duffy v. Vogel, 91 N.Y.2d 167 (2008)

    In New York, a litigant has an absolute right to have the jury polled upon request, and the failure to honor this request can never be deemed harmless error.

    Summary

    After a complex medical malpractice trial, the jury returned a verdict seemingly in favor of the defendant physicians but also awarded damages to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury. The trial court later acknowledged its error and granted a mistrial. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming the error harmless because the jury unanimously signed the verdict sheet. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the denial of a request for a jury poll is never harmless error in New York, as it is a necessary condition for a perfected verdict.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sued defendant physicians for medical malpractice, alleging failure to diagnose and treat a tumor. The jury returned a verdict appearing to favor the defendants, yet it also awarded damages to the plaintiff. Each juror had signed the verdict sheet in response to each interrogatory, with unanimous responses recorded. The foreperson announced the verdict in open court, with no juror objecting.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury but subsequently granted the plaintiff’s post-trial motion to set aside the verdict and declare a mistrial. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding the failure to poll the jury a harmless error. The New York Court of Appeals granted plaintiff’s appeal as of right and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a party’s request to poll the jury constitutes harmless error, where the jury unanimously signed the verdict sheet and no juror voiced dissent during the verdict’s announcement.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, honoring a request for a jury poll is a necessary condition for a perfected verdict, and the failure to poll the jury can never be deemed harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the long-standing common-law right to poll a jury to ensure each juror individually assents to the verdict. The Court stated that polling is “indispensable to a properly published, and thereby perfected, verdict.” The court reasoned that a verdict isn’t “finished or perfected” until recorded, and it cannot be validly recorded without a jury poll when one is requested. It refuted the argument that signing a verdict sheet is equivalent to a poll, quoting Root v. Sherwood, 6 Johns 68, 68 (1810): “There is no verdict of any force but a public verdict, given openly in court; until it was received and recorded it was no verdict.” The court reasoned it could not know each juror’s conscience retrospectively to assure that the verdict initially expressed their actual intent, and only timely inquiry of jurors will disclose whether their announced verdict truly expresses their will. The dissent argued that the error was harmless given the detailed and unanimous verdict, suggesting the majority’s decision could lead to trial judges improperly denying jury poll requests. The majority rejected this, arguing that jury polling entails little burden, is demonstrably efficacious, and protects the right to trial by jury. It emphasized that harmless error analysis impermissibly substitutes judicial judgment for the judgments of the jurors.

  • People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979): Jury Poll Sufficiency After Dismissal of Inclusory Count

    People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979)

    A single jury poll is sufficient when the jury clearly manifests a unanimous verdict, even if the trial court subsequently dismisses an inclusory concurrent count.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. After the jury rendered its verdict, each member confirmed their assent during a poll. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the possession charge as an inclusory concurrent count. The defendant argued that the court should have polled the jury again after dismissing the possession charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial poll, which demonstrated a unanimous verdict, satisfied the statutory requirement, and the subsequent dismissal did not necessitate a second poll.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree stemming from a single transaction.

    Following the jury’s verdict of guilty on both counts, the trial court conducted a poll of the jury, during which each juror affirmed their agreement with the verdict.

    After the jury poll, the trial court dismissed the criminal possession charge because it was an inclusory concurrent count of the criminal sale charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was required to conduct a second jury poll after dismissing the inclusory concurrent count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, when the jury had already unanimously assented to the verdict during the initial poll.

    Holding

    No, because the initial jury poll clearly demonstrated that the verdict was unanimous, satisfying the requirement of CPL 310.80. The subsequent dismissal of the inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate this expression of unanimity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of a jury poll, as outlined in CPL 310.80, is to ensure that each juror individually assents to the verdict. Once this unanimity is established, the statutory requirement is satisfied. The court emphasized that the initial poll clearly manifested the jury’s unanimous agreement with the verdict on both counts.

    The subsequent dismissal of the possession charge, based on the principle that a defendant cannot be convicted of both the sale and possession of the same controlled substance in a single transaction (inclusory concurrent counts), did not undermine the validity of the initial unanimous verdict. The court stated, “During the initial poll, the jury clearly manifested that the verdict was unanimous, thus satisfying the statutory requirement set forth in CPL 310.80. The subsequent colloquy between counsel and the court concerning the People’s motion to dismiss an inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate that expression of unanimity. Therefore, the trial court’s acceptance of the verdict was proper.”

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where a juror expresses doubt or uncertainty during the poll, which would necessitate further inquiry. Here, there was no ambiguity in the jurors’ assent to the verdict when it was initially rendered. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to accept the verdict without a second poll was deemed proper.