New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Instructions

  • People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819 (1986): Defendant’s Right to Alibi Charge

    People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819 (1986)

    A defendant is entitled to an alibi charge when their testimony suggests they were elsewhere when the crime occurred, and the failure to provide such a charge is reversible error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and mandated a new trial for the defendant, who was convicted of stabbing a man to death. The defendant testified he was 11 blocks away at the time of the crime and had only been near the crime scene earlier in the evening. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an alibi charge. The Court of Appeals held that the denial was an error because the defendant’s testimony suggested he was elsewhere, entitling him to an alibi charge. The court also noted that allowing a police officer to testify about arresting the defendant after conferring with the eyewitness was improper bolstering, though not reversible on its own.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of fatally stabbing a man in a parking lot in Manhattan.
    The conviction relied on the testimony of a single eyewitness.
    At trial, the defendant testified that he was 11 blocks away from the crime scene when the stabbing occurred.
    He also stated that earlier that evening, he had walked on 8th Avenue, passing 39th Street (near the crime scene), but was never closer than half a block from the parking lot.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of manslaughter.
    The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alibi charge and in allowing a police officer to testify about arresting him after conferring with the eyewitness.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for an alibi charge, given the defendant’s testimony suggesting he was not present at the crime scene when the crime occurred.
    Whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify that he arrested the defendant after conferring with the eyewitness.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s testimony placed him elsewhere at the time of the crime, entitling him to an alibi charge.
    Yes, because the officer’s testimony constitutes implicit bolstering of the eyewitness’s identification. Although not reversible error on its own, it should be excluded on retrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Barbato, stating that if alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence at the crime scene, the defendant is entitled to have the defense fairly treated. The Court quoted Barbato: “If the proof as to an alibi, when taken into consideration with all the other evidence, raises a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal”. The Court found that the defendant’s testimony that he was 11 blocks away at the time of the stabbing was sufficient to warrant an alibi charge.
    The Court also addressed the police officer’s testimony. While acknowledging that such “implicit bolstering” might not, on its own, warrant reversal, the Court directed that this testimony be excluded in the retrial if a proper objection is made. This highlights the importance of avoiding testimony that improperly strengthens a witness’s credibility before it has been directly challenged.

  • People v. Townsend, 67 N.Y.2d 815 (1986): Premature Jury Instructions on Elements of Crime

    People v. Townsend, 67 N.Y.2d 815 (1986)

    Distributing a written outline of the elements of charged offenses to jurors at the beginning of trial, before the presentation of all evidence and final jury instructions, constitutes reversible error because it invites premature analysis of the evidence.

    Summary

    Townsend was convicted of felony murder. Prior to trial, the court gave jurors written instructions outlining the elements of the charged offenses, encouraging them to refer to the instructions during the trial. The defense argued the defendant’s statements were involuntary and challenged witness credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that providing jurors with a written outline of the elements of the charges at the beginning of trial invited piecemeal, premature analysis of the evidence, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The court reasoned that the jury might conclude the defendant was guilty before the defense had a chance to present its arguments and evidence, particularly concerning voluntariness and credibility, which were not included in the preliminary instructions.

    Facts

    Townsend and a co-defendant were convicted of felony murder for shooting a limousine driver during a robbery.

    Much of the prosecution’s case rested on statements made by Townsend and his co-defendant admitting their participation in the robbery and the shooting.

    The defense argued that these statements were made involuntarily and attacked the credibility of witnesses who claimed to have heard them.

    The trial court gave preliminary instructions that gave the jury an overview of trial procedure and their duties.

    The court read the elements of the crimes charged, including second-degree murder, felony murder, and first-degree robbery. The court also described the elements of the affirmative defense to the felony murder charge at the defendant’s request.

    The court gave each juror written instructions outlining the elements of the charged offenses and the affirmative defense, explaining the written instructions were only an aid to help the jury place the testimony in context.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of felony murder at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by distributing a written outline of the elements of the charged offenses to the jury at the beginning of the trial, prior to the presentation of all evidence and final jury instructions?

    Holding

    No, because by providing the written outline, the court invited piecemeal, premature analysis of the evidence, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the laudable objective of enhancing jury understanding and the desirability of preliminary general instructions, as outlined in CPL 270.40.

    However, the court held that distributing a written outline of the elements of the charges in this case was an error because it invited a premature evaluation of the evidence, which should only occur after the summations and final charge.

    The court reasoned that the outline served as a checklist against which jurors could measure the evidence as it came in, creating a danger that jurors would conclude the defendant was guilty even before he could present his evidence or argument.

    This danger was heightened because the issues of voluntariness and credibility, central to the defense, were not part of the outline.

    The court concluded that this error deprived the defendant of a fair trial and, therefore, could not be considered harmless error, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238.

    The court emphasized the importance of the timing of instructions: “An evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence presented should be made only when the jurors retire to deliberate, after summation by counsel and charge by the court.”

  • People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 424 (1985): Adequacy of Circumstantial Evidence Jury Charge

    People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 424 (1985)

    When a case relies solely on circumstantial evidence, a jury charge is insufficient if it fails to instruct that the facts proved must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

    Summary

    Defendants Ford and Ladson were convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession related to the shooting death of Brian Buchanan. The prosecution’s case was largely circumstantial. Ford requested a jury instruction stating that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The trial court denied this request. The New York Court of Appeals held that failure to include such an instruction in a circumstantial evidence case constitutes reversible error. The court reversed Ford’s conviction but affirmed Ladson’s due to the lack of a preserved objection on his part to the charge as given. The ruling underscores the importance of proper jury instructions when the prosecution’s case is based on circumstantial evidence.

    Facts

    Perry Dillard overheard an argument involving Ford, Ladson, and Buchanan, including threats to shoot Buchanan if he didn’t give up a “box” (later identified as a radio). Dillard then heard a gunshot and saw Ford and Buchanan struggling over the radio. Ladson was also present. Buchanan died from a gunshot wound to the back. Ford told police Buchanan was his friend and seemed upset. Ford and Ladson gave conflicting statements to police. No gun was found.

    Procedural History

    Ford and Ladson were convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed. Ford appealed, arguing the circumstantial evidence charge was deficient. Ladson also appealed, raising evidentiary issues and challenging the circumstantial evidence charge, among other issues.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the circumstantial evidence charge was so inadequate as to constitute reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury that the facts proved must exclude every reasonable inference of innocence.

    2. Whether it was proper to submit lesser included offenses to the jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a circumstantial evidence charge must instruct the jury that the facts proved must exclude every reasonable inference of innocence to ensure the jury understands the complex reasoning process required in such cases. However, this issue was not preserved for Ladson because his attorney failed to object to the charge on this specific ground.

    2. Yes, because CPL 300.50 permits the court to give a lesser included charge for which there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed such an offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a proper circumstantial evidence charge is crucial to guide the jury’s reasoning process. The court stated, “[T]he jury should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The court explained that circumstantial evidence requires careful reasoning, and the instruction serves to prevent the jury from leaping logical gaps and drawing unwarranted conclusions. The court quoted People v. Cleague, stating that “circumstantial evidence is as nothing unless the inferences to be drawn from the circumstances are logically compelling.” Because Ford’s attorney specifically requested the proper charge and then objected when it was not given, the error was preserved for appeal and the conviction was reversed. Ladson’s attorney did not object to the charge, so the issue was not preserved for appeal. Regarding the lesser included offenses, the court found that there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support submitting manslaughter and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon as lesser included offenses.

  • People v. Williams, 69 N.Y.2d 789 (1987): Improper Jury Charge on Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Williams, 69 N.Y.2d 789 (1987)

    A jury charge that suggests a ‘strong inference’ of guilt based on circumstantial evidence, effectively equating a defendant’s actions (e.g., flight) with guilt, supplants the jury’s fact-finding role and constitutes reversible error.

    Summary

    Jerome Williams was convicted of robbery. The prosecution’s case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the claim that Williams was seen fleeing the scene. The trial court instructed the jury that the direct evidence was sufficient to infer logically and strongly that Williams was fleeing the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court’s instruction improperly suggested that flight equated to guilt, thereby invading the jury’s fact-finding province. This improper instruction necessitated a new trial.

    Facts

    Williams was charged with robbing a parking lot attendant. The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence suggesting Williams was at the scene. Police officers allegedly identified Williams on Mt. Hope Avenue shortly after the robbery. The prosecution argued Williams’ presence indicated he was fleeing the scene of the crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Williams of robbery based, in part, on the circumstantial evidence presented. Williams appealed, arguing the jury charge was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Williams then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, specifically suggesting a ‘strong inference’ of guilt based on the defendant’s alleged flight from the scene, constituted reversible error by improperly influencing the jury’s fact-finding role.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s instruction impermissibly suggested that the defendant’s flight equated to guilt, thus supplanting the jury’s fact-finding function, and under the circumstances of this case, constitutes reversible error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the trial court’s role is to instruct the jury on the applicable law, not to direct them towards a particular factual conclusion. By stating that a “strong inference” could be drawn that Williams was fleeing the robbery, the trial court essentially told the jury to equate Williams’ flight with guilt. The Court cited People v. Lewis, 64 NY2d 1031, 1032. The court stated the suggestion “essentially equated defendant’s flight with guilt as to the crimes charged, supplanted the fact-finding function of the jury, and under the circumstances of this case, constitutes reversible error.” The court found that such an instruction usurped the jury’s responsibility to determine the facts and draw their own inferences from the evidence. This was particularly prejudicial because the prosecution’s case was based, in part, on circumstantial evidence. A misstatement of the law regarding circumstantial evidence is more likely to be prejudicial than in cases resting on direct evidence. The Court reversed the order and ordered a new trial to ensure a fair determination of guilt based solely on the jury’s independent assessment of the evidence.

  • People v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 104 (1983): Jury Instruction on Insanity Defense

    58 N.Y.2d 104 (1983)

    When a defendant raises both the defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance, the jury must be clearly instructed on how each defense applies to the charges, and the failure to do so warrants reversal.

    Summary

    Carolyn Evans was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for stabbing Fleeta Evans. At trial, Evans raised the defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance. Psychiatric experts presented conflicting testimony regarding Evans’ mental state. The trial court’s jury instructions were deemed inadequate because they failed to clearly explain how the insanity defense applied to the manslaughter charge and improperly restricted the jury’s consideration of psychiatric testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the jury instructions were erroneous and deprived the defendant of a fair trial, warranting dismissal of the indictment due to the conviction of a lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Carolyn Evans stabbed Fleeta Evans during a street encounter. Prior to the stabbing, the deceased and her friend had accosted the defendant, with one striking her with an umbrella. Evans, who had a history of mental disturbances, went home, retrieved a kitchen knife, and returned to the location. After further words were exchanged, Evans fatally stabbed the deceased.

    Procedural History

    Evans was indicted on a single count of second-degree murder. The trial court agreed to also charge manslaughter in the first degree. The jury found Evans guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Evans appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the insanity defense and its application to the charge of manslaughter in the first degree, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court erroneously related the insanity defense solely to the charge of second-degree murder and the element of intent with respect to intentional manslaughter, failing to clearly instruct the jury on the scope and effect of the insanity defense as a complete defense relieving the defendant of responsibility for her acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s instructions were confusing and misleading. The court specifically instructed the jury that if they found Evans not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, they should then consider whether she was guilty of manslaughter, creating the impression that the insanity defense related only to the murder charge. The instruction on extreme emotional disturbance failed to reference the insanity defense, impermissibly restricting the jury’s consideration of psychiatric testimony. The court noted that the supplementary charge, in response to the jury’s request for further instructions, erroneously used the “understand[ing] right from wrong” language, resembling the discarded McNaghton Rule. The Court emphasized, “The question of defendant’s sanity at the time of the commission of the homicide * * * was the only real issue in the case and the only one on which the jury, as a practical matter, could have any serious discussion. Above all else on this record, the charge on the law concerning the subject should have been clear and unambiguous. Instead, it was contradictory and must have been perplexing and confusing to an attentive juror.” The Court concluded that the failure to adequately and correctly instruct the jury on the scope and effect of the insanity defense deprived Evans of a fair trial, requiring reversal and dismissal of the indictment because Evans was convicted of a lesser included offense.

  • People v. Schwimmer, 479 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1985): Sufficiency of Evidence for Conspiracy Conviction

    People v. Schwimmer, 479 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1985)

    A defendant can be convicted of conspiracy if the prosecution proves the defendant entered into a criminal agreement with at least one other person, even if the indictment alleges conspiracy with multiple individuals and the evidence does not support the agreement amongst all those named.

    Summary

    Schwimmer was convicted of conspiracy to possess stolen bearer bonds. He appealed, arguing a variance between the indictment (conspiracy with Fellouris, Boggs, and Jones) and the trial evidence (conspiracy with Boggs and Jones against Fellouris). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of an agreement with at least one co-conspirator is sufficient for a conspiracy conviction, even if the indictment names others. The court also addressed the alibi defense and jury instructions regarding co-conspirator liability, finding no reversible error.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for conspiring with Fellouris, Boggs, and Jones to possess bearer bonds stolen from the Vakils’ brokerage accounts. The prosecution alleged the defendant conspired to knowingly possess stolen property with the intent to benefit persons other than the rightful owners. At trial, the evidence indicated the defendant conspired with Boggs and Jones to keep the funds from Fellouris, rather than conspiring with Fellouris.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing a variance between the indictment and the evidence presented. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a conviction for conspiracy can stand when the indictment alleges conspiracy with multiple individuals, but the evidence only proves a conspiracy with a subset of those individuals.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to provide an alibi instruction for one of the overt acts listed in the indictment.
    3. Whether the trial court adequately instructed the jury regarding the rule from People v. McGee, which states a defendant cannot be convicted of substantive crimes of co-conspirators solely based on membership in the conspiracy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because conviction for conspiracy requires only proof of a criminal agreement with at least one other person; the indictment’s allegation of conspiracy with multiple individuals does not obligate the People to prove an agreement amongst all those individuals.
    2. No, because there were numerous other acts tending to show that the defendant joined the conspiracy.
    3. Yes, because the court explained that the conspiracy and criminal possession offenses were distinct, and the defendant could only be convicted of criminal possession if all elements of that offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a conspiracy conviction only requires proof that the defendant entered into a criminal agreement with at least one other person. The indictment served its purpose by providing notice to the defendant that he would be tried for agreeing to participate in a plan to criminally possess stolen bonds. Citing People v. Charles, the court emphasized that alleging conspiracy with more than one person does not require the prosecution to prove an agreement among all named conspirators.

    Regarding the alibi defense, the court found no error because there was other evidence linking the defendant to the conspiracy. Quoting People v. Watts, the court implied that an alibi instruction is not required when the prosecution presents other evidence of the defendant’s involvement.

    The court found that although the trial court did not provide a verbatim restatement of the People v. McGee rule, the court sufficiently conveyed that the conspiracy and criminal possession offenses were distinct, requiring separate proof for each. There was no suggestion that the rejected Pinkerton rule should be followed. The court stated, “Notably absent from the charge was any suggestion that the ‘Pinkerton’ rule (see, Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640) rejected in McGee should be followed.”

  • People v. Bell, 67 N.Y.2d 229 (1986): Extent of Evidence Marshaling Required in Jury Instructions

    People v. Bell, 67 N.Y.2d 229 (1986)

    A trial court is not required to marshal evidence in jury instructions except to the extent necessary to explain the application of the law to the facts of the case, and the critical issue on review is whether any deficiency in that respect denied the defendant a fair trial.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding the jury instructions unfair. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals held that while the charge presented problems in explication because of the multiple victims and defendants and the several counts, the charge did not present grounds for reversal. The court fairly and impartially set forth the contentions of the parties, and its references to the defendants’ contentions was nothing more than a statement of their arguments for acquittal and did not purport to alter the burden of proof.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal activity are not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision. The case concerns the propriety of the jury charge, given the presence of multiple defendants, multiple victims, and multiple counts.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed the judgments against the defendants on the law, holding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury denied them a fair trial, finding that the trial court had unfairly marshaled the evidence and inferentially shifted the burden of proof. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter back to the Appellate Division for review of the facts and consideration of any questions not reached on appeal to that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s jury instructions unfairly marshaled the evidence and inferentially shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendants, thus denying them a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the court fairly and impartially set forth the contentions of the parties, and its references to the defendants’ contentions were nothing more than a statement of their arguments for acquittal and did not purport to alter the burden of proof.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the requirements of CPL 300.10, which states that the court must deliver its charge to the jury, state the fundamental legal principles applicable, but need not marshal the evidence except to the extent necessary to explain the application of the law to the facts of the case. The court is also not required to explain all the contentions of the parties or outline all the inconsistencies in the evidence. The Court of Appeals stated that “the critical issue on review is always whether any deficiency by it in that respect denied defendant a fair trial.” The court acknowledged the challenges in formulating a charge given the multiple victims, defendants, and counts involved. However, it concluded that the charge did not present grounds for reversal because it fairly and impartially set forth the contentions of the parties and did not alter the burden of proof. The court reasoned that references to the defendants’ contentions were merely statements of their arguments for acquittal. The court distinguished the case from situations where the charge would be so unbalanced or misleading to warrant reversal. The court stated, “Fairly read, these references did not purport to alter the burden of proof.”

  • People v. Matthews, 50 N.Y.2d 913 (1980): Necessity of Statutory Definitions in Larceny Jury Instructions

    People v. Matthews, 50 N.Y.2d 913 (1980)

    In a larceny case, failure to include statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, when requested, constitutes reversible error, regardless of whether the larcenous intent issue is unique or difficult.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and remitted the case to the Criminal Court. The court held that the trial judge’s failure to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, despite a request to do so, was reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Term’s reasoning that such definitions are only required when a “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue is present. The Court found that omitting these definitions could mislead the jury into believing any withholding, temporary or permanent, constitutes larceny.

    Facts

    The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was observed striking several women in the back of the head. Following this, he allegedly reached out and pulled an earring from a victim. The earring fell to the ground. By the time the defendant was arrested, both the victim and the earring had disappeared from the scene.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried in the Criminal Court, New York County, for attempted larceny. The trial judge did not include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, despite a request for their inclusion. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the statutory definitions were not required because there was no “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue present. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of the trial judge to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” in the jury charge, when requested by the defense, constitutes reversible error in an attempted larceny case.

    Holding

    Yes, because the omission of the statutory definitions could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constitutes larceny.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge’s failure to include the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” (Penal Law § 155.00, subds 3, 4) was reversible error. The court emphasized that there is no requirement for a “unique and difficult” larcenous intent issue to be present before such definitions must be provided to the jury. The court reasoned that without these definitions, the jury could have been misled into believing that any withholding, whether permanent or temporary, would constitute larceny. The court agreed with Justice Sandifer’s dissent in the Appellate Term, quoting that the omission “could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constituted larceny.” This highlights the importance of accurately conveying the legal meaning of key terms to the jury to ensure a fair trial. The court’s decision underscored the necessity of precise jury instructions, especially when dealing with elements of a crime that have specific statutory definitions. This ensures that the jury understands the specific intent required for a larceny conviction, avoiding the potential for convicting a defendant based on conduct that doesn’t meet the statutory requirements. The practical impact of this decision is that trial judges must include statutory definitions of key terms when requested, even if the case does not present particularly complex issues of intent. This provides a clearer framework for the jury to apply the law to the facts.

  • People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984): When a Lesser Included Offense Instruction is Not Required

    63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984)

    A trial court is not required to charge a lesser included offense to the jury if there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Blim was convicted of burglary in the third degree. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the lesser included offense should have been submitted to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The court reasoned that the key witness’s testimony could not be rationally dissected to accept the unlawful entry but reject the intent to commit a crime therein.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant Avery responded to a burglar alarm at the Moose Lodge. He saw two people running, one of whom he recognized as the defendant, Blim. James Lewis, the other individual, was apprehended. Avery found crowbars, a flashlight, and damage to the door, indicating forced entry. Lewis testified that he and Blim entered the lodge with the intent to open the safe and steal money. They left briefly after noticing a flashing red light but returned. Lewis took $12 from a metal box, while Blim went to the room containing the safe. They fled when they saw a Sheriff’s car and were ordered to halt. A barmaid testified that $11 was missing from the metal box. The lodge governor confirmed the money was present a day or two prior and missing after the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Schuyler County Court convicted Blim of burglary in the third degree. Blim appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal trespass in the third degree as a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree.

    Holding

    No, because under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that criminal trespass in the third degree is a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree because burglary requires all the elements of criminal trespass, plus an intent to commit a crime inside the premises. However, a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a “rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime” (citing People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 369-370). The court found no such rational basis here. The testimony of Lewis, the accomplice, established both the unlawful entry and the intent to commit a crime. Discrediting Lewis’s testimony due to his plea bargain would impact his entire testimony, not just the element of intent. The Court stated, “There is no rational basis for rejecting his testimony concerning their intent to commit a crime in the lodge while accepting his testimony with respect to their unlawful entry into the lodge.” Sergeant Avery’s testimony only established Blim’s presence near the lodge, not that he unlawfully entered or remained inside. Thus, the prosecution’s case established either burglary or nothing, making the lesser included offense instruction unnecessary.

  • People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 (1984): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions

    People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 (1984)

    A defendant preserves an objection to a jury charge when the trial court expressly denies a requested charge, and no further explanation is required to avoid waiving the error.

    Summary

    This case concerns the preservation of objections to jury instructions in New York criminal procedure. The defendant requested a specific alibi charge that the People had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the alibi charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant adequately preserved his objection to the jury charge for appellate review. The Court of Appeals held the objection was not preserved because the defendant failed to specifically object to the charge given after it was delivered.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted for attempted robbery and raised an alibi defense, claiming he was not present at the scene of the crime. Prior to the jury charge, the defendant requested a specific instruction stating the People had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge expressly denied the defendant’s request.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the law, finding that the alibi charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant did not properly preserve his objection to the jury charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a claim of error regarding a jury instruction when the defendant’s request for a specific charge is expressly denied, but the defendant fails to object specifically to the charge as given.

    Holding

    No, because to preserve a claim of error for appellate review in New York, a party must make their position known to the court, affording the court an opportunity to correct the error. A general objection is insufficient when the court has already ruled on a specific request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant did not preserve the issue for appellate review. While the defendant initially requested a specific alibi charge, after the judge gave the jury charge, the defense counsel only made a general objection, stating he was renewing previously mentioned requests. The Court of Appeals stated, “To hold that the general objection sufficed to preserve the error would be to undermine the policy considerations which prompted the enactment of CPL 470.05 (subd 2), namely, to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct claimed error at a time when it could do so, without necessarily aborting the trial and without subjecting the People to the necessity of a new trial.”

    The dissent, authored by Chief Judge Cooke, argued that the defendant’s request for a specific charge, which was expressly denied, was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The dissent cited CPL 470.05 (subd 2), which states that a party who has unsuccessfully requested a particular ruling is deemed to have protested the court’s ultimate disposition, regardless of whether any actual protest was registered. The dissent maintained that once a request to charge is denied, no further objection is necessary, as the judge is on notice that the defendant views any deviation from the requested charge as error. The dissent reasoned that the majority was carrying the concept of preservation too far and emphasized the importance of ensuring that the jury is properly instructed on the applicable law.