New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Instructions

  • People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.3d 530 (2006): Judicial Duty to Control Jury Trial Proceedings

    6 N.Y.3d 530 (2006)

    A defendant is deprived of the right to a fair trial when the presiding judge abdicates control over critical aspects of the jury trial process, particularly jury selection and instructions, requiring the prosecutor to improperly assume those responsibilities.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault and endangering the welfare of an incompetent person. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court order affirming the conviction and ordered a new trial. The Court found the town justice presiding over the trial was unfamiliar with jury trial mechanics and repeatedly ceded control to the prosecutor regarding jury selection, preliminary and final instructions, and managing jury deliberations. This abdication of judicial responsibility deprived the defendant of a fair trial, necessitating a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and endangering the welfare of an incompetent person after a jury trial presided over by a town justice.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The County Court affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was deprived of her right to a fair trial when the presiding judge demonstrated unfamiliarity with jury trial mechanics and relinquished control over critical aspects of the proceedings to the prosecutor.

    Holding

    Yes, because the judge’s lack of control over jury selection, instructions, and management of deliberations, with the prosecutor stepping in to fill the void, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the town justice demonstrated a profound unfamiliarity with the proper procedures for conducting a jury trial. Specifically, the judge:

    1. Attempted to seat a jury before voir dire.
    2. Failed to elicit basic information from prospective jurors.
    3. Issued an oath to the jurors that did not comply with statutory requirements.
    4. Required the prosecutor to correct and guide him during preliminary and final jury instructions.
    5. Allowed the prosecutor to instruct the jury on the correct procedure for requesting evidence during deliberations.

    The Court relied on precedent establishing that a judge must maintain control over jury selection (citing People v. Toliver, 89 NY2d 843, 844 [1996]) and jury deliberations (citing People v. Bayes, 78 NY2d 546, 551 [1991]). By ceding control to the prosecutor in these critical areas, the judge failed to satisfy his obligation to ensure the integrity of the proceedings. The court stated the judge “relinquish[ed] control” over the jury selection process.

    The court also emphasized the impropriety of the prosecutor “assum[ing] the important function of maintaining control of jury deliberations.” The cumulative effect of these errors was so prejudicial that it warranted a new trial.

  • People v. Collins, 99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002): Instructions on Verdict Sheet Do Not Violate Right to be Present

    99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002)

    A trial court’s instruction to a jury on a verdict sheet regarding the order in which submitted charges should be considered does not violate a defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, even if the instruction is not also delivered orally.

    Summary

    Collins was convicted of burglary and related charges. At trial, the court initially failed to instruct the jury to consider burglary in the third degree only if they acquitted him of burglary in the second degree. After the jury retired, the court, at defense counsel’s request and in the defendant’s presence, agreed to add language to the verdict sheet instructing the jury to consider the counts in the alternative. The defendant then left the room, and the specific language was decided upon in his absence. The Court of Appeals held that providing this instruction on the verdict sheet, as authorized by CPL 310.20, did not violate the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial, nor did it constitute a mode of proceedings error excusing the lack of preservation.

    Facts

    Collins was charged with burglary in the second and third degrees, criminal possession of stolen property, criminal trespass, and petit larceny, stemming from entering the victim’s apartment. The second-degree burglary count involved knowingly entering and remaining unlawfully with intent to commit a crime, while the third-degree count involved breaking into the building with the same intent. After the jury retired to deliberate, the defense requested the verdict sheet direct them to consider the burglary counts in the alternative. Collins then left the courtroom temporarily.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Collins on multiple counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Collins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the manner in which the jury was instructed constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal, despite the lack of a timely objection.

    Issue(s)

    Whether instructing the jury through a verdict sheet, outside the defendant’s presence, to consider burglary charges in the alternative constitutes a mode of proceedings error that violates the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal despite the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    No, because the written communication was authorized under CPL 310.20 and did not violate the defendant’s right to be present under CPL 310.30. Failure to object to the lack of supplemental oral instruction is fatal to the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has the right to be present during instructions to the jury on fundamental legal principles, not every communication requires the jury to be recalled or the defendant to be present. CPL 310.20(2) authorizes a court to provide a written list of offenses and possible verdicts to the jury. Citing People v. Cole, the Court stated that a trial court may include on a verdict sheet “a direction regarding the order in which the submitted charges should be considered”. Because the instruction was authorized by statute, its submission on the verdict sheet outside the defendant’s presence was permissible. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving substantive irregularities in jury instructions where preservation is not required. The Court noted that the defendant was present when his counsel requested the alternative instruction, and his subsequent absence for the drafting of the instruction involved only a ministerial act and a purely legal argument. As such, his presence was not required.

  • People v. Yates, 98 N.Y.2d 462 (2002): Mandatory “Acquit-First” Jury Instruction in New York Criminal Cases

    People v. Yates, 98 N.Y.2d 462 (2002)

    In New York, when a court submits multiple offenses in the alternative to a jury, it must instruct the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense before considering any lesser-included offense; failure to provide this “acquit-first” instruction constitutes reversible error, barring retrial on the greater offense due to double jeopardy principles.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter for the strangulation death of his girlfriend. At trial, the judge also submitted second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide as lesser included offenses, but refused the prosecution’s request for an “acquit-first” instruction as mandated by People v. Boettcher. The jury convicted Defendant of criminally negligent homicide, implying acquittal on the higher charges. The People sought retrial on the manslaughter charge, arguing the jury instructions violated Boettcher. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision that the trial court’s failure to provide the “acquit-first” instruction barred retrial on the manslaughter charge, emphasizing the mandatory nature of the Boettcher rule.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for the strangulation death of his girlfriend. Initially, he denied involvement, but later admitted to choking her, claiming it was an accident while he was drunk and trying to quiet her. At trial, the prosecution argued that Defendant intentionally caused serious injury and showed depraved indifference to her life. The defense maintained it was accidental.

    Procedural History

    The trial court submitted second-degree murder, first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide to the jury. The prosecution requested a Boettcher “acquit-first” instruction, which the trial court denied. After the jury convicted Defendant of criminally negligent homicide, the People moved for retrial on the manslaughter charge, which was denied. The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s Article 78 proceeding but stated the trial court erred in refusing the Boettcher instruction. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that double jeopardy barred retrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with the “acquit-first” format as required by People v. Boettcher when submitting multiple offenses in the alternative.

    2. Whether a conviction for criminally negligent homicide bars retrial on a greater charge of first-degree manslaughter when the “acquit-first” instruction was not given.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Boettcher “acquit-first” instruction is mandatory under New York law when submitting multiple offenses in the alternative.

    2. Yes, because under CPL 300.50(4), a conviction on a lesser-included offense is deemed an acquittal of every greater offense submitted, barring retrial on the greater offense due to double jeopardy principles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the mandatory nature of the “acquit-first” instruction established in People v. Boettcher. The court explained that CPL 300.50(4) deems a conviction on a lesser-included offense as an acquittal on the greater offense. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to provide the Boettcher instruction had significant consequences, preventing a retrial on the first-degree manslaughter charge. The court rejected the argument that criminally negligent homicide was not a lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter, citing precedent. The Court stated, “[w]henever the court submits two or more offenses in the alternative pursuant to this section, it must instruct the jury that it may render a verdict of guilty with respect to any one of such offenses, depending upon its findings of fact, but that it may not render a verdict of guilty with respect to more than one. A verdict of guilty of any such offense is not deemed an acquittal of any lesser offense submitted, but is deemed an acquittal of every greater offense submitted.” The court declined to overrule prior case law to cure the trial court’s error, indicating that the failure to follow established precedent had resulted in a non-remediable situation. The decision underscores the importance of strictly adhering to the Boettcher rule to avoid jeopardizing the prosecution’s ability to retry a defendant on more serious charges.

  • Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999): Admissibility of Physician’s Desk Reference and Jury Charges in Medical Malpractice

    Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999)

    The Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is generally inadmissible as direct evidence of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, and jury charges must be tailored to the specific facts and issues presented at trial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of the PDR as evidence of the standard of care in a medical malpractice case and the necessity of specific jury charges. The plaintiff, Spensieri, sued Dr. Lasky for prescribing Estinyl, alleging negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the PDR is not, on its own, admissible as evidence of the standard of care. The court also addressed the importance of tailored jury instructions, emphasizing that while a generalized malpractice charge may suffice, specific facts may require a charge focusing on the standard of care in prescribing medications. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court’s order due to the plaintiff’s failure to properly preserve objections to the jury charge.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Spensieri, brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Lasky, alleging negligence in prescribing Estinyl (estrogen medication). The plaintiff attempted to introduce the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) as evidence of the standard of care. The plaintiff also requested a specific jury charge concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to introduce the PDR as evidence. The specific jury charge requested by the plaintiff was not given in the form requested. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Dr. Lasky. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the exclusion of the PDR and the failure to give the requested jury charge were errors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is admissible as evidence to establish the standard of care in a medical malpractice action.
    2. Whether the jury charge given adequately addressed the applicable standard of care for prescribing medication, given the facts of the case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the PDR, by itself, does not establish the standard of care.
    2. Yes, in this specific case, because the plaintiff did not properly preserve their objections to the jury charge for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the PDR is not a substitute for expert testimony in establishing the standard of care. While the PDR may contain information relevant to a physician’s knowledge, it does not, on its own, dictate the standard of care. Regarding the jury charge, the court acknowledged that a tailored charge might be necessary depending on the specific facts, particularly concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications. However, because the plaintiff’s request for a specific charge was bundled with inappropriate requests and the plaintiff failed to properly redact or clarify their request, the court found no reversible error. As Judge Smith stated in his concurrence, “The trial court’s instructions ‘should state the law as applicable to the particular facts in issue in the case at bar, which the evidence in the case tends to prove; mere abstract propositions of law applicable to any case, or mere statements of law in general terms, even though correct, should not be given unless they are made applicable to the issues in the case at bar’ ” citing Green v Downs, 27 NY2d 205, 208. The court emphasized that specific requests to change the charge are necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.

  • People v. Roman, 97 N.Y.2d 770 (2002): Jury Instructions and the Presumption of Innocence

    People v. Roman, 97 N.Y.2d 770 (2002)

    While it is generally proper to instruct a jury that an indictment is not evidence, the omission of such an instruction is not reversible error if the jury instructions, viewed in their entirety, adequately convey that the verdict must be based solely on the evidence and that the defendant is protected by the presumption of innocence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of robbery, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a firearm. The appeal centered on the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that “the indictment is not evidence of anything.” The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the omission, while not ideal, did not constitute reversible error. The Court reasoned that the overall jury instructions adequately emphasized that the verdict must be based on the evidence presented and that the defendant was protected by the presumption of innocence, thus ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a firearm, leading to a trial. During jury selection, the trial court initially instructed the potential jurors that the indictment was not evidence. However, this specific instruction was omitted from the final charge to the jury at the close of the trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a Judge of that Court, focusing on the alleged error of omitting the instruction that the indictment is not evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the indictment is not evidence of anything constitutes reversible error, given the other instructions provided to the jury.

    Holding

    No, because considering the jury instructions in their entirety, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. The court’s charge sufficiently emphasized that the jury’s verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented and that the defendant was protected by the presumption of innocence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while it is proper to instruct the jury that the indictment is not evidence, its omission here did not warrant reversal. The Court emphasized that jury instructions must be considered in their totality. In this case, the trial court gave “ample emphasis in the final jury charge that the jury’s verdict must be based on an assessment only of the evidence…and that the defendant was always protected by the presumption of innocence.” The court distinguished this case from Carter v. Kentucky and Taylor v. Kentucky, as well as People v. Newman, where more fundamental errors occurred, such as failing to instruct the jury on the prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court found that the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately protected the defendant’s rights. The court essentially found that the absence of one specific instruction did not negate the effectiveness of the instructions given which emphasized the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof based on presented evidence.

  • People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999): Addressing Spillover Errors and Brady Violations in Criminal Convictions

    People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999)

    When an error affects some counts in a multi-count indictment, the remaining counts are reversed only if there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the jury’s verdict on those counts in a meaningful way; the prosecution is not required to disclose information that the defendant knew or should have known.

    Summary

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was convicted on multiple counts related to the illegal sale of controlled substances. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that good faith was irrelevant for four counts concerning lorazepam 2.5 mg. The Appellate Division vacated these counts, but Doshi argued this error tainted the remaining convictions. The Court of Appeals held that the error did not warrant reversal of the remaining counts because the jury was properly instructed on the element of good faith for those charges, and the jury acquitted on other counts. The Court also found no Brady violation, as Doshi knew of the Medicaid records he claimed were improperly withheld.

    Facts

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was accused of illegally selling controlled substances and prescriptions. Sara Cordova, a former addict and police informant, testified that she purchased drugs from Doshi for resale, and that Doshi was aware of this. Thomas Creelman, an undercover agent, also purchased drugs from Doshi. Doshi claimed he acted in good faith as a psychiatrist. He was convicted on multiple counts, but the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that “good faith” was irrelevant for counts related to lorazepam 2.5 mg.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Doshi. Doshi moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a Brady violation. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate but reversed four counts relating to lorazepam 2.5 mg. Doshi appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on four counts of the indictment had a prejudicial “spillover effect” on the remaining counts, requiring reversal of those convictions.

    2. Whether the People’s failure to turn over certain Medicaid records constituted a violation of the People’s disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland.

    Holding

    1. No, because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial judge’s erroneous charge influenced the jury’s decision to convict on the remaining counts.

    2. No, because Brady does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The Court applied the standard from People v. Baghai-Kermani, focusing on whether there was a “reasonable possibility” that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its guilty verdict on the remaining counts in a “meaningful way.” The Court found the tainted counts distinguishable because the jury was specifically instructed that “good faith” was irrelevant for the lorazepam 2.5 mg counts, while the remaining counts required a showing of absence of “good faith.” The Court also noted the jury acquitted Doshi on five other counts, demonstrating they were capable of distinguishing between the charges.

    2. The Court stated that the Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence to defendants but does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature. The billing statements were generated by Doshi himself when he submitted claims to Medicaid. The Court found that Doshi knew of the Medicaid payment records because he billed Medicaid and received payment, thus, the People had no obligation to disclose them. As stated in the opinion, “the existence of the Medicaid payment records was necessarily known to defendant by virtue of his having billed Medicaid and received payment.”

  • People v. Hues, 92 N.Y.2d 413 (1998): Discretion to Allow Juror Note-Taking

    People v. Hues, 92 N.Y.2d 413 (1998)

    Trial courts have the discretion to allow jurors to take notes during a trial, provided they give appropriate cautionary instructions to mitigate potential risks.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether juror note-taking is permissible during a trial. The court held that it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow note-taking, provided the court gives cautionary instructions. This decision updates the common-law rule prohibiting juror note-taking, which stemmed from high illiteracy rates. The Court of Appeals emphasized the benefits of note-taking in complex trials while acknowledging potential dangers, such as undue influence from the juror with the best notes. The court found that the trial court’s cautionary instructions were sufficient, and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    Resean Hues was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance after selling cocaine to an undercover officer. Prior to the trial, the court informed counsel it would allow jurors to take notes, cautioning them on the practice’s use. The defense attorney objected, requesting the court prohibit note-taking during the trial and jury charge. The court denied the request, instructing the jury that note-taking was neither encouraged nor discouraged and that notes were only to refresh memory, not to persuade other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The County Court convicted Hues. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to allow juror note-taking with adequate cautionary instructions. Hues appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of a fair trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court abuses its discretion and deprives a defendant of a fair trial by permitting jurors to take notes during testimony and the court’s charge, even with cautionary instructions.

    Holding

    No, because a trial court has the discretion to permit note-taking by jurors during a trial, and the trial court provided sufficient cautionary instructions to mitigate any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the common-law prohibition on juror note-taking was outdated due to increased literacy and the complexity of modern trials. The court recognized that “note-taking can serve as a legitimate aid in absorbing and synthesizing information, as well as refreshing memory.” While acknowledging the potential for jurors with better notes to unduly influence others, the court stated that “With appropriate direction from the court, potential abuses arising from note-taking can be abated.” The court emphasized the importance of cautionary instructions, including that jurors should not allow note-taking to become a distraction, notes are not superior to independent recollection, jurors who do not take notes should rely on their own recollection, notes are for personal use only, and the official record prevails over any juror’s notes. The court found that the trial court’s instructions were adequate and that there was no material difference between the court giving instructions sua sponte and the jury requesting such instructions. The court also referenced People v. Tucker, stating that note-taking during the court’s charge is permissible if the court instructs the jury that disagreements require a readback of the charge.

  • People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996): Preserving Jury Instruction Error for Appeal

    People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996)

    To preserve for appellate review a claim that the trial court erred in failing to give an interested witness instruction, the defendant must specify on the record the particular witness for whom the instruction was requested.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing his request for an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to specify which witness the instruction should apply to. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a defendant generally need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction, under these circumstances, the failure to specify the witness waived the issue.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the issue was unpreserved. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must specify the particular witness for whom an interested witness instruction is requested to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s failure to specify to the trial court on the record the particular witness for which the instruction was requested, although given an opportunity to do so, renders the defendant’s claim of error unreviewable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court acknowledged the general rule that a defendant need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction to preserve an objection. However, the Court distinguished this case, emphasizing that the defendant was given an opportunity to specify the witness in question but failed to do so. The court reasoned that without this specification, the trial court could not properly evaluate the request and, therefore, the error was not preserved for appellate review. The court cited CPL 470.05[2] in support of the preservation requirement. The court differentiated the facts from cases such as People v. Karabinas, 63 NY2d 871, where preservation was found despite a lack of perfect specificity.

  • People v. Bond, 90 N.Y.2d 877 (1997): Justification Defense Requires Reasonable Belief of Imminent Threat to Defendant

    90 N.Y.2d 877 (1997)

    A defendant’s claim of justification (self-defense) requires a reasonable belief that the purported victim was about to use deadly physical force against the defendant; an objection to the jury instruction must be specific to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Summary

    Richard Bond was convicted of second-degree murder and related charges after firing a rifle at a group of people, resulting in the death of an innocent bystander. Bond claimed he acted in self-defense because he believed individuals in the group were about to draw weapons. The trial court instructed the jury on the justification defense. Bond appealed, arguing that the instruction was erroneous because it implied the justification defense only applied if Bond reasonably believed the bystander was about to use deadly force against him. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Bond’s general objection to the jury instruction was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that his sentencing claim lacked merit. The court’s decision emphasizes the need for specific objections to jury instructions to preserve appellate review.

    Facts

    Richard Bond fired a rifle at a group of people standing in front of a grocery store.

    A stray bullet fatally injured Lloyd Pearsol, an innocent bystander inside the store.

    Bond claimed he fired the rifle because he believed individuals in the group outside the store were gesturing as if to draw their weapons.

    The trial court charged the jury on the defense of justification at the request of both sides.

    Procedural History

    Bond was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree reckless endangerment, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

    Following a jury trial, Bond was convicted.

    Bond appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction.

    Bond appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bond’s general objection to the trial court’s justification instruction was sufficient to preserve his appellate claim that the instruction was erroneous.

    Holding

    No, because defense counsel’s brief objection at trial to the court’s justification instruction was not sufficient to preserve defendant’s present appellate claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Bond’s objection at trial was too general to preserve the specific argument he raised on appeal regarding the justification defense. The court emphasized that a specific objection is necessary to bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention and allow for correction. Because Bond failed to specifically object to the instruction on the ground that it improperly focused on the bystander’s (Pearsol’s) actions rather than the actions of those Bond claimed to be acting in self-defense against, the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. The court also summarily dismissed Bond’s challenge to his consecutive sentences as meritless.

  • People v. Slacks, 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996): Jury Instructions and Burden of Proof

    225 A.D.2d 805, 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996)

    A trial court’s instruction to the jury that a trial is “a search for the truth” does not necessarily undermine the proper burden of proof when viewed in the context of the jury instructions in their entirety.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of felony murder, robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s jury instructions were flawed, specifically the instruction that the trial was a “search for the truth” and the refusal to instruct that mere presence at the scene is insufficient for criminal liability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the “search for the truth” instruction, when viewed in context, did not undermine the burden of proof. The court also found no error in refusing the mere presence instruction, as no reasonable view of the evidence supported it, and the court properly instructed on accessorial liability.

    Facts

    The defendant, along with unapprehended individuals, robbed two men in a parked car. During the robbery, one of the men in the car was fatally shot. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted of felony murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. At trial, the defendant objected to the court’s jury instructions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court’s jury instructions warranted reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the trial was “a search for the truth” undermined the People’s burden of proof.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to establish criminal liability.

    Holding

    1. No, because reviewing the statement in the context of the jury instructions in their entirety, there is no basis for concluding that the proper burden of proof upon the People was undermined or less than adequately conveyed.

    2. No, because under the circumstances of this case, no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge, and the court properly instructed on accessorial liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the “search for the truth” instruction, the Court of Appeals relied on People v. Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817, 819, stating that when viewed in the context of the entire jury instruction, the instruction did not undermine the burden of proof. The Court also noted that the defendant’s claim relating to the cumulative effect of the “search for the truth” instruction was unpreserved for review because no objection was raised before the trial court on that specific ground.

    Regarding the refusal to instruct on mere presence, the Court reasoned that no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge. The court emphasized that the defendant’s concern about potential guilt based solely on presence was mitigated by the court’s recitation of Penal Law § 20.00, which included the requirement of acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime charged. The court stated that “acting in concert liability requires acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime charged.”