New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Instructions

  • People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017): Permissible Supplemental Jury Instructions Regarding Unanimity After a Defective Verdict

    People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017)

    A trial court’s supplemental instruction to a jury after it returns a non-unanimous verdict, directing the jury to resume deliberations, is permissible as long as it does not coerce the jury to reach a specific verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a supplemental instruction, given by the trial court after the jury announced a verdict that was not unanimous, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the trial judge’s instruction, which informed the jury that their verdict must be unanimous and directed them to resume deliberations, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the instruction did not pressure the jury to reach a specific verdict and that, because the jury deliberated for a full day after the instruction, it was not unduly coercive. The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s refusal to read back the defense counsel’s summation, finding the issue unpreserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder and other crimes. During deliberations, the jury indicated that it was deadlocked. After further instruction, the jury announced it had reached a verdict: guilty on some counts, not guilty on others. However, the subsequent polling of the jurors revealed that the verdict was not unanimous. The trial court then instructed the jurors to resume deliberations to reach a unanimous verdict. The jury deliberated for another day and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on some counts. The defendant argued that the supplemental instruction was coercive and deprived him of a fair trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the initial non-unanimous verdict and gave a supplemental instruction. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s supplemental instruction, after the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to rehear defense counsel’s summation during deliberations.

    Holding

    1. No, because the instruction was not coercive and did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. No, because the issue was not properly preserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Criminal Procedure Law § 310.80, which mandates that if the jury’s verdict is not unanimous, the court must direct the jury to resume deliberations. The court cited People v. Aponte and People v. Pagan to distinguish between permissible and impermissible supplemental jury instructions. The court held that the trial court’s instruction in this case was proper because it did not pressure the jury to reach a particular verdict and it left open the possibility of principled disagreement among the jurors. The court noted that the instruction was not coercive, because it did not overemphasize the need to return a verdict, nor did it suggest the jury was failing in its duty. The absence of “cautionary language” was not considered fatal to the supplemental charge because such language had already been given to the jury two hours earlier.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the permissible scope of supplemental instructions when a jury returns a non-unanimous verdict. Attorneys must be aware of the fine line between encouraging a jury to reach a verdict and coercing them. The court’s holding underscores that a supplemental instruction is permissible if it simply reminds the jury of the unanimity requirement and directs them to continue deliberations. The case also suggests that the content of prior instructions can be considered when evaluating the propriety of supplemental instructions. Moreover, the fact that the jury deliberated for a significant period after the instruction suggests that the court can avoid claims of coercion if the jury deliberates for a substantial amount of time after the instruction is given. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when assessing the impact of supplemental instructions on the jury’s deliberations.

  • People v. Wesley, 24 N.Y.3d 170 (2014): Initial Aggressor Rule in Defense of Others – Intervenor’s Perspective

    24 N.Y.3d 170 (2014)

    When a defendant intervenes in an ongoing struggle to protect a third party, the initial aggressor rule should be applied to the initial conflict, not to the defendant’s actions, to avoid confusion about the justification defense.

    Summary

    In People v. Wesley, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of the “initial aggressor” rule within the justification defense when a defendant intervenes to defend a third party. The court found that the standard jury instruction on the initial aggressor exception was misleading because it failed to clarify that the initial aggressor determination should pertain to the initial conflict, not to the defendant’s actions in intervening. The defendant arrived on the scene of an ongoing fight to assist his brother and girlfriend. He argued that the court should have clarified that he was not the initial aggressor because he was not involved in the initial conflict between the victim and his brother and girlfriend. The court agreed, holding that the jury instruction was confusing and, without the supplemental instruction, the initial aggressor rule was not applicable.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree murder after he stabbed and killed the victim, who was fighting with the defendant’s brother and girlfriend. The defendant arrived on the scene after the fight began and intervened, claiming he acted in self-defense. The defendant testified that he intervened to stop the victim from harming his brother, who was being beaten with a hammer. The trial court gave a jury instruction on the initial aggressor rule as part of the justification defense, but the court denied defendant’s request to omit the initial aggressor rule from the instructions. The prosecutor argued that the defendant was acting in concert with his brother and girlfriend and therefore was an initial aggressor.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the initial aggressor rule without providing a supplemental instruction explaining its application to the defendant’s intervention in an existing fight to protect a third party.

    Holding

    Yes, because the standard initial aggressor instruction was confusing and misleading when applied to the defendant’s actions in defending another, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and dismissed the indictment, with leave for the People to resubmit the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s jury instruction was confusing. The court observed that the initial aggressor rule is not available if the defendant initiated the conflict. However, when an intervenor steps into an ongoing fight to protect a third party, the initial aggressor determination should refer to the original conflict, not the intervenor’s actions. The court cited People v. Melendez, where the court held that the initial aggressor instruction can be confusing and misleading, especially if the intervenor comes into contact with a third party already struggling with another person. The court emphasized that the jury should have been instructed that the initial aggressor rule means that if the defendant somehow initiated or participated in the initiation of the original struggle, or reasonably should have known that the person being defended initiated the original conflict, then justification is not a defense. The court found that failure to provide such clarification created a great likelihood of jury confusion. “If [defendant] had nothing to do with [the] original conflict and had no reason to know who initiated the first conflict, then the defense is available.”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies how the initial aggressor rule should be applied when a defendant intervenes to defend a third party. Attorneys should ensure that jury instructions clearly distinguish between the initial conflict and the defendant’s intervention. Defense attorneys should request supplemental instructions explaining that the initial aggressor determination refers to the original conflict. Prosecutors must be prepared to demonstrate the defendant’s involvement or knowledge of the initial conflict. This case highlights the importance of tailoring jury instructions to the specific facts of a case to avoid jury confusion. It reinforces the principle that a person defending another may have a valid justification defense even if the person being defended was the initial aggressor in the prior conflict, provided that the defendant was not involved in the initiation of the original fight and did not have any knowledge of who initiated the fight.

  • People v. Lovett, 25 N.Y.3d 1095 (2015): Appealability and Jury Instruction Errors in Criminal Cases

    25 N.Y.3d 1095 (2015)

    An appellate court’s jurisdiction is determined by statute, and consolidation of appeals by the Appellate Division does not expand the scope of the Court of Appeals’ review of non-appealable orders.

    Summary

    In People v. Lovett, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the appealability of an order denying resentencing under the 2004 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) and the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel related to jury instructions. The defendant was convicted of drug possession and reckless endangerment and sought resentencing, which was denied. The Court held that the denial of resentencing was not appealable, and that the attorney’s failure to object to jury instructions did not constitute ineffective assistance. The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction is statutorily defined and that consolidation of appeals by the Appellate Division does not broaden the Court’s ability to review non-appealable orders. The Court also found that the jury instruction error, if any, was not so obvious that a reasonable lawyer would have objected.

    Facts

    Cleveland Lovett was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and first-degree reckless endangerment following a high-speed car chase on May 29, 2003. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 27 1/3 years to life on August 19, 2003. Lovett filed a motion to vacate the judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the attorney’s failure to object to portions of the final jury charge. He also applied for resentencing under the 2004 DLRA. The Supreme Court denied both motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and the orders denying both post-judgment motions; one Justice dissented and granted Lovett permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Lovett was convicted and sentenced in the Supreme Court. He moved to vacate the judgment and for resentencing, both of which were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decisions, with one Justice dissenting. The dissenting Justice granted Lovett leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an Appellate Division order affirming the denial of a resentencing application under the 2004 DLRA, despite the Appellate Division’s consolidation of this order with other appealable orders.
    2. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to alleged errors in the jury instructions.

    Holding

    1. No, because no statutory provision authorizes an appeal from an Appellate Division order affirming the denial of a resentencing application under the 2004 DLRA.
    2. No, because the error in the court’s jury instructions, if any, was not so obvious that any reasonable lawyer would have objected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reiterated that its appellate jurisdiction is strictly defined by statute. The Court cited People v. Bautista, which held that there is no right to appeal a denial of resentencing under the 2005 DLRA. The Court found the 2004 DLRA contained similar language regarding appeals. Thus, the Court could not hear an appeal from the Appellate Division’s affirmation of the denial of resentencing. The Court explained that while the Appellate Division has inherent authority to consolidate appeals, this does not alter the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction. The Court also addressed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Given the precedent existing at the time of trial, the Court determined that the failure to object to the jury instructions was not unreasonable. The Court noted that the instructions would not have warranted an objection from a reasonable attorney.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on appeal. Attorneys need to carefully analyze whether an order is statutorily appealable before seeking review by the Court of Appeals. It also demonstrates that the Appellate Division’s procedural actions, like consolidating appeals, cannot expand the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction. Furthermore, this case provides guidance on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, emphasizing the importance of considering the legal landscape at the time of the alleged error. If an attorney’s actions fall within a reasonable range of professional conduct given existing precedent, it is unlikely to constitute ineffective assistance. The case also highlights the importance of preserving issues for appeal; claims raised for the first time on appeal are unpreserved for review.

  • People v. DeLee, 24 N.Y.3d 603 (2014): Repugnant Verdicts and the Remedy of Retrial

    People v. DeLee, 24 N.Y.3d 603 (2014)

    When a jury renders a repugnant verdict by convicting a defendant of a crime containing all the elements of another crime for which the defendant was acquitted, the prosecution may retry the defendant on the repugnant charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime but acquitted of first-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals held that the verdict was repugnant because the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the People could resubmit the charge of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime to a new grand jury, rather than dismissing the charge altogether. This decision clarifies the remedy for repugnant verdicts in New York, allowing for retrial on the repugnant charge rather than automatic dismissal, balancing the need to avoid convictions where the jury found an element lacking with the jury’s prerogative to show leniency.

    Facts

    Dwight DeLee was indicted for second-degree murder as a hate crime, second-degree murder, and third-degree criminal weapon possession. At trial, the jury convicted him of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and weapon possession, but acquitted him of first-degree manslaughter. Defense counsel argued that the verdict was inconsistent, but the trial judge initially dismissed the jury. The judge later recalled the jury to confirm their acquittal on second-degree manslaughter before finally dismissing them.

    Procedural History

    Prior to sentencing, DeLee moved to set aside the verdict as repugnant, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and dismissing that count. The Appellate Division reasoned that the acquittal of first-degree manslaughter meant the jury found at least one element of that crime unproven, making the hate crime conviction logically inconsistent. The dissenting Justice argued the verdict was not repugnant. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the dissenting Justice.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury verdict convicting a defendant of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, while acquitting him of first-degree manslaughter, is repugnant.

    Whether the remedy for a repugnant verdict is dismissal of the repugnant conviction or whether the People may resubmit the charge to a new grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because all of the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, making the verdict inconsistent.

    The People may resubmit the charge of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime to a new grand jury because there is no constitutional or statutory provision that mandates dismissal for a repugnancy error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the established principles of People v. Tucker and People v. Muhammad, stating that a verdict is repugnant when it is legally impossible for the jury to have convicted on one count but not the other. The court emphasized that repugnancy depends on the jury’s instructions and the essential elements of the crimes charged, not on the evidence presented at trial. The court reasoned that in this case, the jury’s acquittal of first-degree manslaughter necessarily meant that they found at least one element of that crime unproven, which is inconsistent with the conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, which requires all the elements of the former. The court stated, “All of the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime. Thus, to find the defendant not guilty of first-degree manslaughter necessarily means that at least one of the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding the remedy, the Court acknowledged its prior statement in Muhammad that the remedy for a repugnant verdict was dismissal of the repugnant conviction. However, the court clarified that this statement was dictum and that there is no constitutional or statutory provision mandating dismissal. The Court reasoned that allowing a retrial on the repugnant charge strikes a reasonable balance because a reviewing court can never know the reason for the repugnancy and because juries may freely reject evidence and exercise its mercy function. The court cautioned trial courts that when “a trial court finds that an announced verdict is repugnant, it may explain the inconsistency to the jurors and direct them to reconsider their decision”.

  • People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 112 (2014): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

    23 N.Y.3d 112 (2014)

    A trial court is not required to submit a charge of reckless manslaughter (second-degree) as a lesser included offense of intentional homicide (e.g., second-degree murder) unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant acted recklessly, meaning the record doesn’t automatically require a reckless manslaughter charge even if it doesn’t completely exclude the possibility of recklessness.

    Summary

    Enrique Rivera was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for the stabbing death of Edgar Ojeda in a bar. Rivera argued the trial court erred by not submitting second-degree manslaughter (reckless manslaughter) to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that Rivera acted recklessly. The court emphasized that the nature of the victim’s wounds and the defendant’s own statements indicated an intent to cause serious physical injury, precluding a finding of mere recklessness. The court reiterated that a lesser included offense instruction is only required when there is a rational basis for the jury to reject evidence establishing the greater crime while accepting evidence of the lesser crime.

    Facts

    Rivera and Ojeda were both at a Brooklyn bar. Rivera approached Ojeda, and after a brief verbal exchange, Rivera stabbed Ojeda multiple times. Eyewitnesses saw Rivera strike or push Ojeda in the chest. Ojeda died from a stab wound to the chest that pierced his lung and a rib. Rivera initially told police he swung a knife at the crowd in self-defense but didn’t know if he had hurt anyone. At trial, Rivera testified that he did not bring the knife and did not stab Ojeda.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was charged with second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, he requested that the court also submit charges of second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court refused to submit second-degree manslaughter to the jury. The jury acquitted Rivera of murder but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit a charge of second-degree manslaughter to the jury as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder.

    Holding

    No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that Rivera acted recklessly rather than intentionally causing serious physical injury, as required for first-degree manslaughter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test for determining whether a lesser included offense should be charged: (1) the crime must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court acknowledged that second-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. However, the Court found that Rivera failed to satisfy the second prong because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to suggest recklessness. The court considered the forensic pathologist’s testimony that the wounds were stab wounds, not the result of merely “waving” a knife. Further, the court noted the depth and location of the wounds, which indicated an intent to cause at least serious physical injury. The Court rejected Rivera’s argument that his initial statement suggested recklessness, finding it inconsistent with the nature of the wounds and the circumstances of the stabbing. The Court emphasized that jury instructions should not invite the jury to compromise or return an unwarranted verdict. Quoting People v. Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 369-370 (1980), the court stated that “if, on the whole record, there is not some identifiable, rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime, then the lesser included offense may not be submitted”. The court found no such rational basis here.

  • People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012): Entitlement to Intoxication Charge in Criminal Cases

    People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012)

    A defendant is entitled to an intoxication charge only when there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable person to doubt whether the defendant formed the required intent due to intoxication; self-serving statements and the mere smell of alcohol are typically insufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and burglary. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for an intoxication charge, claiming he was too drunk to form the necessary intent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence presented by the defendant—his own self-serving statements and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath—was insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions, such as cutting a screen, instructing the victim to be quiet, and stealing her phone, indicated purposeful behavior inconsistent with a lack of intent due to intoxication.

    Facts

    The victim returned home, charged her cell phone, and fell asleep. She was awakened by the defendant, who was lying next to her and smelled of alcohol. The defendant choked and raped her, threw a blanket over her head, and fled. The victim’s cell phone was missing. Police found cuts in the porch screen of the victim’s apartment. Ten days later, during questioning about another incident, the defendant was asked about the rape. A search warrant of defendant’s apartment revealed the victim’s cell phone hidden in the ceiling. Defendant gave a written statement claiming he had an alcohol problem and remembered knocking on the victim’s window but did not admit to the rape, claiming he fell asleep on the couch and fled when the woman screamed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to establish his entitlement to an intoxication charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge based on the evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s self-serving statements about his intoxication and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath were insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge, especially in light of the evidence showing the defendant’s purposeful actions during the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while intoxication is not a defense, evidence of intoxication is admissible to negate an element of the crime. An intoxication charge is required when “there is sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to [an] element … on that basis” (People v. Perry, 61 N.Y.2d 849, 850 (1984). To meet this threshold, the defendant must present corroborating evidence beyond bare assertions, such as the number of drinks, the time frame of consumption, the lapse of time, whether alcohol was consumed on an empty stomach, the alcohol content of the drinks, and the specific impact of the alcohol on behavior or mental state (People v. Gaines, 83 N.Y.2d 925, 927 (1994).

    The Court found the defendant’s statements about his intoxication were insufficient. The Court also noted that the defendant’s actions showed a purposeful intention. "[H]e cut a hole in a screen to gain entry, instructed the victim to be quiet, threw a blanket over her head, and stole her cell phone so she could not call the police. Given this evidence, the court correctly ruled an intoxication charge was not warranted." Thus, the evidence did not allow a reasonable juror to doubt the element of intent based on intoxication. The Court cited People v. Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d 744, 745 (2011), for the proposition that bare assertions of intoxication are insufficient to warrant the charge.

  • Horn v. New York Methodist Hospital, 22 N.Y.3d 952 (2013): Jury Instructions and Burden of Proof in Medical Malpractice

    Horn v. New York Methodist Hospital, 22 N.Y.3d 952 (2013)

    In a medical malpractice action, a jury charge, when taken as a whole, must not improperly alter the causation standard or reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proof; specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a trial court’s jury instructions in a medical malpractice case improperly reduced the plaintiff’s burden of proof regarding causation. The plaintiff, Marguerite Horn, suffered injuries due to a perforated esophagus during an intubation procedure. The defendants argued that the jury charge on the “loss-of-chance” theory lowered the burden of proof. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the jury charge, viewed in its entirety, properly conveyed the standard of causation and the plaintiff’s burden to prove the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.

    Facts

    Marguerite Horn, an 83-year-old woman, was rushed to the hospital after being found unresponsive. Dr. Martin, the emergency room physician, attempted to intubate her. During these attempts, Dr. Martin inserted the tube into Horn’s esophagus and observed subcutaneous emphysema. It was later discovered that Horn’s esophagus had been perforated during the intubation. Surgical repair failed, leaving Horn unable to eat or drink orally for the remaining three years of her life, requiring a feeding tube and constant care from her husband.

    Procedural History

    The jury found Dr. Martin solely liable and awarded the plaintiffs $1,000,000.00 ($500,000 for the decedent’s pain and suffering, and $500,000 for the husband’s loss of consortium). The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict, but reduced the loss of consortium damages to $200,000. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court’s jury instructions improperly reduced the plaintiffs’ burden of proof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court improperly reduced the plaintiff’s burden of proof by instructing the jury that the defendants’ actions may be considered a cause of the injuries if the defendants’ actions or omissions deprived the decedent of a substantial possibility of avoiding the consequences of having a permanent feeding tube?

    Holding

    No, because the jury charge, when taken as a whole, properly instructed the jury on the plaintiffs’ burden of proof and the proper standard for causation in a medical malpractice case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendants’ challenge to the loss-of-chance theory of liability was not properly preserved because the defendants did not specifically argue against the theory itself at trial, but rather argued that the facts of the case did not support the charge. Addressing the preserved argument regarding the burden of proof, the court emphasized that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The court noted that the trial court explicitly instructed the jury on the plaintiffs’ burden of proof and recited the proximate cause charge directly from the Pattern Jury Instructions (PJI). Specifically, the court cited the PJI language: “An act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. That is, if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury.” The Court concluded that, considering the jury charge in its entirety, there was no improper alteration of the causation standard or reduction of the plaintiff’s burden of proof. The Court reasoned that a proper jury charge, viewed as a whole, provides sufficient guidance to the jury, even if isolated portions might be subject to criticism.

  • Caldwell v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 20 N.Y.3d 365 (2013): Admissibility of Fact Witness Testimony When Paid Excessively

    20 N.Y.3d 365 (2013)

    Testimony from a subpoenaed fact witness who receives a fee disproportionately exceeding the statutory minimum is generally admissible; however, the trial court may need to instruct the jury about potential bias if the fee is excessive and unexplained.

    Summary

    Caldwell sued Cablevision Systems Corp. for negligence after she tripped and fell in a trench created during cable installation. CSI, Cablevision’s contractor, subpoenaed the emergency room physician who initially treated Caldwell, to testify that she stated she tripped over her dog. The physician testified consistently with his records. Caldwell’s counsel revealed the physician was paid $10,000 by CSI for his appearance. The court provided a general bias charge but not a specific one related to the doctor’s payment. The jury found CSI negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals held the testimony was admissible, but a specific jury instruction regarding potential bias should have been given. However, the error was deemed harmless.

    Facts

    In September 2006, CSI, contracted by Cablevision, installed fiber-optic cable, cutting trenches and test pits along Benefield Boulevard. On October 11, 2006, Caldwell, a resident, tripped and fell while walking her dog, allegedly due to a “dip in the trench.” She claimed injuries from the fall. CSI subpoenaed the emergency room physician who treated Caldwell to testify about his consultation note stating Caldwell “tripped over a dog.” The physician testified confirming his note, and admitted being paid $10,000 by CSI for his appearance.

    Procedural History

    Caldwell sued CSI for negligence. At the trial level, the Supreme Court denied Caldwell’s motion to set aside the jury verdict finding CSI negligent but not the cause of the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that while the payment to the doctor did not warrant excluding his testimony, the Supreme Court erred by not adequately charging the jury regarding the credibility of a paid fact witness, but deemed the error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a subpoenaed fact witness, who receives a fee alleged to be disproportionately in excess of CPLR 8001 (a)’s mandatory fee requirement for attendance at trial, is inadmissible as a matter of law, and whether the trial court erred by not giving a specific jury instruction regarding the potential bias of the paid fact witness.

    Holding

    No, the testimony is generally admissible, but a specific jury instruction should have been given regarding potential bias, because the payment was substantial and unexplained, but the failure to do so was harmless error under the circumstances of this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged concerns about the substantial payment to the fact witness, noting such payments could create an implication that the testimony was bought or influenced. While CPLR 8001(a) sets a minimum witness fee, it doesn’t authorize unlimited payments. The Court referred to precedent stating, “To procure the testimony of witnesses it is often necessary to pay the actual expenses of a witness in attending court and a reasonable compensation for the time lost.” The Court cited Rules of Professional Conduct, permitting “reasonable compensation…for the loss of time.” The Court emphasized the prohibition against paying a fact witness contingent on favorable testimony or the litigation’s outcome. The Court determined, although a more specific jury charge should have been given, Supreme Court’s failure to issue one in this case was harmless. The dispute underlying the doctor’s testimony was not whether he fabricated the contents of the consultation note. In other words, the substance of the doctor’s testimony was such that the jury’s assessment was only tangentially related to the doctor’s credibility. Thus, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010): Reversible Error for Failing to Define ‘Deprive’ and ‘Appropriate’ in Larceny Cases

    People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010)

    In larceny-related crimes, a trial court’s failure to provide the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” to the jury, when those terms are essential to understanding larcenous intent, constitutes reversible error if it creates a likelihood of confusion and prejudices the defendant.

    Summary

    Medina, a DEA informant, was convicted of first-degree robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury expressed confusion about the meaning of intent. The trial court had not provided the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate,” which are components of larcenous intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to define these terms was reversible error because the jury’s notes showed they struggled with the concept of intent, and the omission created a likelihood of confusion regarding whether Medina intended to permanently deprive the victim of property.

    Facts

    Medina, a paid DEA informant, participated in an unauthorized break-in at Jose Oleaga’s home. During the incident, Medina took Pena’s cell phone. Pena and Oleaga later claimed several thousand dollars were missing. Medina was arrested and told police conflicting stories, initially claiming he was trying to stop a robbery, then admitting he was offered money to participate. He implicated others, including Nelson Guerrero, whom he had previously informed on.

    Procedural History

    Medina was indicted on multiple counts, including first-degree robbery. He was convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with the statutory definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive,” which forms part of the definition of larcenous intent, is reversible error.

    Holding

    Yes, because the omission of the definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive” did not adequately convey the meaning of intent to the jury and instead created a great likelihood of confusion such that the degree of precision required for a jury charge was not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the failure to define “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error. The Court emphasized that, based on prior precedent (People v. Blacknall), omission of these definitions “could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constituted larceny.” The court highlighted that the concepts of “deprive” and “appropriate” are essential to defining larcenous intent because they “ ‘connote a purpose … to exert permanent or virtually permanent control over the property taken, or to cause permanent or virtually permanent loss to the owner of the possession and use thereof’ ” (quoting People v. Jennings). The court found that the jury’s notes during deliberations indicated confusion about intent, demonstrating that the omission was not harmless. The court explicitly stated: “in this case, no such speculation is necessary as the jury’s confusion concerning the concept of intent is evident from its own messages to the court during deliberations. Taken together with the facts underlying the conviction in this case, we find that the jury notes provide a clear basis for our conclusion that the court’s failure to define ‘appropriate’ and/or ‘deprive’ was not harmless.” The court noted that it is critical that the jury understands whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the victims of their property. Because of this failure, the court reversed the conviction.

  • People v. Williams, 16 N.Y.3d 480 (2011): Addressing Inconsistent Verdicts and Jury Instructions

    16 N.Y.3d 480 (2011)

    When a jury returns a verdict that is inconsistent with the court’s instructions, the court is obligated to explain the defect and direct the jury to reconsider, and is not required to provide prior notice to counsel of its intended response.

    Summary

    Williams was convicted of second-degree murder (transferred intent), attempted second-degree murder, and weapon possession. The convictions stemmed from a shooting at a dance club. The jury initially returned an inconsistent verdict, acquitting Williams of intentional murder but convicting him of attempted murder. The trial court, without notifying counsel beforehand, explained the inconsistencies and directed the jury to reconsider. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted properly under CPL 310.50(2), as the court was responding to a defective verdict, not a jury request for further instruction under CPL 310.30. Thus, prior notice to counsel was not required.

    Facts

    Williams was indicted on multiple charges, including murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, assault, and weapon possession, relating to a shooting at a dance club where a woman was killed and a man wounded. The prosecution argued that the male victim was the intended target, and the woman was killed accidentally. During deliberations, the jury initially acquitted Williams of second-degree murder (both depraved indifference and transferred intent) but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter and attempted second-degree murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the initial verdict inconsistent and instructed the jury to reconsider. After further deliberations and an Allen charge, the jury returned a second verdict, which the court also found deficient. Eventually, the jury reached a third verdict, convicting Williams of second-degree murder (transferred intent), attempted second-degree murder, and weapon possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by not providing notice to defense counsel before responding to the jury’s initial inconsistent verdict, in violation of CPL 310.30.
    2. Whether the trial court improperly directed the jury foreperson to complete the verdict sheet in open court, thereby causing the jury to deliberate in public.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 310.50(2), which governs responses to inconsistent verdicts, does not require prior notice to counsel, unlike CPL 310.30, which applies to jury requests for further instruction.
    2. No, because the court’s direction to the foreperson amounted to a ministerial act and did not violate the principle of secret jury deliberations, especially since the counts in question resulted in acquittals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 310.30 applies only when the jury requests further instruction or information, whereas CPL 310.50(2) applies when the jury returns a verdict that is inconsistent with the court’s instructions. The Court emphasized that the Legislature deliberately omitted the notice requirement from CPL 310.50(2), indicating a conscious choice not to require notice in cases of inconsistent verdicts. The court stated, “CPL 310.30 applies to specific ‘request[s]’ by the jury ‘for further instruction or information’…whereas CPL 310.50 (2) applies when a jury ‘renders a verdict which in form is not in accordance with the court’s instructions or which is otherwise legally defective.’” The Court also found that directing the jury foreperson to complete the verdict sheet was a ministerial act, as CPL 310.50(3) converts any incomplete counts into acquittals, and thus did not constitute improper public deliberation. The court stated, “We hold that the performance of the instant ministerial act was not violative of the rule requiring jurors to deliberate in secret outside the courtroom.”